No breakthrough yet, but Iranians are betting on one

One of the clearest indicators has come from Iran’s real-estate market, traditionally viewed as one of the safest destinations for capital during periods of uncertainty. According to Tehran-based media, a growing number of property listings have been withdrawn in recent days.

Estate agents told local newspapers that many owners have instructed them to pause sales, believing that easing tensions and the possibility of a diplomatic opening could push prices higher. Similar behavior has been reported in parts of the rental market.

Sharq reported that some owners had previously hesitated to sell amid conflicting signals from Washington and uncertainty surrounding President Donald Trump’s statements, fearing renewed volatility.

Financial markets have also responded. Reports from both sides about a possible memorandum of understanding have helped lift sentiment on the Tehran Stock Exchange.

Expectations were further fueled after chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Central Bank Governor Abdolnasser Hemmati traveled to Doha, where Tehran hopes to secure access to billions of dollars in frozen assets.

At the same time, some analysts have begun debating the structure of a potential agreement as though its broad outlines are already taking shape.

Former diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi argues that while a deal could benefit Iran, particularly if it results in sanctions relief without major additional nuclear concessions, the two-stage format reportedly under discussion carries significant risks.

He warned that a phased agreement could prolong the uncertainty that has weighed on Iran’s economy for years because the success of an initial understanding would depend on reaching a later nuclear settlement.

Ahmadi said a more effective approach would have been “a single, comprehensive package negotiated over a defined period as a final settlement that ends 25 years of uncertainty for Iran and its people.”

He also contended that the emerging framework suggests Trump’s primary objective remains Iran’s nuclear program rather than broader issues such as missiles or regional alliances.

Whether such assessments prove correct or not, they have contributed to a growing perception that a narrower agreement may be more achievable than previously thought.

The government’s recent decision to lift the 88-day internet blackout has also been interpreted by many activists, technology analysts and political commentators as a sign that officials expect a period of reduced tension.

Some critics argue, however, that the move is intended to ease public frustration at a sensitive political moment, while others see it as preparation for possible concessions in negotiations with Washington.

Still, among many politically engaged Iranians, the restoration of connectivity has been viewed less as a technical decision than as a political signal. In a political environment where even minor policy shifts are closely scrutinized, the move has reinforced perceptions that officials believe the country may be entering a less confrontational phase.

Whether those expectations prove justified remains unclear. What is clear is that many Iranians are increasingly behaving as though a diplomatic opening may be approaching—even if few are ready to assume it is guaranteed.

US President Donald Trump said on Friday he was heading to the White House's Situation Room to make a final decision on an emerging deal with Iran, after saying parts of the arrangement had been agreed.

The remarks came one day after the US military struck an Iranian drone facility near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards reportedly responded by targeting an American base in the region, believed to be located in Kuwait.

In Tehran, lawmakers aligned with Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf — who is also leading Iran’s negotiating team — reacted positively to reports of progress, while hardline factions sharply criticized the negotiations.

Fada-Hossein Maleki, a member of parliament’s National Security Commission, spoke of “significant quantitative and qualitative progress” in the talks and claimed that “most proposals of the Islamic Republic have been accepted.”

According to Maleki, Iran’s main concern is “Trump’s unpredictability.” He also said Ghalibaf’s recent trip to Qatar focused on frozen Iranian assets and had produced positive results for Tehran.

By contrast, National Security Committee spokesman Ebrahim Rezaei criticized concessions in the negotiations during a televised interview. “Why should we even commit to the United States not to build a nuclear weapon?” he said.

Another lawmaker, Ruhollah Izadkhah, accused Ghalibaf of sidelining parliament. “Apparently, they intend to keep parliament shut so they can reopen the strait,” he said, adding: “The people will not allow it.”

Abolfazl Aboutorabi, another lawmaker, claimed that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s “red lines” regarding the Strait of Hormuz, the nuclear issue and compensation demands had been violated in the talks.

He accused Washington of trying to deceive Iran by offering “a lollipop” — referring to a proposed $300 billion reconstruction fund without binding guarantees — in exchange for reopening the Strait of Hormuz. He also predicted that the United States would attack Iran again after the World Cup and US congressional elections.

Parisa Nasr, a market specialist, accused the negotiators of “surrenderism”. Writing online, she said: “First they turn Iran’s strategic assets into bargaining chips; then they effectively transform these into burned cards and worthless leverage; and finally, by arguing that ‘we have no winning cards left,’ they drag the country from one pit into another colonial surrender agreement.”

Doubts about a lasting agreement

Some Iranian social media users argue that even a signed agreement would not prevent future war. Others fear that if a temporary arrangement evolves into a durable settlement, hopes for political change inside Iran will fade significantly. Many in this camp believe Trump has abandoned the Iranian people and left them alone.

Saeed Mohammadi-Jazi, a trader and financial analyst, wrote on X that within a few months either a comprehensive agreement would be reached — ensuring the survival of the current system — or the region would face a “big and final” war that would determine the fate of the Islamic Republic.

Another user wrote: “A real nuclear agreement seems unlikely. Both sides will use this temporary calm to prepare for the next round of conflict — a conflict that may resume within months.”

Some ordinary users have also criticized Washington for negotiating with the Islamic Republic.

One user wrote on X: “A temporary Iran-US agreement — if it is signed — will not end Iran’s crisis. A regime emerging from this war will be weaker externally but stronger internally, and financially integrated into the global economy without the slightest accountability for what it has done.”

“The people who came into the streets in January and were killed were used as bargaining chips in this equation and then discarded once the deal was completed,” the user added.

A nation suspended between war and peace

Many Iranians are following developments minute by minute with growing anxiety. Ordinary citizens say the prolonged atmosphere of uncertainty has become more exhausting than anything else.

Sima, a Tehran resident, said the feeling of living in a “neither war nor peace” situation has affected every aspect of her life and the lives of those around her.

“So many times we thought a deal was close, and then within hours everything suddenly changed, and the threat of war escalated again — like last night’s clashes in the Persian Gulf and Bandar Abbas,” she said. “I truly felt again as if I could hear planes and missiles above my head. Fortunately, so far, neither side has said these clashes mean the ceasefire has collapsed.”

On Iranian news websites, reports on gold and currency prices continue to dominate headlines. Amid soaring inflation and political instability that have weakened the national currency, many Iranians have turned to buying foreign currency and gold. Yet a temporary agreement could sharply reduce the value of those investments if markets suddenly fall.

Morteza, a Tehran-based engineer, said he converted all of his savings intended for buying a home into US dollars several months ago. Although he believes an agreement — especially one leading to sanctions relief — could improve the economy, he says the uncertainty keeps him awake at night.

“When I was a child, after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, many people — including my father — suffered huge losses when Iran accepted the ceasefire resolution,” he said.

The poster, announcing a memorial ceremony at the Abdol-Azim shrine in Rey, south of Tehran, lists Zahra Sadat Haddad-Adel, Boshra Hosseini Khamenei, Mesbah al-Hoda Bagheri and Zahra Mohammadi Golpayegani as among the dead.

Each name connects the Khamenei household to one of the families or institutions that have shaped the Islamic Republic’s political, cultural and administrative elite for decades: the parliament, the Supreme Leader’s office, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, Imam Sadegh University and the network of institutions around the leader’s office.

The ceremony itself is religious and familial. But the names on the poster point to something larger: a closed circle of family relationships through which access, influence and institutional power have long moved inside the Islamic Republic.

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The Haddad-Adel connection

One of the most recognizable names is Zahra Sadat Haddad-Adel, wife of Mojtaba Khamenei and daughter of Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel.

Haddad-Adel served as speaker of Iran’s seventh parliament from 2004 to 2008 and is known as the first non-clerical speaker of the Islamic Republic’s parliament. He also served as a lawmaker in several parliamentary terms and remains head of the Academy of Persian Language and Literature.

His influence extends beyond parliament. He is a member of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, an adviser to the slain Supreme Leader and founder of the private Farhang school, which critics have described as one of the symbols of special educational access for families close to the ruling system.

For critics, Haddad-Adel’s presence across political, cultural and educational institutions, combined with his family tie to the Khamenei household, reflects the concentration of power within a limited circle of families close to the state.

His name also appears on the US Treasury Department’s sanctions list.

Imam Sadegh University and the Bagheri Kani family

The name Mesbah al-Hoda Bagheri draws attention to another powerful network: the Bagheri Kani family and the institutions around Imam Sadegh University.

Mesbah al-Hoda Bagheri Kani was the husband of Hoda Khamenei, Ali Khamenei’s daughter, and the son of Mohammad-Bagher Bagheri Kani, an influential cleric who served in the Assembly of Experts and headed Imam Sadegh University.

The same family also includes Ali Bagheri Kani, a senior diplomat who has held key posts in Iran’s foreign policy establishment, including political deputy foreign minister, acting foreign minister, senior nuclear negotiator and senior positions in the Supreme National Security Council.

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Their uncle, Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani, was one of the Islamic Republic’s most influential clerics. He served as head of the Assembly of Experts, secretary-general of the Combatant Clergy Association, briefly as prime minister in 1981, and for decades as head of Imam Sadegh University.

Imam Sadegh University expanded after the 1979 revolution and became one of the main training grounds for state managers. Many officials in Iran’s political, security, media and diplomatic institutions are graduates of Imam Sadegh University.

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Through these links, the Bagheri Kani family connects the Khamenei household to one of the Islamic Republic’s most important pipelines for training and placing loyal officials in diplomacy, security, politics and state administration.

The Supreme Leader’s office

Another name on the poster, Zahra Mohammadi Golpayegani, points directly to the Supreme Leader’s office.

The 14-month-old child was connected to two of the most influential families in the Islamic Republic. On one side, she was the granddaughter of Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, the longtime head of Ali Khamenei’s office. On the other, she was a granddaughter of Ali Khamenei.

Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani headed the Supreme Leader’s office since 1989, the year Khamenei became leader. He is one of the most influential but least publicly visible figures in the Islamic Republic’s power structure.

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Because of his position, Golpayegani has played a central role in the messages, decisions and administrative machinery of the leader’s office. The US Treasury sanctioned him in 2019 over his role acting on behalf of that office.

His family link to Khamenei, as reflected in the name of Zahra Mohammadi Golpayegani, shows how the leader’s office is not only an institution but also part of a wider web of personal and familial ties.

Boshra Khamenei

The poster also lists Boshra Hosseini Khamenei, Ali Khamenei’s eldest daughter.

Unlike some other members of the Khamenei family, Boshra Khamenei has rarely appeared in public, and little information has been published about her personal life or activities.

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In recent weeks, state media have referred to her as “martyr Boshra Khamenei.” Some reports have mentioned her educational background and interest in literature.

Tabnak, in a report framed as a student’s note for “martyr Boshra Khamenei,” referred to her as “Ms. Hosseini” and described her connection to education and literature.

Her presence on the poster alongside the other names brings the focus back to the Khamenei family itself, a household that has remained mostly shielded from public life while remaining central to the structure of power.

A compressed image of power

The memorial poster is striking because it brings together four names that would otherwise appear in different corners of the Islamic Republic’s elite: the Haddad-Adel family, the Bagheri Kani family, the Mohammadi Golpayegani family and the Khamenei household.

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Together, they form a compressed image of how power has been organized around the leader’s family and its closest allies.

For critics of the Islamic Republic, the connections point to a familiar pattern: influence concentrated among a small circle of trusted families whose proximity to the leader’s office can open paths across the state.

The memorial in Rey is therefore more than a family or religious ceremony. It offers a glimpse of how, at the top of the Islamic Republic, family names often double as signs of political access, institutional reach and long-standing power.

In a fiery Hajj message, Mojtaba Khamenei described Israel as a “cancerous tumor” nearing the “final stages” of its existence, praised the October 7 attacks and repeated his father’s prediction that Israel would not survive beyond 2040.

The statement came as Hezbollah sharply increased attacks on Israel’s northern border, including explosive drone strikes near civilian communities, and as the Trump administration signaled progress toward a possible deal with Tehran.

The parallel escalation has raised questions over whether Tehran may be trying to strengthen its hand in talks with Washington, using Hezbollah as leverage while publicly hardening its posture toward Israel.

On X, Iran analyst Arash Azizi described Mojtaba Khamenei’s statement as “remarkable for how extremely eliminationist it is toward Israel, even by the regime’s standards.”

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar responded to Mojtaba Khamenei's remarks by invoking the fate of his slain father and pointing to the new supreme leader’s absence from public view since the February 28 attack, which killed several members of his family and left him injured.

“Sounds familiar. I remember someone with a similar surname who used to say it. BTW, where are you?” Sa’ar wrote.

Hezbollah as leverage against US

Reuters reported Tuesday that Israeli troops had expanded ground operations beyond a demarcation line established after the April ceasefire, while Hezbollah claimed attacks on Israeli forces using explosive drones, rockets and artillery.

For Sarit Zehavi, founder of the Alma Research and Education Center, the timing of Hezbollah’s escalation is no coincidence.

“There is no doubt they are doing that under the order of Tehran,” Zehavi told Iran International.

“They intensify the attacks while there is a lot of pressure on Iran to get a deal and the gaps between the Americans and the Iranians are really big,” she said.

Zehavi argued that Iran is using Hezbollah as leverage against Washington, either to pressure the United States into concessions or to prolong negotiations while the Islamic Republic rebuilds.

“They are using Hezbollah as a leverage of pressure on the Americans."

The escalation is already having deadly consequences inside Israel. Zehavi’s cousin’s son, Staff Sgt. Noam Hamburger, 23, was killed last week by a Hezbollah drone strike near the northern border, weeks before he was due to complete his military service.

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“In the process people are being killed,” Zehavi said.

Zehavi said Hezbollah’s escalation may also be intended to provoke a wider Israeli response in Lebanon, allowing Tehran to blame Israel if the diplomatic track collapses.

“They are dragging Israel to attack in Beirut at this specific time,” she said, “and that way blame Israel for any dead-end in the negotiations.”

Several commentators and state-linked outlets have suggested Qatar may be exploring financial mechanisms that would give Tehran access to some of its frozen assets without requiring direct US cash transfers to Iran.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati paid a highly publicized visit to Doha on Monday, fueling speculation that talks focused heavily on the frozen assets issue.

Iranian media widely linked Hemmati’s presence to negotiations over financial guarantees, though no official details of the discussions have been released.

CNN reported on Monday that Intense talks were ongoing in Doha in coordination with the United States, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s highly enriched uranium and frozen funds.

A day earlier, an informed source with direct knowledge of the negotiations told Iran International that Tehran has demanded guaranteed access to $12 billion in frozen assets during the first phase of any arrangement.

Iranian officials continue to insist that the country’s nuclear program and stockpile of highly enriched uranium should only be addressed in later stages of a broader agreement.

The current focus appears to center on roughly $6 billion in Iranian assets transferred from South Korea to Qatar in 2023 under a US-Iran prisoner exchange deal.

The funds were later re-frozen following the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent deterioration in relations between Tehran and Washington.

Mohammad Marandi, a commentator close to the Iranian government, suggested in a televised interview Sunday that Qatar could initially transfer the money to Iran before later being reimbursed by the United States.

Political analyst Shahir Shahidsaless wrote on X that such an arrangement would allow Washington to avoid directly paying Tehran while still meeting one of Iran’s principal demands.

Reuters previously reported, citing senior Iranian sources, that Washington had agreed in principle to release some frozen Iranian assets as part of efforts to secure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, though US officials later denied that any final agreement had been reached.

The IRGC-linked Tasnim news agency, citing what it described as an informed source, reported Sunday that Tehran had made clear it would reject any preliminary arrangement lacking a concrete first step by Washington on the assets issue.

“Iran has emphasized that without the release of a specific portion of the blocked assets in the very first step, and without a clear and guaranteed mechanism for the release of all frozen assets, no agreement will be possible,” the source told Tasnim.

Tasnim also claimed US officials were backtracking on earlier signals delivered through intermediaries regarding the funds.

“Based on past experiences of repeated American violations and obstruction,” the source said, “Iran will not allow the issue of asset release to be reduced to vague and unreal promises.”

Despite the tensions, Mashallah Shamsolvaezin, a member of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s Media Council, expressed cautious optimism, describing the frozen-assets dispute as “a small problem” in remarks to Fars News Agency.

He said the disagreement could be resolved within 48 hours and suggested future negotiations might move from Doha to Geneva or another location more accessible to the American delegation.

At the same time, hardline figures continue to insist on preserving what they describe as “Iran’s management” of the Strait of Hormuz.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei denied Monday that Tehran was seeking to impose tolls on ships passing through the waterway, but said providing navigation and environmental protection services would require fees.

Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief of the hardline Kayhan newspaper, criticized reports suggesting Iran could agree to reopen the Strait of Hormuz under a broader understanding with Washington.

“If this news is true,” he wrote, “the real meaning of opening the Strait of Hormuz is the disarmament of Iran against military, economic and political attacks by enemies.”

The comments highlighted the enduring influence of hardliners advocating maximalist demands, a dynamic critics say has repeatedly helped sink fragile diplomatic openings between Tehran and Washington.