Marco Rubio’s invocation of ancient Persia in a speech championing Western power has given Tehran an opportunity to present itself as a defender of Iranian identity, even as critics recall the Islamic Republic’s own record of disparaging pride in the country’s pre-Islamic rulers.
The US secretary of state’s October 7 address in Athens drew on Xerxes’ invasion of Greece in 480 BC to celebrate Western resilience, before contrasting Western traditions of sacrifice with what he called the Iranian leadership’s “cult of death.”
The remarks drew objections even from critics of the Islamic Republic, who argued that opposition to clerical rule does not diminish Iranians’ attachment to their ancient history.
Iranian officials seized on that sensitivity to cast themselves as defenders of the country’s ancient heritage. Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf accused Iran’s adversaries of seeking to erase ancient civilizations and warned Washington that it would meet the fate of Persia’s defeated enemies.
“Those who chase Alexander’s legacy will share Valerian’s fate: you will kneel,” he wrote on X on Friday, referring to the Roman emperor captured by the Sasanian king Shapur I.
That embrace of ancient Persian power contrasts with slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s criticism of the very campaign Rubio recounted.
Addressing army commanders in April 2012, Khamenei cited Xerxes’ invasion of Greece as an example of military force serving rulers’ political ambitions rather than national interests. He described an army returning defeated, its ships wrecked, and associated the campaign with Iran’s historical taghut, a religious term used to condemn illegitimate or ungodly rule.
“These were not for national interests,” he said.
In 2018, Khamenei dismissed pride in the rule of the ancient Kayanian and Achaemenid dynasties as illusory, arguing that national esteem should rest on tangible achievements in contemporary society.
Those remarks complicate the authorities’ present effort to speak for Iranians offended by Rubio’s account. One Persian-language X user mocked government supporters’ sudden concern for Xerxes, contrasting it with their past ridicule of ancient Persian figures and people visiting historical sites.
The struggle over these symbols predates the current war. During Nowruz in March 2025, crowds gathered at Persepolis and the tombs of Hafez and Ferdowsi while authorities promoted religious mourning coinciding with the holiday.
After the June 2025 war with Israel and the United States, patriotic music entered the leadership’s own ceremonies: Khamenei asked eulogist Mahmoud Karimi to perform “Ey Iran Iran” at a July mourning gathering, a separate song from the better-known anthem.
Later, media reports documented a statue of the mythical archer Arash in Tehran, banners likening Iranian missiles to his legendary arrows, and a billboard depicting Benjamin Netanyahu kneeling before an ancient Persian emperor.
By November 2025, authorities had also unveiled a statue depicting Valerian’s submission to Shapur I. Such imagery associated the state’s confrontation with foreign powers with a national history reaching far beyond the Islamic Republic.
A propaganda opening
Speaking at the Pnyx with the Acropolis behind him, Rubio recounted the Persian destruction of Athens’ sanctuaries and the city’s subsequent rebuilding. He also praised the Spartans’ last stand at Thermopylae, presenting ancient Greek traditions as foundations of Western courage, ambition and duty.
His explicit attack on contemporary Iran targeted its rulers, whom he called “radical mullahs.” But placing that criticism within a speech celebrating resistance to Persian armies prompted objections to the implied continuity between ancient conflict and today’s war.
Historian Touraj Daryaee told the Tehran Times that treating the ancient wars as a confrontation between East and West misrepresented a conflict between an empire and Greek city-states. He also challenged the use of that history to frame the present conflict.
Questions about Rubio’s historical framing also came from admirers of the speech. Writing in the Spectator, Alexander Munguía praised its defense of the West but argued that its celebration of relentless ambition better resembled Alcibiades, who championed Athens’ disastrous expedition to Sicily, than Pericles, whose wartime strategy emphasized restraint.
US-based Iranian journalist and analyst Omid Memarian warned on X that Rubio “may have just handed Tehran one of the biggest propaganda gifts of this war.”
“It just reframes this war as a civilizational clash. And that plays directly into Tehran’s hands,” he wrote, arguing that the rhetoric helped authorities portray Washington as an enemy of Iran itself rather than its government.
The State Department did not immediately respond to Iran International’s request for comment on the criticism and whether Rubio intended to draw a parallel between ancient Persia and today’s Iranian government.
A distinction between Iran and its rulers
Iranian political analyst Nejat Bahrami disputed the interpretation of Rubio’s speech as an attack on Iranian civilization.
“Rubio’s speech was part of a broader theme that he, the current Trump administration and right-wing political figures in Europe have pursued in recent years: that the West must return to its roots, resist the erosion of Western civilization and preserve Western values,” he told Iran International.
“Contrary to the fuss made by the Islamic Republic, Rubio did not attack Iranian civilization in the speech. He referred to a historical event: the Persian attack on Athens and the destruction that followed, before describing how the Greeks returned and rebuilt. His point was that the West today should similarly follow their example of determination and resilience.”
Rubio had previously drawn an explicit distinction between Iranians and their rulers. At his January 2025 Senate confirmation hearing, he praised Iran’s ancient civilization and culture and Iranians’ pride in their Persian heritage, saying he knew of no country with a greater divide between its people and those governing them.
The US blockade and tighter sanctions enforcement are cutting into Iran’s oil income and targeting financial networks that sustain the Islamic Republic, but may still fall short of forcing Tehran into concessions, experts said at an Iran International town hall in Washington.
The discussion, hosted by Fardad Farahzad, brought together Kerri Bitsoff, a former senior official at the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC); Patrick Clawson, the Morningstar senior fellow at the Washington Institute; and Mohammad Machine-Chian, a senior economist and analyst at Iran International.
“The thing about sanctions, if they’re on the books but not enforced, they only hurt the people,” Bitsoff said, arguing that the current US campaign differed from previous rounds by focusing more heavily on enforcement and the financial intermediaries sustaining Iran’s economy.
Blockade bites
Iran faces declining oil revenues alongside damage to its energy infrastructure following the war, raising the prospect of severe economic difficulties during the coming winter, Clawson said.
President Masoud Pezeshkian had acknowledged that Iran could not export oil during the initial blockade, according to Clawson, who said the country subsequently sought alternative routes for limited shipments.
Iran had also relied on oil previously stored aboard vessels and in China, but those reserves were approaching exhaustion, he said.
Damage to natural gas infrastructure could compound the difficulties, potentially forcing greater reliance on mazut, a heavily polluting fuel used for electricity generation.
Iran depends on natural gas for approximately 69 percent of its energy requirements, making disruptions particularly consequential for households and industry, Clawson said.
Machine-Chian estimated that between $21 and $23 billion in export proceeds had not returned to Iran and that the blockade could cost the country another $35 billion in oil revenue.
Hitting financial networks sustaining Iran's leadership
The current campaign differs from previous sanctions because Washington is concentrating on enforcement and the intermediaries sustaining Iran's economy rather than simply announcing additional restrictions, Bitsoff said.
She pointed to restrictions imposed by the United Arab Emirates, measures against Iranian airlines and Turkish action against banks connected to Iranian transactions.
Such measures could influence officials and business figures whose continued support for the Islamic Republic depends on financial privileges and access to international markets.
Earlier sanctions had often pushed legitimate commerce underground while allowing networks connected to the Revolutionary Guards to profit, Bitsoff said.
Machine-Chian described the emergence of wealthy intermediaries, sometimes called sanctions merchants, who benefited from moving Iranian oil and money through opaque arrangements.
Those networks subsequently became obstacles to negotiations and economic normalization because their commercial interests depended on maintaining the existing system, he said.
Machine-Chian distinguished between sanctions that impose prolonged hardship without producing results and measures designed to achieve specific objectives within a foreseeable period.
The loss of the UAE, Machine-Chian added, as a major commercial and financial intermediary has further complicated Iran's position.
Dubai previously provided an important channel for Iranian transactions, but restrictions have forced businesses to seek alternatives through Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Machine-Chian said.
Those routes, he said, have limited capacity and cannot quickly replace the financial infrastructure previously available through the Emirates.
China and regional allies face financial constraints
China remains Iran's principal oil customer, but its commercial relationship offers fewer advantages to the Islamic Republic than commonly assumed, Bitsoff said.
Independent Chinese refineries purchase Iranian crude at substantial discounts, while payments in yuan often remain in China and are largely available for purchasing Chinese goods.
Major Chinese banks generally avoid Iranian transactions, leaving smaller intermediaries to facilitate much of the remaining trade, she said.
The blockade also allows Washington to restrict Iranian oil exports without directly confronting major Chinese financial institutions, Clawson said.
Targeting those institutions could provoke Chinese retaliation affecting broader US economic interests.
The financial pressure is also affecting Iran's regional allies.
Hezbollah has struggled to maintain basic financial obligations and social support programs since the blockade began, Bitsoff said.
Machine-Chian argued that Iran's relationships with allied armed groups had become increasingly transactional, making continued financial assistance essential to sustaining their loyalty.
Political survival and prospects for negotiations
Despite the mounting pressure, the panelists differed over whether the Islamic Republic would ultimately accept Washington's demands.
Economic hardship alone was unlikely to persuade Iran's leadership to abandon its objectives, Bitsoff said.
Instead sustained pressure could influence members of the security apparatus whose loyalty depends on salaries, privileges and expectations of continued stability.
Clawson considered negotiated concessions possible, pointing to previous occasions when Iran reversed positions it had presented as nonnegotiable.
He suggested Iran could accept a three-year suspension of uranium enrichment, particularly because its facilities had been damaged and were not operational.
Machine-Chian was more skeptical, arguing that abandoning regional ambitions and nuclear objectives would challenge central elements of the Islamic Republic's political identity.
The blockade's sustainability also remains a concern because maintaining naval operations places substantial demands on American ships, crews and maintenance resources, Bitsoff said, although she expected the operation to continue.
The discussion highlighted a central uncertainty: whether sustained economic pressure will produce concessions, weaken the leadership's support structures or prolong Iran's economic difficulties without fundamentally changing its political direction.
A revisionist argument is emerging in Tehran over Iran’s nuclear strategy: that its longstanding policy of nuclear ambiguity failed its most important test when it did not deter the United States and Israel from attacking, and should now be reconsidered.
Nezamoddin Mousavi, a former conservative lawmaker with longstanding ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), gave unusually explicit expression to that argument this week, declaring that “nuclear ambiguity did not prevent war” and raising the prospect of revisiting Iran’s nuclear doctrine and even its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Mousavi, who helped found IRGC-linked media outlets, made the remarks in an interview with Ensaf News, a website close to President Massoud Pezeshkian.
Senior Iranian officials have previously hinted that Tehran could change its nuclear doctrine if sufficiently threatened. But such warnings have generally been directed outward, rather than framed as criticism of an established policy favored by slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Mousavi, however, is effectively arguing that a policy intended to preserve strategic uncertainty while stopping short of weaponization failed to provide the deterrence its architects expected.
That diagnosis feeds into a wider debate over what lesson Iran should draw from the war: whether the failure was one of deterrence, requiring greater military leverage, or of escalation management, requiring a different approach to diplomacy.
Iran has long cited Khamenei’s fatwa prohibiting the possession and use of nuclear weapons when confronted with accusations that it might seek a bomb.
Critics, however, have questioned how absolute that prohibition would prove in an existential crisis, especially since Khamenei’s predecessor and founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomeini, held that preserving the state was paramount, taking precedence even over religious obligations.
Against that backdrop, Mousavi said Tehran should reassess its international commitments, the value of NPT membership and its broader deterrence strategy following attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
He stopped short of explicitly advocating the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
His reasoning amounts to three premises and a conclusion: Iran refrained from building a nuclear weapon; ambiguity was supposed to contribute to deterrence; yet Iran was attacked and senior leaders and military commanders were killed. The assumptions underlying Iran’s deterrence strategy, he argues, must therefore be reconsidered.
Beyond Khamenei
Mousavi also ventured into another sensitive subject: whether Khamenei’s death would fundamentally alter Iran’s strategic direction.
He argued that he would not expect dramatic change. Foreign and security policy, he said, is not simply the product of one individual but of institutional thinking and long-term calculations developed over decades.
It reflects a distinctly conservative view of regime continuity: leaders matter, but institutions matter more. Major strategic directions, in this reading, are unlikely to change abruptly regardless of who occupies the highest office.
That also gives the nuclear debate greater significance. If Iran’s strategic direction is fundamentally institutional rather than dependent on one leader, the lessons the establishment draws from the war could outlast the present leadership.
Deterrence or de-escalation?
Not everyone in Tehran is drawing the same lesson.
An article published Wednesday in Etemad newspaper highlighted a competing strand of Iranian political thinking. Where Mousavi sees a failure of deterrence, more moderate voices see a failure to manage escalation.
The hardline argument holds that the United States and Israel seek to weaken Iran regardless of its diplomatic behavior and that negotiations cannot guarantee security while military pressure continues.
The more moderate argument sees the conflict as the product of a broader strategic environment shaped by political, regional, military and economic pressures. For this camp, the lesson is not necessarily that Iran needs greater deterrence, but that it needs more effective crisis management.
The emerging argument in Tehran, then, appears to be shifting from how this war ends to what lesson should be drawn from it: whether greater military and potentially nuclear deterrence offers the best protection against another conflict, or whether security ultimately depends on preventing the next escalation before it begins.
Iran-based and Iranian-linked actors have used two leading US artificial intelligence platforms to place articles under fake journalist identities and help develop targeting recommendations against US naval forces, according to separate investigations by OpenAI and Anthropic.
The latest disclosure came Thursday, when OpenAI said it disrupted an Iran-origin influence operation that used ChatGPT to help fake journalist personas place almost 100 articles in roughly a dozen online outlets around the world.
OpenAI dubbed the campaign “Bogus Bylines.”
The operators used seven fake journalist identities to pitch English-language articles, primarily about the US-Iran conflict. ChatGPT was used to refine drafts according to outlets’ submission requirements and prepare emails pitching them to editors.
The personas presented themselves as Western journalists, usually Americans. One, Ervin B. Hoskins, described himself as an “American freelance writer” and maintained accounts on X, Facebook, Instagram and Threads.
But OpenAI said platform transparency information showed the accounts were operated from Iran.
OpenAI identified articles under the operation’s bylines dating from July 2025 through October 2026 and said publication increased significantly after the US-Iran conflict began.
Some outlets subsequently promoted the articles through their own social media accounts, potentially exposing the material to audiences the operators could not otherwise reach.
The operators also used ChatGPT to produce batches of social media comments. Some were generated in response to posts promoting their own articles and praised or endorsed the stories, which OpenAI assessed was likely intended to make them appear more popular.
Other prompts requested comments portraying the United States as the aggressor in the conflict, Israel as an unreliable US ally and Iran as a defiant but resilient victim.
The operation generated more than two dozen batches of hostile Persian-language responses to posts by Iran International.
OpenAI said the replies it found generally received low engagement and rated that component Category 2 on its six-level IO Breakout Scale. The article-placement campaign was more successful, reaching Category 4 after repeatedly getting material published by media outlets.
OpenAI said the overall activity was consistent with a commercial actor running an influence campaign for hire but said it could not identify the actor behind it.
From influence to military targeting
The OpenAI findings follow a September report from Anthropic documenting Iranian-linked use of Claude for activities extending beyond influence operations.
Anthropic said it disrupted an “Iran-nexus threat actor” that used Claude to collect and analyze publicly available information to develop targeting recommendations against US naval forces in the region.
The actor used Claude to help construct a Python pipeline for tracking naval positions and compiling targeting handbooks.
The material included US personnel identified from captions on publicly available military photographs, ship and aircraft transponder identifiers, scripts for querying commercial satellite imagery and lists of public websites exposing US naval movements.
The actor also directed Claude to research vulnerabilities in shipboard systems, including maritime satellite communications terminals, Cisco communications equipment and industrial control products.
OpenAI and Anthropic have documented misuse by actors linked to several countries, including for cyber operations, influence campaigns and intelligence gathering, suggesting generative AI is increasingly being incorporated into activities that long predate the technology.
OpenAI concluded that the influence operations it uncovered resembled campaigns from the pre-AI era, with artificial intelligence making parts of the workflow easier.
The two investigations suggest AI is being used less to invent entirely new forms of influence and intelligence activity than to accelerate existing ones: drafting and pitching articles, manufacturing online responses, processing surveillance data, writing software and assembling open-source military intelligence.
Iran has sharpened its criticism of a Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Turkey defense pact after it became operational, warning against intervention in Yemen and questioning Pakistan’s role as a mediator between Tehran and Washington.
The trilateral pact entered its operational phase on October 5 following an escalation in Houthi missile and drone attacks on Saudi infrastructure. Turkey and Pakistan said they had begun taking measures to support Saudi Arabia.
Under arrangements discussed by the three countries, Pakistani and Turkish forces are expected to provide military, technical and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia, including defensive capabilities inside the kingdom. Officials have said the forces will not take part in offensive operations in Yemen.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei, asked on Sunday about reports that tens of thousands of Pakistani troops could be deployed to Saudi Arabia, said: “We have also heard this rumor, and we hope it is not true.”
“The countries of the region are well aware that any intervention in the Yemen issue could have undesirable consequences for the region,” he added, expressing hope that pacts such as the Mecca agreement would not be used “against the interests and welfare of the Muslim community.”
The Saudi Arabia-Turkey-Pakistan defense pact, signed in August in Mecca, stipulates that an attack on any one of the three countries will be treated as an attack on all three.
‘Begging for security’
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, without directly referring to the pact, called on neighboring countries to pursue “self-reliance” and a policy based on “genuine brotherhood.” He also said such agreements would not constrain Iran.
Several lawmakers dismissed the pact as largely symbolic. Ahmad Bakhshayesh, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, called it a “paper and political pact.”
Sharper criticism came from committee member Ebrahim Rezaei.
“The Saudis should know that a paper agreement with Turkey and Pakistan will not bring them security, just as years of one-sided milking of the Americans did not bring them security,” he wrote on X. “Correct your policies so that you do not have to beg others for security.”
That tone has hardened as the pact has moved into its operational phase.
Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said Thursday that Turkish and Pakistani involvement in the Saudi conflict with Ansarullah, as the Houthis are formally known, would neither weaken the group nor restrict its ability to operate in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
“The entry of Pakistan and Turkey will definitely work to their own detriment,” he told ISNA. “They should learn from history ... Saudi Arabia once had a coalition with a large number of countries, but after seven years of war in Yemen, it was defeated.”
‘Regional intervenor’
Iranian criticism has focused more heavily on Pakistan than Turkey, in large part because of Islamabad’s prominent role in mediating between Tehran and Washington.
Lawmaker Ahmad Naderi wrote on X that “Pakistan’s entry alongside Saudi Arabia into the war against the people of Yemen … shows that Pakistan should no longer be considered a mediator but a regional intervenor.”
The Tabnak news website went further, saying Iran viewed the deployment of Pakistani forces to Saudi Arabia as a threat to its security and “will not tolerate Pakistan’s military presence for military operations in the Yemen war.”
It also warned that Pakistan’s increasingly overt alignment with Saudi Arabia could heighten sectarian tensions at home and bring instability to the Iranian-Pakistani border.
Conservative commentator Hassan Hanizadeh similarly accused Saudi Arabia of seeking to create a religious divide, describing a recent meeting in Riyadh involving Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials as a sign of “the formation of a Shiite-Sunni polarization in the region.”
Boroujerdi pointed to potential domestic opposition in Pakistan, saying its people were “revolutionary, Muslim and highly sensitive to such issues” and that Islamabad would not have an easy path if it entered the war.
‘Alliance against the oppressed?’
Iranian state media have adopted a more confrontational tone as the pact has become operational, while giving extensive coverage to warnings from Houthi officials directed at Turkey and Pakistan.
Tasnim described the development as “Turkey and Pakistan join the Saudi war against the Yemeni people,” while Nour News, which is close to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, asked: “Mecca alliance or alliance against the oppressed people of Yemen?!”
In a Thursday commentary, Tasnim warned that if Ankara and Islamabad participate in attacks on Yemen, “they may be directly harmed through attacks on their ships, interests and perhaps even their own territory.”
More than two-thirds of respondents to an Iran International Instagram poll said the Trump administration’s pressure on the Islamic Republic is hurting ordinary Iranians more than the authorities.
More than 56,000 people took part in the October 8 poll, with 68% saying ordinary people bear the greatest burden of US pressure. Another 23% said both the public and the government suffer, while 9% said the authorities are affected most.
Men accounted for approximately 76% of respondents and women for 24%.
The largest age group was 25 to 34, representing about 38% of participants, followed by those aged 35 to 44 at 29%. Respondents aged 18 to 24 and 45 to 54 each accounted for 12%.
Thousands of comments accompanying the poll reflected differing views on the economic consequences of US pressure, the Islamic Republic's responsibility for worsening living conditions and whether external pressure could bring political change.
Rising prices dominate concerns
The most common concern among respondents who believed ordinary Iranians were suffering most was the deterioration in daily living conditions.
Many cited rising prices, declining purchasing power, shrinking incomes and the growing financial burden on low-income households.
Others pointed to difficulties accessing medicine and medical treatment, arguing that people with fewer financial resources were particularly vulnerable to economic restrictions.
"Only ordinary people are being crushed under the pressure," one respondent wrote.
Several participants argued that even when US measures target the Islamic Republic, their economic consequences ultimately reach households through higher prices and reduced access to essential goods.
Officials seen as insulated from hardship
Another recurring theme was the perceived gap between the living standards of ordinary Iranians and those of government officials.
Some respondents argued that access to wealth, foreign currency, privileged positions and state resources allowed officials and their associates to avoid some of the hardships experienced by the wider population.
"The main burden falls on the people. The government would even be happy to see people becoming poorer every day," one respondent wrote.
Other participants said the Islamic Republic also suffers from economic restrictions through reduced revenues and limited access to financial resources, but can pass some of those costs on to the public.
For these respondents, the issue was not simply whether sanctions hurt the government or the public, but how the economic burden was distributed.
Economic hardship versus hopes for political change
The sharpest disagreement concerned whether the immediate economic costs of US pressure could be justified by the prospect of political change.
Some respondents acknowledged that ordinary Iranians were suffering but considered the hardship acceptable if it weakened the Islamic Republic or helped bring about a different political system.
"People will endure it because this suffering is worth it for a free Iran tomorrow," one wrote.
Others questioned whether worsening economic conditions would produce meaningful political change.
They argued that household finances could deteriorate far more quickly than external pressure could affect the country's political leadership.
Several respondents held both US policies and the Islamic Republic's economic management responsible for the hardships facing Iranians.
Some likened sanctions to a painful medical treatment, reflecting a willingness among certain supporters of external pressure to accept short-term suffering in pursuit of longer-term political goals.
Others rejected that calculation, arguing that the prospect of political change remained uncertain while the immediate costs to families were already evident.
A divided view of US pressure
Although 68% of respondents believed ordinary Iranians were bearing the greatest burden, their answers did not necessarily show opposition to all forms of US pressure.
Some viewed the economic consequences as unacceptable, while others regarded them as a painful but potentially necessary means of weakening the Islamic Republic.
Likewise, respondents who believed the government was suffering most did not necessarily dismiss the economic difficulties facing households.
