Iraqi PM orders draft law to restrict weapons to state
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi ordered the preparation of a draft law Tuesday to restrict weapons to the state, the Iraqi News Agency reported, one day after Iran's IRGC Quds Force chief met Tehran-backed militia leaders in Baghdad.
Zaidi said “the most serious threat to the state is the proliferation of weapons,” adding that it “undermines the rule of law and weakens the authority of security institutions.”
In his Monday trip, IRGC Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani met leaders of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, armed factions and the Coordination Framework in Baghdad and discussed weapons restrictions, Al Hadath reported, citing sources.
Iranian security forces shot protester Farid Ramezani during the January protests in Tehran, then targeted his Pahlavi crown tattoo as he lay wounded before killing him with a shot to the forehead, a source familiar with the case told Iran International.
Ramezani, 29, was shot on the evening of Jan. 8 in Tehran's Ariashahr neighborhood, said the source who could not be named for fear of retribution from Iranian authorities.
Ramezani was among hundreds of thousands of protesters who took to the streets of Tehran on Jan. 8 as nationwide demonstrations against the Islamic Republic intensified.
A video obtained by Vahid Online from Ariashahr that same night shows security forces opening a barrage of gunfire on protesters, with repeated shots heard as people scream and run from the scene.
On that night, security forces fired three bullets at Ramezani in total: the first brought Ramezani to the ground, the second was fired at the finger bearing the crown tattoo, and the third struck his forehead and killed him, according to the source.
After his death, Ramezani's family came under intense pressure from security agencies, the source said. Authorities demanded money from the family for the three bullets used to kill him, describing the payment as a “bullet fee,” and withheld his body for about two weeks.
Security agencies also barred the family from burying him in Tehran. His body was transferred to Hashjin in Khalkhal county, in the northwestern province of Ardabil, where he was buried.
The source said security forces imposed tight restrictions on the funeral, preventing a public ceremony and barring the display of Iran’s pre-1979 Lion and Sun flag, a symbol widely used by opponents of the Islamic Republic, at the burial site.
The Pahlavi crown tattooed on his finger is associated with the monarchy which ruled Iran before the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979.
Monarchist and other symbols associated with pre-1979 Iran have increasingly appeared among opponents of the clerical establishment.
The targeting of Ramezani's tattoo is not the first such case reported during the January protests. Last month, Iran International reported that security agents used a blade and box cutter to cut away skin and flesh bearing tattoos of Reza Shah Pahlavi and an imperial crown from the arm of 21-year-old protester Amirhossein Nobakht Pardasti before later killing him with a gunshot, according to sources close to his family.
Similar cases have also been documented during earlier protest movements.
One of the best-known was Majidreza Rahnavard, a protester executed in Mashhad in December 2022, following the Woman, Life, Freedom protests.
Rahnavard had a Lion and Sun emblem tattooed on his left forearm. Images released after his arrest showed the arm badly injured and immobilized in a cast and bandages.
A person close to Rahnavard told Iran International that security agents repeatedly struck the tattooed arm with batons and stun guns because of the emblem, eventually breaking it.
An Islamic Republic supporter holds a photo of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei during a state-run rally. / Photo by IRNA
Iran's unseen supreme leader has issued his first military decrees, raising a central question about the emerging order under Mojtaba Khamenei: is he tightening his grip on power, or relying on the old security establishment to shore up his authority?
The six decrees named Ali Abdollahi chief of staff of the armed forces, with Kioumars Heydari as his deputy; Ahmad Vahidi commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guards, with Mostafa Izadi as his deputy; Ali Azmaei commander of the Guards' navy; and Hossein Taeb, the feared former intelligence chief of the Guards, head of the Basij.
Separately, Mohsen Rezaei, the former Guards commander named Khamenei's military adviser in March, became secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and the leader's representative on the body.
The appointments put veterans of the Guards, intelligence services and Iran-Iraq war generation across the upper reaches of the security establishment. But rather than marking a wholesale changing of the guard, they draw heavily on figures who built their careers under Ali Khamenei — leaving open whether the new supreme leader is imposing his authority on the system or assembling an experienced security bloc whose support he needs to exercise it.
Khamenei's directives suggest the changes are not simply about personnel. In his appointment decree for Vahidi, he called for strengthening the force's capabilities for “maximum deterrence” and maintaining readiness to carry out “powerful offensive operations against the enemy.”
Lawmaker Ebrahim Rezaei described the appointments as “basically an indication of the fact that the Islamic Republic is moving toward a more offensive military structure.”
War commanders move to the top
The clearest sign that Khamenei may be changing how the military is run, rather than merely replacing its commanders, lies in the elevation of Abdollahi and Heydari from the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters to the two highest positions in the Armed Forces General Staff.
The General Staff is Iran's highest military coordinating body, while Khatam Central Headquarters has a more operational wartime role, coordinating military activity across different branches.
There has been no confirmed announcement that the two bodies have formally merged, but pro-establishment commentator Mohammad-Sadegh Alizadeh said the appointments confirmed a process of centralizing Iran's military command.
“The merger of Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters and the Armed Forces General Staff means concentrating the country's wartime, military and offensive activities,” he wrote on X, adding that Abdollahi's decree explicitly tasked him with completing the process.
Abdollahi previously served as coordination deputy of the General Staff and deputy commander of Iran's police. Heydari commanded the regular Army Ground Forces for more than seven years before moving into Khatam's command structure in late 2025.
Heydari's appointment also preserves a senior regular Army presence near the top of a leadership heavily populated by Revolutionary Guards veterans, suggesting that greater centralization does not necessarily amount to straightforward IRGC domination of the command structure.
Taeb’s return puts domestic security in focus
If the Abdollahi and Heydari appointments point to tighter wartime command, Taeb's return to the Basij reveals the domestic-security side of Khamenei's emerging structure.
Taeb commanded the Basij during the unrest following Iran's disputed 2009 presidential election and later spent more than a decade heading the IRGC Intelligence Organization before his removal in 2022.
Khamenei's decree calls for strengthening what it describes as the Basij's “popular intelligence network,” drawing attention to the surveillance and internal-security component of Taeb's mandate.
New York-based journalist and Middle East writer Séamus Malekafzali said Taeb's return was particularly significant given his intelligence background.
“Taeb spent 13 years after leaving the Basij as the head of IRGC intelligence,” he wrote on X on August 10. Referring to Khamenei's directive for a “grassroots confrontation with enemy threats,” he added that it “certainly sounds like making sure the January protests never happen again.”
Taeb has also long been identified with Mojtaba Khamenei's security network. When he was removed as IRGC intelligence chief in 2022, Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, described the move as “an earthquake in Iran's intelligence community,” noting his close relationship with both Ali Khamenei and his son.
His return therefore restores a longtime Khamenei confidant to command of an organization embedded across universities, workplaces, neighborhoods and state institutions, and which has played a central role in surveillance, political mobilization and the suppression of protests.
Journalist Morteza Kazemian linked the appointment to worsening economic conditions and public discontent, arguing that Taeb had become one of Khamenei's trusted instruments of security and governance and that the Basij under his command was intended to embody the leadership's “iron fist.”
Rezaei comeback underscores reliance on old guard
If Taeb's return highlights Khamenei's reliance on trusted security figures, Rezaei's comeback makes the generational continuity harder to miss.
Rezaei commanded the Revolutionary Guards from 1981 to 1997, including through most of the Iran-Iraq war, before moving into politics and holding a succession of senior state positions.
He later served at the Expediency Council, repeatedly ran for president and became vice president for economic affairs under Ebrahim Raisi. Khamenei appointed him military adviser in March before naming him secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and his representative on the body less than five months later.
Journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi questioned why Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr had been replaced by Rezaei and what substantive change the appointment was intended to bring.
“What does the appointment of Mohsen Rezaei in place of Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council mean, and what change is it supposed to bring to the way this position operates?” he wrote on X.
Some Iranian social-media users responded with mockery, reviving jokes surrounding Rezaei's repeated presidential campaigns and decades-long circulation through senior state positions.
The criticism reflected one of the broader themes surrounding the reshuffle: that Khamenei's first major appointments have elevated not a new generation of officials, but men who have occupied the Islamic Republic's military and political establishment for decades.
Vahidi promotion highlights hardline continuity
Vahidi's promotion adds another dimension to that continuity: the elevation of a commander whose record spans Iran's external military operations and domestic repression.
Vahidi had served as acting Guards commander following Mohammad Pakpour's death during the war with the United States and Israel. Khamenei formally installed him as commander and promoted him to major general.
He previously held senior roles in the Quds Force and served as defense minister under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and interior minister under Ebrahim Raisi.
Argentine prosecutors have sought Vahidi in connection with the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people. Iran denies involvement.
Israel's foreign ministry focused its response to the reshuffle on Vahidi and Rezaei, linking both men to allegations surrounding the AMIA case and accusing Tehran of elevating figures associated with attacks abroad.
“The Iranian regime worships terror, rewards its architects and promotes them to the highest levels of power,” the ministry said on X.
The United States has also sanctioned Vahidi over his role as interior minister during the suppression of protests following Mahsa Amini's death in custody in 2022.
But the wartime record of Vahidi, Abdollahi and Taeb also complicates the idea that their elevation simply represents Khamenei extending his personal control over the security apparatus.
President Masoud Pezeshkian accused Vahidi and Abdollahi of taking unilateral military actions that undermined efforts to secure a ceasefire, Iran International reported in April. The report also described a heated confrontation involving Taeb.
All three men now occupy senior positions in the military-security structure under Khamenei, raising the possibility that the new leader has elevated figures whose institutional power was already considerable before he formally appointed them.
Khamenei’s first imprint on security establishment
Several major international outlets interpreted the reshuffle as an early indication of how Khamenei intends to shape the security establishment after succeeding his father.
The Wall Street Journal portrayed the appointments as Khamenei putting his stamp on the national-security system and signaling a tougher approach toward Washington.
“Iran's mysterious ruler signals a hard line on Trump with new leadership,” the newspaper wrote.
The Financial Times focused on the promotion of loyalists and the possibility that Rezaei's return could point toward a harder line on the United States, while Reuters described Rezaei as a close ally of Khamenei and highlighted his recent opposition to extending a ceasefire and his skepticism toward negotiations with Washington.
Those readings emphasize Khamenei's role in choosing the new hierarchy. But the identities of the men he chose point just as strongly to continuity with the security establishment inherited from his father.
Iran International analysts had raised that tension even before the latest decrees.
The deaths of Ali Khamenei and other senior officials created a leadership gap in which his successor was still working to consolidate his position, Kazemian said in May.
After the appointments were announced, journalist Kamyar Behrang argued that the death of Ali Khamenei, who had served as the system's final arbiter, had given the Revolutionary Guards greater room to shape the political order that followed him.
The appointments can therefore be read in both directions. Khamenei is placing his own stamp on the military and security hierarchy, centralizing command and restoring trusted figures to key posts.
But he is doing so largely through men formed under his father's rule — veteran commanders and intelligence officials whose institutional weight may be as important to his authority as their loyalty to him.
The first map of power under Mojtaba Khamenei is taking shape. What remains unclear is whether these men are primarily instruments of his control, or the establishment on which that control depends.
Rising living costs have forced many Iranians to give up cafes and restaurants, turning a once-routine form of leisure into an expense increasingly squeezed out by rent, food and healthcare, messages to Iran International say.
“Cafe and restaurant outings are a form of recreation and something people look forward to, but inflation and rising costs have deprived many people even of that,” one audience member wrote.
Responses to an Iran International question about monthly cafe spending ranged from zero to hundreds of millions of rials. For many respondents, however, “nothing” and “zero” were the recurring answers.
When essentials leave Iranians nothing for a coffee
Several people said they had not visited a cafe or restaurant for months or years because rent, utility bills, medical care, food and debt payments had taken priority.
“How much do we earn in this inflation for anything to be left for recreation? We work from morning until night and can only pay the rent,” one person wrote.
Another said even buying enough food had become difficult.
A cup of coffee sits on a table inside a café in Iran.
“We are trying to be able to provide two meals a day. Going to a cafe has become completely out of reach for us,” the respondent wrote.
Healthcare expenses featured repeatedly in the messages. One person said a root canal on August 10 cost 120 million rials ($65), leaving no money for leisure or cafe visits.
Many Iranian workers earn around 200 million to 250 million rials ($108-$134) a month. The rial trades at around 1.86 million to the dollar on the free market.
Another, a retired education worker, said even one restaurant or cafe visit a year was unaffordable.
“I pay for medicine and doctors in installments,” the retiree wrote.
Others described a gradual erosion of living standards rather than a sudden end to leisure spending. One said the family had gone to cafes or restaurants around three times a month until relatively recently but was now buying basic necessities on credit.
“Expenses such as cafes and restaurants, recreation and travel disappeared a long time ago, and only essential costs such as healthcare, food, rent and installments remain,” another person wrote.
Some said even those essentials were becoming increasingly difficult to afford.
“We have become dependent on money for our daily bread. Where would we find money for cafes or eating out? Buying fruit has become a dream for us,” one person wrote.
Another said the family had been unable to afford recreation or leisure activities for about one or two years and believed much of society was focused primarily on getting by.
A simple cafe order costs millions of rials
Prices listed by cafes on SnappFood application show how quickly even relatively simple orders can add up.
An Americano at cafes reviewed by Iran International started at about 1.1 million rials ($0.59) and reached roughly 3.8 million rials ($2.04) at some establishments. Espresso prices exceeded 3 million rials ($1.61) in some cases.
Breakfast dishes started at around 2 million rials ($1.08) at some cafes, while options including omelets or bread, cheese and herbs could cost more than 4 million rials ($2.15).
One said two drinks and a slice of cake for two people now cost about 12 million rials ($6.45).
Another calculated that buying only a morning espresso every day would cost 60 million to 70 million rials ($32-$38) a month.
Prices vary substantially by city, neighborhood and establishment, but several cafe visits each week can push monthly spending into tens of millions of rials.
Millions spent to preserve a social life
Not everyone has stopped going. Some said they deliberately continued setting aside money for cafes despite rising costs, describing the outings as one of their remaining opportunities for socializing and escaping daily pressures.
Monthly spending among this group commonly ranged from 50 million to 100 million rials ($27-$54), according to figures respondents provided, with some putting their spending at 150 million to 200 million rials ($81-$108) or as much as 300 million rials ($161).
“Every day I buy a shot of coffee and a small bottle of water from a cafe, and maybe a vitamin C drink. I calculated that it comes to around 50 million rials ($27) a month,” one person wrote.
Another said they visited cafes at least 20 times a month.
The spending does not necessarily reflect financial comfort, according to some of the messages. Citizens described paying for cafes as a way to preserve a fragment of ordinary social life despite the squeeze on household budgets.
One person estimated that under current prices, even a relatively frugal young person could face monthly expenses of 150 million to 300 million rials ($81-$161), rising to between 400 million and 700 million rials ($215-$376) with greater spending, whether on cafes or other necessities.
Cafe owners squeezed by debt and closures
Cafe owners and workers who contacted Iran International described the other side of the contraction in discretionary spending: fewer customers alongside rising operating costs and debt.
People gather at a busy café in Tehran, Iran.
One respondent from Khuzestan said debt had forced them out of business.
“I have been unemployed for two months because of debt, I lost my cafe, my bank installments are overdue and there is nothing I can do,” the person wrote.
Businesses also face closures linked to enforcement of Iran's mandatory hijab rules. Another pointed to cafes being sealed in Qazvin over compliance with the dress code.
For many, cafe outings have therefore become another measure of shrinking household choices: eliminated altogether by some families and maintained at considerable cost by others seeking a few hours of social life outside the pressures of everyday expenses.
Germany's embassy in Tehran remains on emergency operations because of the security situation in Iran, with its visa section closed to regular visitors and no regular visa appointments being issued, the German Foreign Office told Iran International on Tuesday.
National visa applications from people who have already appeared at the embassy or its external service provider will continue to be processed within the embassy's available capacity, the ministry said. Visas that are ready to be issued will also be handed out at the embassy in Tehran where capacity allows.
"Due to the current security situation in Iran, the embassy and, in particular, the consular and visa section in Tehran continue to operate in emergency mode," the ministry told Iran International. "The visa section is closed to regular visitors until further notice; no regular visa appointments are being issued."
The ministry said the current crisis had worsened an already difficult situation, as the embassy's visa section had been operating with severe technical and staffing limits since events in Iran in June 2025.
It said it was continuing efforts to expand capacity for accepting visa applications from Iran.
Germany has also created separate arrangements for Iranian nationals living in Iran who are seeking visas for family reunification.
Applicants who previously registered on the German embassy's appointment waiting list and have not canceled their registration are being contacted to submit applications in Istanbul through the International Organization for Migration's Family Assistance Programme, the ministry told Iran International.
Priority is being given to applicants whose previously scheduled appointments at the German embassy in Tehran were canceled because of the military conflict in Iran. Appointments will then be offered in chronological order based on the original registrations.
Visa service provider TLScontact is also issuing new appointments to some applicants with preliminary approval under Germany's fast-track procedure for skilled workers.
This applies to eligible applicants who were on the service provider's waiting list as of Jan. 18 or whose appointments were canceled after the embassy closed from Jan. 16.
Since July 15, applicants in several national visa categories, including students and doctors, who were not previously on a waiting list have also been able to register on new waiting lists. It is not yet clear when appointments will be offered to those applicants.
Workers at the Hashuni mine, part of the Kerman Coal Mines Company, in southern Iran.
Workers across Iran’s mining, industrial and municipal sectors say they have gone months without full pay, while some employers have also cut staff, deepening pressure on households already struggling with rising living costs.
Messages sent to Iran International describe wage arrears ranging from several weeks to eight months at mining operations in different parts of the country. Iran International could not independently verify the accounts.
The wife of an employee at the Sanghan iron ore mine in Khaf, northeastern Iran, said her husband, who has worked there for 24 years, had not received a salary for three months despite receiving his work statement through late June.
Workers at the Chah Firouzeh copper mine in Kerman province were still waiting for their June wages, according to another message.
At Gol Gohar in Sirjan, also in Kerman, workers had gone eight months without pay and some employees had been dismissed without receiving wages owed to them, another message said.
Similar complaints have emerged from major industrial companies.
Employees at MAPNA Locomotive in Karaj, west of Tehran, have gone four months without full wages, according to information received by Iran International.
One employee said workers received just 20% of their salary last month and that the payment problems began during the 40-day war and have continued since. Staff are reluctant to protest because they fear layoffs and are already under severe financial pressure, the employee said.
Contract employees at Iran Air have also reported reduced and delayed pay since the war. One employee said salaries had not returned to previous levels even after the company’s revenues recovered, adding that workers who complained risked losing their jobs.
In Sari, a northern city near the Caspian Sea, another source told Iran International that municipal employees and workers had gone three months without pay.
“We really don’t know where to turn,” the source said.
Household pressure
The wage problems come amid broader economic strains acknowledged by senior Iranian officials.
Central Bank Governor Abdolnasser Hemmati said Friday there was “no doubt that Iran’s economy faces serious problems,” adding that war and economic pressure had worsened inflation and unemployment. He rejected, however, suggestions that the economy faced an “imminent collapse.”
Even for workers receiving their wages, earnings increasingly fall short of basic living costs.
The semi-official ILNA news agency reported that many households exhaust their salaries before the middle of the month, forcing them to rely on installment plans and credit for routine expenses.
Majid Rahmati, a member of Tehran’s Coordination Council of Islamic Labor Councils, said in May that the minimum monthly household living basket had risen to around 70 million tomans, while married workers were receiving roughly 24 million tomans a month.
Iran’s statutory base minimum wage is around 16.6 million tomans a month before benefits, according to a Labor Ministry wage directive reported by the Tasnim news agency.
For those waiting months to be paid, the problem is compounded by what workers describe as a lack of effective recourse.
Some employees told Iran International they feared layoffs if they protested over unpaid wages, while others said complaints to labor authorities had failed to produce results.
