Ignore prices and economy is fine, Iran ex-minister says

Recipients described repeated delays of several weeks and said banks and Social Security offices had provided little clarity over when the money would arrive, as inflation above 70% and the rial’s steep decline further squeeze household finances.

“Unemployment benefits are our only lifeline. I’m struggling to cover expenses for myself, my spouse and children,” one recipient said. “Every day the money doesn’t arrive, we’re left with an empty table and a sense of shame.”

Payments ‘weeks late’

Several recipients reported recurring delays of 20 to 25 days, while others said they had gone without benefits for as long as two months.

One person whose payment was more than a month overdue said people depended on the modest allowances to put food on the table and service debts.

The person said Bank Melli and Refah Bank had refused to accept responsibility for the delay, while the Social Security Organization said it had issued the payment check and the matter was now in the banks’ hands.

Another recipient reported a 25-day delay in receiving a monthly allowance of 160 million rials, saying Branch 15 of the Social Security Organization routinely made late payments.

A person with 22 years of employment history who had been unemployed for six months said the organization’s Shemiran branch in northern Tehran had failed to pay their benefits.

Others described receiving vague promises from local offices.

“The payment was supposed to arrive by the 15th of the month, but there’s been nothing. Some branches told us to wait until the 30th because it might be paid then,” one person said.

Under Iranian law, workers who involuntarily lose their jobs may qualify for unemployment benefits if they meet employment and insurance requirements.

For many recipients, the payments are their primary source of income while looking for work.

Social Security under strain

The delays come amid wider concerns about the finances of the Social Security Organization (SSO), Iran’s main social insurance institution responsible for unemployment benefits and pensions.

SSO chief Mostafa Salari said on July 27 that the organization faced a monthly pension shortfall of at least 170 trillion rials even if it collected all current insurance contributions. He put its debt to the central bank at 750 trillion rials.

Pensioners have also protested over delayed payments in recent months. On Sept. 20, retirees gathered in Tehran, Ahvaz, Rasht, Shush and Kermanshah to demand outstanding payments, including delayed pension adjustments.

The complaints come alongside broader reports of unpaid wages and insurance contributions across Iran.

Iran International reported last month that workers in several sectors, including factories and healthcare facilities, were facing delayed salaries and insurance contributions.

Workers laid off from Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas have also reported unpaid wages and difficulties accessing unemployment benefits.

For those waiting for payments, however, the immediate problem is making ends meet.

“They haven’t deposited my unemployment benefits. I have countless loan repayments and debts, and I’m desperate,” one recipient said. “Social Security treats us so badly, as though we’re the ones who owe them money.”

The speech appears to have been delivered in late April or May 2025, shortly before the 12-day war with Israel.

Zarif argued that the balance of power had changed and that nuclear weapons no longer provided effective deterrence, pointing to Israel's experience and the collapse of the Soviet Union to argue that possessing them neither prevented attack nor guaranteed a state's survival.

He dismissed acquiring an atomic bomb as “the paradigm promoted by a few ignorant demagogues.”

More than a year and two wars later, the remarks collide with a growing hardline argument that Tehran's failure to possess a nuclear weapon deprived it of the deterrent that might have prevented those attacks.

The video's renewed circulation has therefore fed directly into a growing debate over whether the wars vindicated Zarif's skepticism about military deterrence or proved his critics right.

Calls for a change in nuclear doctrine

Some officials and media outlets have openly raised the possibility of changing the country's nuclear doctrine.

Hassan Ghashghavi, a member of parliament, claimed in recent days that support for such a change was growing among the public, experts and officials.

The conservative newspaper Vatan-e Emrooz put the issue prominently on its front page Monday with the headline “Iran Should Build a Bomb.”

An accompanying report argued that Iran should develop a “deterrent” nuclear weapon to prevent future attacks by Israel and the United States.

The argument contrasts sharply with Zarif's contention that nuclear weapons cannot guarantee security and that Iran should place greater emphasis on diplomacy and economic cooperation.

Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, told Khabar Online on Tuesday that threats from Israel and the United States could strengthen arguments inside Iran for acquiring a bomb.

Journalist Seyed Sadegh Hosseini, writing on Sadegh Media, defended Zarif's argument, saying attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities and the assassinations of its nuclear scientists had demonstrated the failure of the assumption that uranium enrichment and stockpiling nuclear material would deter attacks or force Washington to make concessions.

Hardliners turn on Zarif

The video's renewed circulation has also prompted attacks on Zarif at pro-government and pro-war gatherings in several parts of Iran, including Isfahan and Borujerd, where demonstrators chanted slogans against him and former president Hassan Rouhani.

In Isfahan, protesters called Zarif a “spy” and an American “mercenary.”

The conservative newspaper Kayhan also attacked Zarif in an article titled “Mr Zarif! Why do you carry out a suicide operation whenever America is in trouble?!”

Kayhan accused the former foreign minister of making statements at sensitive moments that damaged Iran's national security capabilities and gave its adversaries “an opportunity to breathe.”

It also criticized Zarif's record in the negotiations that produced the 2015 nuclear agreement, accusing him of seeking to “whitewash the enemy and blame our own side.”

Two visions of Iranian power

But Zarif's speech went beyond the question of whether Iran should possess a nuclear weapon, challenging the security-oriented approach that has shaped much of the Islamic Republic's regional policy.

He drew a distinction between what he called a “threat-oriented” and an “opportunity-oriented” view of Iran's neighbors, arguing that Tehran's conception of the region determined the kind of relationship it built with surrounding states.

“If Iran's view of the region is threat-oriented, its ambassador should be a representative of the Quds Force. If its view is opportunity-oriented, the ambassador should be chosen from among businesspeople and diplomats,” Zarif said.

He argued that the dominance of security considerations in foreign policy had prevented Iran from taking full advantage of economic relations with neighboring countries.

“Why are our ambassadors in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq representatives of the Quds Force?” he asked. “Because we see them as threats.”

Zarif's critics say the wars demonstrated the danger of entering a confrontation without the ultimate deterrent and strengthened the case for greater military capability. His argument points in the opposite direction, that Iran has placed too much faith in military deterrence and treated economic ties and diplomacy as secondary sources of national power.

More than a year after he made it, that argument is being tested against a reality Zarif could not then have known.

Iran was subsequently attacked by both Israel and the United States, and the question of what might have prevented those attacks has become one of the most consequential debates in Tehran.

Farmers described having to pay cash for seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, labor, irrigation and other costs while waiting for the government to settle payments for wheat already delivered.

A farmer in the Sanjabi area of the western province of Kermanshah told Iran International that the delays were making it increasingly difficult to cover essential expenses.

"Most of my farming expenses have to be paid in cash, while the government pays us our own money in installments," the farmer said.

Another farmer in western Iran said inflation and the rial's depreciation meant that delayed payments were worth considerably less by the time they arrived.

"By the time they pay us everything they owe for our wheat, gold and dollar prices and inflation will have multiplied, and the value of our money will have fallen sharply. Which official cares about the difference?" the farmer told Iran International.

Even when farmers eventually receive the full amount originally agreed, the money may buy considerably less than it would have when they delivered their crop.

Between 10% and 30% of payments owed to wheat farmers remain outstanding in different provinces, according to Ghadam Borbor, deputy head of Iran's National Wheat Foundation.

Rial depreciation cuts dollar value of wheat payments by 36%

Earlier this year, the government set its guaranteed wheat purchase price for the previous agricultural year at between 475 million and 495 million rials per metric ton, depending on the type and quality of the crop.

At the time, the dollar traded at 1,663,700 rials on the open market, making the highest guaranteed price equivalent to approximately $298 per ton.

At the current open-market rate of about 2.615 million rials to the dollar, that same 495 million-rial payment is worth about $189, a decline of roughly 36%.

The figures illustrate how the depreciation of the rial has reduced the dollar value of farmers' earnings while the government's nominal debt has remained unchanged.

The actual loss of purchasing power depends on changes in domestic prices and agricultural production costs, but farmers say they are increasingly unable to afford supplies needed for the next harvest.

Billions owed as government cites administrative delays

Borbor said the new 1405–1406 agricultural year (2026–2027) had begun without a guaranteed wheat purchase price and with preparations for autumn planting still incomplete.

Iran's government says it has settled most of its debts to wheat farmers but has not announced a deadline for paying the remainder.

According to figures released by the Targeted Subsidies Organization, the government body responsible for administering subsidy payments, on October 9, approximately 3,920 trillion rials ($1.50 billion at the current open-market rate) of the 4,100 trillion rials ($1.57 billion) owed to wheat farmers had been paid.

That left about 180 trillion rials ($69 million) outstanding.

Hassan Norouzi, head of the organization, said some payments were being held up by discrepancies between its records and those of the Ministry of Agriculture.

He said the remaining payments depended on correcting information in the government's administrative system.

For farmers who need the money for autumn planting, that means continuing to cover new production costs while government agencies resolve the discrepancies.

The Ministry of Agriculture has set wheat seed prices at between 720,000 and 756,000 rials ($0.28–$0.29) per kilogram, at least 45% above the highest guaranteed government purchase price of 495,000 rials ($0.19) per kilogram for harvested wheat.

Although seeds prepared for planting differ from ordinary harvested wheat, the price difference illustrates the financial burden facing farmers as they prepare for the new season.

A farmer in Nourabad told Iran International that the situation was becoming increasingly difficult.

"We have to buy seeds with cash, even though the government owes us money. Under these circumstances, what motivation is left to continue?" the farmer said.

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Farmers turn to middlemen for immediate payment

The payment delays have prompted some farmers to sell their wheat to middlemen at prices below the government's guaranteed purchase rate.

Peyman Alemi, head of Iran's Chamber of Agricultural Guilds, said farmers urgently needing cash were selling wheat to intermediaries for between 380,000 and 440,000 rials ($0.15–$0.17) per kilogram.

That compares with the government's highest guaranteed purchase price of 495,000 rials ($0.19) per kilogram.

The difference means farmers accepting lower prices for immediate payment are sacrificing part of their potential income to cover mounting expenses.

Alemi warned that continued delays could discourage farmers from selling wheat to the government and potentially reduce domestic production in the next agricultural year.

Lower government purchases or falling domestic wheat output could complicate efforts to maintain strategic wheat reserves and increase reliance on imports, particularly as the rial's depreciation raises the cost of purchasing grain from abroad.

Bread prices climb despite unpaid farmers

The payment delays also come as bread prices rise across Iran, adding to the financial pressure on households.

Under the latest officially approved prices in Tehran, a loaf of sangak, a traditional Iranian flatbread, costs 155,000 rials (about $0.06), while barbari bread costs 100,000 rials (about $0.04).

Prices are considerably higher at bakeries operating outside the subsidized pricing system.

A review of prices recorded in October showed some varieties of sangak selling for as much as 500,000 rials ($0.19) in Tehran and 400,000 rials ($0.15) in the northeastern city of Mashhad.

The increases mean consumers are paying more for bread while some farmers who produced the wheat are still waiting for their earnings.

However, the current rise in bread prices cannot be directly attributed to delayed government payments, and the potential effects on future wheat production and imports have yet to materialize.

New planting season begins without guaranteed prices

Farmers face further uncertainty because the government has yet to announce the guaranteed purchase price for wheat from the current agricultural year.

The lack of a confirmed price makes it harder for farmers to calculate expected income and decide how much they can afford to spend on the new crop.

Many are therefore beginning the new planting season with part of the money for their previous harvest still unpaid, production costs that must largely be met in cash and no certainty over what the government will pay for their next crop.

Even if the government settles all outstanding payments, farmers may not recover the purchasing power lost during months of delays or the opportunities missed to buy agricultural supplies earlier.

Their previous wheat harvest has already been delivered to government storage facilities, but some producers are still waiting to be paid.

Agricultural officials warn that continued delays could undermine farmers' willingness to plant wheat or sell it to the government, potentially creating further challenges for Iran's domestic wheat supply.

The divergence is particularly striking after the International Monetary Fund on Tuesday forecast Iran's economy would contract 7.6% in 2026, far more sharply than the 0.3% decline expected across the Middle East and Central Asia.

Against that backdrop, the strength of Tehran's stock market raises a question: are investors betting that the worst is approaching an end, or simply running out of places to protect their money?

Recent analyses in Iranian media offer competing explanations, ranging from expectations of an Iran-US agreement to the immediate pressures of dwindling foreign currency and energy shortages.

Dollars in short supply

Iran's oil exports have effectively stopped under the US blockade, while non-oil exports including steel and petrochemicals have also fallen. Delays in repatriating export earnings have further restricted the supply of hard currency.

Fararu identifies dwindling foreign-exchange inflows, energy shortages and uncertainty as the three principal pressures on the economy. Khabar Online puts the currency shortage at the center of its analysis, pointing to a 35,000-toman rise in the free-market dollar over the past month.

The widening gap between official and market exchange rates has added to volatility, while businesses dependent on imported machinery and raw materials face higher costs and tighter access to foreign currency.

Energy shortages are compounding those problems. Years of underinvestment have left Iran struggling to meet domestic demand, while wartime damage to infrastructure has added pressure on production.

Hovering over both is uncertainty about what comes next. The economic consequences of renewed fighting would differ dramatically from those of a negotiated settlement, making long-term investment all but impossible and pushing businesses and households toward assets that can preserve value.

Why are stocks rising?

That makes the performance of Tehran's stock market more striking.

Rouydad24 interprets its wartime strength as a sign that investors increasingly expect an Iran-US agreement. On that reading, equities are looking beyond present economic conditions toward possible de-escalation, sanctions relief and improved access to international markets.

But there is another explanation that requires no assumption that investors know where negotiations are heading: they may simply have nowhere better to go.

With the rial losing value, foreign currency increasingly scarce, property relatively illiquid and bank deposits losing purchasing power to inflation, domestic equities can become attractive even when confidence in the underlying economy is weak.

A rising stock market, in other words, may say less about optimism over Iran's economic prospects than about the scarcity of alternatives for preserving wealth.

That would also help reconcile what otherwise appear to be conflicting signals. The currency market reflects immediate scarcity and fear of further deterioration, while stocks may reflect either hopes for political relief or an effort to escape the declining value of cash.

Different markets, different futures

The IMF's latest forecast represents another substantial downgrade from the 5.4% contraction it expected as recently as July. Iranian government data has meanwhile shown GDP contracting 10% year-on-year in the spring, with the downturn extending beyond the oil sector.

For businesses and investors, much now depends on which of two very different futures emerges: renewed conflict and prolonged restrictions on oil exports, or de-escalation that begins restoring access to foreign currency and international trade.

Iran's markets may therefore be pricing different risks rather than delivering contradictory verdicts. The currency market reflects a shortage that already exists. The stock market may be looking toward political relief or reflecting the capital having nowhere else to go.

Esmail Qaani, commander of the IRGC’s overseas arm, recently appointed Mojtaba Hagh-Lesan to lead the unit previously known as Unit 840, the sources said.

Hagh-Lesan, 64, previously headed the unit’s intelligence department. He replaces Yazdan Mir, also known as Haj Asghar Bagheri, who was killed in a targeted Israeli strike on April 6.

The unit had been without a commander since Mir’s killing, the sources said. Hagh-Lesan’s appointment puts an existing senior member in charge of a formation linked to plots against Iranian dissidents, journalists, former US officials and Israeli targets abroad.

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The sources provided Iran International with the unit’s latest command chart, identifying its leadership and the officials responsible for operations across several regions.

Command structure revealed

According to the chart, Mohammad-Reza Ansari serves as Hagh-Lesan’s deputy and oversees the Israel portfolio.

Mohsen Boroujeni heads special operations for the United States and Europe, while Morteza Babaei leads the department responsible for the Middle East and Africa. Javad Sharfaei oversees special operations in Asia.

The chart identifies Meysam Sahraei as an operative involved in preparing attacks in Africa and India. It also names Gholamhossein Hosseini and Mohammad Hosseinpour as prominent operatives involved in the department’s activities.

The sources said the reliance on existing personnel reflected a crisis in the command structure following the killing of senior IRGC officers. They said it had also raised doubts among Quds Force members about the organization’s effectiveness.

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Hagh-Lesan’s published work includes two articles in Strategic Studies, a journal published by the Expediency Council’s Center for Strategic Research.

“Regional Unrest and Domestic Security” appeared in the combined fifth and sixth issues, published on September 23, 1999. “US Intervention in the Bosnian Crisis” was published on November 22, 2004.

From US officials to Israeli businessmen

Unit 840 emerged from Unit 400 in the early 2010s on the orders of then-Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. Unit 400 is a covert special operations formation with close ties to Hezbollah.

A photograph of Mir alongside Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and senior IRGC commanders Mohammad Reza Zahedi and Mohammad Hejazi illustrates those connections.

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Informed sources told Iran International that a Western intelligence service identified and attacked the unit’s headquarters in Damascus in 2020.

The unit subsequently became the focus of investigations into assassination plots abroad.

In August 2022, the US Justice Department charged IRGC member Shahram Poursafi with plotting to assassinate John Bolton, who served as national security adviser during President Donald Trump’s first administration.

Prosecutors said Poursafi offered $300,000 for Bolton’s killing, likely in retaliation for the US strike that killed Soleimani in January 2020.

Iran International’s subsequent investigation, based on information provided by the Black Door hacking group, identified Ansari as the Syria-based Unit 840 commander who led the failed operation against Bolton and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

According to that reporting, Poursafi worked under Ansari, and the network sought to hire non-Iranians to conceal Tehran’s involvement. The person recruited to arrange the killings was an FBI informant.

In June 2023, the US Treasury sanctioned Ansari and Poursafi, saying Ansari, with Poursafi’s support, had planned and attempted to assassinate two former US government officials.

Ansari was also linked to a foiled plot against two Israeli businessmen in Colombia. Iran International reported in December 2022, citing an investigation by Infobae, that he had directed the operation through locally recruited criminals.

The businessmen and their families left Bogota under tight security after Colombian intelligence authorities warned them of the threat, according to that reporting.

Criminal networks and journalist targets

Unit 840 has repeatedly sought to use criminal gangs and traffickers to carry out operations abroad.

In Germany, Iran International previously reported that Ramin Yektaparast, an Iranian-German member of the Hells Angels motorcycle gang, organized attacks against synagogues in Bochum and Essen on behalf of the Quds Force.

The investigation, citing a Western intelligence source and a source within the IRGC, also linked him to a failed plot to assassinate Iranian rapper Shahin Najafi at a concert in Hanover in September 2023.

Yektaparast was shot four times and killed in Tehran on April 28, 2024. Following reports of possible Mossad involvement, the IRGC-linked Tasnim news agency denied he had ties to the Guards and said he was killed in a dispute over “personal matters.”

His funeral notice nevertheless described his death as a “martyr-like ascension,” and he was buried in Section 19 of Tehran’s Behesht-e Zahra cemetery, reserved for fallen IRGC and Basij members.

In Britain, an ITV News investigation exposed a Unit 840 plot, codenamed “the wedding,” to kill Iran International journalists Fardad Farahzad and Sima Sabet.

ITV reported in December 2023 that Iranian operatives had offered a people-smuggler $200,000 to arrange the murders. It identified Ansari as the commander behind the plot.

The plan failed because the smuggler was working as a double agent for a Western intelligence service and passed details to his handler, according to the investigation. Iran’s embassy in London rejected ITV’s findings as baseless.

In Sweden and Denmark, the Quds Force used Rawa Majid, leader of the Foxtrot criminal network, to attack Israeli-linked targets, according to Iran International’s previous reporting.

Swedish investigative journalist Diamant Salihu told the BBC that Majid fled to Tehran in October 2023 and that his links with Iranian authorities developed afterward. Iran International reported in April 2025 that he was living in Iran under IRGC protection.

Britain sanctioned Majid and Foxtrot in 2025. Iran’s embassy in London denied Tehran’s links to the network.

Repeated intelligence setbacks

The unit has suffered a series of blows through the exposure of its personnel and operations.

In May 2022, footage emerged of an interrogation attributed to Mossad in which Mansour Rasouli, a trafficker linked to Unit 840, said he had been tasked with killing an Israeli citizen in Turkey, a senior US general in Germany and a journalist in France.

Later that month, Hassan Sayyad Khodaei, a senior figure in the unit, was shot dead in central Tehran. The New York Times, citing an intelligence official, reported that Israel had told the United States it was responsible.

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Those setbacks were followed in June by the removal of Hossein Taeb as head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization.

The following month, Iran International reported that Mossad agents had interrogated Yadollah Khedmati, an IRGC logistics and support commander, near Tehran. Footage of that interrogation was also released.

More recently, Israel announced the disruption of another IRGC network accused of planning attacks on strategic infrastructure and Israeli and Jewish targets abroad.

In a joint statement on April 20, Mossad, the Israeli military and Shin Bet said an operation in Azerbaijan had foiled plans to attack the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Israeli embassy, a synagogue in Baku and Jewish community leaders.

Azerbaijani authorities arrested members of the cell and seized explosive drones and other explosives smuggled from Iran, according to the Israeli account. The suspects had conducted surveillance and photographed targets under orders from handlers in Tehran.

The US, Britain and European Union have imposed sanctions on figures linked to overseas assassination plots. Alongside the US measures against Ansari and Poursafi, Britain sanctioned Unit 840 and Ansari in January 2024. The EU sanctioned Ansari in July 2025, accusing him of ordering the assassination of journalists critical of the Islamic Republic.

Reorganization amid calls for revenge

According to Iran International’s sources, the Quds Force decided to reorganize Unit 840 after its structure and personnel were exposed. Six months after Mir’s killing, Hagh-Lesan’s appointment restores a commander to a unit responsible for covert operations against Iranian government opponents, critical journalists and Israeli targets worldwide.

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The reorganization follows public calls for revenge over the killing of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

In July, Hossein Shariatmadari, the supreme leader’s representative at the hardline Kayhan newspaper, urged authorities to declare Trump and pilots involved in Khamenei’s killing people whose killing was a religious obligation.

Kayhan also said the security of Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had been permanently destroyed. Tehran municipal murals threatened both leaders, including one bearing the English words “We will kill Trump.”

Iranian authorities have also expanded efforts to collect information about government opponents abroad.

In September, the IRGC-affiliated Fars news agency announced a system called “Alaj” to identify and track such individuals. It urged government supporters to submit information through the system’s website and the Telegram and Bale messaging platforms.