Iran International
The reported killing of thousands of protesters across Iran in just two days has raised a central question: who carried out the deadliest crackdown in the country’s living memory?
The scale of the violence—put at 12,000 by Iran International and as high as 20,000 by CBS—has shocked many Iranians.
As images and accounts continue to emerge despite a near-total internet shutdown, attention has focused on who was responsible for the bloodshed.
Tehran maintains that the violence was the result of armed infiltrators backed by Israel and the United States who attacked civilians and police and damaged state property, which it says triggered their forceful response.
Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence said on Friday that it had arrested 3,000 people it described as members of “terrorist groups.”
There remains no evidence that any force beyond the Iranian police and Revolutionary Guards were behind the violence, though some Iranians aghast at the scale of the killing mooted the possibility Iraqi, foreign militias or even freed criminals lent a hand.
The Guards
Witness reports suggest that the primary force deployed on the streets was the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
One video that circulated despite the internet shutdown appears to show a pickup truck mounted with a DShK heavy machine gun in western Tehran that resembles those used by the IRGC’s Imam Ali Security Unit, which is tasked with security operations in the capital.
Such footage, along with witness accounts collected by journalists and rights groups outside Iran, has fueled suspicion that the IRGC may have directly commanded the crackdown.
Some analysts have pointed to the IRGC’s overseas arm, the Quds Force, citing its track record abroad rather than confirmed reports.
The Quds Force has extensive experience in urban warfare from the Syrian conflict, where it supported Bashar al-Assad’s government against both protesters and armed opposition groups.
Reports of foreign fighter deployment
Shortly after demonstrations began, social media users reported the presence of Iraqi pro-Iran militias in Iran’s Khuzestan province.
Their potential involvement drew closer scrutiny after a series of reports and images circulated in Iraqi and international media. The reports remain unconfirmed.
On January 11, videos showed large groups of fighters from Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) holding rallies in the southern Iraqi port city of Basra publicly declaring support for the Islamic Republic.
Iran’s Press TV later aired footage of a pro-government gathering near the Iranian embassy in Iraq, where participants carried flags associated with Iraqi militias such as Hashd al-Shaabi and Kataib Hezbollah, as well as Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
Other reports alleged more direct involvement. Iraqi television channel Al-Sumaria reported on Thursday that around 3,000 Iraqi fighters had crossed into Iran in a convoy of buses through the Shalamcheh border, disguised as religious pilgrims, to join IRGC bases in cities including Ahvaz.
CNN reported the same day that a military source said thousands of Iraqi militiamen had entered Iran through two border points, while an Iraqi security source cited the entry of hundreds more under the guise of pilgrims.
An image circulating online appears to show a dark armored vehicle believed by analysts to be used by Iraqi militias alongside Iranian police and IRGC units in Tehran. One man standing atop the vehicle is wearing a green headband commonly associated with Hashd al-Shaabi. The image has not been independently verified.
Some social media users have also alleged the involvement of other Quds Force-linked groups, such as the Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun brigades, composed of Afghan and Pakistani Shiites previously deployed in Syria. Those claims also remain unconfirmed.
Use of criminal networks
There is no confirmed evidence that professional criminal networks were used in the latest crackdown. However, precedent exists.
During the 2009 protests, the IRGC released or recruited criminals from prison to suppress demonstrations. IRGC commander Hossein Hamedani—who was later killed in Syria—confirmed that 5,000 such individuals had been organized into three battalions.
“These three battalions showed that if we want to train fighters, we must bring in those who are used to knives and blades,” Hamedani told state-media reporters.
In subsequent years, images have surfaced showing some notorious Iranian convicts alongside IRGC forces in Syria, reinforcing long-standing claims that irregular actors have at times been incorporated into security operations.
Claims of drug use
Officials and critics have also offered competing explanations for some of the deaths, neither supported by verifiable evidence.
Iran’s Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh asserted on Thursday that some protesters had died from overdoses of industrial drugs rather than violence, saying they showed “no other injuries.”
Dissident activists, by contrast, have raised the possibility that Captagon—an amphetamine-type stimulant—was used to increase aggressiveness among forces deployed to suppress protests.
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime has identified Syria as a major producer of Captagon, with large seizures of Syrian-origin pills documented in Iraq.
The remarks he made in a video message seek to define what Iran would do in practical terms across security, diplomacy, energy, governance, and the economy after the fall of the clerical system.
Rather than focusing on personalities or transitional mechanics, Pahlavi presents a policy-based framework that contrasts sharply with the Islamic Republic’s record of confrontation, sanctions exposure, and institutional opacity. The message is structured around specific sectors, each tied to measurable shifts in behavior and outcomes.
Ending confrontation as a security doctrine
“In security and foreign policy, Iran’s nuclear military program will end. Support for terrorist groups will cease immediately. A free Iran will work with regional and global partners to confront terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and extremist Islamism,” said Pahlavi in his message.
Iran’s security posture has been the principal driver of its isolation for more than four decades. Sanctions linked to the nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for armed groups have cut Iran off from large parts of the global economy since the mid-1990s. Even during periods of diplomacy, such as after the 2015 nuclear agreement, parallel regional policies limited normalization and kept secondary sanctions risks alive for investors.
Pahlavi’s proposal centers on abandoning confrontation as a governing doctrine. Ending any military dimension of the nuclear program would place Iran fully back under international nonproliferation norms, reopening the path to inspections, sanctions relief, and structured security dialogue. Cooperation on transnational crime and drug trafficking – areas where Iran’s geography makes it a key transit state – would align Tehran with existing UN and regional initiatives rather than leaving it outside them.
From regional spoiler to regional stakeholder
“Iran will act as a friend and a stabilizing force in the region. And it will be a responsible partner in global security,” the exiled prince added.
The Islamic Republic’s regional strategy has relied heavily on influence through allied militias and political networks, particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. While this approach expanded Iran’s footprint, it also generated sustained pushback from Arab states and contributed to cycles of escalation that raised economic and military costs.
Recasting Iran as a regional stakeholder would imply a shift toward formal state-to-state engagement, confidence-building measures with Persian Gulf neighbors, and participation in multilateral security mechanisms. Practical steps could include joint maritime security arrangements, border coordination, and structured regional dialogue – tools that have been largely absent from Iran’s regional policy toolkit.
A clean break with four decades of diplomatic estrangement
“In diplomacy, relations with the United States will be normalized and our friendship with America and her people will be restored. The State of Israel will be recognized immediately,” said Pahlavi.
“We will pursue the expansion of the Abraham Accords into the Cyrus accords bringing together a free Iran, Israel, and the Arab world.”
Diplomatic normalization sits at the center of the proposed reset. Iran has lacked formal relations with the United States since 1980 and with Israel since 1979, a rupture that has shaped its entire foreign policy architecture. Recognition and normalization would reverse this trajectory, embedding Iran in the same regional diplomatic frameworks that have expanded since 2020.
Such a shift would have concrete effects: reopening embassies, restoring direct financial channels, enabling aviation and trade links, and allowing Iran to participate in regional investment and infrastructure projects from which it has long been excluded.
Turning vast reserves into predictable supply
“In energy, Iran holds some of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world. A free Iran will become a reliable energy supplier to the free world,” the son Iran’s former Shah said.
“Policy-making will be transparent. Iran’s actions will be responsible. Prices will be predictable.”
Iran holds roughly 10 percent of global proven oil reserves and about 15 percent of natural gas reserves, yet sanctions and underinvestment have kept production well below potential. Oil output has fluctuated between 2 and 3.8 million barrels per day over the past decade, often constrained by export restrictions and opaque trading practices.
A transparent energy policy would enable long-term contracts, foreign investment in aging infrastructure, and integration into global pricing systems. Predictability – rather than leverage – would become the sector’s defining feature, turning energy exports into a stabilizing economic anchor rather than a geopolitical liability.
Governance as the foundation of credibility
“In transparency and governance, Iran will adopt and enforce international standards. Money laundering will be confronted. Organized corruption will be dismantled. Public institutions will answer to the people.”
Iran’s exclusion from global banking networks has been driven not only by sanctions but also by persistent concerns over financial transparency and institutional accountability. Failure to meet international anti–money laundering and counter-terror financing standards has limited access to correspondent banking even during diplomatic openings.
Adopting international governance standards would have immediate economic implications, enabling banks, insurers, and investors to reengage. More broadly, institutional accountability would shift the state from discretionary rule toward predictable administration, a prerequisite for sustained economic growth.
Reconnecting Iran’s economy to global capital and trade
“In the economy, Iran is one of the world’s last great untapped markets. Our population is educated, modern, with a diaspora that connects it to the four corners of the world,” said Pahlavi.
“A democratic Iran will open its economy to trade, investment, and innovation. And Iran will seek to invest in the world.”
With a population of around 90 million and high tertiary education rates, Iran has long been viewed by economists as a middle-income economy with unrealized potential. Years of sanctions, capital controls, and politicized regulation have instead driven capital flight and underinvestment.
Opening the economy would involve restoring property rights, stabilizing currency policy, and reintegrating Iran into global trade and financial systems. The Iranian diaspora – numbering in the millions – represents a ready source of capital, expertise, and global connectivity if legal and political barriers are removed.
A future defined by national interest, not ideology
“This is not an abstract vision. It is a practical one. Grounded in national interest, stability, and cooperation,” reads Pahlavi’s latest message.
The roadmap for Iran’s reintegration into the global system contrasts sharply with the Islamic Republic’s record of isolation driven by ideology, sanctions exposure, and institutional opacity.
By anchoring change in measurable policy shifts – rather than slogans – Pahlavi’s framework addresses a central question for international audiences: not whether Iran can rejoin the world, but what rules it would follow if it does.
