Hormuz disruption tests limits of global energy markets

Supporters of the Islamic Republic have gathered in several cities to show loyalty to the new leader. The officialdom has congratulated him in unison. But Khamenei Jr is yet to appear.

There has been no speech, no televised address and very few photos or videos of the new leader. The only recording attributed to him so far is a short old video announcing that his religious classes have been canceled.

The lack of information has been so striking that even state media appears uncertain about how to present him to the public.

Older photographs have been circulated, stylized illustrations or AI-generated renderings have appeared online to fill the visual vacuum. These images are not presented as authentic photos but symbolic representations.

The situation raises a central question: what scenario may explain the unusual debut of Iran’s new Supreme Leader?

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  The ascendency of Khamenei Jr was a long-planned improvisation

Scenario one: delayed unveiling

The simplest explanation is that the Islamic Republic intends to introduce Mojtaba through a carefully managed televised address or recorded message once security conditions allow.

In this scenario, the leadership transition would be framed as orderly and unified, with Mojtaba reiterating familiar themes of resistance, continuity and cohesion under wartime pressure.

Even so, the delay itself invites scrutiny. Authorities could cite security concerns, but the absence of even a brief recorded message—particularly after the steady stream of congratulatory statements from senior officials—has raised questions about the pace and choreography of the transition.

For now, the silence has only heightened curiosity about how and when the new leader will first address the public.

Scenario two: leadership by statement

A second possibility is that Mojtaba may initially govern largely through written statements rather than public appearances. Such an approach would allow the system to project continuity while limiting exposure during a volatile security moment.

Iran’s leadership has long relied on tightly managed messaging, and written statements attributed to Mojtaba could reiterate established positions while reinforcing the central role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which appears to wield growing influence over wartime decision-making.

State television has already described Mojtaba as a veteran of the “Ramadan war,” part of an emerging narrative that presents him as shaped by wartime experience. Under this scenario, his absence would reflect caution rather than weakness.

Scenario three: managed vacuum

A third possibility is that Mojtaba’s continued absence reflects deeper uncertainty within the leadership itself.

The Islamic Republic is operating under sustained Israeli and US strikes, and the rapid announcement of his succession may have served primarily to prevent internal competition at a moment of acute vulnerability.

Another explanation is that Mojtaba may have been injured in the same attacks that killed his father and other senior figures—a scenario that would help explain both the speed of his appointment and his continued absence.

Naming him quickly could have forestalled rivalries among powerful factions while allowing the Revolutionary Guards and other security institutions to consolidate operational control.

In such circumstances, Mojtaba would function largely as a symbolic leader while practical authority remained concentrated within the security establishment, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in particular.

Presenting an absent or wounded successor could also suppress dissent by discouraging open criticism of someone portrayed as a victim of the same war that killed the previous Supreme Leader.

Continuity and risk

Such a strategy, however, carries risks. If the leader continues to remain unseen for an extended period, public skepticism could deepen further, particularly among a population already wary of official narratives.

The lack of clarity may also reinforce uncertainty within the elite at a time when the system is under exceptional strain.

In the short term, projecting continuity appears to be the system’s priority. By naming a successor quickly, even if still absent, the establishment in Tehran may hope to signal stability to both domestic and international audiences.

Whether that image can be sustained, however, may ultimately depend on one simple question: when and if Iran’s new Supreme Leader finally appears.

The longer he remains unseen, the more his absence risks becoming a political fact in its own right—one that could deepen uncertainty at a moment when Tehran can least afford it.

Rather than confronting the official narrative head-on, many posts mocked the opaque and unusual circumstances of Mojtaba’s rise – especially the emergence of a leader who, for many Iranians, remains almost entirely unseen.

The jokes fall broadly into several recurring themes.

‘A leader no one has seen'

Many jokes focus on Mojtaba Khamenei’s near-total absence from public life.

Unlike most senior political figures, Mojtaba has rarely appeared in speeches or interviews, and only a handful of recordings of his voice are publicly known.

Some users turned this into a technological joke. One widely shared post said:

“There isn’t even enough audio of Mojtaba Khamenei for AI to train on to make a fake voice of him.”

Others simply pointed to the unusual situation more directly.

“We are entering the second day of Mojtaba Khamenei's leadership, and still nobody has seen him.”

Several posts framed the absence through humor about remote work – a concept familiar to many younger Iranian users.

“If you like working remotely, the best job is Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Nobody asks where you are, what you’re doing, or even whether you’re alive.”

Another post used religious imagery to exaggerate the idea that he has remained invisible.

“We’re in a situation where the appearance of Mahdi is more likely than the appearance of Mojtaba.”

Mahdi – the messianic figure awaited in Shiite Islam – frequently appears in Iranian satire as a way of describing events considered extremely unlikely.

Another viral joke suggested Mojtaba’s leadership was almost abstract.

“In the phrase ‘Mojtaba’s leadership,’ the literary device being used is personification.”

The remark plays on a Persian rhetorical term used in literature classes, implying that leadership is being attributed to something that has not visibly acted.

'The only known quote'

Another recurring joke centers on how little Mojtaba Khamenei has publicly said.

One of the few widely circulated videos attributed to him shows him announcing that his religious classes would be canceled.

That short clip has now become a punchline.

One post summarized the situation: “The only existing quote from Imam Mojtaba Khamenei: ‘Next week there will be no class.’”

The post was accompanied by a parody image styled like the decorative wall murals commonly seen on schools and public buildings in Iran, where passages from religious figures and political leaders are often painted alongside floral designs.

In the satirical version circulating online, however, the wall bears only the mundane line about next week’s class being canceled – recasting an ordinary notice as the supposedly defining quotation of a newly appointed Supreme Leader.

Other jokes focused on Mojtaba’s lack of a public résumé. One post mocked the situation using corporate language:

“You don’t have a résumé, you want to work remotely, you got the job through connections – and you don’t even have a photo for your CV so they have to generate one with AI.”

Another user suggested that even performing a simple task could count as experience.

“At least bury your father so you can have one executive job on your résumé.”

‘Schrödinger’s Khamenei’

A darker strand of satire reflects the uncertainty and speculation that often accompany major political events in Iran.

Some jokes played with the idea that Mojtaba’s status remains ambiguous because he has not appeared publicly.

One widely shared post referenced the famous physics thought experiment known as Schrödinger’s cat:

“I think instead of Schrödinger’s cat we’re dealing with Schrödinger’s Khamenei. Until they show him, we don’t know whether he’s alive or dead.”

Some posts jokingly suggested that naming Mojtaba as leader could solve several political problems at once.

“Announcing Mojtaba as leader was actually smart. You can’t kill someone who’s already dead.”

Another post used similarly blunt humor:

“You know what’s better than one dead Khamenei? Two dead Khameneis.”

Other jokes focused on the strange overlap between the funeral of the late leader and the introduction of the new one. One user wrote sarcastically:

“Right now the Islamic Republic has two leaders on earth – one they won’t bury and another they won’t reveal.”

Even the burial itself became a subject of dark humor.

“The only reason they haven’t buried Khamenei yet is to save funeral costs – they’re waiting a few days to bury Mojtaba too.”

A Guards spokesman, responding to Trump, said Washington was lying about conditions in the region and warned that Iran would not allow “one liter of oil” to be exported by hostile states and their partners.

The threat came after Trump warned Tehran against disrupting tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical oil shipping chokepoint, and said the conflict was moving ahead of schedule.

Trump said the United States would strike Iran “much harder” if it tried to stop oil shipments through Hormuz. He also predicted the war could end before the four-week timeline he had previously outlined.

His remarks helped calm markets after a wild trading session in which Brent surged to as high as $118-$119 a barrel – the highest level since 2022 – before retreating sharply as investors bet Washington may try to contain the economic fallout.

The sharp swings show how the war has thrust the Strait of Hormuz to the center of global energy markets.

Global economic ripple effects

The narrow waterway off Iran’s coast normally carries about a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas supplies, but tanker traffic has been severely disrupted for more than a week, forcing Persian Gulf producers to cut output and raising fears of a major supply shock.

Saudi Arabia has reduced production by between 2 million and 2.5 million barrels per day, according to a Bloomberg report, while Iraq has cut output by about 2.9 million barrels per day. The United Arab Emirates has lowered production by up to 800,000 barrels per day and Kuwait by about 500,000 barrels per day.

Saudi Aramco warned on Tuesday that continued disruption to shipping through Hormuz could have “catastrophic consequences” for global oil markets.

The strait is also crucial for natural gas exports. Qatar alone ships roughly 20% of the world’s liquefied natural gas through the corridor, meaning any prolonged closure could affect energy markets far beyond oil.

Rising fuel costs are already feeding fears of renewed inflation worldwide, with analysts warning that sustained oil prices above $100 per barrel could push US gasoline prices toward $4 per gallon and raise costs for air travel, manufacturing and food.

The White House is weighing several options to contain the economic fallout, including releasing strategic oil reserves, easing sanctions on Russian crude and coordinating with allies to stabilize global supply.

The Group of Seven has said it stands ready to take steps to support energy markets, including possible stockpile releases if disruptions continue.

Much of that privileged access is believed to operate through so-called “white SIM cards” – mobile lines exempt from Iran’s filtering system that allow direct access to blocked platforms such as X, Telegram and Instagram.

Spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani did not directly refer to those SIM cards but spoke about the government-imposed national internet blackout, saying Tehran is instead offering connectivity to “those who can better deliver the message.”

According to internet monitoring group NetBlocks, the Iranian government has been promoting its agenda through whitelisted online services while the public remains in a digital blackout

“The regime continues to promote its agenda through whitelisted networks, cultivating media assets at home and abroad,” NetBlocks said on Friday, six days into the latest round of nationwide internet shutdown.

This is while President Masoud Pezeshkian vowed in early December to deactivate the so-called “white SIM cards” that grant unfiltered access to a circle of state-linked users.

“We have instructed that these white internet lines be turned black as well, to show what will happen to people if this blackness continues,” he said.

Pezeshkian has repeatedly promised to lift filtering, a key pledge of his 2024 presidential campaign.

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  New X location feature fuels dispute over unequal internet access in Iran

Meanwhile, Iran’s nationwide internet shutdown has continued for more than 240 hours, marking one of the most severe government-imposed nationwide blackouts ever recorded globally and the second longest in the country’s history after the January protests, according to NetBlocks.

The group said on Tuesday that Iran has now spent roughly a third of the year 2026 offline.

But trauma specialists say those reactions reflect something deeper: decades of repression that have fundamentally shaped how many Iranians perceive danger. For many inside the country, the regime itself—not the bombs—has long been the most immediate threat to their lives.

The discussion gained attention after a viral Instagram reel by Iranian-origin actor and producer Tara Grammy. In the video, Grammy recounts a conversation a friend in Iran said they had with their therapist—a moment that appeared to capture what many Iranians had already been expressing online.

According to Grammy, her friend admitted they found themselves celebrating the sound of bombs hitting Tehran—something that surprised even them. The therapist’s explanation, she said, was psychological.

“When your entire life you have lived under the constant threat of the Islamic Republic—arrests, prison, executions, morality police, surveillance, people disappearing after exercising their right to protest—your brain learns to fear the thing that actually controls your life,” Grammy said in the video.

“Psychologists call this threat normalization.”

The concept describes how people living under long-term repression can come to see the greatest danger not as an external threat such as war, but the authority that controls their daily lives.

To better understand the reaction, Iran International spoke with two therapists who work with Iranians affected by political repression and trauma.

Clinical psychotherapist Azadeh Afsahi, founder of Iran House, an NGO in contact with political prisoners inside Iran, said many reactions seen online cannot be understood without recognizing the depth of suffering many Iranians have endured.

“I think what we need to look at is the big picture: why is it that a nation is celebrating what the whole world fears—bombs?” Afsahi said.

“For them, the bomb can feel like a form of liberation, as sad as that sounds. For 47 years they have lived under oppression without meaningful help.”

Afsahi said many Iranians understand the risks and potential loss of life associated with conflict. But for some, the possibility that the Islamic Republic could finally fall outweighs those fears.

According to Afsahi, many messages she has received from inside Iran reflect a mix of fear, anxiety and renewed hope. After recent crackdowns and mass killings during protests, she said many Iranians had fallen into what she described as a “collective depression.”

“Right now, despite their houses being bombed and loved ones being killed, there is still an element of hope,” she said. “Because the pain is being seen internationally, and somebody is intervening.”

Another trauma counselor, Farnaz Farrokhi-Holmes, said decades of repression have left many Iranians living with complex trauma—a condition caused by prolonged exposure to violence and fear.

“When trauma happens repeatedly, the brain begins to normalize the threats around it,” she explained.

Over time, she said, the brain adapts to survive in an environment of constant danger.

“The bombs are no longer perceived as the primary threat. The imminent threat is the IRGC—its survival and its continued power.”

Farrokhi-Holmes said she is currently providing pro bono counseling to a young Iranian woman who survived the January 2026 protest crackdowns and later escaped the country after witnessing security forces shoot demonstrators.

The trauma many Iranians carry, she said, is difficult for outsiders to fully grasp. Unless someone has lived under a system where arrests, violence and executions can happen without warning, the psychological response may be hard to understand.

Both therapists emphasized that reactions inside Iran remain complex. Many people are afraid. Many are grieving. But some, they say, also feel something absent for years: hope.

As Afsahi put it, many Iranians are not celebrating war itself but the possibility that decades of repression could finally end.

“They’re not happy about the war,” she said. “They are happy about the possibility of liberation.”