Iran International
Iran’s clerical body, the Assembly of Experts, has elected Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the late Ali Khamenei, as the Islamic Republic’s new Supreme Leader, according to his informed sources who spoke to Iran International on condition of anonymity.
The decision marks one of the most consequential moments in the history of the Islamic Republic, effectively transferring power within the same family for the first time since the 1979 revolution.
But who exactly is Mojtaba Khamenei?
A powerful figure behind the scenes
Mojtaba Khamenei, 55, has long been considered one of the most influential figures inside Iran’s ruling system despite rarely appearing in public or holding formal political office.
For years he operated from within the Office of the Supreme Leader, serving as a gatekeeper and power broker around his father. His position has often been compared to the role played by Ahmad Khomeini, the son of Islamic Republic’s founder Ruhollah Khomeini, who served as a key aide and confidant during the early years of the revolutionary state.
Analysts say Mojtaba gradually built influence across the regime’s political, security and clerical institutions.
Dr. Eric Mandel, director of the Middle East Political and Information Network (MEPIN), told Iran International that Mojtaba has long been a central but opaque figure in Tehran’s power structure.
“Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, has long operated behind the scenes in Tehran, building deep ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and consolidating influence within the regime’s power structure. He is widely viewed as one of the architects of the regime’s repression," Mandel said.
Author and Iran analyst Arash Azizi told Iran International Mojtaba is viewed with deep suspicion. "This is why he has been a bete noire of democratic movements at least since 2009 when he was rumored to have helped orchestrate the repression. He is also known to be a favorite of some sections of the establishment such as those close to Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf who has ambitions of becoming Iran’s strongman."
Ties to Iran’s security establishment
A key source of Mojtaba’s influence lies in his close connections to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Mojtaba served in the Habib Battalion, a unit made up largely of volunteers connected to the Islamic Republic’s emerging revolutionary networks. The battalion operated under forces linked to the IRGC and took part in several major battles of the war.
Service in the Habib Battalion proved significant for Mojtaba. Many of the men who fought alongside him later rose to senior positions in Iran’s security and intelligence apparatus, including figures who would go on to lead parts of the IRGC’s intelligence organization and security commands responsible for protecting the regime.
Those wartime relationships are widely believed to have helped Mojtaba build lasting connections inside Iran’s powerful security establishment.
Over the years, opposition figures and political rivals have accused Mojtaba of playing a role in shaping election outcomes and coordinating crackdowns on dissent.
Questions over religious credentials
Iran’s constitution requires the Supreme Leader to possess deep knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence and be recognized as a senior religious authority.
Mojtaba, however, is not widely considered to be among the highest-ranking clerics in Iran. He studied in the seminaries of Qom under several prominent conservative scholars but does not hold the rank of ayatollah and is not a Mujtahid.
He also lacks any executive and administrative experiences which are required by the Constitution.
Despite that, Iran’s political system has historically shown flexibility when elite consensus forms around a candidate.
A controversial succession
Mojtaba’s elevation is likely to intensify criticism that the Islamic Republic founded as a revolutionary Islamic system is evolving toward dynastic rule.
For years speculation about his succession drew comparisons to hereditary monarchies.
For a man who has spent decades operating largely in the shadows of Iran’s power structure, Mojtaba Khamenei now finds himself at the center of one of the most consequential periods in the country’s modern history.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed on Saturday morning in US and Israeli air strikes. On Tuesday, according to exclusive information obtained by Iran International, Iran’s Assembly of Experts, under pressure from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), chose his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as the next Supreme Leader. The decision has not been made public and is expected to be announced after Ali Khamenei is buried.
This is not a routine succession. It is a wartime decision shaped by the security state, and it raises serious questions about constitutional procedure. The priority appears to be speed and control, as the Islamic Republic faces attacks from outside and a leadership vacuum at the top.
Why the IRGC pushed Mojtaba
The IRGC needed two things at the same time: control and legitimacy.
Control means keeping the chain of command intact, preventing splits at the top, keeping the security forces coordinated, and stopping a scramble for power. In this crisis, the IRGC’s first priority is internal stability.
Legitimacy matters too, but not in a broad national sense. It means legitimacy inside the regime’s core base: hard-line politicians, the security institutions, and the loyal networks that still see the Islamic Republic as “their” state. In that narrow world, Mojtaba has something others do not. He can claim direct continuity with Khamenei, and the core base can accept him without feeling the system has broken.
That combination is why the IRGC chose him.
Mojtaba also has long-standing ties to the IRGC, going back decades, and deep relationships across its command networks. For years, he has been a key channel between his father and the Guard’s leadership. That gives him a rare position. He is close to the security core, but also linked to the civilian and clerical leadership that depends on it.
He has also effectively run the Supreme Leader’s office, the Beit, for at least the past two decades, and is widely seen as Ali Khamenei’s closest confidant. The Beit is not just a state within the state. It is the core of the state itself. In practice, Iran’s elected government and president are often a façade, with little real power. Real authority has long sat in the Beit, which controls key security, political and financial levers. That is why this apparatus is now protecting itself, and why it does not want an outsider coming in and taking control.
The Islamic Republic at a fork in the road
The Islamic Republic now faces two broad directions.
One is to keep fighting, stay defiant, absorb more damage, and try to outlast the attacks. That would likely mean tighter internal control, the dispersal of forces and assets, and heavier reliance on asymmetric pressure, including missiles, drones, proxies, and covert operations, while signalling that the state will not negotiate under fire.
The other is to step back and accept major concessions to stop the war and reduce pressure. That would mean giving up key pillars of Iran’s regional and military posture in return for a halt to attacks and some easing of pressure.
Mojtaba is well placed to pursue either path.
If the system chooses a bitter deal, it needs someone who can own it and stop the hardcore from turning on the leadership. If it chooses to fight on, it needs someone who can keep the IRGC united and keep the security state functioning under sustained attack. That is the political function of this succession.
The main question now is whether Israel and the US will target him immediately or give him time to make that choice. If they strike him straight away, it will be hard to avoid one conclusion: the campaign is no longer about pressure or deterrence. It is about regime change. If they hold back, the focus shifts to Mojtaba’s next move, and whether he chooses escalation or a climbdown.
The problem of blood and revenge
Any agreement with Donald Trump was always difficult for Ali Khamenei. In Tehran’s narrative, Trump sought Iran’s “surrender” and had the blood of Qasem Soleimani on his hands. Khamenei repeatedly ruled out reconciliation and called for qisas, a concept in Islamic law meaning retribution, often understood as “life for life.”
For his successor, the burden is heavier. Trump now carries not only Soleimani’s blood, but also Ali Khamenei’s. That makes any compromise far harder to sell, and it also raises the domestic stakes for any decision to escalate.
Mojtaba has one advantage inside the system. He can present himself as the person entitled to decide what comes next. If the leadership chooses to fight on, he can frame it as continuity, duty, and retaliation. If it chooses to pause revenge and prioritise survival, he can frame it as a decision made by the heir and the family, not as a humiliation forced from the outside.
Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder and first Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, set the guiding rule in a line that has the force of a fatwa in Shia political doctrine: “Preserving the system is the highest duty.” In plain terms, it means the survival of the Islamic Republic comes before almost everything else. As vali-e dam, the next of kin with the right to demand retribution, Mojtaba can argue that he also has the right to set it aside if the state’s survival requires it. That is how he can ask the regime’s core base to accept restraint, and present it not as retreat, but as obedience to a higher obligation.
What stepping back would mean in practice
If Mojtaba chooses regime survival over confrontation, the price will be high. A serious de-escalation would likely mean accepting Trump’s demands, including:
For Mojtaba, accepting these would not just be a policy shift. It would mean dismantling his father’s 37-year legacy in a single afternoon.
Without real and verifiable change in these areas, the US and Israel would have little reason to stop.
Even then, a deal would not solve the regime’s deeper problem at home. Legitimacy inside Iranian society is badly damaged, especially after the January massacre, and the state is widely seen as corrupt, incompetent, and violent. A ceasefire might stop the bombs, but it would not stop the political decay.
Where this leaves the Islamic Republic
If Mojtaba keeps the hard line while the world’s most powerful military is striking alongside the region’s most capable one, the window for a new leader to consolidate may be measured in days, not months.
If he chooses a climbdown, the war may stop, but the inheritance remains bleak. He would be taking ownership of painful concessions that undo much of his father’s legacy, while inheriting a state that is badly broken. The Islamic Republic is facing something close to a failed-state reality: an economy in severe distress, hollowed-out institutions, and public hostility so high that normal governance becomes hard to sustain. A halt in attacks would not restore capacity, trust, or authority.
Either way, Mojtaba Khamenei begins in the ruins of his father’s world. The Islamic Republic’s options are all expensive, its survival is no longer guaranteed, and for the first time in forty years, time is the one thing Tehran cannot buy.
“The United States Munitions Stockpiles have, at the medium and upper medium grade, never been higher or better,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.
The US, he wrote, has “a virtually unlimited supply of these weapons” and that “Wars can be fought ‘forever,’ and very successfully, using just these supplies.”
His remarks came after CNN and The Wall Street Journal reported concerns about the pace at which key US munitions are being consumed in the escalating war with Iran.
Meanwhile, Washington sustains both offensive strikes and defensive intercept operations across the region. US systems, including Patriot and THAAD batteries deployed in Israel and neighboring states, have been heavily engaged in countering Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks.
CNN reported on Monday that US reserves of certain missile systems – including Tomahawk land-attack missiles and SM-3 interceptors – are under strain amid sustained operations.
The Wall Street Journal also wrote Sunday that as the US planned operations against Iran, the military’s top general raised concerns about munitions stockpiles, particularly air defense interceptors needed to counter Iranian ballistic missiles and drones targeting regional sites hosting US forces.
Trump, in a separate post on Tuesday, called The Wall Street Journal report a “disgrace” on Truth Social, saying the United States has “unlimited mid to upper tier Weaponry – Brutal ‘stuff.’”
Iran’s arsenal under pressure
Trump told Politico on Tuesday that Iran was running out of crucial armaments.
“They’re running out and they’re running out of areas to shoot them, because they’re being decimated,” Trump said. “They’re running out of launchers.”
The New York Times reported Sunday, citing Israeli military officials, that Israeli airstrikes carried out since June last year have destroyed roughly 200 Iranian ballistic missile launchers and disabled dozens more – amounting to about half of Iran’s operational launcher fleet.
Israeli strikes, according to the report, during both the current offensive and last summer’s 12-day campaign also hit Iran’s primary explosives production facility. That complex provides key components for missile warheads and supports weapons programs including rockets, drones and cruise missiles.
Before last year’s assault, Israeli intelligence had assessed that Iran possessed approximately 3,000 ballistic missiles and was seeking to dramatically expand output, potentially reaching 8,000 missiles by 2027.
A Defense Express analysis on Tuesday said that as of Monday, Iran had launched at least 771 ballistic missiles at neighboring countries and Israel since the start of the conflict.
The figure is not definitive, as totals vary by reporting country and strikes remain ongoing. Defense Express noted that different states have published their own counts while Iran continues firing missiles, and Tehran has not released an official tally of launches.
Despite damage inflicted during the earlier campaign, The New York Times reported that Iran has attempted to rebuild its missile manufacturing capacity, with recent estimates suggesting output of dozens of missiles per month. The newspaper added that Iran has also sought components from abroad to restore its surface-to-surface missile arsenal.
Images from the briefing showed spokesperson Esmail Baghaei speaking from a podium inside Mahalati School in Tehran. Iranian outlets said the school had been hit in recent attacks and presented the setting as evidence that educational facilities were being targeted.
Holding an official briefing in a classroom also prompted renewed speculation online that some officials may be seeking to operate from civilian buildings.
In recent days, social media users have circulated videos and photographs that appear to show security forces stationed inside schools in Tehran and Shiraz.
Iran International has also reported on security activity inside medical facilities. In one case, it cited a hospital employee who said military commanders held meetings inside a Tehran hospital.
Military presence in civilian sites
Teachers’ unions have voiced alarm. The Coordinating Council of Iranian Teachers’ Trade Associations published an image a day before US-Israeli strikes began showing what it said was military equipment positioned inside a school, warning that classrooms were being turned into “shields for deadly equipment.”
Earlier this week, an image was released from a meeting of the interim leadership council, attended by President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei and cleric Alireza Arafi.
Hours later, social media posts suggested the meeting had taken place in a ward at Tehran’s Arman Hospital.
International humanitarian law requires parties to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives.
Schools and hospitals are protected unless, and for such time as, they are used for military purposes, and the use of civilians to shield military objectives is prohibited.
Disputed strike in Minab
The controversy intensified after Iranian media reported that an elementary and preschool complex in Minab, Hormozgan province, adjacent to an IRGC compound, was struck on February 28, killing more than 160 people.
Asked about the incident, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the United States would not deliberately target a school and that its objectives were focused on missiles, related manufacturing and launch capabilities, and drones.
"We would have no interest and frankly no incentive to target civilian infrastructure.”
Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, said on Monday he had seen differing accounts of what happened in Minab, including claims that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards were responsible. He said Israel targets military assets and expressed regret for civilian casualties.
“We regret the loss of life of any civilian. And we pray for the people of Iran. But we have the intelligence and we target military assets. That’s what we do. The Iranians, they do exactly the opposite,” he said.
As the conflict deepens, any overlap between official or security activity and civilian sites could increase the risks for densely populated areas and raise further legal and humanitarian concerns.
“I think that is a big miscalculation on the part of Iran,” Petraeus told 24 with Fardad Farahzad Show, arguing that striking Arab countries that had sought to avoid direct involvement could push them to contribute more directly to regional defense efforts.
US and Israeli forces, Petraeus said, have already “dramatically degraded” Iran’s retaliatory capabilities, though he cautioned it was too early to determine whether the decline in attacks over the past 12 to 24 hours signaled a lasting shift.
“I think it's premature at this point to judge whether or not that will degrade further or if the volume can pick back up,” he said.
Coalition dynamics shift
Petraeus said Tehran’s decision to target regional states – including those that did not allow their bases to be used for operations – may alter the strategic calculus across the Persian Gulf.
Many countries in the region, he said, are already contributing to an integrated air and missile defense network that includes US-supplied Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, along with naval assets and aircraft capable of intercepting incoming projectiles.
While he stopped short of predicting expanded offensive participation, Petraeus said additional Western powers could also align more closely with the effort. “I’m confident they are all taking part in the defensive efforts that are ongoing,” he said.
Uncertain path to political change
Addressing whether military pressure could lead to political transformation inside Iran, Petraeus said any lasting shift would depend primarily on internal fractures within the security forces and leadership.
“The sad reality in such cases often is that the most guys with the most guns and the most willing to be brutal to the people prevail,” he said, cautioning against assumptions that external air campaigns alone can bring about regime collapse.
Petraeus described exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi as a symbolic presence who has outlined a transition toward an elected government rather than dismantling all existing institutions.
Ultimately, he said, momentum would hinge on whether influential insiders conclude that continued confrontation has become unsustainable, shaping not only Iran’s future but the broader balance of power across the Middle East.
