The Israeli military is using a new method to launch drone swarms over Iran targeting security forces involved in domestic repression, sources familiar with the matter told Iran International.
In surprise attacks on Wednesday night, Israel carried out precision drone strikes against Basij militia checkpoints that had been set up across Tehran in recent days.
The drone attacks marked the beginning of aerial operations targeting forces involved in repression inside Iran.
Informed sources told Iran International that the Israeli military is carrying out such operations through a new method which uses a flying platform acting as a “mother launcher” to deploy drones equipped with artificial intelligence and a large database of targets.
Israel makes extensive use of artificial intelligence and computer guidance to operate the new weapons system, enabling wide-ranging surveillance, identification and precise strikes.
The system is said to be capable of facial recognition, allowing highly precise strikes based on the identification of individuals.
To enable broader use of the method, Israel, in cooperation with the United States, established air superiority over Iranian skies in the early phase of the military campaign against Iran which began on Feb 28. by suppressing Iranian air defenses, paving the way for the deployment of the system.
Most reconnaissance and surveillance operations in Iran are currently carried out using Israeli Hermes and Heron drones, as well as US MQ-9 Reaper drones.
Features of 'mother ship'
Israel’s offensive drone operations under the “mother ship” or “mother launcher” concept have four main characteristics:
A notable feature of the current aerial campaign in Iran is Israel’s move toward manned–unmanned teaming (MUM-T).
Under this approach, drones used in offensive operations in Iran are launched from three main platforms.
Transport aircraft such as the C-130 are used as drone carriers capable of releasing large numbers of attack drones at high altitude, allowing them to travel hundreds of kilometers beyond the range they could cover if launched from the ground.
Large UAVs such as the Heron, capable of flying at altitudes of about 45,000 feet, may also serve as airborne carriers capable of deploying micro-drones against repression forces and other military targets.
Israeli fighter jets including the F-15I Ra’am and F-16I Sufa can also carry smaller drones in pods or on wing pylons and release them at high altitude to act as decoys, electronic warfare disruptors or reconnaissance observers.
For days the conflict had focused largely on military bases, missile sites and command facilities, particularly in southern Iran, as part of the wider US-Israeli campaign that has struck thousands of targets across the country since the war began on February 28.
But since Wednesday evening, reported drone strikes on checkpoints in Tehran have pointed to a parallel line of pressure: the local security posts, patrol units and temporary deployments used to enforce control on the streets.
Iranian state-linked media said several checkpoints in Tehran were hit, killing members of the security forces and Basij militia. The reported locations included positions in multiple districts across the capital.
The development suggests the conflict is increasingly intersecting with the structures the state relies on to control neighborhoods rather than only its larger military infrastructure.
From fixed bases to moving checkpoints
Since the start of the war, residents across Iran say checkpoints and patrols have multiplied in major cities as authorities attempt to prevent unrest and maintain control.
At the same time, Iran International has received a steady stream of messages from viewers describing the locations of checkpoints, security deployments and temporary bases.
Some reports describe armed units inspecting vehicles at major highway entrances or intersections. Others mention security forces using schools, sports halls and religious institutions as temporary accommodation or staging points.
Messages received in recent days pointed to deployments in locations ranging from major Tehran highways to entrances to cities such as Karaj, Shiraz, Mashhad and Qazvin. Residents also described units stationed beneath highway bridges, near parks or inside parking areas where buses and motorcycles were parked overnight.
In several cases, viewers reported that checkpoints they had previously seen disappeared within hours or days, while others appeared to move to nearby streets or disperse into smaller patrol groups.
Some messages described security forces sleeping inside buses or personal vehicles and conducting mobile patrols rather than remaining in fixed positions.
Others said checkpoints that had been inspecting vehicles were suddenly dismantled, leaving only a few officers nearby.
Such reports cannot be independently verified in each case. But taken together they suggest that many deployments are becoming more fluid, with positions shifting frequently rather than remaining in one place.
A war over control of the neighborhood
The shift reflects a deeper pressure on the state’s local enforcement network.
For years the Islamic Republic has relied on a dense web of Basij, police and Revolutionary Guards positions to control neighborhoods and quickly suppress unrest.
During the recent nationwide protests earlier this year, these same networks formed the backbone of the crackdown that sealed off districts and quashed the demonstrations.
In wartime, those local security units appear to be playing an even more central role.
As larger bases and installations come under pressure from airstrikes, authorities appear to be relying more heavily on mobile checkpoints and temporary deployments to maintain control on the ground.
Now those fallback positions are also being drawn into the conflict.
The result is a battlefield that increasingly overlaps with everyday urban space. Instead of remaining confined to distant military facilities, the war is beginning to touch the street corners, highway entrances and neighborhood patrol routes where the state exerts day-to-day authority.
Players who arrived on Wednesday are being kept at a hotel where journalists and media are not allowed to enter, according to sources familiar with the situation.
Some players had their mobile phones confiscated, while others were allowed to keep them only under the supervision of security personnel from the Iranian football federation.
Sources told Iran International that pressure on the players began in Tehran and has continued during the team’s camp ahead of the 2026 Asian Championship.
Mohammad Rahman Salari, a member of the Iranian Football Federation’s board, played a central role in enforcing the restrictions and repeatedly collected and inspected the phones of players and staff after the team’s first match.
Fatemeh Bodaghi, who is traveling with the delegation as manager of Iran’s women’s national team, was described by sources as acting on behalf of the federation’s security apparatus under the leadership of federation president Mehdi Taj, monitoring players’ social media accounts and reporting their activities to authorities in Tehran.
Sources also said Zeinab Hosseinzadeh, the team’s physiotherapist, was among those involved in exerting pressure on players.
Farideh Shojaei, the women’s vice president of the football federation, is also accompanying the team. She previously said options for the team’s return to Iran amid US-Israeli airstrikes were being examined, including a possible land route through Turkey, after attempts to return via the United Arab Emirates did not succeed.
Players face pressure after anthem protest
The crisis surrounding the Iranian women’s national football team began on March 2, when the squad refused to sing the Iranian national anthem before their opening match against South Korea at the AFC Women's Asian Cup in Australia.
This silent protest, occurring shortly after the start of the Iran war and the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, was immediately labeled an act of "wartime treason" by the state media. As the team progressed through the group stage, they were reportedly kept under strict surveillance by delegation minders, with international human rights groups and political figures warning that the athletes faced severe punishment, including the possibility of the death penalty, if they were forced to return to Tehran.
Six members of the delegation accepted humanitarian visas and remained in Australia to seek asylum, while the rest of the team boarded their flight to Malaysia.