Journalist at Iran International
Tehran’s decision to widen the war is an attempt to project strength but may better be understood as a survival strategy—one rooted in deliberate escalation and shaped by a logic akin to mutually assured destruction.
Following US and Israeli attacks on the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran’s leadership followed through with a long-standing threat: expanding the conflict beyond its borders and drawing neighboring states into the confrontation.
One notable example came on February 1, roughly a month before Khamenei was killed in a joint US–Israeli missile strike on February 28, when he said that if the United States attacked Iran militarily, the conflict would become “regional.”
Today, the armed forces of the Islamic Republic—led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—appear to be implementing that doctrine by expanding hostilities beyond Iran’s borders.
The logic is to link the fate of the Islamic Republic to the stability of the wider region: as the state faces mounting internal and external pressures, it seeks to entangle neighboring countries in the crisis, raising the costs of continued confrontation.
This approach resembles elements of Nixon’s “madman theory” and Israel’s “Samson option,” reflecting a strategic logic akin to mutually assured destruction. Whether such a strategy can deter adversaries—or instead isolate Tehran further—remains uncertain.
Several neighboring countries have now been drawn into the conflict. States along the Persian Gulf have been targeted, and missile and drone strikes have also been directed toward Azerbaijan and Turkey.
In some cases, countries that previously maintained relatively cooperative relations with Tehran, including Qatar, have found themselves on the receiving end of these attacks.
The responses of neighboring governments suggest that widening the conflict could ultimately produce stronger regional opposition rather than easing pressure on Tehran. From their perspective, the concern is precedent: if such attacks occur once, what guarantees exist that they will not happen again?
This concern increases the likelihood of coordinated responses designed to prevent further escalation.
The strategy also reflects long-running domestic pressures on the system. Over the course of its existence, the Islamic Republic occasionally managed to regain some degree of public support at critical moments—including the elections of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and 2001, the high participation in the 2009 election, and the victories of Hassan Rouhani in 2013 and 2017.
But the broader trajectory has been one of declining engagement and growing disillusionment. By the time of the 2024 presidential election—officially won by Masoud Pezeshkian—turnout had fallen sharply, reflecting wider frustration shaped by years of repression and repeated cycles of protest.
Demonstrations in 1999, 2009, 2019 and 2022 were met with force, while the downing of the Ukrainian passenger plane and the large-scale crackdown in January 2026 further deepened mistrust between the state and society.
At the same time, nearly five decades of governance have left Iran confronting multiple structural crises, including environmental degradation, water scarcity, energy shortages, mounting economic pressure on households, systemic corruption and widening inequality.
Together, these pressures have steadily eroded confidence in the system and narrowed expectations for reform from within.
Against this backdrop, widening the conflict may appear to the leadership less a choice than a calculation: that survival at home increasingly depends on raising the stakes abroad. Yet this logic carries obvious risks.
Attempts to regionalize the confrontation could deepen Iran’s isolation and accelerate pressures already bearing down on the system.
Taking into account both long-term domestic trends and the current military situation—including damage to Iran’s military capabilities and the widening of hostilities—the future of the Islamic Republic remains uncertain.
International politics rarely unfolds along a single predictable path, and multiple outcomes remain conceivable. Still, history suggests that political systems under sustained internal strain and external pressure often appear stable until they do not.
As Iran confronts war with the United States and Israel abroad while continuing to face mistrust and periodic unrest at home, the strategy of widening the conflict may prove less a path to survival than a reflection of the system’s mounting vulnerability.
Supporters of the Islamic Republic have gathered in several cities to show loyalty to the new leader. The officialdom has congratulated him in unison. But Khamenei Jr is yet to appear.
There has been no speech, no televised address and very few photos or videos of the new leader. The only recording attributed to him so far is a short old video announcing that his religious classes have been canceled.
The lack of information has been so striking that even state media appears uncertain about how to present him to the public.
Older photographs have been circulated, stylized illustrations or AI-generated renderings have appeared online to fill the visual vacuum. These images are not presented as authentic photos but symbolic representations.
The situation raises a central question: what scenario may explain the unusual debut of Iran’s new Supreme Leader?
Scenario one: delayed unveiling
The simplest explanation is that the Islamic Republic intends to introduce Mojtaba through a carefully managed televised address or recorded message once security conditions allow.
In this scenario, the leadership transition would be framed as orderly and unified, with Mojtaba reiterating familiar themes of resistance, continuity and cohesion under wartime pressure.
Even so, the delay itself invites scrutiny. Authorities could cite security concerns, but the absence of even a brief recorded message—particularly after the steady stream of congratulatory statements from senior officials—has raised questions about the pace and choreography of the transition.
For now, the silence has only heightened curiosity about how and when the new leader will first address the public.
Scenario two: leadership by statement
A second possibility is that Mojtaba may initially govern largely through written statements rather than public appearances. Such an approach would allow the system to project continuity while limiting exposure during a volatile security moment.
Iran’s leadership has long relied on tightly managed messaging, and written statements attributed to Mojtaba could reiterate established positions while reinforcing the central role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which appears to wield growing influence over wartime decision-making.
State television has already described Mojtaba as a veteran of the “Ramadan war,” part of an emerging narrative that presents him as shaped by wartime experience. Under this scenario, his absence would reflect caution rather than weakness.
Scenario three: managed vacuum
A third possibility is that Mojtaba’s continued absence reflects deeper uncertainty within the leadership itself.
The Islamic Republic is operating under sustained Israeli and US strikes, and the rapid announcement of his succession may have served primarily to prevent internal competition at a moment of acute vulnerability.
Another explanation is that Mojtaba may have been injured in the same attacks that killed his father and other senior figures—a scenario that would help explain both the speed of his appointment and his continued absence.
Naming him quickly could have forestalled rivalries among powerful factions while allowing the Revolutionary Guards and other security institutions to consolidate operational control.
In such circumstances, Mojtaba would function largely as a symbolic leader while practical authority remained concentrated within the security establishment, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in particular.
Presenting an absent or wounded successor could also suppress dissent by discouraging open criticism of someone portrayed as a victim of the same war that killed the previous Supreme Leader.
Continuity and risk
Such a strategy, however, carries risks. If the leader continues to remain unseen for an extended period, public skepticism could deepen further, particularly among a population already wary of official narratives.
The lack of clarity may also reinforce uncertainty within the elite at a time when the system is under exceptional strain.
In the short term, projecting continuity appears to be the system’s priority. By naming a successor quickly, even if still absent, the establishment in Tehran may hope to signal stability to both domestic and international audiences.
Whether that image can be sustained, however, may ultimately depend on one simple question: when and if Iran’s new Supreme Leader finally appears.
The longer he remains unseen, the more his absence risks becoming a political fact in its own right—one that could deepen uncertainty at a moment when Tehran can least afford it.
