US defense official denies Iran's claim US bases were hit

Iran International also found that US investigations into some banks were years behind the activities of the network, which expanded across multiple countries and moved billions of dollars for Iran despite sanctions.

The investigation was based on leaked internal correspondence and foreign transaction records from Bank Parsian spanning November 2022 to May 2023. The Iranian bank has been under US sanctions since 2018.

These documents shed light on a multi-layered operation within Iran’s banking system. The records offer only a snapshot of one network over a seven-month period, suggesting the full scale is far greater.

Iran International found no evidence that the banks in the UAE and China knowingly facilitated Iran’s efforts to circumvent US sanctions.

The investigation identified 15 foreign-based banks that helped Iran conduct international transactions in recent years.

Thirteen of these banks have faced no US penalties or enforcement for their involvement, according to publicly available records.

Only two of the 15 banks were targeted by the United States in August as part of the “D-Day” economic campaign which Washington described as an onslaught against Iran’s financial connections around the globe.

On August 24, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent called on all governments to close branches of Bank Melli Iran.

Four days later, the Treasury proposed cutting Banque Misr’s UAE operations off from correspondent banking access to the US financial system.

Treasury estimates that from 2024 to 2026, Banque Misr UAE processed approximately $1.8 billion for 103 companies that are potentially part of Iranian shadow banking networks.

However, documents reviewed by Iran International showed that funds originating from Iran’s central bank were being directed to accounts at Banque Misr’s UAE branches as early as November 2022.

Banque Misr and Bank Parsian did not respond to requests for comment.

China and UAE

Iranian banks use intermediaries to move foreign currency outside the country while obscuring their involvement in transactions, according to the US Treasury. Brokers working for the banks use so-called “rahbar” companies, which in turn rely on overseas shell and front companies to bypass sanctions.

The leaked documents showed funds belonging to Iranian banks being deposited into accounts outside Iran — referred to in the records as “trustee accounts” — and then moved according to the Iranian banks’ instructions.

At each stage, identifying details disappeared, leaving foreign banks facing non-Iranian, mostly non-sanctioned trading companies rather than sanctioned institutions such as Bank Parsian, Bank Shahr or Iran’s central bank.

A May 22, 2023 letter from Bank Parsian showed the bank asking Bank Shahr, another Iranian lender, to arrange the “settlement of purchased dirhams of nominee origin.”

The letter said Bank Parsian had bought 3.06 million UAE dirhams from Iran’s central bank and that the funds were held in a “trustee account” at Bank Shahr. It asked Bank Shahr to transfer the money to an account at Banque Misr.

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“What keeps the regime’s shadow banking network, the so-called rahbar network, running is not clever financial engineering. It is people: trusted individuals and a handful of sarrafis, the currency brokers who serve as the regime’s gateway to the global financial system,” said Miad Maleki, a former senior Treasury official now at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank.

“Just as IRGC soldiers carry out the regime’s repression at home, these businessmen and trustees carry the responsibility for funding its terrorism at home and abroad. Without them, Tehran could not move a single yuan out of its accounts in China or buy a single dollar or euro in Dubai or Istanbul,” he added.

Iran International identified 33 instruction letters in the leaked documents that directed the movement of dirham, yuan and dollars, with a total value of roughly $36 million.

Dollars made up the largest share of the value transferred, meaning the dominant currency in this shadow network was still the one US sanctions are designed to control.

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UAE and China

The US Treasury described Banque Misr UAE as “a critical node for the Iranian regime’s access to U.S. dollars.”

Banque Misr was the most frequent UAE destination for Bank Parsian’s foreign transactions, the documents showed, but seven other banks operating in the Arab state also appeared in the records, including some of the UAE’s largest lenders.

The documents showed the transactions took place between 2022 and 2023, years after Bank Parsian was designated under an executive order targeting terrorism financing.

Thirteen UAE-registered companies also appeared as beneficiaries across these eight banks. Five of them held the Banque Misr accounts.

Iran International also identified seven Chinese banks that received money on behalf of Iran.

The leaked documents include 23 letters from Bank Parsian involving yuan-denominated transactions with Chinese banks, including some of the country’s largest lenders by assets.

One Chinese bank that specialises in cross-border settlements for small exporters received 11 payment instructions from Bank Parsian according to the documents.

Most of the beneficiary firms were general trading companies registered in Hong Kong and Singapore, where companies can be established relatively easily, while receiving banking services from mainland China.

None of the seven Chinese banks identified in the documents has faced US enforcement action over its dealings with Iran.

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Tip of the iceberg

Bessent said in August that the department had "mapped the networks, facilitators, and financial channels that Iran uses to smuggle oil, evade sanctions, and fund terror."

President Donald Trump also said in a post on Truth Social that “ANY country that allows its financial institutions, businesses, airports, or government entities to provide any type of lifeline to Iran will itself face TREMENDOUS Economic Consequences.”

His warning included cash transfers, exchange houses and front companies.

However, U.S. sanctions have tended to focus more heavily on Iran’s oil-revenue and procurement networks than on correspondent banking and trade finance.

The Iran International investigation reveals the scale of what remains untouched by the US administration. The leaked files show that one Iranian bank, in seven months, directed money to 15 foreign-based banks in two countries through 33 beneficiary companies.

Out of 33 beneficiaries, only three have been publicly identified by the US Treasury.

The transactions identified by the investigation were carried out by Iranian financial institutions that were already under US sanctions when the instruction letters were issued.

Throughout that period, the Iranian institutions at the heart of the network - including the Central Bank of Iran, Bank Parsian, Bank Shahr, Bank Eghtesad Novin, Bank Saman, and Bank Melli - were already under extensive US sanctions. Yet the money continued to move, largely through financial institutions outside Iran.

Section 311

Washington has stopped short of targeting larger financial institutions, particularly major Chinese banks involved in financing Iranian trade, a step Washington has so far avoided amid concerns over wider financial disruption and retaliation.

Hours after the United States sanctioned dozens of Chinese entities and threatened to target an unspecified “major financial institution” over its dealings with Tehran, Beijing said in a threatening tone that its relationship with Iran “should not be disrupted or undermined.” China would take “all necessary measures” to safeguard its interests, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian warned.

Washington has begun targeting the banking channels used by Iran’s shadow network through a more targeted tool, Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, which can restrict foreign financial institutions’ access to the US financial system.

Unlike a sanctions designation, a Section 311 finding does not require the Treasury to show that the bank knowingly handled Iranian money — which may be why it was the instrument chosen.

Banque Misr’s UAE operations were targeted under Section 311 as part of the economic D-Day campaign.

“What makes this package different is that it isn’t operating alone. US diplomatic engagement and pressure on jurisdictions like the UAE, Turkey — and even China, is now coupled with a blockade that is choking off a large share of the imports Iran uses these networks to finance,” former Treasury official Maleki said.

“Together, that accelerates what sanctions alone would take years to do. And the regional calculus has shifted: jurisdictions that have themselves been targeted by the regime are far more willing to cooperate on enforcement — as the UAE just showed,” he added

Washington has signaled that further action against foreign banks is coming.

Whether Washington’s D-Day economic campaign succeeds will depend heavily on enforcement beyond Iran, including action against foreign institutions facilitating Iranian transactions, many of which are based in partner countries or strategic rivals.

Saeed Golsorkhi, an athlete and powerlifter, was shot in the knee during protests on January 9 and taken to hospital, the sources said. Concerned he could be arrested there, Golsorkhi discharged himself and returned home to continue treatment.

Security forces and Revolutionary Guards intelligence agents raided the family home on January 11, assaulted relatives and used pepper spray against Golsorkhi’s mother, according to the sources.

The forces bound Golsorkhi’s hands while his wounded knee was still bleeding and took him outside, the sources said. They blocked both ends of the alley before shooting him at close range in the head and abdomen.

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  Iran court sentences 10 protesters to death in Isfahan

Golsorkhi’s mother and his young niece witnessed the shooting, and he died in his mother’s arms, according to the sources.

Iran International previously reported on January 28 that Revolutionary Guards intelligence agents raided Golsorkhi’s home and shot him dead in front of his mother after he chanted “Death to Khamenei.”

Killings in Shahroud

Golsorkhi’s death forms part of a broader picture of the January crackdown in Shahroud documented by Iran International.

Eyewitnesses previously told that security forces killed at least 200 people in the city on January 8 and 9. The deaths of 22 women were recorded at Bahar Hospital alone, according to those accounts.

Other accounts from Shahroud have described security forces firing directly at protesters and authorities imposing restrictions on the families of those killed.

Iran International previously reported that Hossein Gharib, a 32-year-old athlete from Shahroud, was shot dead by security forces on January 9. His body was released only after his family agreed not to publicize his death and to hold a burial attended by no more than 10 people.

Brother detained, family barred from public mourning

Golsorkhi’s brother, Navid Golsorkhi, was arrested after the killing and held in temporary detention for about a month.

The family was able to retrieve Golsorkhi’s body several days later after agreeing to hold his burial without a gathering or public ceremony. Golsorkhi was buried on January 15 under tight security.

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Security forces also blocked both ends of the street outside his mother’s home to prevent people from visiting the family to offer condolences, sources close to the family said. The family was not permitted to hold a public memorial.

The restrictions were not limited to Golsorkhi’s relatives. Iran International documented similar measures following the January crackdown, including bodies being returned at night, families being required to hold restricted burials and authorities preventing public mourning ceremonies.

Golsorkhi was a powerlifter and owned a clothing store in Shahroud.

People close to him said he admired the Pahlavi family and had an image of Reza Shah Pahlavi tattooed on his arm.

Iran International has obtained information about three alleged recruits and an operation being developed by Unit 4000, the Special Operations Division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization.

According to the sources, the unit recruited the three individuals through Shiite clerics in Thailand and Indonesia and has begun planning attacks in the Malacca and Bangka straits, as well as at Tanjung Priok Port in Indonesia and the Ningbo-Zhoushan and Shanghai ports in China.

The operations are being overseen by Brigadier General Rahman Moghaddam, commander of Unit 4000, according to Iran International’s sources.

Moghaddam was reported killed in an Israeli strike in Tehran on March 3, during the opening days of the war. Israeli security agencies identified him among senior Iranian intelligence figures killed in Israeli attacks.

Two days later, drones struck Nakhichevan in Azerbaijan in an attack Baku blamed on Iran, although Tehran denied responsibility. CNN later reported that Iranian officials believed the drone attack was retaliation for Moghaddam’s killing, which Tehran suspected had been carried out with Israeli assistance from Azerbaijan.

Iran International has now obtained information indicating that those reports of Moghaddam’s death were incorrect. According to the new information, he survived the strike and is now overseeing what the sources describe as a new phase of Unit 4000’s overseas maritime operations.

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Moghaddam, a former deputy coordinator at the Defense Ministry’s Protection and Intelligence Organization, took charge around three years ago of Unit 4000, which has been linked to assassination and sabotage operations targeting opponents of the Islamic Republic and Israeli interests abroad.

Plans to target ships in Indonesian and Chinese waters

Two sources familiar with the IRGC’s activities said Moghaddam is overseeing a new program aimed at expanding Unit 4000’s operations into East Asian waters.

The sources said the unit is considering attacks on commercial, military and privately owned vessels transiting the Malacca Strait, one of the world’s most important shipping routes, as well as the Bangka Strait.

Operatives recruited by the unit have also developed plans targeting Tanjung Priok, Indonesia’s busiest port, and the major Chinese ports of Ningbo-Zhoushan and Shanghai, the sources said.

The plans would represent a significant geographical expansion of Iran’s maritime pressure campaign.

Since the war began on February 28, Iran has sought to restrict shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, while the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have disrupted maritime traffic around the Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea.

In June, Mohsen Rezaei, then a senior adviser to Iran’s supreme leader and now secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, told CNN that Tehran could expand the conflict if the war and US naval blockade continued.

“If the war continues and the naval blockade is not lifted, we will drag the war to the Indian Ocean, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean,” Rezaei said.

Around the same period, Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani said a new “security belt” of Iran’s so-called resistance front would extend from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab and from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.

Sources identify recruitment links in Thailand and Indonesia

Iran International’s sources said Unit 4000 had been seeking non-Iranian recruits for its East Asian maritime operations, allowing Tehran greater deniability if an operation was exposed.

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The recruits were brought to Iran for training before being assigned to operations in East Asia, according to the sources.

For recruitment in Thailand, Moghaddam approached Seyyed Momen Saketicha, a prominent figure in the country’s Shiite community, the sources said.

Saketicha was part of a Thai delegation that travelled to Tehran in 2023 and met Hamas representatives in efforts to secure the release of Thai nationals taken hostage during the October 7 attack on Israel.

The sources described Saketicha as a close associate of prominent Thai Shiite cleric Seyed Sulaiman Husaini, who heads the Al-Mahdi Foundation in Thailand and serves as imam of the Ruhollah Mosque in Nakhon Si Thammarat.

Husaini also has ties to Al-Mustafa International University, an Iran-based institution sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2020 over what Washington described as its role in facilitating recruitment for the IRGC Quds Force.

In 2012, after explosions in Bangkok that Thai and Israeli officials said were part of a plot targeting Israeli diplomats, Husaini blamed Mossad. A Thai court later convicted two Iranian men over the bomb plot. Iran denied involvement.

Focus on Indonesia

The bulk of Unit 4000’s planned East Asian maritime activity is centered on Indonesia, according to Iran International’s sources.

The sources said Moghaddam used two Indonesian clerics to identify potential recruits.

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One is Zahir Yahya, chairman of Ahlulbait Indonesia, a national Shiite organization. Iran International’s sources described Yahya as an intermediary who introduced potential operatives to Unit 4000.

The second is Abdullah Saqqaf, whom the sources identified as head of the Amir al-Mu’minin seminary in Bogor and as having links to Al-Mustafa International University.

According to the sources, Saketicha, Yahya and Saqqaf introduced potential recruits to the IRGC, while two Unit 4000 figures — Mohsen Aghazadeh and Vahid Yekeh-Dehqan — were responsible for recruitment and training.

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Three alleged recruits identified

Iran International has identified three individuals its sources say were recruited by Unit 4000 for covert maritime operations in East Asia.

The first, Pandu Yudhawinata, is an Indonesian operative who has previously been linked in counterterrorism reporting to Hezbollah and Iranian intelligence.

Yudhawinata was implicated in a failed 1994 Hezbollah plot to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok. Counterterrorism reporting has said he underwent training in Iran and later worked with Hezbollah networks in Southeast Asia.

Iran International’s sources also linked him to attacks in Sri Lanka.

The sources said Yudhawinata and two other Indonesian nationals, Ardiyanta Mutoha and Mohammad Hossein, travelled to Tehran for training intended to prepare them for covert operations at ports and waterways across East Asia.

The alleged plans come as Washington seeks to increase pressure on Iran’s oil exports while helping move energy shipments through the Strait of Hormuz.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last week that the United States had helped move 130 million barrels of oil through the waterway over a two-week period while preventing Iranian exports.

Asia is particularly exposed to any expansion of maritime disruption. The International Energy Agency estimates that around 80% of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz is destined for Asian markets.

The plans described to Iran International suggest that Unit 4000 may now be seeking to threaten another critical section of the energy and commercial shipping network serving Asia — extending the potential reach of Iran’s maritime campaign from the Middle East into some of the world’s busiest waters.

The reserves, intended to cushion severe shortages and emergencies, have been tapped at a pace in recent weeks that has prompted warnings from experts within the state about the consequences of continuing, the sources said.

Remaining fuel stocks could be depleted within several weeks if withdrawals continue at the current rate, limiting the government's ability to offset disruptions to domestic production or imports and prevent widespread supply stoppages, according to the sources.

The growing reliance on strategic stocks has also opened a dispute between the government and the Revolutionary Guards over how long withdrawals should continue, they said.

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  Iran keeps finding gas. Getting it out is the problem

Revolutionary Guards officials oppose unrestricted use of the reserves, while government officials want to keep drawing on them to keep filling stations operating and contain public concern over shortages and higher prices, the sources added.

Daily shortfall strains supplies

Iran produces about 120 million liters of gasoline a day but consumes around 135 million liters, leaving a daily deficit of about 15 million liters.

Ali-Akbar Saghab Esfahani, head of Iran's Energy Optimization and Strategic Management Organization, put the daily gasoline shortfall at 14 million to 15 million liters on August 15.

Before the shortage intensified, imports covered about half the gap, much of it through fuel supplies from Russia, the sources said.

A US maritime blockade, Ukrainian strikes on Russian refining infrastructure and the closure of the Caspian Sea supply route have sharply restricted Iran's ability to maintain those imports, according to the sources.

Iranian diplomatic efforts to secure alternative fuel supplies from allies and neighboring countries have yet to produce an agreement.

Britain and Qatar have meanwhile backed a new US economic campaign against the Islamic Republic, as Washington seeks to restrict its financial, shipping and energy trade routes.

Fuel moved to reopen Tehran stations

Gasoline shortages have reached Tehran, forcing some filling stations to close, according to information obtained by Iran International.

Authorities have ordered fuel transferred from neighboring provinces to reopen some stations in the capital, but dozens of others remain at risk of closure, the sources said.

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  Iran weighs gasoline rationing as fuel deficit widens

Videos and messages sent by citizens have also documented long lines, station closures and difficulties obtaining gasoline in Tehran, Alborz, South Khorasan and Razavi Khorasan provinces.

The Tehran regional manager of the National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company attributed temporary closures at some stations to a sudden rise in demand and congestion along fuel transportation routes.

Reports from citizens suggest the disruption is also affecting transportation costs. Several people told Iran International that fares charged by ride-hailing services Snapp and Tapsi had risen sharply as fewer drivers accepted trips.

“Gas stations are crowded, GPS doesn't work and you can't work for Snapp. Fares have gone up, but there are no drivers to accept the trip. We're left without money and without gasoline,” a Tehran resident told Iran International.

Another citizen said the cost of a regular Snapp journey had risen from 1,000,000 rials last month to 3,200,000 rials, while a resident of Shiraz described steep increases in ride-hailing fares despite no gasoline shortage there.

A Snapp driver said fuel consumption from running air conditioning for passengers required him to refill about every two days, but his quota had been exhausted and purchases outside the quota were limited to 25 liters.

Other messages sent to Iran International accused authorities of deliberately restricting supplies before a possible price increase.

“When they want to raise the price of cooking oil, they say there isn't any. When they want to raise the price of rice, they say there isn't any. But after the price goes up, everything is available,” a resident of Mashhad said. “Now it's gasoline's turn.”

The Mashhad resident said filling stations were not receiving enough gasoline but predicted supplies would become readily available if authorities raised prices.

Another citizen questioned why a gasoline deficit of 10% to 20% was causing such widespread disruption and accused authorities of deliberately making fuel scarce to make consumers more willing to accept higher prices.

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“Many gas stations are either closed or have no gasoline to distribute,” a Tehran resident said, also accusing the government of diverting fuel for foreign currency earnings.

Another message accused authorities of using the shortage as justification for a gasoline price increase and manipulating distribution to create congestion at filling stations and reduce resistance to higher prices.

“Half of Pakdasht's gas stations have no gasoline and the rest are extremely crowded,” a resident said. “They are trying to force people to accept higher gasoline prices.”

Government weighs three options

The government is considering three responses to the shortage: limiting gasoline supply to domestic production levels, reducing subsidized quotas and selling additional consumption at the unrestricted price, or shifting fuel quotas from vehicles to individuals.

Concern that higher gasoline prices could trigger protests has encouraged the government to use strategic reserves to buy time, the sources said.

Fuel price increases have been politically sensitive in Iran. A sudden rise in gasoline prices in November 2019 triggered nationwide protests followed by a deadly state crackdown.

The attempt to delay harder choices by drawing on emergency stocks is now creating another problem, according to Iran International's sources: the buffer intended to protect Iran during severe supply disruptions may itself be only weeks away from exhaustion.

Intercepted radio communications, video footage and eyewitness accounts point to security forces operating from several mosques in and around the capital on January 8 and 9, when protests drew large crowds and authorities launched a deadly crackdown.

In one intercepted exchange, security personnel discussed deploying forces and equipment inside Imam Hossein Mosque, which Iran International geolocated to the intersection of Sattari and Mokhbari in western Tehran.

Witnesses described security operations around the mosque as electricity was cut in the area and surveillance drones flew overhead.

Other locations identified through footage and witness accounts included mosques along Andarzgoo Boulevard and Qolhak Grand Mosque.

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Witnesses also described security personnel positioned outside some mosques engaging protesters before forces inside emerged to beat and arrest them.

Taken together, the evidence suggests some mosques served not simply as gathering points but as bases from which security forces monitored and confronted protesters.

Shooting from rooftops

Several eyewitnesses described mosque rooftops being used as observation or firing positions.

One witness described several people positioned on the roof of a mosque near Kashani Boulevard in western Tehran on January 8.

“The sound of a stun grenade could be heard,” the witness said. “Once the crowd scattered a little, they started shooting from above.”

In Naziabad in southern Tehran, another witness described protesters coming under fire from elevated positions.

“They were being shot at from the rooftops of mosques and Basij bases,” the witness said.

Witnesses in the area described security forces firing directly at crowds and from elevated positions, with a number of protesters wounded or killed.

Video footage obtained by Iran International also showed surveillance drones flying above crowds during the protests.

Other witnesses described security personnel monitoring protesters with cameras from inside mosques. Some said windows at mosque buildings had been broken to create positions from which weapons could be fired and described seeing weapons fitted with laser sights.

In several areas, witnesses also said security forces pursued protesters who sought refuge in residential buildings or private parking garages, beating some of those sheltering inside and preventing injured protesters from leaving to seek medical treatment.

Iran International was not able to independently verify each of those accounts or determine who was responsible for individual shots seen or heard in footage.

Allegations of fires

Some witnesses alleged that security personnel themselves damaged or set fire to mosques that authorities could subsequently portray as having been attacked by protesters.

One witness also said security forces left gas valves open at a mosque before departing, creating the risk of a fire or explosion.

Iran International could not independently verify those accounts or establish whether any fires at the sites were deliberately started by security forces.

The allegations are significant because Iranian authorities repeatedly portrayed damage to mosques and other religious sites during the January unrest as evidence of violence by protesters.

Civilian sites used in crackdowns

The apparent use of mosques as operational sites in Tehran follows evidence that security forces used other civilian buildings during the January crackdown.

A separate Iran International investigation in neighboring Alborz province found security forces using a public library as an ammunition store and staging point, schools and mosques as gathering places for armed personnel, and the roof of a cinema as a firing position.

There is also precedent for security forces operating from or around religious sites during earlier protests.
Human Rights Watch documented security forces firing on protesters and bystanders from rooftops around Zahedan’s Grand Mosalla prayer hall and Makki Mosque during the September 2022 crackdown known as Bloody Friday.

The United Nations separately documented the use of live ammunition, tear gas and metal pellets against protesters following Friday prayers in Zahedan, with footage analyzed by the UN appearing to show security forces firing from rooftops.

The evidence gathered in Tehran suggests some mosques became part of the security apparatus during the January crackdown: used to assemble personnel and equipment, monitor crowds and, according to multiple eyewitnesses, confront protesters.