Iranian-American activists are calling on US authorities to deport relatives of senior Iranian officials who are living in the United States, according to a report published by the New York Post on Wednesday.
"The pampered offspring of Iran’s ruling elite are living the American Dream as the country’s brutal regime kills protesters by the thousands — and fed-up Iranians in California and across the US want them out," the outlet wrote.
The report said two online petitions are demanding the deportation of Eissa Hashemi, the son of former Iranian vice president Masoumeh Ebtekar, and Fatemeh Ardeshir-Larijani, the daughter of Ali Larijani, who currently serves as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.
According to the Post, Hashemi lives in California and works as an academic, while Ardeshir-Larijani resides in Georgia and is a medical professor.
The petitions said that allowing relatives of Iranian leaders to live in the United States is unjust as Iranian authorities continue a deadly crackdown on protesters at home.
The development comes as the United States imposed new sanctions on Thursday against Ali Larijani, citing his role in overseeing the government’s response to nationwide protests.
The measures were part of a broader sanctions package targeting senior Iranian officials and entities accused of involvement in the violent crackdown on demonstrators.
Iran’s deadly crackdown on nationwide protests has drawn international attention, with the United Nations Security Council holding an emergency session on Thursday at the request of the United States to discuss developments in Iran and the reported use of lethal force against demonstrators.
In the meeting, the United States and several other countries condemned the violence and urged restraint, while Iranian representatives pushed back against foreign criticism.
The remarks he made in a video message seek to define what Iran would do in practical terms across security, diplomacy, energy, governance, and the economy after the fall of the clerical system.
Rather than focusing on personalities or transitional mechanics, Pahlavi presents a policy-based framework that contrasts sharply with the Islamic Republic’s record of confrontation, sanctions exposure, and institutional opacity. The message is structured around specific sectors, each tied to measurable shifts in behavior and outcomes.
Ending confrontation as a security doctrine
“In security and foreign policy, Iran’s nuclear military program will end. Support for terrorist groups will cease immediately. A free Iran will work with regional and global partners to confront terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and extremist Islamism,” said Pahlavi in his message.
Iran’s security posture has been the principal driver of its isolation for more than four decades. Sanctions linked to the nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for armed groups have cut Iran off from large parts of the global economy since the mid-1990s. Even during periods of diplomacy, such as after the 2015 nuclear agreement, parallel regional policies limited normalization and kept secondary sanctions risks alive for investors.
Pahlavi’s proposal centers on abandoning confrontation as a governing doctrine. Ending any military dimension of the nuclear program would place Iran fully back under international nonproliferation norms, reopening the path to inspections, sanctions relief, and structured security dialogue. Cooperation on transnational crime and drug trafficking – areas where Iran’s geography makes it a key transit state – would align Tehran with existing UN and regional initiatives rather than leaving it outside them.
From regional spoiler to regional stakeholder
“Iran will act as a friend and a stabilizing force in the region. And it will be a responsible partner in global security,” the exiled prince added.
The Islamic Republic’s regional strategy has relied heavily on influence through allied militias and political networks, particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. While this approach expanded Iran’s footprint, it also generated sustained pushback from Arab states and contributed to cycles of escalation that raised economic and military costs.
Recasting Iran as a regional stakeholder would imply a shift toward formal state-to-state engagement, confidence-building measures with Persian Gulf neighbors, and participation in multilateral security mechanisms. Practical steps could include joint maritime security arrangements, border coordination, and structured regional dialogue – tools that have been largely absent from Iran’s regional policy toolkit.
A clean break with four decades of diplomatic estrangement
“In diplomacy, relations with the United States will be normalized and our friendship with America and her people will be restored. The State of Israel will be recognized immediately,” said Pahlavi.
“We will pursue the expansion of the Abraham Accords into the Cyrus accords bringing together a free Iran, Israel, and the Arab world.”
Diplomatic normalization sits at the center of the proposed reset. Iran has lacked formal relations with the United States since 1980 and with Israel since 1979, a rupture that has shaped its entire foreign policy architecture. Recognition and normalization would reverse this trajectory, embedding Iran in the same regional diplomatic frameworks that have expanded since 2020.
Such a shift would have concrete effects: reopening embassies, restoring direct financial channels, enabling aviation and trade links, and allowing Iran to participate in regional investment and infrastructure projects from which it has long been excluded.
Turning vast reserves into predictable supply
“In energy, Iran holds some of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world. A free Iran will become a reliable energy supplier to the free world,” the son Iran’s former Shah said.
“Policy-making will be transparent. Iran’s actions will be responsible. Prices will be predictable.”
Iran holds roughly 10 percent of global proven oil reserves and about 15 percent of natural gas reserves, yet sanctions and underinvestment have kept production well below potential. Oil output has fluctuated between 2 and 3.8 million barrels per day over the past decade, often constrained by export restrictions and opaque trading practices.
A transparent energy policy would enable long-term contracts, foreign investment in aging infrastructure, and integration into global pricing systems. Predictability – rather than leverage – would become the sector’s defining feature, turning energy exports into a stabilizing economic anchor rather than a geopolitical liability.
Governance as the foundation of credibility
“In transparency and governance, Iran will adopt and enforce international standards. Money laundering will be confronted. Organized corruption will be dismantled. Public institutions will answer to the people.”
Iran’s exclusion from global banking networks has been driven not only by sanctions but also by persistent concerns over financial transparency and institutional accountability. Failure to meet international anti–money laundering and counter-terror financing standards has limited access to correspondent banking even during diplomatic openings.
Adopting international governance standards would have immediate economic implications, enabling banks, insurers, and investors to reengage. More broadly, institutional accountability would shift the state from discretionary rule toward predictable administration, a prerequisite for sustained economic growth.
Reconnecting Iran’s economy to global capital and trade
“In the economy, Iran is one of the world’s last great untapped markets. Our population is educated, modern, with a diaspora that connects it to the four corners of the world,” said Pahlavi.
“A democratic Iran will open its economy to trade, investment, and innovation. And Iran will seek to invest in the world.”
With a population of around 90 million and high tertiary education rates, Iran has long been viewed by economists as a middle-income economy with unrealized potential. Years of sanctions, capital controls, and politicized regulation have instead driven capital flight and underinvestment.
Opening the economy would involve restoring property rights, stabilizing currency policy, and reintegrating Iran into global trade and financial systems. The Iranian diaspora – numbering in the millions – represents a ready source of capital, expertise, and global connectivity if legal and political barriers are removed.
A future defined by national interest, not ideology
“This is not an abstract vision. It is a practical one. Grounded in national interest, stability, and cooperation,” reads Pahlavi’s latest message.
The roadmap for Iran’s reintegration into the global system contrasts sharply with the Islamic Republic’s record of isolation driven by ideology, sanctions exposure, and institutional opacity.
By anchoring change in measurable policy shifts – rather than slogans – Pahlavi’s framework addresses a central question for international audiences: not whether Iran can rejoin the world, but what rules it would follow if it does.
Officials assert that dozens of mosques and shrines across the country were deliberately attacked during protests.
Reports by eyewitnesses point to multiple mosques set ablaze in Tehran and Gilan province and in other major cities including Karaj and Isfahan.
In the past week, due to the near-total ongoing internet shutdown, state media have effectively become the primary source of visual material related to alleged damaged during the protests for many Iranians.
Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani said on Thursday that more than 61 mosques were torched during unrest in the capital. President Masoud Pezeshkian echoed the condemnation on January 12, stating that “Iranian society does not accept those who burn mosques.”
Pezeshkian went further, saying: “They have trained some people inside and outside, brought terrorists into the country from abroad, and they burn mosques.”
State media are widely circulating images of charred interiors and half-burned copies of the Quran in Abu Dhar Mosque in Tehran and CCTV footage from an unnamed mosque in Isfahan that appears to show individuals setting fire to the building and its contents.
In pro-government rallies, some participants were seen holding half-burned Qurans, and the state TV showed several interviews with them reinforcing the narrative that demonstrators were “terrorists” attacking Islam itself.
Amplification beyond Iran
The images have not remained confined to Iranian media. They have been reshared widely on social platforms by supporters of the Islamic Republic, including some foreign influencers.
Accounts such as “Partisan Girl” (Sirin Girl) and Hamza Adi reposted the images, accusing supporters of Reza Pahlavi of burning the Quran.
Even amid internet restrictions, many pro-government users inside Iran continued to circulate the material online.
The repeated sharing has helped frame the unrest in some Muslim countries such as Pakistan as an attack on religious sanctities rather than a political protest.
Criticism and Fact-Checking
Some opponents of the government argue that the information released is selective and misleading. They say the extensive focus on mosque imagery by outlets such as state broadcaster IRIB aims to discredit protesters and provoke religious sentiment against them.
Iranian fact-checking website Factnameh wrote: “What is being presented is an incomplete and misleading picture of reality, designed to stir religious emotions and mobilize the government’s religious supporters, as well as to inflame Muslim public opinion against protesters in Iran.”
At the same time, some anonymous social media accounts have explicitly encouraged attacks on religious sites. An account posting under the name “Imam Tusi” wrote on X: “People burned Fatemeh Zahra Mosque in Isfahan, too. People should torch all shrines, mosques, and religious seminaries together with the mullahs in them.”
Most mosques and religious employees receive state backing in the Islamic theocracy.
Some opposition figures have implicitly acknowledged mosque burnings.
Darya Safai, an Iranian-born member of the Belgian parliament, wrote on X: “In western Tehran, a great mosque burned. For forty-seven years, its minarets echoed with ‘Allahu Akbar,’ and in that name, Iranian women and men were chained, silenced and broken.”
Yet other observers blamed authorities for the damage,
“They did this themselves to provoke the people—impaling the Quran on spears, setting fires, and destroying the mosque are just the tools of deception used by these hypocrites,” a user posting as Hatam wrote on X, without providing evidence.
Mosques as security hub
Iran has an estimated 75,000 mosques, around two-thirds of which are believed to be largely inactive. Tehran's critics argue that unlike in other Muslim-majority countries, mosques in Iran function not only as religious spaces but also serve as function halls for the state's repressive apparatus, including the Basij militia which quashed protests.
Iranian authorities openly acknowledge this role. On January 9, Revolutionary Guards commander Hossein Yekta called on government supporters via state television to gather in mosques and Basij bases to confront “the enemies of the revolution.”
In August 2024, Iranian media quoted Brigadier General Heydar Baba-Ahmadi, head of the Mosques and Neighborhoods Affairs of Basij militia force, as saying that “79 percent of Basij resistance bases are located in mosques, with another 5 percent in other religious sites.”
Factnameh estimates suggest nearly 50,000 Basij bases operate within mosques nationwide.
During the 2021–2022 protests, CNN reported on networks of secret detention sites, some allegedly located inside mosques. The report asserted that these spaces were used for temporary detention and torture of protesters, run by Basij units based in mosques.
