How four Khamenei family names map the Islamic Republic’s inner circle

In a fiery Hajj message, Mojtaba Khamenei described Israel as a “cancerous tumor” nearing the “final stages” of its existence, praised the October 7 attacks and repeated his father’s prediction that Israel would not survive beyond 2040.

The statement came as Hezbollah sharply increased attacks on Israel’s northern border, including explosive drone strikes near civilian communities, and as the Trump administration signaled progress toward a possible deal with Tehran.

The parallel escalation has raised questions over whether Tehran may be trying to strengthen its hand in talks with Washington, using Hezbollah as leverage while publicly hardening its posture toward Israel.

On X, Iran analyst Arash Azizi described Mojtaba Khamenei’s statement as “remarkable for how extremely eliminationist it is toward Israel, even by the regime’s standards.”

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar responded to Mojtaba Khamenei's remarks by invoking the fate of his slain father and pointing to the new supreme leader’s absence from public view since the February 28 attack, which killed several members of his family and left him injured.

“Sounds familiar. I remember someone with a similar surname who used to say it. BTW, where are you?” Sa’ar wrote.

Hezbollah as leverage against US

Reuters reported Tuesday that Israeli troops had expanded ground operations beyond a demarcation line established after the April ceasefire, while Hezbollah claimed attacks on Israeli forces using explosive drones, rockets and artillery.

For Sarit Zehavi, founder of the Alma Research and Education Center, the timing of Hezbollah’s escalation is no coincidence.

“There is no doubt they are doing that under the order of Tehran,” Zehavi told Iran International.

“They intensify the attacks while there is a lot of pressure on Iran to get a deal and the gaps between the Americans and the Iranians are really big,” she said.

Zehavi argued that Iran is using Hezbollah as leverage against Washington, either to pressure the United States into concessions or to prolong negotiations while the Islamic Republic rebuilds.

“They are using Hezbollah as a leverage of pressure on the Americans."

The escalation is already having deadly consequences inside Israel. Zehavi’s cousin’s son, Staff Sgt. Noam Hamburger, 23, was killed last week by a Hezbollah drone strike near the northern border, weeks before he was due to complete his military service.

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“In the process people are being killed,” Zehavi said.

Zehavi said Hezbollah’s escalation may also be intended to provoke a wider Israeli response in Lebanon, allowing Tehran to blame Israel if the diplomatic track collapses.

“They are dragging Israel to attack in Beirut at this specific time,” she said, “and that way blame Israel for any dead-end in the negotiations.”

"Welcome back Iran! Metrics show a further rise in connectivity as mobile networks and other segments are reconnected to the global internet," the internet observatory Netblocks said in a Tuesday post on X.

"Filternet remains in place but can be worked around. WhatsApp now restricted, requiring circumvention. Some users still offline," it added, as it put the connectivity rate at 86 percent.

The restoration followed a Monday vote by a special cyberspace body created by President Masoud Pezeshkian to return international internet access to its pre-January 2026 status.

However, state media reported Tuesday that an administrative court had temporarily suspended implementation of the order that established the body, raising questions over the legal future of the reopening process.

ICT Minister Sattar Hashemi said the restoration decision was approved by nine votes to two at the body’s first official meeting, while his deputy said the reopening of fixed-line internet had begun nationwide.

On Monday, the IRGC-affiliated Fars News agency first questioned whether the administration had the authority to issue such an order, arguing that because the restrictions were imposed by the Supreme National Security Council, only the same body could formally reverse them.

Hours later, however, Fars appeared to soften its position in an editorial describing the reopening as a necessary “technical and security” decision that would have happened “sooner or later” as cyber conditions improved.

The outlet said the restrictions had originally been imposed to prevent cyber espionage and protect critical infrastructure during wartime conditions and an unprecedented wave of cyberattacks.

While acknowledging criticism over the legal process behind the decision, Fars dismissed efforts to turn the issue into a political dispute and accused some reformist media outlets of exploiting the shutdown to deepen internal divisions during what it described as a “full-scale war.”

The meeting of the Special Task Force on Cyberspace Management ended with nine votes in favor and three against reconnecting Iran to the global internet, according to reports.

Peyman Jebelli, head of Iran’s state broadcaster, and Mohammad-Amin Aghamiri, secretary of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, were among the strongest opponents of restoring international internet access, Faraz reported citing informed sources.

According to Faraz, both men remained firmly opposed to reconnecting the country to the global internet until the end of the meeting.

The report said Aghamiri’s position was particularly notable because the secretary of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace is appointed by the president. Although Aghamiri was first appointed under the previous administration, Pezeshkian later retained him in the post.

Faraz said Aghamiri’s opposition had placed him at odds with the government at a time when Pezeshkian has publicly identified restoring internet access as one of his priorities.

Several commentators and state-linked outlets have suggested Qatar may be exploring financial mechanisms that would give Tehran access to some of its frozen assets without requiring direct US cash transfers to Iran.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati paid a highly publicized visit to Doha on Monday, fueling speculation that talks focused heavily on the frozen assets issue.

Iranian media widely linked Hemmati’s presence to negotiations over financial guarantees, though no official details of the discussions have been released.

CNN reported on Monday that Intense talks were ongoing in Doha in coordination with the United States, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s highly enriched uranium and frozen funds.

A day earlier, an informed source with direct knowledge of the negotiations told Iran International that Tehran has demanded guaranteed access to $12 billion in frozen assets during the first phase of any arrangement.

Iranian officials continue to insist that the country’s nuclear program and stockpile of highly enriched uranium should only be addressed in later stages of a broader agreement.

The current focus appears to center on roughly $6 billion in Iranian assets transferred from South Korea to Qatar in 2023 under a US-Iran prisoner exchange deal.

The funds were later re-frozen following the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent deterioration in relations between Tehran and Washington.

Mohammad Marandi, a commentator close to the Iranian government, suggested in a televised interview Sunday that Qatar could initially transfer the money to Iran before later being reimbursed by the United States.

Political analyst Shahir Shahidsaless wrote on X that such an arrangement would allow Washington to avoid directly paying Tehran while still meeting one of Iran’s principal demands.

Reuters previously reported, citing senior Iranian sources, that Washington had agreed in principle to release some frozen Iranian assets as part of efforts to secure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, though US officials later denied that any final agreement had been reached.

The IRGC-linked Tasnim news agency, citing what it described as an informed source, reported Sunday that Tehran had made clear it would reject any preliminary arrangement lacking a concrete first step by Washington on the assets issue.

“Iran has emphasized that without the release of a specific portion of the blocked assets in the very first step, and without a clear and guaranteed mechanism for the release of all frozen assets, no agreement will be possible,” the source told Tasnim.

Tasnim also claimed US officials were backtracking on earlier signals delivered through intermediaries regarding the funds.

“Based on past experiences of repeated American violations and obstruction,” the source said, “Iran will not allow the issue of asset release to be reduced to vague and unreal promises.”

Despite the tensions, Mashallah Shamsolvaezin, a member of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s Media Council, expressed cautious optimism, describing the frozen-assets dispute as “a small problem” in remarks to Fars News Agency.

He said the disagreement could be resolved within 48 hours and suggested future negotiations might move from Doha to Geneva or another location more accessible to the American delegation.

At the same time, hardline figures continue to insist on preserving what they describe as “Iran’s management” of the Strait of Hormuz.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei denied Monday that Tehran was seeking to impose tolls on ships passing through the waterway, but said providing navigation and environmental protection services would require fees.

Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief of the hardline Kayhan newspaper, criticized reports suggesting Iran could agree to reopen the Strait of Hormuz under a broader understanding with Washington.

“If this news is true,” he wrote, “the real meaning of opening the Strait of Hormuz is the disarmament of Iran against military, economic and political attacks by enemies.”

The comments highlighted the enduring influence of hardliners advocating maximalist demands, a dynamic critics say has repeatedly helped sink fragile diplomatic openings between Tehran and Washington.

The pressure comes as parliament prepares to elect its new presidium on Monday.

An unusually blunt report published Sunday by the semi-official Iran Labour News Agency (ILNA) described what it called “organized destruction,” media pressure campaigns and coordinated text-message attacks targeting Ghalibaf ahead of the vote.

A lawmaker interviewed by ILNA, Rouhollah Lak Aliabadi, accused political rivals of orchestrating text-message campaigns against Ghalibaf in an effort to influence members of parliament before the leadership vote.

He said opponents were portraying support for negotiations as a form of surrender or deviation from revolutionary principles, even though decisions regarding diplomacy ultimately rest with Iran’s top leadership.

The attacks reflect broader tensions inside Iran’s conservative establishment as indirect negotiations with Washington appear to be gaining momentum.

US President Donald Trump struck a cautiously optimistic tone over the weekend, saying negotiators should “not rush into a deal” because “time is on our side,” while administration officials indicated progress had been made on the outlines of a possible agreement.

At the same time, officials and media outlets close to the Revolutionary Guards have emphasized deep skepticism toward Washington, insisting major disagreements remain unresolved and warning against excessive optimism.

Among the most contentious issues are restrictions affecting the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions relief, the future of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile and the sequencing of commitments by both sides.

The growing attacks on Ghalibaf suggest hardliners fear that even a limited diplomatic breakthrough could shift the balance of power within the Islamic Republic toward figures advocating a more controlled and pragmatic form of engagement with the West.

A similar dynamic is also visible in Washington, where prominent Republican hawks and conservative commentators have begun warning against any agreement they believe would leave Iran’s military or nuclear infrastructure substantially intact.

Senator Ted Cruz has been among those signaling concern that the administration may be softening its position, while Democratic critics such as Senator Chris Murphy argue the war failed to achieve its objectives and ultimately left Tehran in a stronger position.

After two months offline, Morteza finally managed to reconnect for a few minutes and send a message to a group of old friends.

“Hi guys, do you know any VPN that actually works?” he wrote. “I’m locked out of my hearing-aid account. I can’t update it.”

The message captured something many Iranians have been trying to explain for months: the country’s internet crisis is no longer just about Instagram, Telegram or access to foreign news websites. The internet has become woven into nearly every aspect of daily life: from work and banking to transportation, education and healthcare.

Iran’s latest shutdown, which began on February 28 and continues in various forms, has become one of the longest nationwide internet disruptions in the world.

Even global tech companies have begun to feel its effects. Meta, the owner of WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram, recently reported that the average daily users of its apps fell from 3.58 billion to 3.56 billion in the first quarter of the year, partly because of internet disruptions in Iran.

The decline was small by Meta standards but striking nonetheless: Iran’s blackout had become large enough to leave visible marks on the usage charts of some of the world’s biggest technology platforms.

The whitelist

During wars, outages caused by attacks on infrastructure are not unusual. But in Iran’s case, the authorities themselves ordered and implemented the restrictions while simultaneously insisting that no real “internet shutdown” had occurred.

Officials instead describe the measures as restrictions on “foreign platforms” imposed because of wartime conditions.

Rasool Jalili, a member of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace, argued that when foreign media speak about an internet shutdown, they really mean access to Instagram and Telegram. He went further, placing those platforms in the same category as American fighter jets and missiles.

The comparison reflects a broader shift in how parts of the Iranian establishment increasingly view the internet: not as infrastructure, but as a threat to governance and security.

The same argument is often echoed abroad by commentators close to the government. Mohammad Marandi, for example, argued in response to an Al Jazeera report that because some domestic applications and services remained functional, describing the situation as an “internet blackout” was misleading.

Technically, internet filtering usually means blocking specific websites or services from a global network—a system based on blacklists.

But what Iran is now moving toward goes further than blocking Instagram, X or Telegram. Increasingly, access itself is being reorganized around approved users and approved services through a system marketed as “Internet Pro.”

Internet as privilege

The idea emerged publicly after the ceasefire alongside official talk of domestic governance of foreign platforms. 

The government presented the plan—reportedly approved by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council—as a temporary measure designed to reduce pressure on businesses during wartime.

In practice, it creates different layers of internet access based on profession, identity and official approval.

A doctor’s package may allow access to YouTube while keeping Instagram blocked. A businessman’s package may permit Instagram but not other services. The result is a more formalized version of what critics inside Iran have long described as “class-based internet.”

The prolonged restrictions have inflicted severe damage on businesses already weakened by inflation and war. But they have also created new economic opportunities.

Pursuit of workarounds

VPNs sold in Iran vary widely. Some are commercial products, others are homemade “configurations” that function only through specific servers and routes, while some reportedly rely indirectly on systems such as Starlink.

For users, however, they all mean the same thing: paying increasingly large sums for fragments of connection to the outside world.

Reports suggest VPN prices have multiplied several times since the beginning of the war, though free anti-censorship tools developed by independent developers occasionally disrupt the market and drive prices down.

But here is the contradiction: if unrestricted internet access is truly considered a security threat, why does that same access become available to approved groups through money, permits or connections?

Independent investigative journalist Yashar Soltani has argued that the “Internet Pro” system is tied partly to the financial interests of major telecom operators and networks linked to powerful state institutions.

Whether or not all aspects of those claims withstand scrutiny, one reality is already visible inside Iran: alongside the shutdown itself, a market has emerged for selling different levels of digital access.

The result is a growing divide between those who remain connected and those effectively cut off from the outside world.

At the same time as restricting access to the global internet, the Islamic Republic has increasingly redefined connectivity not as a public right but as a controlled privilege—one that can be priced, restricted and distributed according to political and economic priorities.

In Iran today, internet access is becoming not just a tool of communication, but a commodity and an instrument of control.