More than 36,500 Iranians were killed by security forces during the January 8-9 crackdown on nationwide protests, making it the deadliest two-day protest massacre in history, according to documents reviewed by Iran International's Editorial Board.
Iran International's Editorial Board can confirm the death toll after reviewing newly obtained classified documents, field reports, and accounts from medical staff, witnesses, and victims’ families.
The new information provides a clearer picture of the killing pattern and the scale of a crime that can now be described as the largest and bloodiest massacre of civilians during street protests, over a two-day period, in history.
Iran International has received reports and evidence indicating the extrajudicial execution of a number of detainees in Tehran and other cities. Images released from morgues leave little doubt that some wounded citizens were shot in the head while hospitalized and undergoing medical treatment. It is evident that, had these individuals sustained fatal head wounds on the streets, there would have been no reason to admit them to hospital or begin treatment in the first place.
The images also show that in some cases, medical tubes and patient-monitoring equipment remained attached to the bodies. In other cases, cardiac monitoring electrodes are visible on the chest, suggesting these individuals were under medical care before being shot in the head. A number of doctors and nurses have also told Iran International that so-called “finishing shots” were fired at wounded patients.
In its previous statement on January 13, Iran International’s Editorial Board reported at least 12,000 deaths caused by the crackdown.
That figure was explicitly cited in a report by the IRGC Intelligence Organization submitted to the Supreme National Security Council and the Presidential Office on January 11, two days after the two-day massacre, reviewed by Iran International.
36,500 killed in 400 cities
Our Editorial Board has now obtained more detailed information provided by the IRGC Intelligence Organization to the Supreme National Security Council.
Other state institutions have also received differing figures from other security bodies. However, given the scale of the killings, deliberate concealment, and what appears to be intentional disorder in the registration and transfer of bodies – along with pressure on families and, in some cases, the quiet burial of victims – it appears that even the security agencies themselves do not yet know the precise final death toll.
In a report presented on Wednesday, January 21, to the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee seen by Iran International, the number of those killed was listed as at least 27,500.
According to sources within Iran’s Interior Ministry who spoke to Iran International on condition of anonymity, a consolidation of figures received from provincial security councils by Tuesday, January 20, showed the death toll had exceeded 30,000.
Two informed sources from the Supreme National Security Council also told Iran International that in two recent reports by the IRGC Intelligence Organization, dated January 22 and January 24, the number of those killed was listed as more than 33,000 and more than 36,500 respectively.
Interior Ministry reports say security forces confronted demonstrators in more than 400 cities and towns, with more than 4,000 clash locations reported nationwide.
Despite the confusion and concealment, the rapid increase in death toll figures in classified government reports has heightened concerns that the actual number of those killed may be even higher.
Due to communication restrictions and security pressure, independent verification remains impossible. However, based on credible information from hospital sources and eyewitnesses, the number of deaths in several major cities is described as shocking.
Conservative assessments by medical sources, based on the number of bodies delivered to hospitals and medical centers, estimate more than 2,500 killed in Rasht, at least 1,800 in Mashhad, more than 2,000 in Isfahan, Najafabad, and Khorasgan, at least 3,000 in Karaj, Shahriar, and Andisheh, 700 in Kermanshah, and 400 in Gorgan.
No clear aggregate figure has yet been obtained for Tehran. However, images released from Kahrizak morgue and hospitals across the capital indicate that thousands were killed in Tehran, with a significant proportion of the deaths occurring in southern Tehran.
Horrifying details of a historic crime
1 - Three doctors and four nurses in Tehran who spoke to Iran International said security forces entered hospitals and took away some wounded patients who were undergoing treatment. Images received by Iran International, along with videos circulating on social media, also show that some bodies with gunshot wounds to the head bear clear signs of hospitalization.
Two other nurses told Iran International that after a wounded young man was transferred to an ambulance in a clash area in western Tehran, a security agent suddenly entered the vehicle and, in front of them, killed him by firing two consecutive shots. The nurses said the man had been severely beaten before being moved and was semi-conscious. A trusted specialist physician at a Tehran hospital confirmed their account.
There are also reports that individuals were detained at home and that their families were later told to go to Kahrizak to collect their bodies. Other reports say security forces went to homes and drew people to the door – including under the pretext of delivering a package – before shooting and killing them.
These deeply alarming reports have in recent days been published by families or provided to Iran International by credible eyewitnesses.
If confirmed through independent investigation, the accounts would amount to clear cases of extrajudicial killing and, if found to be widespread, could be examined under the rubric of crimes against humanity.
The withholding of detainee numbers, the unknown locations of detention sites, and the lack of clarity over prisoners’ access to medical care and legal representation have heightened concerns among human rights activists.
A prominent lawyer inside Iran, who requested anonymity, described the situation as an “international human rights crisis.” He said, “Unofficial reports indicate that tens of thousands have been arrested, and the IRGC or whichever security body has custody of them can kill as many as it wants, send their bodies to Kahrizak or other morgues, and claim they were killed on the streets.”
2 - The organized killings across Iran indicate the brutal crackdown was carried out with the agreement and cooperation of state institutions and on the orders of the highest authorities of the Islamic Republic.
According to information received by Iran International, following a speech by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on January 9, phrases such as “al-nasr bil-ru‘b” (victory through terror) and “fight them until there is no sedition” were used in briefings and discussions among senior IRGC commanders. The same phrases also appeared on January 9 in Telegram channels affiliated to hardliners.
3 - Numerous reports and other evidence indicate that in many cities, bereaved families were forced to pay large sums described as “bullet fees” in exchange for receiving the bodies of their loved ones. In some cases, despite families’ objections, those killed were presented as members of the Basij militia.
4 - While most of the killings were carried out by IRGC and Basij forces, reports received by Iran International indicate that proxy forces from Iraq and Syria were also used in the crackdown. The deployment of non-local forces suggests a decision to expand repression capacity as quickly as possible.
Should Iran International obtain further information, it will inform its audience in subsequent statements.
Call for submission of evidence
Iran International once again calls on all compatriots inside and outside the country to send any documents, videos, photographs, audio testimonies, information about those killed or wounded, medical centers, locations of clashes, timing and geography of events, and any verifiable details related to the events of the past weeks.
The security of sources and confidentiality of information are our highest priorities. If you are concerned about your safety, do not send identifying information and provide only general, verifiable details.
Following verification and careful assessment, Iran International will publish its findings and share them with all relevant international bodies and institutions.
The truth will be recorded and documented. The names of the victims will be preserved. This crime will not be buried in silence.
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting has lost the few audience it once assumed it possessed. According to a 2024 survey by the state-run ISPA, only 12.5 percent of Iranians follow the news through the state broadcaster, and 11.5 percent watch films and TV series on state TV.
Viewers have migrated elsewhere, disengaged, or stopped watching altogether. The result is a broadcaster that retains infrastructure and reach on paper but has been stripped of public relevance in practice.
This erosion matters because the system was never designed to retain an audience. Its function was to define reality by default, assuming passive consumption rather than active belief. Once viewers disengaged, repetition lost its force. Control of distribution no longer compensates for the absence of viewers.
During moments of nationwide crisis, when internet shutdowns leave citizens with few information sources, state television no longer functions as a reference point. Instead, it serves as a tool of narrative management: selecting what can be shown, omitting what cannot be explained, and substituting political reality with staged images of normalcy.
Broadcasting without an audience
For decades, Iran’s media model assumed a captive audience. State television and aligned agencies – particularly Guards-affiliated outlets such as Tasnim and Fars – operate not as independent newsrooms but as synchronized instruments of governance. Their role has been to speak in a single vocabulary, regardless of whether anyone is listening.
This model depends on two conditions: uninterrupted control of distribution and a public compelled to accept official framing as the baseline. Periods of unrest strain both. Authorities respond by narrowing the information space – blocking platforms, jamming opposition satellite networks, sidelining independent outlets and cutting internet access – to prevent images and testimony from circulating outside official filters.
Yet this strategy also exposes weakness. When viewers are forced back to a channel they no longer trust, omissions and contradictions become more visible, not less. Absence of alternatives does not restore authority; it highlights how little credibility remains.
Managing perception through omission
One of the clearest techniques used by Iranian state media during crises is substitution: replacing destabilizing political reality with curated depictions of normalcy. While protests across the country have been driven by explicit rejection of the political system – including chants calling for the overthrow of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – state television has persistently reframed unrest as a response to economic pressure.
Instead of addressing violence, casualties or political slogans, IRIB dispatched reporters to city streets to highlight the availability of basic goods such as chicken meat. These segments emphasized supply while omitting that prices had surged several times over in recent weeks.
By focusing on availability rather than affordability – and by recasting a political uprising as economic grievance – the broadcasts constructed an image of stability. The effect was to depoliticize a movement defined not by price demands, but by calls for the end of the ruling order.
Alongside omission sits coercive performance: televised confessions aired by Fars and Tasnim from detained protesters presented as “leaders” of unrest. These segments are not designed to persuade skeptics. They function as demonstrations of power, signaling the state’s ability to script guilt and enforce compliance.
From staged crowds to synthetic reality
What distinguishes the current phase is not the presence of propaganda, but its tools. Traditional methods – recycled crowd shots, selective framing and inflated attendance claims – have long been used. What is new is reliance on digitally manipulated or AI-assisted content that blurs the line between documentation and fabrication.
A recent example illustrates such shift. State media circulated a video presented as aerial helicopter footage of pro-government rallies, promoting it as evidence of mass popular support. Viewers quickly questioned its authenticity, pointing to visual inconsistencies in lighting, movement and composition, as well as the absence of basic helicopter safety features.
The state’s instinctive response – denial, external blame and further restriction – reinforced the cycle. Each tightening of control signaled anxiety. Each refusal to address substantive questions accelerated the erosion of credibility.
Whether every technical critique was correct was secondary. The significance lay in the reaction. Official visuals were no longer treated as authentic; they were examined as artifacts to be tested for manipulation.
This marked a shift from propaganda as persuasion to propaganda as evidence production. The aim was no longer only to frame events, but to manufacture visual proof. Paradoxically, the more sophisticated the techniques, the faster trust eroded.
Rasht Bazaar: A disaster told through one voice
The fire at Rasht’s central bazaar showed how narrative control operates under blackout conditions.
During protests in the northern city on January 8 and 9, a large section of the historic market caught fire as internet and phone services were cut, limiting residents’ ability to document events. State television retained full operational capacity and sent reporters to the scene while the fire was still burning.
Official coverage attributed the blaze to protesters and focused on material damage, repeatedly citing the number of shops destroyed. Casualty figures were absent. Later segments emphasized economic losses through interviews with selected shopkeepers and officials, while avoiding scrutiny of security forces.
Eyewitness testimony carried by Iran International described a sharply different sequence: crowds pushed toward the bazaar, people trapped by smoke in narrow corridors, and security forces firing on those emerging with raised hands to surrender.
In this environment, state broadcasting operated with technical access but without an audience willing to accept its account. The absence of open networks and real-time citizen reporting produced a one-sided evidentiary landscape shaped by coercion and selective disclosure.
Beyond access: a crisis of credibility
Iran’s media crisis is often framed as a problem of access – blocked platforms, censored outlets and restricted bandwidth. It is more fundamentally a crisis of credibility.
A broadcaster that has lost its viewers may still produce content, but it no longer produces belief. Control without an audience is not influence. And in politics, messages that are not believed might as well not be seen.
