Iranian-Americans call for deportation of officials’ relatives - NY Post

Turkish officials have acknowledged that the unrest is rooted in genuine domestic grievances, but warned against what they describe as external efforts to exploit the turmoil.

This balancing act reflects Turkey’s dual position.

A NATO member with institutional ties to the West, Ankara is also a pragmatic regional power deeply embedded in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Its approach to Iran’s crisis has been shaped less by ideological alignment than by concern over how prolonged instability could affect Turkey’s borders, economy and regional posture.

Senior officials, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and spokesperson for the ruling AKP party Ömer Çelik, have framed the protests as domestically driven but vulnerable to manipulation by outside actors, particularly Israel.

"We are against a military intervention against Iran," Fidan said on Wednesday. Iran needs to solve its authentic internal problems on its own."

At the same time, Turkey has avoided explicitly endorsing Tehran’s security response, signaling unease with the scale of repression.

Shared interests

Behind the public rhetoric, Turkish diplomacy has intensified.

Reports in Turkish media this week suggest that Ankara has remained in close contact with Tehran, Western partners and Arab countries surrounding the Persian Gulf—urging de-escalation and arguing against US intervention.

This is despite Turkey and Iran standing on opposing sides of regional conflicts in recent years, notably in Syria and Iraq.

The Kurdish question adds another layer of sensitivity. Both states oppose Kurdish separatism, but Turkish officials have long accused Iran of tolerating or exploiting groups linked to the PKK, which Ankara considers an existential threat.

But such rivalries have often given way to pragmatism.

Bilateral trade reached roughly $10 billion in 2024, and Iran supplies about 15 percent of Turkey’s natural gas under a pipeline agreement set to expire in mid-2026. Tourism, transportation links and security coordination have continued even during periods of political tension.

Turkey has also consistently opposed US sanctions on Iran, arguing they harm regional trade and ordinary Iranians more than decision-makers in Tehran.

Impartial intermediary

Public messaging during the current crisis has been carefully calibrated.

On January 12, Ömer Çelik warned that foreign intervention would “lead to greater crises,” urging negotiations while acknowledging Iran’s internal problems. Fidan echoed that line and sought to downplay the scale of unrest—perhaps to discourage escalation.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has also largely avoided inflammatory rhetoric. Rather than issuing public condemnations or threats, he convened security meetings to assess potential spillover risks.

Turkish authorities restricted demonstrations near Iran’s consulate in Istanbul, aiming to reassure Tehran of shared security interests.

Overall, Ankara has sought to position itself as a potential intermediary rather than a partisan actor.

Retaining regional influence

Prolonged unrest in Iran raises the prospect of refugee flows that Turkey, already hosting millions of displaced people from Syria and elsewhere, is politically and economically ill-equipped to absorb.

Large-scale displacement from Iran would strain public services, intensify domestic backlash against migrants and complicate relations with the European Union.

Economic exposure reinforces that caution. Iran remains a key energy supplier, and any disruption, particularly during winter, would push up prices and inflation in Turkey’s already fragile economy. With the gas contract nearing renewal, Ankara has strong incentives to avoid a rupture with Tehran.

A wider military confrontation involving Iran would also threaten Turkey’s commercial routes and military positions in Iraq and Syria.

Ultimately, Turkey’s response reflects strategic self-preservation. By combining public restraint with private engagement, Ankara aims to shield itself from instability, protect critical economic links and preserve leverage regardless of how events in Iran unfold.

Whether the Islamic Republic emerges intact or weakened, Turkey appears determined to remain positioned as a consequential regional actor—even as unrest across its border underscores how rarely domestic crises in the Middle East remain contained.

The remarks he made in a video message seek to define what Iran would do in practical terms across security, diplomacy, energy, governance, and the economy after the fall of the clerical system.

Rather than focusing on personalities or transitional mechanics, Pahlavi presents a policy-based framework that contrasts sharply with the Islamic Republic’s record of confrontation, sanctions exposure, and institutional opacity. The message is structured around specific sectors, each tied to measurable shifts in behavior and outcomes.

Ending confrontation as a security doctrine

“In security and foreign policy, Iran’s nuclear military program will end. Support for terrorist groups will cease immediately. A free Iran will work with regional and global partners to confront terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and extremist Islamism,” said Pahlavi in his message.

Iran’s security posture has been the principal driver of its isolation for more than four decades. Sanctions linked to the nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for armed groups have cut Iran off from large parts of the global economy since the mid-1990s. Even during periods of diplomacy, such as after the 2015 nuclear agreement, parallel regional policies limited normalization and kept secondary sanctions risks alive for investors.

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Pahlavi’s proposal centers on abandoning confrontation as a governing doctrine. Ending any military dimension of the nuclear program would place Iran fully back under international nonproliferation norms, reopening the path to inspections, sanctions relief, and structured security dialogue. Cooperation on transnational crime and drug trafficking – areas where Iran’s geography makes it a key transit state – would align Tehran with existing UN and regional initiatives rather than leaving it outside them.

From regional spoiler to regional stakeholder

“Iran will act as a friend and a stabilizing force in the region. And it will be a responsible partner in global security,” the exiled prince added.

The Islamic Republic’s regional strategy has relied heavily on influence through allied militias and political networks, particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. While this approach expanded Iran’s footprint, it also generated sustained pushback from Arab states and contributed to cycles of escalation that raised economic and military costs.

Recasting Iran as a regional stakeholder would imply a shift toward formal state-to-state engagement, confidence-building measures with Persian Gulf neighbors, and participation in multilateral security mechanisms. Practical steps could include joint maritime security arrangements, border coordination, and structured regional dialogue – tools that have been largely absent from Iran’s regional policy toolkit.

A clean break with four decades of diplomatic estrangement

“In diplomacy, relations with the United States will be normalized and our friendship with America and her people will be restored. The State of Israel will be recognized immediately,” said Pahlavi.

“We will pursue the expansion of the Abraham Accords into the Cyrus accords bringing together a free Iran, Israel, and the Arab world.”

Diplomatic normalization sits at the center of the proposed reset. Iran has lacked formal relations with the United States since 1980 and with Israel since 1979, a rupture that has shaped its entire foreign policy architecture. Recognition and normalization would reverse this trajectory, embedding Iran in the same regional diplomatic frameworks that have expanded since 2020.

Such a shift would have concrete effects: reopening embassies, restoring direct financial channels, enabling aviation and trade links, and allowing Iran to participate in regional investment and infrastructure projects from which it has long been excluded.

Turning vast reserves into predictable supply

“In energy, Iran holds some of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world. A free Iran will become a reliable energy supplier to the free world,” the son Iran’s former Shah said.

“Policy-making will be transparent. Iran’s actions will be responsible. Prices will be predictable.”

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Iran holds roughly 10 percent of global proven oil reserves and about 15 percent of natural gas reserves, yet sanctions and underinvestment have kept production well below potential. Oil output has fluctuated between 2 and 3.8 million barrels per day over the past decade, often constrained by export restrictions and opaque trading practices.

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  Iran’s crisis and the limits of sovereignty

A transparent energy policy would enable long-term contracts, foreign investment in aging infrastructure, and integration into global pricing systems. Predictability – rather than leverage – would become the sector’s defining feature, turning energy exports into a stabilizing economic anchor rather than a geopolitical liability.

Governance as the foundation of credibility

“In transparency and governance, Iran will adopt and enforce international standards. Money laundering will be confronted. Organized corruption will be dismantled. Public institutions will answer to the people.”

Iran’s exclusion from global banking networks has been driven not only by sanctions but also by persistent concerns over financial transparency and institutional accountability. Failure to meet international anti–money laundering and counter-terror financing standards has limited access to correspondent banking even during diplomatic openings.

Adopting international governance standards would have immediate economic implications, enabling banks, insurers, and investors to reengage. More broadly, institutional accountability would shift the state from discretionary rule toward predictable administration, a prerequisite for sustained economic growth.

Reconnecting Iran’s economy to global capital and trade

“In the economy, Iran is one of the world’s last great untapped markets. Our population is educated, modern, with a diaspora that connects it to the four corners of the world,” said Pahlavi.

“A democratic Iran will open its economy to trade, investment, and innovation. And Iran will seek to invest in the world.”

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With a population of around 90 million and high tertiary education rates, Iran has long been viewed by economists as a middle-income economy with unrealized potential. Years of sanctions, capital controls, and politicized regulation have instead driven capital flight and underinvestment.

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  Iran crossed a political threshold

Opening the economy would involve restoring property rights, stabilizing currency policy, and reintegrating Iran into global trade and financial systems. The Iranian diaspora – numbering in the millions – represents a ready source of capital, expertise, and global connectivity if legal and political barriers are removed.

A future defined by national interest, not ideology

“This is not an abstract vision. It is a practical one. Grounded in national interest, stability, and cooperation,” reads Pahlavi’s latest message.

The roadmap for Iran’s reintegration into the global system contrasts sharply with the Islamic Republic’s record of isolation driven by ideology, sanctions exposure, and institutional opacity.

By anchoring change in measurable policy shifts – rather than slogans – Pahlavi’s framework addresses a central question for international audiences: not whether Iran can rejoin the world, but what rules it would follow if it does.

The accounts, shared in short voice messages over encrypted apps between 13 and 15 January, come from two people in Tehran—a journalist and a business owner—and an engineer in Isfahan.

All three are political activists who have been present in multiple rounds of protests over the years, giving them a clear basis for comparison and a sharp memory of how earlier protests unfolded.

Each stressed that their impressions were drawn not only from what they personally witnessed, but from conversations with friends, relatives, employees, and colleagues across multiple cities and towns.

All three said the demonstrations on the evening of 8 January dwarfed any other round of protests they had seen or known of. One described the crowds as numbering in the millions nationwide.

A European diplomat, citing intelligence shared with Iran International, said their information indicates that at least 1.5 million people took to the streets in Tehran on Thursday, 8 January.

He said the number was lower on Friday, 9 January, as security forces were heavily present in the streets and, in many cases, began shooting as people started to assemble, killing people en masse.

However, the European diplomat who spoke to the channel believes as many as half a million people were present in Tehran on Friday despite the mass killing.

The number of people in other cities is unclear due to the lack of foreign diplomatic presence outside Tehran—all embassies are in the capital. However, their intelligence estimate is that at least 5 million people participated in nationwide protests on Thursday and Friday.

What set that Thursday night apart, the three eyewitnesses said, was timing.

Protests had already been unfolding for more than a week when exiled prince Reza Pahlavi called for coordinated demonstrations at 8pm on 8 and 9 January. The appeal, they said, did not initiate the unrest but gave it focus—“an amplifying and organizing effect”, as one put it.

Few expected such numbers to turn out, possibly including the authorities themselves. Security forces were present, but initially appeared unprepared for the scale.

That changed rapidly.

By the following evening, after a speech by supreme leader Ali Khamenei on Friday morning framing the protests as the work of foreign-backed agents, the tone shifted decisively. Security forces were deployed in force well before nightfall. Streets that had filled easily a night earlier were saturated with armed personnel.

“It was a massacre,” the engineer said of the violence that followed—an unprecedented massacre in Iran’s modern history. The business owner added: “Everybody you see knows someone who was killed, injured or is missing.”

Iran International reported this week that at least 12,000 people were killed in the crackdown, a figure leaked to us from Iran’s presidential office and the Supreme National Security Council amid the blackout—a sign that the death toll has grown so vast it has shaken the conscience of people inside the system, pushing them to let the number out.

“This is the same system that helped kill hundreds of thousands of people in Syria to keep Bashar al-Assad in power,” the business owner said. “How many do you think it’s willing to kill for its own survival?”

They described the crackdown continuing well beyond the demonstrations themselves. In several neighborhoods, they said, an informal curfew has taken hold: being outside after dark is enough to risk being stopped, searched or detained.

Thousands are believed to have been arrested. In the days before the protests, many ordinary Iranians posted on Instagram urging others to join demonstrations on Thursday and Friday. Many businesses—including ordinary shopkeepers—also posted videos saying they would close on Thursday and Friday to join the protests.

Many doctors posted basic guidance on how to help the injured, or invited people to contact them if they needed medical help. Now that the internet is down, those posts are still there, and security forces are using them to identify and arrest the people who shared them.

“It’s ongoing,” the journalist said. “They’re knocking on doors now, especially of people who posted Instagram stories just before the 8th, when everyone was pumped up and reckless.”

Even those who stayed home have not been spared.

The engineer said several students he knew who had avoided the protests, but had expressed general sympathy online, had since been summoned and charged.

Witnesses also described widespread slogans and chants in support of Reza Pahlavi, echoing through streets and squares before security forces moved in.

Contrary to Tehran’s narrative, all three insisted, those who took to the streets were not “terrorists” but fed-up ordinary Iranians struggling to make ends meet, looking for a way out of what they feel is irreversible deterioration.

“The economy has been going downhill for almost a decade,” the business owner said. “Before that, there were ups and downs. Now it’s all down—and people believe it will only get worse.”
In his factory, the engineer said, most workers joined the protests on both nights. One was seriously injured; another is still missing. Many, he noted, had voted for reformist president Masoud Pezeshkian just a year earlier.

“It shows they’re willing to try anything they think might improve their lives even a tiny bit.”

Messages from outside Iran also helped drive turnout. US President Donald Trump urged Iranians to keep taking to the streets, saying “help is on the way”.

The three said the posts—and other public signals of support—spread quickly through private chats and family networks inside Iran, encouraging people to go out despite the risk.
What followed, the three said, was as striking and as sudden as the demonstrations themselves: silence.

“It’s been a cull, not just of bodies, but of souls,” the business owner said. “I can’t see the will to fight right now.” The engineer described an atmosphere of pervasive grief. “The city smells of death,” he said. “As if human ashes have been spread all over Iran.”

None of the three supports foreign military intervention. Yet all said a majority of people they speak to now openly wish for a US attack, seeing no internal path forward. “It’s certainly the prevailing sentiment,” the journalist said.

The engineer described near-universal support for that view among his workers. “It’s sad in every sense of the word,” he said. “Utter and absolute despair.”

For now, under tightened security and a suffocating blackout, the question is what comes next. One of the three warned that the most damaging consequence may be the loss of agency itself—the sense that change, if it comes at all, must arrive from outside.

“I’d say Trump attempting regime change is as likely as Trump making a deal,” the business owner said. “No one knows where this ship is going. For now, most people are too seasick to even look ahead.”

The protests began on December 28 amid soaring inflation. It initially drew a more measured response from the government.

But following a surge in demonstrations on January 8, and especially after a Supreme Leader speech the following day, officials reverted to a familiar framing: unrest portrayed as a foreign-backed security threat demanding a forceful response.

In an interview with Al Jazeera broadcast between January 9 and 12, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said protests had been peaceful from December 28 through January 7, but claimed that “armed terrorist elements linked to Israel and the United States” had subsequently turned them violent.

The judiciary soon echoed that framing.

Speaking to bazaar merchants on January 10, Chief Justice Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei said protesters had initially “demanded the country’s progress,” avoiding direct reference to the violent response.

Three days later, he called for the immediate trial of detainees, and in a January 14 post on X announced plans to televise the trials of what he called the “main culprits” in order to expose their alleged foreign ties.

Around the same time, footage of Ejei interrogating a detainee on state television circulated on social media.

‘No peace, only war’

The rhetorical shift became unmistakable on January 9, when Khamenei delivered a speech that many observers viewed as pivotal. He described protesters as “rioters under foreign influence” and urged security forces to confront them sternly.

President Masoud Pezeshkian, who until then had acknowledged protesters’ grievances and expressed openness to dialogue, followed suit.

“(They are) violent terrorists and rioters brought from abroad to attack mosques and civilians,” he said, urging the public “to stop the terrorists.”

Other senior figures reinforced the message. Security Chief Ali Larijani said on January 11 that forces were “controlling the protests with minimal damage,” despite emerging videos of a bloody crackdown.

“There will be no peace and no ceasefire, only war,” he warned protesters.

‘Conspiracy’

Some civilian officials sought to strike a more conciliatory tone, though without challenging the core narrative. Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani condemned violence in general terms and said the internet blackout—entering its eighth day on Thursday—was a “temporary measure.”

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said on January 13 that “protesting is the people’s legitimate right” and promised to address economic grievances, while also accusing protesters of “seeking violence.”

Military commanders, meanwhile, were more explicit. From January 8 through 14, senior officers repeatedly characterized the unrest as a “conspiracy” orchestrated by Israel and unnamed terrorist groups.

Army Commander Abdolrahim Mousavi praised the Basij domestic enforcement militia and police for “controlling the riots,” warned of possible direct military involvement, and described the protests as “a malicious conspiracy.”

Police Commander Ahmadreza Radan said “the level of confrontation has been raised,” warned that attacks on police stations “will not be tolerated,” and described police conduct as “mild” despite reports of mounting casualties.

Taken together, the statements reflect a rapid convergence among Iran’s political, judicial and security elites around a securitized narrative after January 8—one that recast the protests as an externally driven threat that can only be thwarted with bullets.

Officials assert that dozens of mosques and shrines across the country were deliberately attacked during protests.

Reports by eyewitnesses point to multiple mosques set ablaze in Tehran and Gilan province and in other major cities including Karaj and Isfahan.

In the past week, due to the near-total ongoing internet shutdown, state media have effectively become the primary source of visual material related to alleged damaged during the protests for many Iranians.

Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani said on Thursday that more than 61 mosques were torched during unrest in the capital. President Masoud Pezeshkian echoed the condemnation on January 12, stating that “Iranian society does not accept those who burn mosques.”

Pezeshkian went further, saying: “They have trained some people inside and outside, brought terrorists into the country from abroad, and they burn mosques.”

State media are widely circulating images of charred interiors and half-burned copies of the Quran in Abu Dhar Mosque in Tehran and CCTV footage from an unnamed mosque in Isfahan that appears to show individuals setting fire to the building and its contents.

In pro-government rallies, some participants were seen holding half-burned Qurans, and the state TV showed several interviews with them reinforcing the narrative that demonstrators were “terrorists” attacking Islam itself.

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Amplification beyond Iran

The images have not remained confined to Iranian media. They have been reshared widely on social platforms by supporters of the Islamic Republic, including some foreign influencers.

Accounts such as “Partisan Girl” (Sirin Girl) and Hamza Adi reposted the images, accusing supporters of Reza Pahlavi of burning the Quran.

Even amid internet restrictions, many pro-government users inside Iran continued to circulate the material online.

The repeated sharing has helped frame the unrest in some Muslim countries such as Pakistan as an attack on religious sanctities rather than a political protest.

Criticism and Fact-Checking

Some opponents of the government argue that the information released is selective and misleading. They say the extensive focus on mosque imagery by outlets such as state broadcaster IRIB aims to discredit protesters and provoke religious sentiment against them.

Iranian fact-checking website Factnameh wrote: “What is being presented is an incomplete and misleading picture of reality, designed to stir religious emotions and mobilize the government’s religious supporters, as well as to inflame Muslim public opinion against protesters in Iran.”

At the same time, some anonymous social media accounts have explicitly encouraged attacks on religious sites. An account posting under the name “Imam Tusi” wrote on X: “People burned Fatemeh Zahra Mosque in Isfahan, too. People should torch all shrines, mosques, and religious seminaries together with the mullahs in them.”

Most mosques and religious employees receive state backing in the Islamic theocracy.

Some opposition figures have implicitly acknowledged mosque burnings.

Darya Safai, an Iranian-born member of the Belgian parliament, wrote on X: “In western Tehran, a great mosque burned. For forty-seven years, its minarets echoed with ‘Allahu Akbar,’ and in that name, Iranian women and men were chained, silenced and broken.”

Yet other observers blamed authorities for the damage,

“They did this themselves to provoke the people—impaling the Quran on spears, setting fires, and destroying the mosque are just the tools of deception used by these hypocrites,” a user posting as Hatam wrote on X, without providing evidence.

Mosques as security hub

Iran has an estimated 75,000 mosques, around two-thirds of which are believed to be largely inactive. Tehran's critics argue that unlike in other Muslim-majority countries, mosques in Iran function not only as religious spaces but also serve as function halls for the state's repressive apparatus, including the Basij militia which quashed protests.

Iranian authorities openly acknowledge this role. On January 9, Revolutionary Guards commander Hossein Yekta called on government supporters via state television to gather in mosques and Basij bases to confront “the enemies of the revolution.”

In August 2024, Iranian media quoted Brigadier General Heydar Baba-Ahmadi, head of the Mosques and Neighborhoods Affairs of Basij militia force, as saying that “79 percent of Basij resistance bases are located in mosques, with another 5 percent in other religious sites.”

Factnameh estimates suggest nearly 50,000 Basij bases operate within mosques nationwide.

During the 2021–2022 protests, CNN reported on networks of secret detention sites, some allegedly located inside mosques. The report asserted that these spaces were used for temporary detention and torture of protesters, run by Basij units based in mosques.