Senior visiting fellow, George Mason University
Turkey has adopted a calculated caution during the recent waves of protests in neighboring Iran, avoiding endorsement of those who took to the streets while stopping short of backing Tehran’s violent crackdown.
Turkish officials have acknowledged that the unrest is rooted in genuine domestic grievances, but warned against what they describe as external efforts to exploit the turmoil.
This balancing act reflects Turkey’s dual position.
A NATO member with institutional ties to the West, Ankara is also a pragmatic regional power deeply embedded in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Its approach to Iran’s crisis has been shaped less by ideological alignment than by concern over how prolonged instability could affect Turkey’s borders, economy and regional posture.
Senior officials, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and spokesperson for the ruling AKP party Ömer Çelik, have framed the protests as domestically driven but vulnerable to manipulation by outside actors, particularly Israel.
"We are against a military intervention against Iran," Fidan said on Wednesday. Iran needs to solve its authentic internal problems on its own."
At the same time, Turkey has avoided explicitly endorsing Tehran’s security response, signaling unease with the scale of repression.
Shared interests
Behind the public rhetoric, Turkish diplomacy has intensified.
Reports in Turkish media this week suggest that Ankara has remained in close contact with Tehran, Western partners and Arab countries surrounding the Persian Gulf—urging de-escalation and arguing against US intervention.
This is despite Turkey and Iran standing on opposing sides of regional conflicts in recent years, notably in Syria and Iraq.
The Kurdish question adds another layer of sensitivity. Both states oppose Kurdish separatism, but Turkish officials have long accused Iran of tolerating or exploiting groups linked to the PKK, which Ankara considers an existential threat.
But such rivalries have often given way to pragmatism.
Bilateral trade reached roughly $10 billion in 2024, and Iran supplies about 15 percent of Turkey’s natural gas under a pipeline agreement set to expire in mid-2026. Tourism, transportation links and security coordination have continued even during periods of political tension.
Turkey has also consistently opposed US sanctions on Iran, arguing they harm regional trade and ordinary Iranians more than decision-makers in Tehran.
Impartial intermediary
Public messaging during the current crisis has been carefully calibrated.
On January 12, Ömer Çelik warned that foreign intervention would “lead to greater crises,” urging negotiations while acknowledging Iran’s internal problems. Fidan echoed that line and sought to downplay the scale of unrest—perhaps to discourage escalation.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has also largely avoided inflammatory rhetoric. Rather than issuing public condemnations or threats, he convened security meetings to assess potential spillover risks.
Turkish authorities restricted demonstrations near Iran’s consulate in Istanbul, aiming to reassure Tehran of shared security interests.
Overall, Ankara has sought to position itself as a potential intermediary rather than a partisan actor.
Retaining regional influence
Prolonged unrest in Iran raises the prospect of refugee flows that Turkey, already hosting millions of displaced people from Syria and elsewhere, is politically and economically ill-equipped to absorb.
Large-scale displacement from Iran would strain public services, intensify domestic backlash against migrants and complicate relations with the European Union.
Economic exposure reinforces that caution. Iran remains a key energy supplier, and any disruption, particularly during winter, would push up prices and inflation in Turkey’s already fragile economy. With the gas contract nearing renewal, Ankara has strong incentives to avoid a rupture with Tehran.
A wider military confrontation involving Iran would also threaten Turkey’s commercial routes and military positions in Iraq and Syria.
Ultimately, Turkey’s response reflects strategic self-preservation. By combining public restraint with private engagement, Ankara aims to shield itself from instability, protect critical economic links and preserve leverage regardless of how events in Iran unfold.
Whether the Islamic Republic emerges intact or weakened, Turkey appears determined to remain positioned as a consequential regional actor—even as unrest across its border underscores how rarely domestic crises in the Middle East remain contained.
The remarks he made in a video message seek to define what Iran would do in practical terms across security, diplomacy, energy, governance, and the economy after the fall of the clerical system.
Rather than focusing on personalities or transitional mechanics, Pahlavi presents a policy-based framework that contrasts sharply with the Islamic Republic’s record of confrontation, sanctions exposure, and institutional opacity. The message is structured around specific sectors, each tied to measurable shifts in behavior and outcomes.
Ending confrontation as a security doctrine
“In security and foreign policy, Iran’s nuclear military program will end. Support for terrorist groups will cease immediately. A free Iran will work with regional and global partners to confront terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and extremist Islamism,” said Pahlavi in his message.
Iran’s security posture has been the principal driver of its isolation for more than four decades. Sanctions linked to the nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for armed groups have cut Iran off from large parts of the global economy since the mid-1990s. Even during periods of diplomacy, such as after the 2015 nuclear agreement, parallel regional policies limited normalization and kept secondary sanctions risks alive for investors.
Pahlavi’s proposal centers on abandoning confrontation as a governing doctrine. Ending any military dimension of the nuclear program would place Iran fully back under international nonproliferation norms, reopening the path to inspections, sanctions relief, and structured security dialogue. Cooperation on transnational crime and drug trafficking – areas where Iran’s geography makes it a key transit state – would align Tehran with existing UN and regional initiatives rather than leaving it outside them.
From regional spoiler to regional stakeholder
“Iran will act as a friend and a stabilizing force in the region. And it will be a responsible partner in global security,” the exiled prince added.
The Islamic Republic’s regional strategy has relied heavily on influence through allied militias and political networks, particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. While this approach expanded Iran’s footprint, it also generated sustained pushback from Arab states and contributed to cycles of escalation that raised economic and military costs.
Recasting Iran as a regional stakeholder would imply a shift toward formal state-to-state engagement, confidence-building measures with Persian Gulf neighbors, and participation in multilateral security mechanisms. Practical steps could include joint maritime security arrangements, border coordination, and structured regional dialogue – tools that have been largely absent from Iran’s regional policy toolkit.
A clean break with four decades of diplomatic estrangement
“In diplomacy, relations with the United States will be normalized and our friendship with America and her people will be restored. The State of Israel will be recognized immediately,” said Pahlavi.
“We will pursue the expansion of the Abraham Accords into the Cyrus accords bringing together a free Iran, Israel, and the Arab world.”
Diplomatic normalization sits at the center of the proposed reset. Iran has lacked formal relations with the United States since 1980 and with Israel since 1979, a rupture that has shaped its entire foreign policy architecture. Recognition and normalization would reverse this trajectory, embedding Iran in the same regional diplomatic frameworks that have expanded since 2020.
Such a shift would have concrete effects: reopening embassies, restoring direct financial channels, enabling aviation and trade links, and allowing Iran to participate in regional investment and infrastructure projects from which it has long been excluded.
Turning vast reserves into predictable supply
“In energy, Iran holds some of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world. A free Iran will become a reliable energy supplier to the free world,” the son Iran’s former Shah said.
“Policy-making will be transparent. Iran’s actions will be responsible. Prices will be predictable.”
Iran holds roughly 10 percent of global proven oil reserves and about 15 percent of natural gas reserves, yet sanctions and underinvestment have kept production well below potential. Oil output has fluctuated between 2 and 3.8 million barrels per day over the past decade, often constrained by export restrictions and opaque trading practices.
A transparent energy policy would enable long-term contracts, foreign investment in aging infrastructure, and integration into global pricing systems. Predictability – rather than leverage – would become the sector’s defining feature, turning energy exports into a stabilizing economic anchor rather than a geopolitical liability.
Governance as the foundation of credibility
“In transparency and governance, Iran will adopt and enforce international standards. Money laundering will be confronted. Organized corruption will be dismantled. Public institutions will answer to the people.”
Iran’s exclusion from global banking networks has been driven not only by sanctions but also by persistent concerns over financial transparency and institutional accountability. Failure to meet international anti–money laundering and counter-terror financing standards has limited access to correspondent banking even during diplomatic openings.
Adopting international governance standards would have immediate economic implications, enabling banks, insurers, and investors to reengage. More broadly, institutional accountability would shift the state from discretionary rule toward predictable administration, a prerequisite for sustained economic growth.
Reconnecting Iran’s economy to global capital and trade
“In the economy, Iran is one of the world’s last great untapped markets. Our population is educated, modern, with a diaspora that connects it to the four corners of the world,” said Pahlavi.
“A democratic Iran will open its economy to trade, investment, and innovation. And Iran will seek to invest in the world.”
With a population of around 90 million and high tertiary education rates, Iran has long been viewed by economists as a middle-income economy with unrealized potential. Years of sanctions, capital controls, and politicized regulation have instead driven capital flight and underinvestment.
Opening the economy would involve restoring property rights, stabilizing currency policy, and reintegrating Iran into global trade and financial systems. The Iranian diaspora – numbering in the millions – represents a ready source of capital, expertise, and global connectivity if legal and political barriers are removed.
A future defined by national interest, not ideology
“This is not an abstract vision. It is a practical one. Grounded in national interest, stability, and cooperation,” reads Pahlavi’s latest message.
The roadmap for Iran’s reintegration into the global system contrasts sharply with the Islamic Republic’s record of isolation driven by ideology, sanctions exposure, and institutional opacity.
By anchoring change in measurable policy shifts – rather than slogans – Pahlavi’s framework addresses a central question for international audiences: not whether Iran can rejoin the world, but what rules it would follow if it does.
Officials assert that dozens of mosques and shrines across the country were deliberately attacked during protests.
Reports by eyewitnesses point to multiple mosques set ablaze in Tehran and Gilan province and in other major cities including Karaj and Isfahan.
In the past week, due to the near-total ongoing internet shutdown, state media have effectively become the primary source of visual material related to alleged damaged during the protests for many Iranians.
Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani said on Thursday that more than 61 mosques were torched during unrest in the capital. President Masoud Pezeshkian echoed the condemnation on January 12, stating that “Iranian society does not accept those who burn mosques.”
Pezeshkian went further, saying: “They have trained some people inside and outside, brought terrorists into the country from abroad, and they burn mosques.”
State media are widely circulating images of charred interiors and half-burned copies of the Quran in Abu Dhar Mosque in Tehran and CCTV footage from an unnamed mosque in Isfahan that appears to show individuals setting fire to the building and its contents.
In pro-government rallies, some participants were seen holding half-burned Qurans, and the state TV showed several interviews with them reinforcing the narrative that demonstrators were “terrorists” attacking Islam itself.
Amplification beyond Iran
The images have not remained confined to Iranian media. They have been reshared widely on social platforms by supporters of the Islamic Republic, including some foreign influencers.
Accounts such as “Partisan Girl” (Sirin Girl) and Hamza Adi reposted the images, accusing supporters of Reza Pahlavi of burning the Quran.
Even amid internet restrictions, many pro-government users inside Iran continued to circulate the material online.
The repeated sharing has helped frame the unrest in some Muslim countries such as Pakistan as an attack on religious sanctities rather than a political protest.
Criticism and Fact-Checking
Some opponents of the government argue that the information released is selective and misleading. They say the extensive focus on mosque imagery by outlets such as state broadcaster IRIB aims to discredit protesters and provoke religious sentiment against them.
Iranian fact-checking website Factnameh wrote: “What is being presented is an incomplete and misleading picture of reality, designed to stir religious emotions and mobilize the government’s religious supporters, as well as to inflame Muslim public opinion against protesters in Iran.”
At the same time, some anonymous social media accounts have explicitly encouraged attacks on religious sites. An account posting under the name “Imam Tusi” wrote on X: “People burned Fatemeh Zahra Mosque in Isfahan, too. People should torch all shrines, mosques, and religious seminaries together with the mullahs in them.”
Most mosques and religious employees receive state backing in the Islamic theocracy.
Some opposition figures have implicitly acknowledged mosque burnings.
Darya Safai, an Iranian-born member of the Belgian parliament, wrote on X: “In western Tehran, a great mosque burned. For forty-seven years, its minarets echoed with ‘Allahu Akbar,’ and in that name, Iranian women and men were chained, silenced and broken.”
Yet other observers blamed authorities for the damage,
“They did this themselves to provoke the people—impaling the Quran on spears, setting fires, and destroying the mosque are just the tools of deception used by these hypocrites,” a user posting as Hatam wrote on X, without providing evidence.
Mosques as security hub
Iran has an estimated 75,000 mosques, around two-thirds of which are believed to be largely inactive. Tehran's critics argue that unlike in other Muslim-majority countries, mosques in Iran function not only as religious spaces but also serve as function halls for the state's repressive apparatus, including the Basij militia which quashed protests.
Iranian authorities openly acknowledge this role. On January 9, Revolutionary Guards commander Hossein Yekta called on government supporters via state television to gather in mosques and Basij bases to confront “the enemies of the revolution.”
In August 2024, Iranian media quoted Brigadier General Heydar Baba-Ahmadi, head of the Mosques and Neighborhoods Affairs of Basij militia force, as saying that “79 percent of Basij resistance bases are located in mosques, with another 5 percent in other religious sites.”
Factnameh estimates suggest nearly 50,000 Basij bases operate within mosques nationwide.
During the 2021–2022 protests, CNN reported on networks of secret detention sites, some allegedly located inside mosques. The report asserted that these spaces were used for temporary detention and torture of protesters, run by Basij units based in mosques.
Iran International has received a large volume of videos, audio testimonies and written accounts describing how the bodies of protesters killed in the latest unrest are being collected, stored and released under strict security conditions.
While a nationwide internet blackout, now about a week, has made independent verification difficult in some cases, Iran International has cross-checked and verified key elements through corroborating footage, eyewitness commentary and the consistency of reports from multiple cities.
According to senior government and security sources speaking to Iran International, the number of protesters killed during the current unrest is believed to be in the thousands, with estimates placing the figure at around 12,000.
Morgues under security control
Videos verified by Iran International show the continued transfer of protesters’ bodies to the Kahrizak forensic medicine complex south of Tehran. One verified video, dated Wednesday, shows dozens of bodies laid out inside large warehouse-style halls at the facility. In the same footage, a trailer is seen as security forces unload additional bodies.
Similar videos and reports received from Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan and Rasht show what appear to be large numbers of bodies stored in forensic facilities and hospitals.
Field reports describe heavily securitized conditions around morgues and hospitals, with access tightly controlled by security forces. Families seeking information about missing relatives have described chaotic scenes, long waits and limited communication.
Pressure on families
Multiple sources told Iran International that families attempting to retrieve the bodies of their relatives face intimidation and pressure from security forces, including plainclothes agents and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
According to these accounts, security forces have raided the homes of victims’ families and their neighbors, searched mobile phones, verbally abused family members and, in some cases, fired shots at walls during nighttime raids. Hospital conditions have also been described as critical, with families reporting security presence inside medical facilities.
Sources said authorities have informed families that bodies can only be released during the early hours of the morning. Burial ceremonies, they said, are restricted to individual funerals and must be completed by 4 a.m.
Several families reported being warned that if they refuse to comply with these conditions, the bodies of their relatives would be buried collectively, without their consent.
Paying for the bullets
One of the most consistent elements across testimonies received by Iran International is the demand for money in exchange for the release of bodies.
According to multiple sources, families are being told they must pay for each bullet used to kill their relatives. The amounts demanded range from 700 million rials to 2.5 billion rials per bullet, depending on the case.
At the current exchange rate of approximately 1,450,000 rials to the US dollar, this translates to roughly $480 to $1,720. The average monthly income of a worker in Iran is less than $100, making such payments unaffordable for many families.
This practice is not new and has been used by Iranian authorities in previous crackdowns. However, they described its application during the current unrest as unusually widespread.
Forced Basij membership
In addition to financial demands, families have reported pressure to consent to their relatives being identified as members of the Basij militia, the paramilitary volunteer force of the Revolutionary Guards.
Rights monitors and sources said families are told that if they agree to a Basij membership card being issued posthumously for their relative, the body may be released without payment.
According to Dadban, a rights monitoring group, authorities in several cities have made free release of bodies conditional on families accepting that their killed relatives be registered as Basij members allegedly killed by protesters.
Rights groups say the practice amounts to forced identity alteration and an effort to inflate official claims of security force casualties, supporting authorities’ assertions that the unrest involved “terrorist elements.”
Hospitals overwhelmed
Audio testimonies sent to Tavaana, a civil society platform, describe hospitals overwhelmed by gunshot victims and bodies, with security forces intervening to prevent bodies from being released or funerals from taking place.
One audio account said security forces raided the homes of families who had managed to retrieve bodies. Another described a nurse who died by suicide after exposure to what was described as an overwhelming number of corpses.
Additional messages from Isfahan described widespread killings, mass arrests and refusal to release bodies. Some accounts said entire neighborhoods had lost at least one resident, with businesses shut down amid fear and anger.
Silencing grief
The restrictions placed on funerals and burials appear designed to prevent public mourning from becoming a focal point for further protest.
Families described being forced to bury their dead quickly, quietly and under surveillance. Some said they were instructed not to speak publicly or share images, while others reported continued monitoring after burial.
For many families, the process has turned private grief into a prolonged ordeal – one shaped by fear, financial coercion and the threat of erasure.
Iranian authorities have blamed foreign enemies, including the United States and Israel, for the unrest and have described the protests as a security threat. They have denied allegations of mass killings.
