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Iranian banks remain open in UAE as US campaign squeezes Dubai trade - FT

Aug 29, 2026, 07:17 GMT+1

Iran’s trade with Dubai is showing growing signs of strain under the war and Washington’s new economic campaign, but sanctioned Iranian banks, flights and some commercial routes continue to operate despite calls for a sweeping cutoff, the Financial Times reported Saturday.

Shipping between Dubai Creek and Iranian ports has fallen sharply. At a terminal historically used by wooden dhows trading with Iran, a security guard told the FT vessels were now heading to Oman and India. “No more Iran since last week,” he said.

The disruption matters because Dubai has for decades served as one of Iran’s most important gateways to international trade and finance. Pre-war commerce between Iran and the UAE was worth nearly $30 billion annually.

“The UAE is the only avenue for Iranian imports, as Iran has access to no other major container port other than Jebel Ali in Dubai,” Esfandyar Batmanghelidj of the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation told the FT.

The effects are increasingly visible in Dubai’s traditional trading districts. But the economic break remains far from complete.

Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, both under US sanctions, continue serving customers through more than a dozen UAE branches combined, despite US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent calling for every Bank Melli branch worldwide to be closed. The two Iranian banks have more than 12 branches between them in the UAE, according to the report.

A Bank Melli employee said daily transactions, lending and letters of credit had seen no significant disruption and that the bank had recently renewed its license with the UAE central bank.

“We’re used to this,” the employee said, referring to previous sanctions.

Iranian airlines are also still flying to Dubai, the Iranian Business Council remains operational and Iranian produce continues to reach markets in the city.

Iranian traders are meanwhile adapting. One Tehran businessman told the FT that goods had been stockpiled in Turkey, some shipments were being rerouted through Oman and cargo could still be sent from Dubai to Bandar Abbas using false destinations on shipping documents.

“We are bypassing the blockade in the same way we have been bypassing sanctions,” he said. “Not much has changed.”

Washington increased the pressure Friday by moving to cut the UAE branches of Egypt’s Banque Misr from access to US financial institutions over alleged Iran-related activity.

The campaign comes after the UAE announced it was suspending trade and financial transactions with Iran. But analysts told the FT that centuries-old commercial ties and Dubai’s reliance on trade make a complete separation difficult.

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Iran’s missing fuel: Can border smuggling explain it all?

Aug 29, 2026, 05:25 GMT+1
•
Umud Shokri
100%
File Photo: Vehicles loaded with fuel containers near Iran’s border, where small-scale cross-border trafficking is the most visible face of a much larger fuel-smuggling economy.

Iran’s large-scale fuel losses appear to go beyond the smuggling cited by officials in Tehran, with evidence pointing to organized diversion within the country’s fuel distribution system.

Iranian officials repeatedly say around 20 million liters of fuel are smuggled out of the country every day, costing Iran between $4 billion and $5.2 billion a year. But the figure is far less precise than it is often presented.

Official statements generally refer to “fuel,” not gasoline alone, and include diesel and other petroleum products. In July 2026, Keramat Veys-Karami, head of the National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company (NIOPDC), said gasoline was less vulnerable to smuggling than diesel and identified transport allocations as a major source of leakage.

The government has not published the refinery, depot, tanker, customs and station-level data needed to show that 20 million liters physically disappear from the regulated system each day. Without a product-by-product balance, the figure cannot be treated as a measured flow of smuggled gasoline.

Its dollar value is equally uncertain. Twenty million liters a day amounts to 7.3 billion liters a year. Valuing that at $4 billion assumes a loss of about 55 cents per liter; a $5.2 billion estimate puts it at 71 cents. Officials rarely explain whether those figures represent replacement costs, forgone subsidy value, foreign black-market prices or smugglers’ revenue.

What the numbers show

Data released after the war reveal a strained gasoline balance, but do not account for smuggling on the scale claimed.

NIOPDC reported that between March and mid-July 2026, Iranian refineries produced around 109 million liters of gasoline a day, with another 12 million liters supplied through blending. Average consumption stood at 129 million liters.

In late June and early July, daily distribution rose to 134.5 million liters, partly because of increased road travel and Iran’s aging vehicle fleet.

Fuel-card data reveal another problem with interpreting headline numbers. Before the three-tier pricing reform introduced in December 2025, NIOPDC was loading the equivalent of 172 million liters a day in entitlements onto fuel cards belonging to 32 million eligible vehicles, even though actual consumption was around 131 million liters.

The reform reduced those entitlements to about 135 million liters a day and was followed by a six-percent fall in consumption.

But the original gap did not mean that more than 40 million liters of fuel were physically disappearing each day. It was a gap between theoretical entitlements and actual consumption—an important distinction when assessing the scale of diversion.

Establishing how much fuel actually disappears requires comparing refinery dispatches with depot receipts, tanker movements and station-level sales, rather than treating unused or inflated card allocations as physical fuel.

The border-province problem

One argument for the scale of gasoline smuggling focuses on allocations to provinces along or near Iran’s borders. But no published NIOPDC series located for 2025–2026 verifies the claim that Kerman, Hormozgan, Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchestan together receive 17.5 million liters a day.

Nor can their “normal” demand reliably be put at 14–15 million liters without data on vehicle registrations, fuel-card transactions, agricultural demand and interprovincial traffic.

Available evidence shows why population alone is a poor measure of legitimate demand. Kerman consumed 586 million liters of gasoline during the summer of 2025, equivalent to around six million liters a day, making it one of Iran’s five largest provincial consumers.

In July 2026, the government approved an additional 20-liter third-tier quota for private vehicles in Kerman, Hormozgan and Sistan and Baluchestan, citing long distances and inadequate public transportation.

The provincial figures therefore raise a question rather than provide an explanation. If verified allocations exceed plausible consumption by only a few million liters a day, much of the claimed national leakage must occur elsewhere, or consist of diesel and other fuels rather than gasoline.

An organized supply chain

There is considerably firmer evidence for large-scale organized smuggling and diversion.

Pakistani traders and transporters told RFE/RL in May 2026 that at least six million liters of Iranian gasoline and diesel were entering Pakistan each day. A leaked Pakistani intelligence report identified around 2,000 vehicles and 1,300 boats involved in the trade and described payments moving through hawala networks.

That points to a substantial and organized cross-border economy. But even the six-million-liter estimate accounts for less than one-third of the 20 million liters Iranian officials say are smuggled daily—and it includes both gasoline and diesel.

Evidence from inside Iran points more clearly to the organized networks behind large-scale diversion.

In November and December 2025, judicial officials in Hormozgan said an investigation known as the Toofan case had uncovered 35 interconnected smuggling networks that allegedly moved more than four billion liters of fuel over several years. Authorities opened cases against 753 people described as major participants.

These remain judicial allegations rather than final findings. But the scale and structure described by investigators point to something considerably larger than subsistence smuggling by residents of impoverished border communities.

Where does the fuel disappear?

One of the strongest official clues lies further upstream, in the way fuel allocations are administered.

NIOPDC says around 60 million liters of diesel are allocated to transport operators every day through electronic waybills and acknowledges that inaccurate information about end users creates opportunities for diversion.

The evidence therefore points not to a single route or group of smugglers but to overlapping channels: manipulated fuel entitlements, transport documentation, bulk tanker movements, maritime trafficking and informal payment networks.

That does not establish that Iran’s official estimate of 20 million liters smuggled each day is wrong. It shows that authorities have not published the data necessary to establish what those millions of liters consist of or where they leave the regulated system.

Answering that question would require depot balances, tanker GPS records, station-level sales and provincial allocation data. Until those are published, attributing 20 million liters of daily smuggling chiefly to border communities risks mistaking the visible final carriers for the organized supply system that makes diversion on such a scale possible.

Iran bets on China to blunt Trump’s economic offensive

Aug 29, 2026, 01:00 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee
100%
Chinese President Xi Jinping welcomes Iran's president Masoud Pezeshkian

China’s refusal to bow to US sanctions has raised hopes in Tehran that Beijing could blunt Washington’s new economic offensive, but a debate inside Iran reveals doubts over how far China is willing or able to go on Iran’s behalf.

China has warned that it would respond if Chinese companies were targeted by any significant expansion of US secondary sanctions related to Iran, prompting Iranian officials to portray Beijing as a potential obstacle to Washington’s effort to further isolate Tehran economically.

The question has become more pressing as the Trump administration weighs whether to extend its campaign to Chinese financial institutions.

Asked Thursday why Washington had not imposed new sanctions on Chinese banks dealing with Tehran, President Donald Trump suggested such measures could already be under consideration.

“You don’t know if I’m doing it. I don’t have to announce everything,” Trump said.

China’s war too?

Some in Tehran see China’s resistance as part of a much larger struggle with Washington in which Iran has become an important front.

Hasan Ameli, the Supreme Leader’s representative in Ardabil province, argued during Friday prayers that Beijing understood that the United States’ ultimate confrontation was with China rather than Iran.

“China fully understands that America’s main war, and the war of the future, is with China, and this war passes through Iran,” Ameli said. “If America gains control over Iranian oil, it will prepare for war with China.”

He described China’s position as “a major opening for Iran’s economy and a heavy blow to American sanctions,” arguing that Tehran could use it to ease Washington’s economic pressure.

Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s parliament speaker and the country’s special representative for China, also welcomed Beijing’s position.

“The Iran-China comprehensive strategic partnership is rooted in mutual respect, win-win cooperation, and a shared vision for a multipolar world. This relationship needs no one’s permission,” he wrote on X.

Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, pointed to China’s importance as one of Iran’s largest oil buyers and called for faster implementation of the two countries’ 25-year cooperation agreement.

“Given China’s opposition to American sanctions against Iran and its role as one of the largest buyers of Iranian oil, there is considerable potential for expanding trade and economic cooperation,” he said.

China’s interests, not Iran’s

But even among those who see China as an important counterweight to US pressure, there is skepticism over a crucial assumption: that Beijing’s interests and Tehran’s necessarily coincide.

Majid-Reza Hariri, head of the Iran-China Chamber of Commerce, said China was not confronting Washington because of any military or ideological alliance with Iran.

“Rather, its economic and strategic interests require it to preserve its trade independence,” Hariri told Khabar Online.

He acknowledged that intensified US pressure could inflict significant economic damage on Iran, but argued that Washington could not cripple the Iranian economy without broader international cooperation.

Relations with China and Iran’s neighbors, he said, remained important to the country’s economic resilience.

Iranian journalist Ata Bahrami similarly argued that Beijing’s position should be understood primarily as a defense of its own sovereignty and growing power rather than a commitment to Iran.

“Their clear message to Washington is: ‘We have grown stronger and you must respect our sovereignty,’” he said. “In fact, Iran is the starting point for demonstrating this power.”

The Hormuz contradiction

The limits of the partnership become more apparent in the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran’s own actions potentially conflict with Chinese interests.

Moderate journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi questioned whether Beijing could be expected to deepen its support for Tehran while Iran keeps closed a waterway through which China receives more than 40% of its oil.

Zeidabadi also pointed to the fact that Ghalibaf has yet to visit Beijing despite his appointment as Iran’s special representative for China, asking whether the delay could reflect Chinese frustration with Tehran’s refusal to end its threat over Hormuz.

The problem goes beyond political differences. Even if Beijing refuses to comply with US secondary sanctions and Chinese buyers remain willing to purchase Iranian oil, Tehran must still be able to move that oil out of the Persian Gulf under a US maritime blockade.

Overcoming that obstacle would potentially require a level of Chinese involvement in Iran’s confrontation with Washington that Beijing has so far shown no willingness to undertake.

The debate inside Iran therefore exposes the gap between diplomatic resistance to US sanctions and the practical ability to defeat them.

Beijing may be willing to protect Chinese commercial interests and challenge Washington’s extraterritorial sanctions, but that is different from assuming the economic—let alone military—costs of Iran’s confrontation with the United States.

For Tehran, China may be Washington’s biggest obstacle in enforcing its economic campaign, but not necessarily Iran’s economic lifeline.

Iran or the dollar? US makes an example of Banque Misr

Aug 28, 2026, 20:50 GMT+1
•
Mohamad Machine-Chian
100%
A customer exchanges U.S. dollars to Egyptian pounds in a foreign exchange office in central Cairo, Egypt December 27, 2016

The US has opened a new front in its economic campaign against Iran by threatening to cut a major third-country bank out of the dollar system over alleged involvement in Tehran’s shadow-banking network.

The US Treasury on Friday labeled Banque Misr’s UAE branches a “financial institution of primary money laundering concern” and proposed cutting them off from the dollar system, marking the first Section 311 action against a third-country bank under Washington’s new Operation Economic Outcast.

The Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) estimates that between January 2024 and June 2026, Banque Misr UAE processed approximately $1.8 billion in transactions for 103 companies it assesses are potentially part of the Islamic Republic’s “shadow banking” network.

The department described the bank as “a critical node for the Iranian regime’s access to US dollars” and said its customers included front companies working for Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and the Revolutionary Guards, as well as a company described in media reports as a money-laundering conduit for Mojtaba Khamenei.

“We also warned that Iran’s enablers cannot continue to enjoy access to the US dollar and the global financial system,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said. “Banque Misr UAE decided to find out the hard way.”

The move is the first use of Section 311 under Operation Economic Outcast, which Bessent announced on August 24 with the stated aim of cutting off the Iranian government’s revenue streams worldwide.

Unlike conventional sanctions, however, the FinCEN action involves no asset freezes.

Cutting off the dollar

Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act allows the Treasury to designate a foreign financial institution as being of “primary money laundering concern” and impose special measures restricting its access to the US financial system.

In Banque Misr UAE’s case, FinCEN has proposed the most severe option, known as the fifth special measure.

The measure would not only close the bank’s three direct correspondent accounts with US financial institutions. American banks would also be required to prevent Banque Misr UAE from accessing dollars indirectly through intermediary foreign banks.

The proposal is subject to a 30-day public comment period after publication in the Federal Register before it can be finalized.

The measure applies only to Banque Misr’s five UAE branches — two in Dubai and one each in Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah. The bank’s Cairo-based parent and operations in other countries are excluded.

Iran-linked transactions

FinCEN named three Banque Misr UAE customers as examples of the activity behind its action.

UAE-based Alpa Trading FZCO conducted more than $32 million in transactions and, according to FinCEN, procured goods on behalf of Iran’s defense ministry and the Revolutionary Guards.

Naba Alzaki Raw Materials Trading LLC processed more than $29 million and was identified as a front for the Iran-based Khandan Exchange. Midas Oil Trading DMCC conducted more than $1 million in transactions and has been described in media reports as a money-laundering conduit for Mojtaba Khamenei.

Of the $1.8 billion in potentially Iran-linked transactions identified by FinCEN, roughly $520 million was processed in the 12 months to June 2026, a period covering the war and tightening US sanctions.

FinCEN described the proportion of suspected Iranian activity relative to the size of Banque Misr UAE as “concerningly high.”

The agency has previously said it identified about $9 billion in potential Iranian shadow-banking activity moving through US correspondent accounts in 2024 alone.

The network relies on exchange houses inside Iran and front companies registered in third countries, particularly the UAE and Hong Kong, to turn revenue from sanctioned Iranian exports into usable currency.

A growing bank

Banque Misr UAE’s audited accounts show that its business was expanding during the period in which FinCEN alleges it became a conduit for Iran’s shadow-banking network.

Total assets rose 11% in 2025 to 23.4 billion dirhams ($6.4 billion), customer deposits increased 9% to 19.1 billion dirhams and loans jumped 60% to 8.8 billion dirhams.

The accounts also show the importance of trade finance to its business. Its books carry more than 1.3 billion dirhams in letters of guarantee and 3.6 billion dirhams in undrawn credit commitments.

Losing dollar correspondent access would therefore strike directly at a business heavily involved in cross-border trade finance, even without freezing any of its assets.

The bank appears well capitalized, with a capital adequacy ratio of 24.7%, well above the UAE central bank’s 10.5% minimum. The immediate threat is therefore not insolvency but the viability of parts of a business dependent on international currency settlement and trade finance.

Banque Misr is Egypt’s second-largest bank and is fully owned by the Egyptian state. That makes Washington’s decision to target its UAE operations particularly significant as the US seeks to persuade foreign financial institutions to stop facilitating Iranian trade.

The move nevertheless stops short of targeting larger financial institutions, particularly major Chinese banks involved in financing Iranian trade, a step Washington has so far avoided amid concerns over wider financial disruption and retaliation.

By threatening a state-owned bank belonging to a major Arab partner with exclusion from the dollar system, Washington is setting out the potential cost for third-country institutions that continue handling business it considers part of Iran’s shadow-banking network.

The warning is now explicit: institutions dealing with Tehran may increasingly have to weigh that business against their access to the dollar.

US targets Egyptian bank in first strike of economic war against Iran

Aug 28, 2026, 17:35 GMT+1
100%
File Photo: People walk in front of Banque Misr in Cairo, Egypt, November 3, 2016

The US Treasury moved Friday to cut the UAE branches of Egypt’s Banque Misr off from direct access to the US financial system over alleged dealings with Iran, marking the first major action in Washington’s new “Economic D-Day” campaign against Tehran.

The Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network proposed barring Banque Misr’s six UAE branches from correspondent banking access to US financial institutions, restricting their ability to conduct dollar transactions.

Treasury estimates the branches processed about $1.8 billion in transactions between January 2024 and June 2026 for 103 companies potentially linked to Iran’s shadow-banking networks, describing the operations as a “critical node” in Tehran’s access to US dollars.

“Treasury promised to sever every economic lifeline Tehran has left and finally end the threat of the Iranian regime,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said.

“We also warned that Iran’s enablers cannot continue to enjoy access to the US dollar and the global financial system,” he added. “Banque Misr UAE decided to find out the hard way.”

Bessent had previewed a “major announcement” involving secondary sanctions against an international bank earlier this week as he launched what Washington has called an “Economic D-Day” against Iran and institutions that facilitate its trade.

The measure is narrower than Bessent’s warning initially suggested. It applies only to Banque Misr’s UAE branches, leaving its Cairo headquarters and branches in countries including France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Djibouti able to continue conducting dollar transactions.

The proposed restriction is also subject to a 30-day public comment period before taking effect.

The Financial Times said the limited scope highlighted Washington’s reluctance so far to target major Chinese banks and other large financial institutions involved in financing Iranian trade, amid concerns over potential disruption to global markets and retaliation.

China remains particularly important to Tehran. Chinese purchases of Iranian oil account for about 45% of the Iranian government budget, according to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, cited by the FT.

The Treasury separately sanctioned Reza Mohammad Taeedi, general manager of Iran’s Bank Melli branch in Dubai, as well as a Hong Kong-based company it accused of helping launder money for a sanctioned Iranian exchange house.

Banque Misr UAE did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment on Friday, while Reuters said it was unable to reach Taeedi.

The measures come as Washington seeks to intensify economic pressure six months into its war with Iran while avoiding measures that could cause wider financial disruption. Iran has urged other countries not to participate in the new US sanctions campaign.

Iranians are selling their own graves to pay for living

Aug 28, 2026, 13:58 GMT+1
•
Saman Rahmatian
100%

Dying has become one of the costs Iranians can no longer meet. Burial plots are advertised at years of wages, families are selling the graves they had reserved for themselves, and some are taking their dead to villages where burial is still free.

A review of grave listings in Tehran found a three-tier plot in sections 39 and 72 of Behesht-e Zahra, the vast cemetery on the southern edge of the capital where Iran's war dead and the founder of the Islamic Republic are buried, offered at 30 billion rials, about $15,000. Tiered graves are stacked burials sold as a single right, allowing several family members to be interred in one plot over time.

The official 2026 tariff for reserving the same three tiers in that part of the cemetery is 3.47 billion rials, roughly $1,740. The asking price in the listings is more than eight and a half times the state rate.

Set against wages, the figures become clearer. Iran's minimum base wage is about 166 million rials a month, around $83. The advertised grave is equivalent to more than 180 months of that wage: a worker on the minimum would have to save every rial for more than fifteen years, spending nothing at all, to reach the asking price. Even the official tariff comes to nearly 21 months of wages.

The market is not confined to the capital. At the Bagh-e Ferdows cemetery in Kermanshah, listings reach 34 billion rials, about $17,000. Two-tier graves at the Saheb al-Zaman cemetery in Kerman are advertised at up to 20 billion rials, some $10,000, and plots at 10 billion rials, around $5,000, appear in Karaj and Yazd.

In Mashhad, family tombs at Behesht-e Reza are priced at up to 18 billion rials, roughly $9,000, and published reports have put burial inside the shrine of Imam Reza, the holiest Shia site in Iran and a place many families regard as a religious privilege, at as much as 14 billion rials, about $7,000.

The bill for a last farewell

A grave is only one of the costs of dying. Transporting the body, ritual washing and the shroud, the burial itself, the headstone, a mosque, flowers, catering and the ceremonies each carry a separate charge.

Under Tehran's official 2026 tariff, basic services run from hundreds of thousands to several million rials. A private hearse costs 50 million rials, about $25, for the first three hours.

Adding the grave, cemetery services, a temporary headstone, a mosque or hall, flowers, catering and other costs, a burial and urban funeral for around 100 people can come to between 1.2 and 1.8 billion rials, roughly $600 to $900. A more expensive plot, a costlier stone, a full meal or several ceremonies can push it far higher.

For many families, though, the question is not whether to buy an expensive grave or an elaborate headstone. It is how to pay for an ordinary burial at all, a cost that pushes them to shrink the ceremonies, drop the traditional third-day and seventh-day gatherings, or find somewhere cheaper to bury their dead.

What has actually changed

Prices inside Behesht-e Zahra vary by zone and section, and the state rates rise every year. In rials the climb is steep: three tiers in the older sections cost 825 million rials in 2022 against 3.47 billion today, a fourfold increase.

Measured in dollars, though, the official price has barely moved. It was worth about $1,700 in 2022 and about $1,740 now, because the city council raises the tariff by a fraction of what the currency loses each year. What has collapsed is the ability to pay: Iran's minimum wage has fallen from more than $230 a decade ago to around $83.

  • Names of some Iran protest victims vanish from Tehran cemetery database

    Names of some Iran protest victims vanish from Tehran cemetery database

That gap between a suppressed official price and what the market will bear is where the private trade lives. The cemetery's managing director said in 2023 that grave sales are the organization's main source of income, that capacity was running out and three new cemeteries were planned, and that each national identity number was now limited to a single plot, a rule introduced to stop what he called brokering and the emergence of "grave sultans." Such brokering, he acknowledged, exists.

Cemetery officials also dispute the highest figures in circulation. A previous managing director said the most expensive grave ever sold there had gone for a fraction of the sums now advertised. The listings reviewed for this report are advertisements placed by private sellers, not transactions recorded by the cemetery.

When a burial right becomes an asset

Iran International contacted three people who had advertised graves for sale in Tehran and Kermanshah, presenting itself as a prospective buyer. None is named here.

One, in Tehran, was selling an unused tier of his father's grave, a space the family had kept for his mother.

"Thank God our mother is alive, and right now we need this money more," he said.

In Kermanshah, another seller had listed his mother's grave, in Bagh-e Ferdows for about 40 years. He counted its position near the car park among its advantages, and said that whenever a buyer needed it, he would come to complete the transfer once the money had been paid, so that the grave could be given to them as a "gift."

  • Iran crackdown reaches cemeteries as graves of slain protesters defaced

    Iran crackdown reaches cemeteries as graves of slain protesters defaced

A third seller in Kermanshah had bought a plot beside his brother's years earlier, intending to be buried next to him. He has put it up for sale. Finding a grave in Bagh-e Ferdows has become difficult, he said, but the money matters more for now: he is still alive, and he would rather use it for what his children need than worry about how easily they will be able to visit him later.

In this market, even a place kept to lie beside a father, a mother or a sibling can lose out to something more urgent: the money a family needs today.

Graves at auction

Burial rights are not only offered as assets in private listings. Court enforcement records show they can be seized and auctioned to settle debts.

In 2022, a single tier of a grave in section 36 of Behesht-e Zahra was put up for auction. In June 2025, so was a grave in section 62 of Bagh-e Ferdows in Kermanshah.

Open trade in graves is not permitted in many Iranian cemeteries, and transfers of burial rights are supposed to go through official channels. In Tehran, the right of use must be registered through the Behesht-e Zahra organization.

The restrictions have not ended the market. Listings continue to appear, and some transfers are dressed as gifts, as the Kermanshah seller described.

The result is a market with almost no transparency: there is no comprehensive official record of how many such deals are done, no clarity on the prices finally paid, and no certainty that a right advertised in a listing can lawfully be transferred at all.

The migration of the dead

Another consequence is visible in the villages around some Iranian cities.

Reports from areas near Mashhad and Gorgan describe urban families moving the bodies of relatives to village cemeteries, where burial is free or cheap, to reduce costs.

One described a rise in city families turning up at rural graveyards. In another village, residents built a fence around the cemetery to stop outsiders being buried there.

Similar accounts have emerged from other cities. There are no official figures, but the cases suggest the price of a grave is now capable of redrawing the geography of burial.

Prices are not driven by inflation alone. Older cemeteries are running short of capacity, families want to be buried alongside relatives, and the religious standing of certain sites carries a premium of its own.

The pressure works in both directions at once: one family drives a body out of the city to save money while, in the same period, a burial plot in an old cemetery becomes an asset worth the equivalent of years of work.

Mourning under financial and security pressure

For some families the difficulty of burial is not only economic.

Reporting on those killed in protests and on people executed in Iran shows that the release of a body, the place of burial and even the holding of a funeral can fall under the control of security institutions. In some cases that pressure has come with a demand for money.

  • Pay for bullets: How Iran pressures families after killing protesters

    Pay for bullets: How Iran pressures families after killing protesters

The family of Babak Pourmazaheri, a 37-year-old protester killed in Alborz province, received his body after three days and a payment of 4 billion rials, about $2,000.

In the case of Jamshid Momeni, 16 billion rials, roughly $8,000, was demanded for the return of his body; when the family said they could not pay, they were asked instead to present him as a "martyr of the state."

In the case of Esmail Fekri, the family was not told where he had been buried, and a security officer demanded 1.5 billion rials, some $750, to reveal the location of the grave.

Here the cost of death is no longer the price of a plot and a ceremony. Money has become entangled with control over the body, the burial and the right to grieve.

Two sides of the market

In a market where a burial right can be worth years of wages and can be auctioned to settle a debt, some families are selling the very place they had kept for themselves or their relatives, in order to pay for living.

In Kermanshah, a man bought a grave beside his brother's years ago. He has now put it up for sale.

He says he needs the money for his children more than he needs somewhere to be buried.