Iran International
A US strike on a container ship approaching an Iranian port has complicated Tehran’s narrative of a strategic victory against Washington over the Strait of Hormuz.
A US Navy MH-60 helicopter carried out a strike on the Panama-flagged containership M/V Vela Nova in the Gulf of Oman on Tuesday.
President Donald Trump later said the United States now had “total control” over the Strait of Hormuz and warned that if Iran acted, “they get blown away.”
Iranian officials remained relatively quiet on the incident through Wednesday afternoon. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei, speaking to Press TV, instead denounced the wider US blockade as “dishonorable and illegal.”
Much of the Iranian media also focused heavily on the new defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, with several outlets portraying the so-called Mecca Pact as politically inflated and of limited relevance to the regional balance.
Competing narratives over Hormuz
Hardline newspaper Vatan Emrooz sought to turn the location of the US strike into evidence of Iranian deterrence rather than American dominance.
The paper argued that the attack, carried out well outside the Strait of Hormuz, showed that US forces remained reluctant to operate within range of Iran’s coastal defenses.
It portrayed Washington’s decision to strike a merchant vessel farther out at sea as a sign of tactical caution and urged Iran to stand by the demands it has set for any reopening of the strait.
The argument reflects a broader theme in Iranian commentary over the past week.
Several outlets and officials have portrayed the confrontation over Hormuz as evidence that Tehran has succeeded in shifting the center of negotiations away from the nuclear issue and toward control of the waterway.
Some commentary also interpreted a temporary easing in Trump’s rhetoric and talks with Oman over shipping arrangements as signs that Washington was adjusting to new realities in the strait, even as Iranian commanders insisted there could be no simple return to pre-war conditions.
Trump’s latest remarks cut directly against that interpretation. His assertion of “total control” over Hormuz and threat of further military action suggest Washington continues to see coercive pressure, rather than accommodation, as central to its approach.
Economic costs remain
Iranian economic outlets have meanwhile focused on the growing cost of disruption to regional shipping.
Donya-ye Eghtesad noted that rising oil prices and maritime war-risk premiums were feeding through into domestic and regional markets, while air travel across the Persian Gulf continued to face suspensions and rerouting.
Recent attacks near Bab el-Mandeb have added to concerns that maritime disruption is no longer confined to Hormuz, increasing risks for shipping across a wider stretch of regional trade routes.
Those costs complicate triumphalist claims on either side. Washington continues to demonstrate its ability to use military force around Iran’s coast, while Tehran retains the capacity to keep maritime insecurity at the center of regional calculations.
The latest developments therefore leave the contest over Hormuz far from settled.
A recent letter to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei from Iran’s new security chief, Mohsen Rezaei, calling for expanded military capability and activity, suggests Tehran is also preparing for the possibility that the confrontation will continue rather than end through a quick diplomatic settlement.
Analysts disagree over how directly Tehran is involved and what is driving the Houthis back into action after largely sitting out the Iran war. But whether Tehran is directing them or benefiting from decisions they make independently, renewed Houthi activity puts additional pressure on Iran's adversaries, particularly Saudi Arabia.
On Tuesday, the Houthis fired missiles at the Tanzania-flagged cargo ship Tihamah in the Bab el-Mandeb strait, killing four crew members and two members of the government-allied National Resistance Forces, according to Yemeni authorities.
Later on Tuesday, the Houthi-affiliated Al-Masirah network said the group targeted another vessel carrying what it described as Saudi “military equipment” in the Bab el-Mandeb.
Houthis pursue their own war
The Houthis' return to action appears rooted first in their own calculations inside Yemen.
Kamran Bokhari, a senior resident fellow at the Middle East Policy Council and strategic forecaster, describes Iran's so-called Axis of Resistance as a corporate brand in which some groups operate more like Iranian-controlled subsidiaries, while the Houthis resemble an independent franchise.
“They'll come in and participate in a conflict and they'll act as and when they see that it's in their interest to do so,” Bokhari told Iran International. “They're not like, you know, Iran says jump and they say how high?”
For months, that interest appeared to lie in staying out of the Iran war while its trajectory remained uncertain.
The calculation began to change following a confrontation involving an Iranian aircraft bound for Houthi-controlled territory. Saudi Arabia struck a Yemeni airfield after the aircraft attempted to land, helping trigger a renewed cycle of attacks between the Houthis and Riyadh.
The escalation also comes amid growing activity by Saudi-backed government forces and UAE-backed southern separatists inside Yemen.
“It's all domestic, is what I'm trying to say. It has nothing to do with Iran,” Bokhari said of the immediate Houthi calculation.
But that domestic struggle is unfolding in a regional environment transformed by the Iran war.
Iranian disruption around the Strait of Hormuz has already increased pressure on Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states. Renewed Houthi activity around Bab el-Mandeb means Riyadh increasingly has to contend with threats around two critical waterways.
Saudi Arabia is also trying to build a stronger security architecture around itself. The recently signed Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish defense pact could give the kingdom greater regional support as it confronts those threats.
That may give the Houthis an incentive to press Riyadh now.
“The Houthis want to be able to extract concessions from the Saudis before the grid goes up, if you will,” Bokhari said.
Their ultimate objective, he argues, remains establishing themselves as Yemen's dominant political and military power and forcing Riyadh to accept that they cannot simply be eliminated.
Iran benefits
But the Houthis' pursuit of their own objectives does not mean Tehran is a bystander.
Fatima Al-Asrar, a Yemen and Iran specialist, sees the renewed Houthi pressure as increasingly intertwined with Iran's broader strategy against the United States.
“Of course, they [Iran] see it as an extension to them. They're no longer hiding it,” Al-Asrar told Iran International, pointing to Iranian rhetoric linking pressure around the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.
She said Tehran is closely watching growing US fatigue with the Iran war and sees the approaching midterm elections as an opportunity to increase pressure on Washington.
“They're very transparent, very calculating, and they're using the Houthis on that front in order to press their advantage,” she said.
New reporting from Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat raises the possibility of a more direct Iranian operational role.
Citing Yemeni security sources, the newspaper reported on Tuesday that IRGC officers are overseeing aspects of the Houthi escalation and that an Iranian official, Ali Mohammad Rezaei, is supervising an operations room managing military and security affairs in Houthi-controlled territory. Iranian officers have also helped establish additional missile and drone launch positions, according to the report.
Iran International has not independently verified the claims.
What will this lead to?
In July of this year, US President Donald Trump has warned Washington would hold Tehran responsible for renewed Houthi attacks, describing the group as an Iranian “Surrogate and/or Proxy” and threatening military punishment against both.
But retired Royal Navy Commander Tom Sharpe, who served for 27 years and commanded four warships, told Iran International that he doubts Trump will want to launch another major military campaign against the Houthis.
“He definitely doesn't want to be embroiled on a second tangent here,” Sharpe told Iran International.
Bab el-Mandeb also does not carry the same strategic weight as the Strait of Hormuz, Sharpe said, because ships have alternative routes, albeit at considerably greater cost and distance.
Yet Iran can still benefit.
Greater Houthi disruption could complicate shipping and potentially force the United States and its partners to devote resources to another strategic waterway.
“I think they'll be pleased,” Sharpe said of Tehran. “If it does draw away resources, US resources from the Gulf of Oman, then that's in Iran's favor.”
The six decrees named Ali Abdollahi chief of staff of the armed forces, with Kioumars Heydari as his deputy; Ahmad Vahidi commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guards, with Mostafa Izadi as his deputy; Ali Azmaei commander of the Guards' navy; and Hossein Taeb, the feared former intelligence chief of the Guards, head of the Basij.
Separately, Mohsen Rezaei, the former Guards commander named Khamenei's military adviser in March, became secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and the leader's representative on the body.
The appointments put veterans of the Guards, intelligence services and Iran-Iraq war generation across the upper reaches of the security establishment. But rather than marking a wholesale changing of the guard, they draw heavily on figures who built their careers under Ali Khamenei — leaving open whether the new supreme leader is imposing his authority on the system or assembling an experienced security bloc whose support he needs to exercise it.
Khamenei's directives suggest the changes are not simply about personnel. In his appointment decree for Vahidi, he called for strengthening the force's capabilities for “maximum deterrence” and maintaining readiness to carry out “powerful offensive operations against the enemy.”
Lawmaker Ebrahim Rezaei described the appointments as “basically an indication of the fact that the Islamic Republic is moving toward a more offensive military structure.”
War commanders move to the top
The clearest sign that Khamenei may be changing how the military is run, rather than merely replacing its commanders, lies in the elevation of Abdollahi and Heydari from the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters to the two highest positions in the Armed Forces General Staff.
The General Staff is Iran's highest military coordinating body, while Khatam Central Headquarters has a more operational wartime role, coordinating military activity across different branches.
There has been no confirmed announcement that the two bodies have formally merged, but pro-establishment commentator Mohammad-Sadegh Alizadeh said the appointments confirmed a process of centralizing Iran's military command.
“The merger of Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters and the Armed Forces General Staff means concentrating the country's wartime, military and offensive activities,” he wrote on X, adding that Abdollahi's decree explicitly tasked him with completing the process.
Abdollahi previously served as coordination deputy of the General Staff and deputy commander of Iran's police. Heydari commanded the regular Army Ground Forces for more than seven years before moving into Khatam's command structure in late 2025.
Heydari's appointment also preserves a senior regular Army presence near the top of a leadership heavily populated by Revolutionary Guards veterans, suggesting that greater centralization does not necessarily amount to straightforward IRGC domination of the command structure.
Taeb’s return puts domestic security in focus
If the Abdollahi and Heydari appointments point to tighter wartime command, Taeb's return to the Basij reveals the domestic-security side of Khamenei's emerging structure.
Taeb commanded the Basij during the unrest following Iran's disputed 2009 presidential election and later spent more than a decade heading the IRGC Intelligence Organization before his removal in 2022.
Khamenei's decree calls for strengthening what it describes as the Basij's “popular intelligence network,” drawing attention to the surveillance and internal-security component of Taeb's mandate.
New York-based journalist and Middle East writer Séamus Malekafzali said Taeb's return was particularly significant given his intelligence background.
“Taeb spent 13 years after leaving the Basij as the head of IRGC intelligence,” he wrote on X on August 10. Referring to Khamenei's directive for a “grassroots confrontation with enemy threats,” he added that it “certainly sounds like making sure the January protests never happen again.”
Taeb has also long been identified with Mojtaba Khamenei's security network. When he was removed as IRGC intelligence chief in 2022, Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, described the move as “an earthquake in Iran's intelligence community,” noting his close relationship with both Ali Khamenei and his son.
His return therefore restores a longtime Khamenei confidant to command of an organization embedded across universities, workplaces, neighborhoods and state institutions, and which has played a central role in surveillance, political mobilization and the suppression of protests.
Journalist Morteza Kazemian linked the appointment to worsening economic conditions and public discontent, arguing that Taeb had become one of Khamenei's trusted instruments of security and governance and that the Basij under his command was intended to embody the leadership's “iron fist.”
Rezaei comeback underscores reliance on old guard
If Taeb's return highlights Khamenei's reliance on trusted security figures, Rezaei's comeback makes the generational continuity harder to miss.
Rezaei commanded the Revolutionary Guards from 1981 to 1997, including through most of the Iran-Iraq war, before moving into politics and holding a succession of senior state positions.
He later served at the Expediency Council, repeatedly ran for president and became vice president for economic affairs under Ebrahim Raisi. Khamenei appointed him military adviser in March before naming him secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and his representative on the body less than five months later.
Journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi questioned why Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr had been replaced by Rezaei and what substantive change the appointment was intended to bring.
“What does the appointment of Mohsen Rezaei in place of Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council mean, and what change is it supposed to bring to the way this position operates?” he wrote on X.
Some Iranian social-media users responded with mockery, reviving jokes surrounding Rezaei's repeated presidential campaigns and decades-long circulation through senior state positions.
The criticism reflected one of the broader themes surrounding the reshuffle: that Khamenei's first major appointments have elevated not a new generation of officials, but men who have occupied the Islamic Republic's military and political establishment for decades.
Vahidi promotion highlights hardline continuity
Vahidi's promotion adds another dimension to that continuity: the elevation of a commander whose record spans Iran's external military operations and domestic repression.
Vahidi had served as acting Guards commander following Mohammad Pakpour's death during the war with the United States and Israel. Khamenei formally installed him as commander and promoted him to major general.
He previously held senior roles in the Quds Force and served as defense minister under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and interior minister under Ebrahim Raisi.
Argentine prosecutors have sought Vahidi in connection with the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people. Iran denies involvement.
Israel's foreign ministry focused its response to the reshuffle on Vahidi and Rezaei, linking both men to allegations surrounding the AMIA case and accusing Tehran of elevating figures associated with attacks abroad.
“The Iranian regime worships terror, rewards its architects and promotes them to the highest levels of power,” the ministry said on X.
The United States has also sanctioned Vahidi over his role as interior minister during the suppression of protests following Mahsa Amini's death in custody in 2022.
But the wartime record of Vahidi, Abdollahi and Taeb also complicates the idea that their elevation simply represents Khamenei extending his personal control over the security apparatus.
President Masoud Pezeshkian accused Vahidi and Abdollahi of taking unilateral military actions that undermined efforts to secure a ceasefire, Iran International reported in April. The report also described a heated confrontation involving Taeb.
All three men now occupy senior positions in the military-security structure under Khamenei, raising the possibility that the new leader has elevated figures whose institutional power was already considerable before he formally appointed them.
Khamenei’s first imprint on security establishment
Several major international outlets interpreted the reshuffle as an early indication of how Khamenei intends to shape the security establishment after succeeding his father.
The Wall Street Journal portrayed the appointments as Khamenei putting his stamp on the national-security system and signaling a tougher approach toward Washington.
“Iran's mysterious ruler signals a hard line on Trump with new leadership,” the newspaper wrote.
The Financial Times focused on the promotion of loyalists and the possibility that Rezaei's return could point toward a harder line on the United States, while Reuters described Rezaei as a close ally of Khamenei and highlighted his recent opposition to extending a ceasefire and his skepticism toward negotiations with Washington.
Those readings emphasize Khamenei's role in choosing the new hierarchy. But the identities of the men he chose point just as strongly to continuity with the security establishment inherited from his father.
Iran International analysts had raised that tension even before the latest decrees.
The deaths of Ali Khamenei and other senior officials created a leadership gap in which his successor was still working to consolidate his position, Kazemian said in May.
After the appointments were announced, journalist Kamyar Behrang argued that the death of Ali Khamenei, who had served as the system's final arbiter, had given the Revolutionary Guards greater room to shape the political order that followed him.
The appointments can therefore be read in both directions. Khamenei is placing his own stamp on the military and security hierarchy, centralizing command and restoring trusted figures to key posts.
But he is doing so largely through men formed under his father's rule — veteran commanders and intelligence officials whose institutional weight may be as important to his authority as their loyalty to him.
The first map of power under Mojtaba Khamenei is taking shape. What remains unclear is whether these men are primarily instruments of his control, or the establishment on which that control depends.
