A major Tehran theater production has dropped a prominent actor after his support for Palestine triggered fierce backlash, exposing a rare reversal where a stance strongly backed by the Islamic Republic appears to have become a liability with the public.
Navid Mohammadzadeh, one of Iran’s most prominent film and theater actors, was removed Monday from the cast of the theater-orchestral production “Arash,” according to a statement from the production team.
The producers cited “multiple controversies,” unspecified personal problems and, unusually, “the lack of audience interest in him” as reasons for the decision, saying a replacement would be announced soon.
The wording was striking in a country where support for Palestine has been promoted for decades as a foundational political and ideological cause, while expressions of sympathy for Israel can carry legal consequences.
Mohammadzadeh had drawn a wave of criticism on social media about two weeks earlier after posting an image of himself wearing clothing bearing the Palestinian flag. He responded with a video in which he made clear that his position went beyond concern for Palestinian civilians.
“I supported Palestine before, I support it now and I will continue to support it,” he said. “Why? Because I simply don’t like Israel. I will definitely choose Palestine forever.”
Mohammadzadeh pointed to football stars Diego Maradona and Cristiano Ronaldo, whom he described as personal idols, as figures whose attitudes toward the Palestinian issue helped confirm his own position.
He also pushed back against attacks on Iranian artists from rival political camps, complaining that both government hardliners and their opponents were quick to accuse people of betraying the country.
“I’m not on your side and I’m not on their side. I’m on nobody’s side,” he said. “I’m only on the side of one thing: life. And one place: Iran.”
“My love is Iran,” he added, saying he could have lived elsewhere but had chosen to remain despite the country’s difficulties.
His remarks failed to quell the criticism, as the social-media backlash over his support for Palestine continued.
The controversy coincided with another problem for “Arash”: anger over its unusually expensive tickets. Prices ranged from 990,000 tomans to nearly 5 million tomans for a limited number of premium seats, prompting criticism that the production had turned theater into a luxury product during a period of severe economic pressure. The producers later announced a 20% discount.
Reports about weak demand cited both ticket prices and opposition to Mohammadzadeh, making it impossible to establish how much of the production’s commercial difficulties resulted from his Palestine stance alone.
What distinguishes Monday’s decision is the production’s own explanation: rather than merely citing scheduling problems or artistic differences, it publicly identified a lack of audience interest in Mohammadzadeh as one of the reasons for removing one of Iran’s biggest stars.
Hardliners question ‘invisible red lines’
The decision drew sharp criticism from hardline Farhikhtegan newspaper, which linked Mohammadzadeh’s removal to his pro-Palestine post.
In a critical piece on Monday, the newspaper asked whether parts of Iran’s cultural scene had developed “invisible red lines” under which support for Palestine could lead to boycott and exclusion.
Farhikhtegan said the unusually blunt announcement — rather than the customary references to scheduling or contractual disagreements — resembled a hurried attempt to distance the production from the actor.
It suggested his removal amounted to a public warning that taking a particular political position could carry a professional cost, while disputing claims of weak demand by noting that audiences had still bought the expensive tickets.
The reaction is revealing. For most of the Islamic Republic’s history, pressure on cultural figures has generally operated in the opposite direction: artists could face bans, prosecution or professional consequences for challenging officially sanctioned causes.
In Mohammadzadeh’s case, a conservative newspaper is effectively complaining that an actor may have suffered commercially for embracing one of the state’s own defining positions.
A divide hidden by censorship
The episode brings into view a political divide that has existed in Iran for years but has been difficult to measure through the country’s tightly controlled domestic media.
Support for the Palestinian cause, and particularly for what Tehran calls the “resistance,” has been a cornerstone of the Islamic Republic’s identity since 1979. Iran has provided money, arms and training to Palestinian armed groups including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The US State Department estimated that Tehran provided up to $100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian militant groups before the latest regional wars.
That policy has unfolded while Iranians have faced repeated currency crises, high inflation, sanctions and declining purchasing power, helping turn Tehran’s spending abroad into a recurrent theme of anti-government protests.
“Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran” first emerged prominently during the 2009 Green Movement and returned during successive waves of unrest.
It was heard again during the economic protests that erupted in late December 2025, including in Tehran, Kermanshah and universities, and continued into January 2026.
The slogan does not necessarily express hostility toward Palestinians themselves. Its central message is that Iran’s resources and political priorities should be directed toward Iranians rather than Tehran’s regional allies.
But other expressions have gone considerably further.
Two days after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, hundreds of Persepolis football fans at Tehran’s Azadi Stadium shouted an obscene slogan demanding the removal of Palestinian flags displayed around the pitch. At another match later that month, spectators disrupted an officially requested minute of silence for people killed in Gaza by shouting and blowing horns.
The scenes contrasted sharply with government-organized rallies supporting Palestinians and Hamas, which failed to generate participation comparable to pro-Palestinian demonstrations seen in several other countries in the region and beyond.
Iranian social media after October 7 also saw unusually visible expressions of sympathy for Israel and hostility toward Hamas, despite the risks involved. In October 2023, Iran’s attorney general designated online activity promoting or supporting Israel a criminal offense, underscoring why such attitudes are largely absent from licensed domestic media.
The divide surfaced again in 2024 when Iranian celebrities joined the global “All Eyes on Rafah” campaign. Critics responded with “All Eyes on Iran,” accusing public figures of showing greater concern for Palestinians than for Iranians killed or imprisoned by the Islamic Republic.
Is Iran’s society anti-Palestine?
Polling helps quantify the gap, while also showing why describing Iranian society simply as anti-Palestinian or pro-Israel would be misleading.
A 2021 survey by the Netherlands-based GAMAAN research foundation found that 70.6% opposed the Islamic Republic’s approach toward Hamas. Nearly 64% agreed with “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran,” while 65.5% opposed the official “Death to Israel” slogan.
Those findings predate the recent wars, suggesting that resentment toward Tehran’s regional priorities is not itself a new postwar development.
A GAMAAN survey conducted after the 12-day Iran-Israel war last year showed the same divide in a more complicated form. Sixty-nine percent said the Islamic Republic should stop calling for Israel’s destruction, while 63% viewed the conflict as a war between Israel and the Islamic Republic rather than between Israel and the Iranian people.
But that did not amount to majority support for Israel. The same survey found 39% viewed Israel favorably and 48% unfavorably. Fifty-seven percent agreed that many Israeli military actions in Gaza could be considered war crimes.
The results suggest that several attitudes can coexist: opposition to Tehran’s funding of armed Palestinian groups, rejection of the “Death to Israel” ideology, anger at the use of Palestine as a compulsory political cause, sympathy toward Israel in its confrontation with the Islamic Republic, and concern about Palestinian civilians and Israel’s conduct in Gaza.
For some government opponents, Israel has also taken on a political meaning separate from the Palestinian conflict: it is an adversary of the state they themselves oppose. That dynamic has helped produce expressions of sympathy for Israel that are unusually visible by the standards of much of the Middle East.
What may be new is the consequence
It is impossible to know whether hostility toward a celebrity for publicly backing Palestine has significantly increased since the recent wars, or whether audiences previously felt much the same way but were less willing or less able to act on it.
What appears different in the Mohammadzadeh case is the consequence.
Attitudes long visible in protest slogans, football stadiums and relatively uncensored corners of social media appear to have crossed into the commercial calculations of a major, officially licensed cultural production.
That creates an extraordinary inversion.
For decades, Iranian artists have had reason to fear the consequences of straying too far from state ideology. Mohammadzadeh publicly embraced a position at the heart of that ideology — rejection of Israel and support for Palestine — yet the production employing him cited audience reluctance when removing him.
In other words, a political stance heavily promoted by the state appears, at least in this case, to have become a liability with part of the paying public.
That does not prove that support for Palestine has become broadly unacceptable in Iran. Mohammadzadeh had other controversies, and the high price of “Arash” tickets provides a separate explanation for the production’s difficulties.
Nor does the episode establish that public attitudes changed because of the wars. The “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon” slogan and polling against Tehran’s regional policies long predate them. The more significant development may instead be that such sentiment can now manifest itself openly enough to affect a high-profile cultural project.
Whether the reversal is allowed to stand is another matter.
Public theater performances in Iran require authorization from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, giving the state considerable leverage over productions and venues. Iranian regulations require theatrical works shown to the public to obtain a performance license from the ministry.
Hardline media are already framing Mohammadzadeh’s removal as punishment for supporting Palestine, a cause the Islamic Republic regards as central to its values and foreign policy.
It remains to be seen whether “Arash” will proceed without official consequences or whether its producers will face pressure over a decision that runs so visibly against the political priorities of the state.
If the removal stands, its significance may extend beyond one actor and one play. It would offer a rare example of a sentiment largely excluded from Iran’s controlled media environment exerting enough pressure from below to produce a tangible result inside the cultural system the state itself regulates.
Around 20,400 people participated in the online poll, with 44% saying they would not invest in property in Iran even if they could afford to do so. Only around half said they would buy a home.
Of those who participated, 67% were men and 33% women.
People aged 25 to 34 made up the largest group of respondents at 36.6%, followed by those aged 35 to 44 at 30.1%. People aged 45 to 54 accounted for 12.8%, while those aged 18 to 24 made up 11.4%.
Participants also left around 2,000 comments explaining their choices, offering a broader picture of the considerations shaping their decisions.
The responses centered on attachment to Iran, hopes for political change, plans to emigrate, economic hardship and concerns over the security of their savings.
‘If I had enough money, I wouldn't be in Iran’
For many of those opposed to buying a home, having enough money would provide an opportunity to leave Iran rather than invest more heavily in the country.
“If I had enough money, I wouldn't be in Iran at all,” one respondent wrote.
“Having enough money in this situation means having the best life abroad,” another wrote.
The responses mirror the findings of an earlier Iran International Instagram poll in which 83% of participants said they would leave Iran if given the opportunity.
Around 100,000 people participated in that poll over 24 hours. Thousands of comments cited economic problems, social restrictions, political conditions and uncertainty over the future among the reasons for wanting to emigrate.
Some participants in the latest poll associated remaining in Iran with insecurity, sanctions, inflation, power outages and difficulties meeting basic needs, saying they would rather put their money into a more stable country.
One described owning a home as inseparable from the wider conditions in which a person lives.
“A home needs a blue sky above it, a thriving tree with bright green leaves in its yard, air without lead coming through its windows, a meal in its kitchen that doesn't come with guilt or selling your dignity, and peace of mind because you feel safe,” the respondent wrote.
“Home is where I can look at the stars at night without waking up the next morning choked with sadness and humiliation.”
Gold and currency offer a way out
Others focused on the financial risks of property ownership.
Unlike in previous years, when buying a home was widely viewed as a relatively secure investment for the future, some said they would now prefer to keep their wealth in gold or foreign currency because those assets are more liquid and easier to take out of the country.
“Investing in a bankrupt economy is certainly a mistake because prices are unrealistic, artificial and like a hollow bubble,” one respondent wrote.
Housing has for years served as a means of preserving wealth in Iran's chronically inflationary economy, and property can provide protection against inflation over the longer term.
But international reporting has also documented a move toward assets that can be carried and quickly converted into cash during periods of uncertainty.
The Associated Press described the trend as a turn toward “portable wealth” during the 12-day war, while the World Gold Council recorded a sharp increase in investment demand for gold in Iran in 2025.
The poll comes as Iranians continue to contend with high inflation. Iran's Statistical Center put year-on-year inflation in July at nearly 88%.
‘I wouldn't trade Iran for anywhere’
For respondents who said they would buy a home, attachment to Iran and a sense of national identity emerged as leading reasons.
Some described owning a home as more than a financial investment, linking it to family, personal history and their connection to the country.
“Yes, I wouldn't trade Iran for anywhere in the world,” one wrote.
“Iran is our mother; you don't abandon your mother when times are difficult,” another wrote.
Others said the country's problems would not persuade them to build a life elsewhere.
“Iran is my first and last choice. I believe good days are ahead of us,” one participant wrote.
Some would buy only after political change
A number of respondents made their willingness to buy a home conditional on political change, greater freedoms or improvements in the country's circumstances.
“When Iran is free, 100%,” one wrote. “After Iran is free, yes, but not under these conditions,” another wrote.
Others questioned the premise of the poll itself, saying the prospect of having enough money to purchase a home was increasingly detached from the economic reality facing many people.
They pointed to difficulties paying for food, rent, medical treatment and other daily necessities, describing home ownership as an unattainable aspiration.
“We are renters, and we'll take the dream of buying a home to the grave,” one respondent wrote.
The findings follow another Iran International Instagram poll in which 90% of respondents said they did not want to marry or have children.
“Are Trump’s sanctions targeting the Iranian people or Islamic Republic officials? We are looking for a way to escape this situation, but it seems all the doors of the world have been closed to us,” one citizen wrote.
Iran International asked its audience to share their experiences of barriers to studying abroad after new sanctions led to restrictions affecting international language tests for Iranians.
An analysis of responses on Instagram showed that the cost of studying and moving abroad, compounded by the falling value of Iran’s currency, and the cancellation of international language tests were the most frequently cited concerns.
The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, indefinitely suspended General License G on August 24 as part of the Trump administration’s latest campaign to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic.
The license had since 2014 provided the legal basis for US universities, testing companies and other American entities to offer a range of educational services to Iranian people.
The Duolingo English Test subsequently announced that it would stop providing services from September 1 to people residing in Iran and holders of Iranian identification documents.
Rising costs narrow options
Financial pressures were the most common concern raised in responses to Iran International.
Respondents cited the rising cost of foreign currency, language tests, university applications, tuition, airline tickets and exit bonds as major obstacles to pursuing education overseas.
“With the euro at 2,400,000 rials, visas not being issued to Iranians, war and rising prices, the very high cost of exit bonds, terrible airline ticket prices, internet problems and language tests are all barriers to migration for us in Iran,” one respondent wrote.
Another described being caught between the expense of leaving Iran and the cost of remaining.
“We are imprisoned in Iran. We have neither the money to leave Iran nor the money to live in it,” the respondent wrote.
Some respondents also pointed to rising living expenses after reaching their destination countries, adding another financial hurdle even for those able to secure admission and leave Iran.
Years of preparation disrupted
The suspension or restriction of international language tests was the second major theme to emerge from the messages.
Some respondents said they had switched to TOEFL or the Duolingo English Test after IELTS became unavailable at various periods in Iran, only to see those alternatives restricted as well.
“After several years of studying for TOEFL, getting a high GPA and working to build a good résumé, I was one step away from taking TOEFL, and now the test is no longer being held,” one respondent wrote.
Another said the cancellation of a TOEFL exam was announced on the morning it was due to take place, after years of preparation and with an embassy appointment approaching.
The Duolingo English Test, launched in 2016, has become an alternative to TOEFL and IELTS for some Iranian applicants. The online test can be taken from home and costs less than some other international English proficiency exams.
Several respondents said the latest restrictions showed how sanctions were affecting ordinary Iranians seeking academic opportunities abroad.
“Why should ordinary people be targeted by sanctions? People in Iran are not allowed to take TOEFL and Duolingo tests inside Iran; they are not even allowed to escape this country,” one respondent wrote.
Iranian passport adds to barriers
Some identified their Iranian nationality and passport as another obstacle to academic opportunities abroad.
They described university positions being closed to Iranian applicants or applications being rejected without what they considered serious consideration of their academic records.
“I think the first problem for many people in Iran who want to migrate is the financial cost, followed by the barriers to being accepted as an Iranian,” one respondent wrote.
Another pointed to lengthy security screening of Iranian applicants at embassies, saying delays can prevent students from reaching universities in time to begin their programs.
Internet disruptions cost opportunities
Internet restrictions inside Iran were another recurring concern in the messages, particularly because applications depend on access to university websites, email and international financial services.
One said Iran’s internet was cut off on January 8, a day after an admissions interview with a university in Britain.
The respondent said two weeks without access to email or the university’s website ultimately resulted in the loss of the study opportunity.
