Meta, Google remove Iran matchmaking app after child marriage report
A photo by an NGO highlighting child marriage. Undated
Meta and Google removed Iran’s “Adam and Eve” matchmaking app and related promotional accounts after an investigation found girls as young as 13 were being listed as prospective spouses, US-based rights group HRANA said Monday.
“The exploitation of children is a horrific crime and we work aggressively to fight it on and off our platforms,” a Meta spokesperson told HRANA. “We investigated the information provided by HRANA and identified external links to underage marriage services. We have removed these entities from Meta platforms.”
Google separately told the group: “The app was removed from Google Play on October 9 for violating our policies.”
HRANA said the action followed an Oct. 8 investigation and a joint appeal by 24 civil society groups urging the companies to remove the app and strengthen protections against services facilitating underage marriage.
The platform had previously drawn scrutiny after Iran’s reformist Shargh newspaper reported in November 2025 that parents could register children as young as 13 as marriage candidates. Reporters were able to create a full profile for a girl born in 2012 without encountering an age restriction or identity barrier.
Shargh said profiles of users under 18 were concentrated in poorer regions where early marriage is more common, with girls most frequently listed between the ages of 13 and 16 and boys between 16 and 18.
The platform’s executive manager, Mohammad-Hossein Asghari, defended the policy at the time, saying Iranian law obliged the service to accept users who fell within the statutory marriage ages.
“Article 1041 of the Civil Code sets the marriage age at 13 for women and 15 for men,” Asghari said. “From a legal standpoint we are obliged to accept membership and cannot block someone who falls within the age range set by law.”
Around 300,000 people had attempted to register with the platform and about 70,000 profiles were active following identity checks and psychological screening, according to Asghari. Minors under 15, he said, were required to have a parent complete the registration form and staff would speak directly with the child before approval.
Child-rights advocates quoted by Shargh warned that formalizing marriage involving minors through a widely promoted digital platform risked further normalizing the practice.
Iran’s Statistical Center recorded about 25,900 marriages involving girls under 15 in 2022, down from roughly 32,000 a year earlier.
Court sketch from Woolwich Crown Court. Credit: SWNS/Julia Quenzler
A man accused of plotting an attack on Iran International journalists in Britain discussed an “embassy” visit with one contact and told another he had been promised £150,000 and help resolving his criminal case in Iran, a London court heard.
Messages presented at Woolwich Crown Court showed Mostafa Sepahvand seeking a meeting with a man saved in his phone as “Navid Embassy Bro,” while separate exchanges detailed his demands for money and assurances relayed by contacts in Iran.
Sepahvand, 41, is on trial alongside Farhad Javadi Manesh, 46, and Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori, 57. All three deny charges under Britain’s National Security Act.
Prosecutors allege they gathered information for Iranian intelligence in preparation for serious violence against at least one target, with Sepahvand expected to carry out an attack and the other two helping to prepare it. The alleged targets included Iran International journalists Mojtaba Pourmohsen and Kambiz Hosseini.
In a message to Navid dated March 28, 2025, Sepahvand wrote: “hello bro, are you well [w]ill come to see you at the embassy”.
Navid replied that something was troubling him and that he would explain that evening.
The contact was saved under the Persian name “Navid Barar Sefarat,” rendered in court as “Embassy Bro,” and associated with a UK telephone number. The exchanges presented did not establish his role or whether he worked for an embassy. The quoted message did not identify which embassy Sepahvand meant.
A day later, Sepahvand sent Navid a link to an auction listing for a 2024 Mercedes-Benz GLE 450.
On April 2, he wrote: “Brother I am waiting for you call me [w]ill send this friend of mine there”.
Further exchanges followed on April 3. When Sepahvand asked Navid to answer, Navid replied that he was on the phone. An April 30 message asking why Navid had not responded went unanswered.
The purpose of the proposed meeting and any connection between those exchanges and the alleged surveillance operation were not established in the messages described in court.
In separate communications with Mostafa Ghorbani, Sepahvand discussed the financial costs of locating individuals and promises to resolve his legal difficulties in Iran.
In a March 20 voice recording, previously aired during the trial, Sepahvand said he had been promised £150,000 as well as help with his court case if he completed the task.
“They have sent me £3,500, and they keep sending me fifty addresses,” he said, complaining about the money he had spent visiting locations.
Ghorbani also relayed assurances that Sepahvand’s case would be resolved once the work was done, that he would be provided with a house and that people would meet him at the airport.
Sepahvand repeatedly complained that the addresses supplied to him proved incorrect and that the work exposed him to arrest. In a March 20 voice message, he described it as “very seriously illegal” and demanded money to cover expenses.
He said locating the individuals required people to attend addresses and keep watch, and that others would be unwilling to take those risks without payment.
The hearing also examined Sepahvand’s communications with Vahid Malmir, whom he repeatedly questioned about a possible role in criminal investigations.
“I knew from very first day that you were with the criminal investigation department, but I couldn’t bring myself to say it,” Sepahvand wrote on March 28.
In another message, he asked: “Tell me the truth are you an officer with the criminal investigation”.
Malmir responded with assurances that he was at Sepahvand’s service, without explicitly confirming such a role.
Later exchanges returned to Sepahvand’s demands for a formal resolution of his Iranian case.
On April 25, he complained that he had repeatedly been told the matter was resolved even though no court ruling had been issued. He said he would stand at the previously discussed addresses if the ruling came through.
The following day, he claimed that a contact named Amin was threatening him and had said his case would not be resolved until he took action.
In earlier sessions, jurors heard evidence about photographs of locations associated with the journalists, information about Hosseini’s social media accounts and communications concerning Iran International’s offices.
Prosecutors have said Sepahvand’s wish to resolve his Iranian criminal conviction was relevant to his motivation. Jurors were previously told not to treat the conviction itself as evidence against him.
According to the prosecution’s account of his defense, Sepahvand accepts conducting surveillance for Iran but says he feared the consequences of refusing and deliberately did a poor job. Prosecutors reject that explanation.
Javadi Manesh and Noori accept visiting locations and taking photographs and videos but say they did not know they were assisting Iranian intelligence.
Armed attacks and security operations in southeastern Iran have left at least 94 people dead and 33 wounded since March 31, with fighting growing more frequent and involving heavier weapons, US-based human rights group HRANA reported Monday.
The group recorded at least 63 armed incidents between March 31 and October 10, especially in Sistan and Baluchestan province.
The escalation has coincided with the US and Israeli conflict with Iran. HRANA said Iranian authorities had focused much of their attention on western and northwestern Iran while a sustained pattern of armed attacks and security operations developed in the southeast.
Attacks on patrol vehicles and military convoys were the most common incidents, with 17 recorded cases, followed by 14 targeted shootings. Seven of the shootings occurred outside victims' homes or workplaces or along their commuting routes.
HRANA also reported a shift toward heavier weapons and more complex attacks.
On October 2, a vehicle allegedly linked to the IRGC Quds Force's Fatemiyoun Brigade was targeted with a booby trap and gunfire near Zahedan.
Five days later, an attack on a police headquarters in Jalegh reportedly involved mines, rocket-propelled grenades and semi-heavy weapons. On October 9, a roadside bomb struck the route of a police convoy near Zahedan.
The People’s Fighters Front, an alliance formed in December 2025 that includes Jaish al-Adl and smaller Baluch armed groups, claimed six of the attacks documented by HRANA, while Ansar al-Furqan claimed one. Most attacks remained unclaimed or could not be reliably attributed, HRANA said.
Government forces also used drones, artillery, armored vehicles and heavy weapons in several operations, HRANA said. In Jahadabad, Gharibabad and Manzalab, homes and sites of armed confrontations were demolished, blown up or set on fire.
The report warned that the use of such weapons in residential areas increased the risk of civilian casualties and property damage.
The region has a long history of clashes between Iranian security forces and Sunni Baluch militants. Jaish al-Adl emerged around 2012 as a successor to Jundullah and has repeatedly targeted security forces, including in a 2019 suicide bombing that killed 27 Revolutionary Guards.
A B-1 bomber takes off from RAF Fairford airbase, as the US removes its B-1 bombers one week after several men were arrested on suspicion of offences under the Explosives Act, in this screengrab obtained from a social media video in Fairford, Gloucestershire, Britain October 4, 2026.
Britain said on Monday that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had “almost certainly” directed a suspected plot targeting RAF Fairford, as it vowed to crack down on Iranian criminal networks, sanctioned two Iranian nationals and summoned Iran’s ambassador.
RAF Fairford in southwest England, which had been used by US bombers to carry out strikes on Iran, became the focus of a major security operation after five British men were arrested nearby in the early hours of Sept. 27 on suspicion of terrorism and explosives offences.
US officials have said the suspected plot involved a drone attack. President Donald Trump said last week that an Iran-linked threat had prompted the United States to withdraw its bombers from the base.
“I can confirm our assessment that it is highly likely to have been coordinated in Iran, almost certainly directed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard,” Prime Minister Andy Burnham told parliament.
Iran has denied involvement. Iran’s ambassador to Britain, Seyed Ali Mousavi, on Monday rejected any Iranian role in the suspected plot and said Tehran was willing to cooperate with British authorities investigating the incident, state news agency IRNA reported.
Details of the suspected plot remain limited. The five British men were later released on police bail under what authorities described as stringent conditions. Two other arrested men, including a British-Iranian national, were also released.
Police said petrol was found in vans seized during the investigation but no viable explosive was discovered.
“We will not tolerate these threats on our soil,” Burnham said. “We will crack down on Iran's use of criminal networks, using our full range of powers to target them and their funding streams, and we will bring further sanctions to restrict the capacity of Iran and the IRGC to do us harm.”
Sanctions and diplomatic summons
Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband said he had instructed his department to summon Iran’s ambassador.
“Iran’s continued attempts to undermine the security of the United Kingdom and international partners through its criminal networks, proxy groups and state-backed malign activity is unacceptable,” Miliband said.
Britain also sanctioned Ruhollah Bazghandi and Shahram Ali Reza Tamarzadeh Jakki under its Iran sanctions regime.
The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office said Bazghandi, whom it identified as the IRGC’s head of counterespionage operations, was suspected of planning or conducting espionage for Iran and of involvement in threatening, planning or conducting attacks against people and assets in Britain or other countries.
Jakki was sanctioned for allegedly supporting or assisting activity involving threats, plans or attacks against people outside Iran. Britain described him as a facilitator for the already sanctioned Zindashti criminal network, which it says has been involved in plots targeting Iranian dissidents.
Joint condemnation
Foreign ministries from nearly 30 countries, including the United States, Canada, France and Germany, issued a joint statement condemning “Iran’s use of violent attacks, including the acts of lethal plotting, arson, sabotage, cyber-attacks, and other hybrid activities against us and our partners.”
“The UK has also concluded this event demonstrates the IRGC’s continued willingness to project hostile activity beyond its borders through covert networks and proxy actors,” the statement said.
British authorities have for years accused Iran of involvement in plots and attempted assassinations in Britain using criminal networks and proxies, allegations Tehran has repeatedly denied. Britain said last year that it had identified 20 credible Iran-backed threats to kill or kidnap people based in the UK.
In July, Britain used new state-threat powers to ban support for the IRGC and Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya, or HAYI, a linked group that had claimed responsibility for seven attacks earlier this year targeting sites connected to Jewish and Israeli communities and Persian-language media.
A cargo ship docked at the Port of Fujairah, as the Iran war limits marine traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, in Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, on May 6, 2026.
Two commercial vessels were attacked near Oman on Sunday, two Indian sailors were left missing, and a drone struck an Iranian Kurdish opposition camp in Iraq on Monday, as Iranian officials warned that a renewed war could put regional infrastructure at risk.
The tanker incidents underscored the threat to shipping beyond the waterway itself. The Nicaragua-flagged Petro Dolphin was hit by a drone at Sohar anchorage off Oman, India’s shipping minister said. Nine of its 11 Indian crew members were rescued, while two remained missing.
Separately, the Marshall Islands-flagged Valthera was struck by an unidentified projectile in the Strait of Hormuz, setting off a fire onboard; all 11 Indian crew members were safe, India’s foreign ministry said. The ministry condemned the attacks, and India’s embassy in Muscat was coordinating with Omani authorities to help locate the missing sailors.
The latest incidents followed repeated attacks on commercial vessels in the region, but the statements from India did not identify who was responsible for Sunday’s strikes.
Separately, a drone struck a camp belonging to an Iranian Kurdish opposition group in Koya, east of Erbil in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, Reuters reported, citing two security sources. No casualties were immediately reported.
Kurdistan-based website Rudaw published video showing a drone in the sky over Koya, but said it was not yet clear whether it had hit a target. No responsibility for the reported strike was established.
The incidents came as Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, warned that a renewed war could put infrastructure across the region within range.
“If war breaks out, many cables, data centers and artificial intelligence facilities, valued at $2 trillion, will be within range,” he said, according to state media. Rezaei added that Iran would continue resisting until its adversaries accepted its rights.
Iranian officials also continued to issue warnings to Washington and regional governments. Acting Defense Minister Majid Ebn al-Reza said the armed forces were ready to respond to threats and urged neighboring countries to leave what he called the US security umbrella.
His remarks followed a statement by armed forces spokesman Abolfazl Shekarchi that Iran would not allow the United States and Israel to re-establish their preferred regional order.
At the same time, diplomatic contacts had not stopped. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said Tehran was reviewing Washington’s latest proposal and that messages between the two countries continued through mediators.
Baghaei gave no indication of a breakthrough, saying Iran’s position on the Strait of Hormuz remained tied to the US naval blockade.
The developments pointed to risks spreading across shipping routes, Iraqi Kurdistan and potentially digital infrastructure, even as intermediaries continued trying to keep US-Iran diplomacy alive.
Men wield machetes during the IRGC-backed "Jan-Fadayan" rally, held along the route from Azadi Square to Golestan-e Shohada cemetery in Isfahan, Iran, October 1, 2026.
Footage and images showing men wielding machetes and swords at an IRGC-backed rally in the central Iranian city of Isfahan have renewed scrutiny of the Islamic Republic's history of using unofficial armed groups to suppress anti-government protests.
The October 1 event, dubbed "Jan-Fadayan," or "Those Willing to Sacrifice Their Lives," brought together members of the Basij paramilitary force, religious organizations and other participants, according to Iranian state media.
Organizers described the gathering as a demonstration of public readiness and mobilization capabilities.
Iranian lawyer Ali Mojtahedzadeh described the public display of bladed weapons as a "show of force with weapons" and called on local security authorities to explain why it had been permitted.
A review of statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders and former security officials shows that the use of unofficial groups, including individuals described as criminals and street thugs, to confront protesters dates back decades.
From the 1999 student protests to the 2009 crackdown
One of the earliest documented accounts dates to July 1999, when security forces and allied groups attacked Tehran University student dormitories, triggering widespread demonstrations.
Iranian security and plainclothes forces confronting protestors during the 2009 Iranian election protests following the disputed presidential election.
Ali Hashemi, a former deputy security minister at Iran's Intelligence Ministry, said in an audio recording published by Iran International that approximately 250 individuals described as "thugs and hooligans" were organized during the student protests.
Hashemi said the experience later served as a model for deploying similar groups during the mass demonstrations that followed Iran's disputed 2009 presidential election.
He also described the use of individuals with criminal records to beat detainees, including at the notorious Kahrizak detention center, referring to authorization from judicial authorities.
Hashemi said similar individuals were subsequently deployed during protests in 2017, 2018 and November 2019.
One of the most explicit accounts came from Hossein Hamedani, a senior IRGC commander responsible for security operations in Tehran during the 2009 unrest.
Iran's then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (L) receives a gesture of respect from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Hossein Hamedani (R) during a meeting in Tehran, Iran, in this handout photo released by the official website of the Leader on October 10, 2015.
Hamedani said the Revolutionary Guards identified approximately 5,000 people who had participated in disturbances but were not affiliated with political parties or movements. He described them as "criminals and thugs."
According to Hamedani, these individuals were initially prevented from leaving their homes on days when protests were planned, but some were later recruited and organized into three battalions.
"I then made them members of the battalions," he said.
Explaining the strategy, Hamedani said that training fighters required recruiting individuals accustomed to handling "blades and machetes."
Hamedani also described preparations to confront protesters during Ashura, a major Shiite religious observance, in December 2009.
He said cinemas, schools and religious halls were made available to pro-government forces, while approximately 30 religious groups were mobilized in Tehran.
"On Ashura, these same three battalions put an end to the unrest," Hamedani said, adding that approximately 45,000 Basij members had also been deployed.
Following Hamedani's death in Syria in 2015, Mohammad Ali Jafari, then commander-in-chief of the IRGC, credited him with helping suppress the 2009 protests, saying his leadership had been crucial to ending what Iranian authorities described as "sedition."
Hamedani had also played a central role in organizing local militias supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during the country's civil war.
Jafari later said Hamedani had organized approximately 100,000 local fighters in Syria.
Allegations of machete-wielding clerics in 2022 protests
Similar allegations emerged following the nationwide protests triggered by the death of Mahsa Jina Amini in morality police custody in September 2022.
In 2024, former lawmaker Mohammad Ashrafi Esfahani accused a group of clerics associated with influential religious figure Alireza Panahian of attacking protesters with knives and machetes while dressed as civilians.
He alleged that the men returned from the streets wearing bloodstained clothes before changing into clerical robes.
Ashrafi Esfahani also said members of the group operated in plainclothes and changed into clerical attire, including turbans, when police officers appeared to avoid being confronted.
The allegations emerged amid a legal and financial dispute between Ashrafi Esfahani and Panahian over a religious complex in Tehran and have not been independently verified.
Renewed scrutiny of unofficial armed groups
Nearly three decades after the 1999 student protests, the images from Isfahan have again raised questions about the role of unofficial groups operating alongside Iran's formal security forces.
Although the names, structures and political circumstances of the groups involved in past crackdowns have varied, accounts by former security officials and IRGC commanders describe the repeated recruitment and deployment of individuals capable of using violence against demonstrators.
The available evidence does not establish that the groups involved in different periods belonged to a single organization or were directly connected.
Nor has any organizational link been established between those previously deployed against protesters and the men seen carrying machetes and swords at the Isfahan rally.
The identities and affiliations of the armed men have not been independently verified.
Their appearance at an IRGC-backed event has nevertheless renewed attention to the Islamic Republic's documented history of mobilizing forces outside conventional security structures during periods of political unrest.