All Mojtaba's men: Old guard shapes Iran’s new order

Pezeshkian inherited years of accumulated economic problems, many created or left unresolved by previous administrations, before war deepened those structural weaknesses.

Two recent assessments of his record suggest the result is something larger than the difficulties of one presidency: the ambitions of government itself are contracting from development toward survival.

“Pezeshkian thinks the nation should thank him only because there is no famine in Iran yet,” said Nasrallah Pejmanfar, an ultraconservative cleric and lawmaker from Shiraz.

Pejmanfar intended the remark as an attack. But it echoed a more substantive criticism offered by sociologist Hamzeh Nozari in the moderate daily Shargh: that merely preventing extreme deprivation is increasingly becoming a measure of government success.

From development to survival

Nozari focused on the government’s emphasis on protecting “people’s livelihood” through subsidies, electronic coupons and efforts to secure basic goods.

Such policies may prevent extreme poverty, he argued, but they also reveal how far the ambitions of government have narrowed.

“Providing a minimal living and securing a hand-to-mouth existence is the ruling paradigm of the government, while concepts like welfare, progress and development are sidelined,” Nozari wrote.

He contrasted the current approach with previous periods when Iranian governments, however successfully, pursued broader ambitions: economic expansion in the late 1980s, greater political openness in the 1990s and redistribution in the following decade.

The question, he argued, is whether this “livelihood paradigm” is a temporary response to war and economic emergency or a more permanent retreat from development.

The economics of scarcity

Economist Teymour Rahmani, writing in Donya-ye Eghtesad, approached the same crisis from a different direction.

For Rahmani, the central problem is inflation, driven above all by a severe fiscal imbalance as government revenues decline while large and inefficient expenditures continue.

He rejected the common explanation that the falling rial is itself responsible for accelerating inflation. Currency depreciation and rising prices, he argued, are symptoms of the same underlying fiscal problem.

“The fact that inflationary force manifests first through the exchange-rate channel and that exchange-rate increases precede inflation spikes does not mean currency depreciation is the root cause,” he wrote.

The consequences are increasingly visible across the country. Rahmani pointed to point-to-point inflation of 112.4 percent in the western province of Ilam, with other poorer provinces including Lorestan, Kurdistan and Hormozgan also experiencing triple-digit inflation.

He argued that Iran has entered an inflationary environment unlike any in its modern history, while crediting experienced civil servants and residual public confidence in the monetary system with helping prevent a slide into full hyperinflation.

“We must understand that inflation is the primary issue of the Iranian economy,” Rahmani wrote, warning that the underlying fiscal imbalance must be addressed.

Administering scarcity

The two analyses approach Pezeshkian’s predicament from different directions but arrive at closely related conclusions.

Nozari describes the consequence: a government whose conception of success increasingly revolves around maintaining minimum living standards. Rahmani describes the economic machinery pushing it there: fiscal imbalance, declining revenues and inflation severe enough to overwhelm household purchasing power.

Neither problem began with Pezeshkian. He inherited years of accumulated economic weakness, while war and sanctions have sharply worsened the conditions under which his government operates.

But two years into his presidency, the distinction between emergency measures and a longer-term transformation is becoming harder to make.

A government occupied with keeping food affordable, financing subsidies and preventing inflation from becoming still more destructive has increasingly little room to pursue the growth, welfare and development promised in its economic plans.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Monday that Iran had no reason to fear that the so-called Mecca Pact was directed against it, portraying the agreement instead as a response to Israeli ambitions and declining regional confidence in US security guarantees.

Seyed Abdollah Motavalian, a hardline commentator writing in the IRGC-affiliated Javan newspaper, similarly described the pact as having “considerable propaganda potential” but facing serious obstacles to becoming a strategic alliance.

He warned Tehran against making hasty decisions, particularly in negotiations with Washington, “based on fear of an alliance that has not yet taken shape amid propaganda hype.”

“Tehran’s strategic skill would be not to allow a political document, before it is tested against reality, to become an imaginary power in the calculations of decision-makers,” Motavalian wrote. “The first defeat in this arena may come not on the battlefield, but in the mind.”

Other Iranian commentary has emphasized the differing interests of the three countries and questioned whether Pakistan or Turkey would be willing to become directly involved in Saudi Arabia’s conflicts.

Their commitments, one analysis in Javan argued, may ultimately be limited to advisory support, weapons sales and joint exercises.

A retreat from Washington?

Iranian officials and state-affiliated media have also sought to interpret the agreement as evidence of Saudi Arabia’s frustration with Washington, particularly over what they describe as inadequate US protection against recent missile and drone attacks.

Tasnim, which is affiliated with the IRGC, argued that repeated attacks and Washington’s inability to contain the threat had pushed Riyadh to diversify its security relationships and reduce its reliance on the United States.

From Tehran’s perspective, that could carry potential benefits. A security architecture less dependent on Washington could weaken the United States’ traditionally dominant role in the region while creating additional complications for Israel.

The pact could also give Riyadh greater leverage in seeking stronger security guarantees from Washington, Iranian analysts said.

Pakistan or Turkey?

The involvement of Pakistan and Turkey nevertheless raises more complicated questions for Tehran.

Pakistan is a nuclear-armed power on Iran’s eastern border and has played an important role mediating between Tehran and Washington during the recent conflict.

Iranian commentators seeking to minimize the threat point out that Islamabad did not act against Iran during the 40-day Iran-US war despite its existing defense relationship with Saudi Arabia, instead helping mediate between the two sides.

Motavalian described Pakistan’s participation as part of “a multilayered deal and an increase in bargaining power,” rather than evidence of “the formation of a coherent war front.”

Turkey may present a different challenge.

Kamran Karami, a Persian Gulf security analyst writing for Donya-e Eqtesad, argued that Ankara’s participation could ultimately prove more consequential for Iran than Pakistan’s.

“For Iran, this development sends a clear message: Turkey is becoming one of the main poles of the Middle East’s new security architecture,” he wrote. Competition between Tehran and Ankara, he added, could gradually expand beyond economics and politics to “the design of the regional order.”

Others see Pakistan as the greater concern precisely because of its recent role as an intermediary with Washington. Tohid Javadi, a Middle East researcher, argued that turning a mediator into a rival security actor could complicate that relationship.

The possibility that other countries, including Egypt, could eventually join the arrangement has added to speculation that it might develop into a broader regional bloc.

Risks of underestimating pact

Not all Iranian commentary accepts the reassuring interpretation.

Asr-e Iran warned that dismissing the agreement as political theater could prove a mistake if it gradually develops military and security mechanisms capable of changing the regional balance.

Saudi Arabia brings financial resources, Pakistan military strength and nuclear capability, and Turkey one of the region’s most powerful armed forces, alongside considerable military experience and geopolitical reach.

Together, Asr-e Iran argued, they could eventually create a deterrent capable of limiting the room for maneuver of other regional powers, including Iran.

Fararu offered a similar warning, arguing that the significance of the pact is greater because it comes after a major Iran-US war whose underlying disputes remain unresolved.

The immediate purpose of such an alliance, it argued, need not be fighting a war. Its significance lies in changing the calculation before one begins.

“If Tehran, or any other actor, knows that an attack on Saudi Arabia could trigger a response from Turkey and Pakistan as well, the cost-benefit calculation of an attack changes,” the analysis said.

“In simple terms, the pact seeks to create a new equation: an attack on Saudi Arabia is no longer just an attack on Saudi Arabia.”

The latest move came Monday, when parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee approved a provision banning the transit of assets and equipment owned by the United States, Israel and other countries Tehran “hostile,” committee spokesperson Valiollah Bayati said, according to parliament’s official news agency ICANA.

The restriction was among the first five articles approved as lawmakers began a detailed review of the proposed “Strategic Action to Ensure the Sustainable Security of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.”

Representatives from Iran’s Foreign Ministry, armed forces and parliament’s Research Center attended the meeting.

Bayati said the measure was adopted because the countries concerned had used the strait to carry out what he described as hostile actions and attacks against Iran. The remaining articles will be considered at future meetings.

Other provisions under consideration include tighter rules for vessels linked to countries Tehran regards as hostile and charges for maritime services provided to ships using the strait, lawmaker Sodeif Badri said Sunday.

Revenue would be directed toward security, monitoring and development infrastructure.

Badri said parliament was seeking a long-term legal framework for Iran’s management of Hormuz rather than relying on temporary policies, adding that the strait would not return to its pre-war conditions.

The legislation has not yet become law, and the provisions being considered by committees would still require parliamentary approval.

Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, which is leading the review, approved the bill’s general outlines Sunday without opposition among members present, spokesperson Hassan Ghashghavi said.

The Construction Committee has also backed the outlines, while the Internal Affairs and Councils Committee is reviewing parts of the legislation.

The parliamentary effort has gathered momentum since the war, with lawmakers increasingly presenting control of the strait as a strategic lever in Iran’s confrontation with the United States.

The legislation was formally submitted to parliament on July 13. A day later, Ebrahim Azizi, chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said lawmakers were standing firmly by their “red lines,” particularly over management of Hormuz.

“This is the first step,” Azizi wrote on social media, adding that further measures would “take sleep from the eyes of our enemies.”

By late July, 12 proposals had been referred to Azizi’s committee for consolidation into a single bill, according to parliament’s presiding-board spokesperson Abbas Goudarzi. Nine dealt directly with Hormuz and three proposed changes to Iran’s maritime zones law.

The proposals cover restrictions on navigation, penalties for violations and potential revenues from Iran’s management of the strait, suggesting lawmakers are seeking to turn wartime control of Hormuz into a more permanent legal framework.

In his decree, Khamenei instructed Taeb to “strengthen the popular intelligence network,” improve training and skills and make greater use of new technologies for what he described as a “people-based” response to enemy threats.

The directive places intelligence gathering prominently among Taeb’s responsibilities at the Basij, whose branches extend through neighborhoods, universities, workplaces and other parts of Iranian society.

With Taeb’s appointment, Khamenei is returning a figure closely associated with the suppression of dissent and protests to a leading role in one of the Islamic Republic’s main domestic security and mobilization organizations.

Taeb previously commanded the Basij during the unrest surrounding the disputed 2009 presidential election, when the force played a major role in suppressing demonstrations.

Taeb’s career has been centered on Iran’s security and intelligence establishment for more than four decades.

Born in Tehran in 1963, the cleric joined the Revolutionary Guards in 1982 and served in IRGC units in Tehran, Qom and Khorasan before moving into the Intelligence Ministry, where he rose to a senior management position.

He also served in counterintelligence at the ministry and later headed the IRGC’s own intelligence protection apparatus.

Return to Basij

His Monday appointment brings him back to an organization he previously led.

Taeb, a longtime ally of Mojtaba Khamenei, was appointed commander of the Basij Resistance Force in 2008, before becoming head of the newly established IRGC Intelligence Organization in October 2009, shortly after the mass protests that followed that year’s presidential election.

He went on to lead IRGC Intelligence for more than a decade, making him one of the most influential figures in the Islamic Republic’s internal security apparatus. The organization grew during his tenure into a powerful intelligence body operating alongside the Intelligence Ministry and became heavily involved in cases concerning political activists, journalists, dual nationals and alleged espionage.

Khamenei’s decree also ordered Taeb to broaden the Basij’s reach under the slogan “Every Iranian, a Basiji,” expand neighborhood and sector-based units, deepen cooperation with state institutions and develop social-service networks centered on mosques. He was also tasked with promoting the Basij model of “popular resistance” abroad.

Taeb replaces Gholamreza Soleimani, who was killed in the US-Israeli war earlier this year.

Ali Abdollahi was appointed chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, while former Army Ground Forces commander Kioumars Heydari was named his deputy.

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Khamenei also formally appointed Ahmad Vahidi as commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and promoted him to the rank of major general. Mostafa Izadi, the former commander of the Cyber and New Threats Headquarters of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, was named deputy commander-in-chief of the IRGC.

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Rear Admiral Ali Azmaei was formally appointed commander of the IRGC Navy, while Hossein Taeb, the powerful former head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization, was named commander of the Basij paramilitary force.

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The decrees formally confirm the positions of Vahidi and Azmaei, who had already been publicly presented as commanders of the IRGC and its navy respectively without published appointment orders from Khamenei.

Vahidi had been introduced as IRGC chief after Mohammad Pakpour was killed earlier this year, while Azmaei emerged publicly as the Guards’ naval commander in July following the killing of Alireza Tangsiri.

The decrees settle some of the most consequential vacancies created by US-Israeli strikes since the war began on February 28. Abdollahi replaces Abdolrahim Mousavi, who was killed alongside Pakpour and Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh in strikes on the opening day of the war.

Abdollahi had been serving as commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the joint operational command responsible for coordinating Iran’s armed forces in wartime.

He emerged as one of Tehran’s most visible military commanders during the conflict, repeatedly issuing warnings to the United States and Israel and overseeing a command central to Iran’s missile operations and its use of the Strait of Hormuz as military leverage.

In his Monday decree, Khamenei ordered the completion of a process to integrate the Armed Forces General Staff with the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, Iran’s top operational military command, as he appointed Abdollahi chief of staff.

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  Mojtaba Khamenei orders integration of Iran’s top military command bodies

Taeb’s return to power

Perhaps the most politically notable appointment is Taeb’s return to command of the Basij, the IRGC’s sprawling paramilitary arm which has played a central role in suppressing domestic protests.

Taeb previously headed the Basij before spending more than a decade at the helm of the IRGC Intelligence Organization. He was removed from that intelligence post in 2022 after a series of security breaches and operations inside Iran attributed to Israel.

Taeb nevertheless remained close to the center of power. He is known as part of the older intelligence-security network surrounding Mojtaba Khamenei, and during the current war he has been involved in high-level political and security deliberations, including disputes over negotiations with the United States.

His appointment to the Basij therefore returns one of the Islamic Republic’s most prominent intelligence and security figures to a major operational position at a time when the leadership remains concerned about both external attack and renewed domestic unrest.

Despite Monday’s sweeping announcement, important gaps remain.

Remaining gaps

Neither of the IRGC’s two principal intelligence bodies has a publicly announced permanent chief. Majid Khademi, who headed the IRGC Intelligence Organization and was also serving as head of its Intelligence Protection Organization, was killed in an April 6 strike in Tehran.

The two bodies perform distinct but complementary roles: the Intelligence Organization focuses heavily on political-security operations and domestic repression, while Intelligence Protection is responsible for counterintelligence, loyalty and preventing infiltration within the Guards.

No permanent replacement has also been publicly announced for Gholamreza Rezaeian, the head of the police Intelligence Organization, who was killed in the opening US-Israeli strikes.

Two other sensitive posts within the Armed Forces General Staff have lacked publicly announced permanent successors for more than a year. Gholamreza Mehrabi, the deputy chief of staff for intelligence, and Mehdi Rabbani, the deputy chief for operations, were killed in Israeli strikes during the June 2025 war.

Cabinet-level vacancies

The military reshuffle also does not resolve two major cabinet-level vacancies created by the current war.

The Defense Ministry remains under acting minister Majid Ebn al-Reza, whom Pezeshkian appointed after Nasirzadeh was killed on February 28. He has continued to represent the ministry in official meetings and international contacts but has not been nominated as permanent defense minister.

The Intelligence Ministry has likewise had no permanent minister since Esmail Khatib was killed in March. Pezeshkian’s office said shortly after his death that an acting minister had been appointed but declined to identify the person, promising that the name would be disclosed later.

No identity has subsequently been made public. Iran International earlier reported that Pezeshkian’s efforts to appoint a permanent intelligence minister had run into resistance from Vahidi and the IRGC leadership.

Those two posts follow a different process from the military commands announced Monday. Although appointments to sensitive ministries such as intelligence and defense are in practice coordinated with and require the approval of the Supreme Leader, they are cabinet positions and cannot simply be filled through a commander-in-chief’s decree.

Under Article 133 of Iran’s constitution, ministers are appointed by the president and must be presented to parliament for a vote of confidence.