44% in Iran International poll would not buy home in Iran

Khabaraneha, run by Iranian political activist Mehdi Mahmoudian, said Branch 1 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court issued the initial verdicts against 16 people detained in connection with the protests that began in late December 2025.

Those sentenced to death are Taraneh Rahimi, Navid Elyasi, Mehrdad Boeri, Abolfazl Dadgostar, Armin Gholami, Mehdi Mansouri, Ahmadreza Saeedi, Mohammadmehdi Asadi, Parsa Jafari and Mehdi Jafari, also known as Mehdi Khosravi.

Romina Rahimi and Milad Boeri were each sentenced to 25 years in prison, while Hamed Mehralian received a 15-year term. Setayesh Saedi, Sajjad Abedi and Ali Boeri were each sentenced to five years, Khabaraneha reported.

In addition, all 16 defendants were sentenced to five years for “assembly and collusion,” five years for “incitement” and one year for “propaganda against the establishment,” according to the report.

The case has become known as the “Isfahan Shohada Square” case and stems from protests in the area during the January uprising.

Khabaraneha said one of the female defendants was assaulted while in detention and filed a complaint over the incident, but that the court issued its verdict without examining the complaint.

Ahmadreza Saeedi also told judges during the trial that he had been tortured during interrogation, the channel reported. Khabaraneha said there had previously been reports of restrictions on lawyers’ access to the case file and of defendants being tortured to extract confessions.

Radio Farda reported in July that the case was connected to the deaths of Abbas Kamrani, a 37-year-old Revolutionary Guards colonel, and another person described in case documents as “homeless.” It said the 16 defendants mostly worked around Shohada Street in Isfahan.

Exiled prince urges international action

The office of Iran’s exiled prince Reza Pahlavi condemned the verdicts on Sunday, calling them “brutal and unjust” and saying they reflected an intensifying crackdown by the Islamic Republic.

Pahlavi’s communications office alleged that defendants had been denied legal representation and subjected to severe torture, including sexual violence against female detainees, to extract forced confessions.

“The world cannot stay silent in the face of these atrocities,” the office said.

The verdicts come amid a wave of death sentences against protesters in Isfahan. In a separate case known as the Alikhani Square case, Iranian authorities have executed five defendants since July.

Ghaem Hosseini was executed on Aug. 20, Abolfazl Sepahi Badjani and Amirhossein Safari Hosseinabadi on July 28, and Golmohammad Mohammadi and Erfan Esfandiari on July 19. The July 28 executions were carried out publicly in Alikhani Square.

Police identified the detainee only by the initials “A.L.” and described the person as one of the leaders of a network of financial intermediaries, known in Iran as “trustees,” used to transfer export revenues outside the formal banking system.

Authorities said the suspect had received foreign currency proceeds from exports over several years but failed to meet obligations to the banking system. The individual had gone on the run before being located and arrested by economic security police and sent to prison.

Majidreza Hariri of the Iran-China Chamber of Commerce said on X that the detainee had served as secretary of the Iranian Association of Money Changers, a description that may point to Ahmad Lavasani, a former head of the group.

Iran’s central bank dissolved the Association of Money Changers in 2023, citing what it called violations and deviation from its objectives.

So-called trustees became increasingly important as sanctions restricted Iranian banks’ access to the international financial system. Individuals or companies with bank accounts or financial links abroad have been used to receive oil revenues, pay for imports and transfer foreign currency outside formal banking channels.

Zabihollah Khodaeian, head of Iran’s General Inspection Organization, told state broadcaster IRIB in July that some trustees had “betrayed” the country and that one intermediary had failed to return $200 million before leaving Iran.

The Tehran-based Sazandegi newspaper reported at the time that at least 15 trustees had become unreachable while holding billions of dollars in Iranian oil revenues, according to Hariri.

Sazandegi said the judiciary had opened 59 cases involving managers of trustee companies and issued prosecution orders in 43 of them. Authorities were also seeking Interpol Red Notices for 15 trustees who had fled.

Details about trustees’ identities, contracts, fees, financial guarantees and oversight are generally not made public.

Separately, an Iran International investigation found that relatives of some of Iran’s most powerful security figures, including the son of Mohsen Rezaei, were among nine people linked to an oil-sales network that sources said failed to return about $11 billion in proceeds to Iran.

“Are Trump’s sanctions targeting the Iranian people or Islamic Republic officials? We are looking for a way to escape this situation, but it seems all the doors of the world have been closed to us,” one citizen wrote.

Iran International asked its audience to share their experiences of barriers to studying abroad after new sanctions led to restrictions affecting international language tests for Iranians.

An analysis of responses on Instagram showed that the cost of studying and moving abroad, compounded by the falling value of Iran’s currency, and the cancellation of international language tests were the most frequently cited concerns.

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, indefinitely suspended General License G on August 24 as part of the Trump administration’s latest campaign to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic.

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The license had since 2014 provided the legal basis for US universities, testing companies and other American entities to offer a range of educational services to Iranian people.

The Duolingo English Test subsequently announced that it would stop providing services from September 1 to people residing in Iran and holders of Iranian identification documents.

Rising costs narrow options

Financial pressures were the most common concern raised in responses to Iran International.

Respondents cited the rising cost of foreign currency, language tests, university applications, tuition, airline tickets and exit bonds as major obstacles to pursuing education overseas.

“With the euro at 2,400,000 rials, visas not being issued to Iranians, war and rising prices, the very high cost of exit bonds, terrible airline ticket prices, internet problems and language tests are all barriers to migration for us in Iran,” one respondent wrote.

Another described being caught between the expense of leaving Iran and the cost of remaining.

“We are imprisoned in Iran. We have neither the money to leave Iran nor the money to live in it,” the respondent wrote.

Some respondents also pointed to rising living expenses after reaching their destination countries, adding another financial hurdle even for those able to secure admission and leave Iran.

Years of preparation disrupted

The suspension or restriction of international language tests was the second major theme to emerge from the messages.

Some respondents said they had switched to TOEFL or the Duolingo English Test after IELTS became unavailable at various periods in Iran, only to see those alternatives restricted as well.

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“After several years of studying for TOEFL, getting a high GPA and working to build a good résumé, I was one step away from taking TOEFL, and now the test is no longer being held,” one respondent wrote.

Another said the cancellation of a TOEFL exam was announced on the morning it was due to take place, after years of preparation and with an embassy appointment approaching.

The Duolingo English Test, launched in 2016, has become an alternative to TOEFL and IELTS for some Iranian applicants. The online test can be taken from home and costs less than some other international English proficiency exams.

Several respondents said the latest restrictions showed how sanctions were affecting ordinary Iranians seeking academic opportunities abroad.

“Why should ordinary people be targeted by sanctions? People in Iran are not allowed to take TOEFL and Duolingo tests inside Iran; they are not even allowed to escape this country,” one respondent wrote.

Iranian passport adds to barriers

Some identified their Iranian nationality and passport as another obstacle to academic opportunities abroad.

They described university positions being closed to Iranian applicants or applications being rejected without what they considered serious consideration of their academic records.

“I think the first problem for many people in Iran who want to migrate is the financial cost, followed by the barriers to being accepted as an Iranian,” one respondent wrote.

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  Iran sanctions reach education: Duolingo blocked, TOEFL and GRE in doubt

Another pointed to lengthy security screening of Iranian applicants at embassies, saying delays can prevent students from reaching universities in time to begin their programs.

Internet disruptions cost opportunities

Internet restrictions inside Iran were another recurring concern in the messages, particularly because applications depend on access to university websites, email and international financial services.

One said Iran’s internet was cut off on January 8, a day after an admissions interview with a university in Britain.

The respondent said two weeks without access to email or the university’s website ultimately resulted in the loss of the study opportunity.

“The fact that a teenager sets out on a route where there is a risk of being shot, a mine explosion or an accident, either to help their family or cover school and living expenses, should be a serious warning to society,” labor activist Abdollah Belvasi told ILNA. “A child should be sitting at a school desk, not on a kolbari route.”

Poverty and unstable household incomes are increasingly affecting children in families living along Iran’s borders, Belvasi said.

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  Kurdish border couriers face snow, heavy loads, and death for $10

A shortage of jobs has also left many young people, including university graduates and accomplished athletes, facing a choice between kolbari, with its risk of death, or migration away from their homes and families, according to Belvasi.

Unemployment and a lack of prospects have prompted many young people in Kordestan to consider leaving their cities or even Iran, Belvasi added.

Economic pressures deepen

Iran has faced years of high inflation, a weakening currency and unemployment, eroding purchasing power and making basic living costs increasingly difficult for many households.

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Residents of some border communities have turned to kolbari to earn a living. Kolbars typically carry heavy loads on foot across difficult mountainous terrain, and some have been killed in shootings by Iranian security forces or died in accidents and mine explosions.

The growing gap between wages and living costs, reduced working hours and skilled workers moving into informal employment have highlighted the depth of Iran’s employment problems in recent weeks.

Hormozgan Workers’ House said on Friday that around 20,000 workers had lost their jobs because of an economic slowdown and business closures.

Kolbar deaths risk becoming routine

Deaths among kolbars are gradually being treated as routine news, receiving attention and prompting protests for several days before fading from public discussion, Belvasi warned.

“When a kolbar is killed, a family suffers,” he said. “A breadwinner may be lost, children may be left without a father, or a family may have to contend with medical expenses and disability. If we see kolbari only in terms of numbers and statistics, we ignore the human dimension of the tragedy.”

Government promises have failed to address the underlying conditions driving people into the work, Belvasi went on to say.

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  Deadly Toll Rises For Kolbars In Iran's Western Border Regions

“The issue of kolbari cannot be solved simply by confronting the kolbar,” Belvasi added. “If the main causes – poverty, unemployment and the lack of stable job opportunities –are not addressed, the issue will emerge again. The root causes must be addressed.”

Discrimination, uneven development and a lack of employment opportunities remain fundamental problems in Iran’s border regions despite their economic, human and natural resources, according to Belvasi.

The significance of closer US-Venezuela energy cooperation lies not only in the scale of Venezuela’s oil reserves, but also in the complementary qualities of the two countries’ crude — and in what international capital, technology and access to Western markets could mean for an oil industry weakened by years of isolation.

Most US shale crude is light and sweet, while Venezuela’s Merey 16 is an extra-heavy, high-sulfur grade. A technical estimate suggests that a blend of roughly 60% light US crude and 40% Venezuelan Merey 16 could produce a crude with an API gravity of around 31 to 32 degrees and sulfur content of roughly 1.5%, depending on the specific US grade used.

Those characteristics are close to Russia’s Urals, a medium-sour crude with an API gravity of around 31 degrees and sulfur content of about 1.4%. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Urals was one of the main feedstocks for European refineries.

The United States could therefore potentially offer European refiners three options: its own light crude, Venezuelan heavy crude for plants capable of processing it, and tailored blends suited to refineries that previously relied heavily on Russian medium-sour crude. Complex US Gulf Coast refineries could also process Venezuela’s heavy oil and export diesel, jet fuel and other refined products needed by Europe.

The United States is already the European Union’s largest supplier of petroleum oil, accounting for 17.8% of EU petroleum-oil imports in the first quarter of 2026.

It is still too early, however, to speak of US-Venezuelan dominance of the European market. Venezuela currently produces around 1.25 million barrels per day, while rebuilding its electricity network, pipelines, processing facilities, refineries and ports will require tens of billions of dollars in investment and several years.

In the short term, the agreement is therefore more significant as a political and psychological signal to the market. In the medium term, if it results in substantially higher Venezuelan production, it could increase Atlantic Basin oil supplies, further reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian and some Middle Eastern crude, redirect some Venezuelan oil from China toward Western markets, and put additional pressure on OPEC+’s ability to manage the market.

A potential model for Iran

For Iranians, however, Venezuela may carry a broader message. Like Venezuela, Iran possesses enormous oil and gas reserves, but its energy industry faces deep problems after years of sanctions, insufficient investment, aging infrastructure, limited access to advanced technology, declining pressure in some mature fields and the constraints under which many projects were developed during the sanctions era.

If the Islamic Republic were to fall, followed by a stable political transition and the establishment of a government capable of maintaining normal and constructive relations with the United States, Europe and the global economy, Iran’s oil and gas industry could become one of the main engines of the country’s economic reconstruction.

Under such conditions, the entry of major international companies, including US oil producers and oilfield-services firms, could provide the capital, technology and managerial expertise needed to rehabilitate wells, pipelines, processing facilities, refineries, ports and Iran’s export infrastructure.

American companies have extensive experience in advanced drilling, reservoir management, enhanced oil recovery, rehabilitating low-output wells, processing heavy and sour crude and designing crude blends tailored to refinery requirements. The same basic logic that makes light US crude a useful complement to Venezuela’s extra-heavy oil could also be applied to the marketing and optimization of some Iranian crude grades.

Iran, of course, has its own broad range of light, medium and heavy crudes as well as condensates. The main opportunity would therefore not simply be to import US light crude for blending, but to use Western technology, capital and commercial networks to develop competitive export blends and regain access to global markets.

The return of established American and European companies could also create an opportunity for an independent assessment of projects carried out during the sanctions era, including those undertaken by domestic and Chinese contractors, and for facilities and equipment to be upgraded or replaced where necessary.

Such a transformation could increase Iran’s production capacity, reduce energy waste and the flaring of associated gas, improve environmental standards and create substantial direct and indirect employment.

None of this, however, would happen automatically or immediately after a change of government. The lifting of sanctions, legal protection for investors, transparent oil contracts, efforts to combat corruption, an independent judiciary and political stability would all be prerequisites for attracting investment on the required scale.

Oil revenues would also need to be managed through transparent mechanisms and directed toward rebuilding the country, its infrastructure, education, healthcare and public welfare, avoiding a repeat of Iran’s historic overdependence on oil.

The US-Venezuela partnership therefore matters to Iran for more than the possibility that a blend of light American and extra-heavy Venezuelan crude could emerge as a serious competitor to Russian Urals in parts of the European market.

The more important lesson is that vast hydrocarbon reserves can regain economic value when accompanied by investment, technology and access to international markets. Iran’s oil and gas resources could still underpin a new period of economic growth if a stable and transparent government with constructive international relations emerges after the Islamic Republic.

Cooperation with American and other major international companies could then help rebuild Iran’s aging energy industry and restore the country as a significant and reliable player in the global energy market.