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SPECIAL REPORT

Forced to serve in the IRGC, now fighting to stay in Canada

Negar Mojtahedi
Negar Mojtahedi

Iran International

Aug 18, 2026, 10:31 GMT+1
A conscript sitting on a metal bench at a train station in Iran
A conscript sitting on a metal bench at a train station in Iran

Iranian men conscripted into the Revolutionary Guards for their compulsory military service fear they and their families could lose the right to remain in Canada, after letters warned the mandatory stint may amount to membership in a terrorist organization.

The Unheard Conscript Advocacy Network, a community group for former Iranian conscripts and their families, says more than 500 people within its roughly 1,300-member Telegram group have reported receiving procedural fairness letters in recent weeks.

The letters give applicants 30 days to respond to concerns raised by immigration officers before a decision is made.

Canada has previously told Iran International that compulsory service in the Guards does not automatically make someone inadmissible and that applications are assessed individually. But several letters reviewed by Iran International reveal a tension between that position and what former conscripts say they are experiencing.

In one case, internal Officer Decision Notes reviewed by Iran International show a former conscript answering a procedural fairness letter with his military completion card and evidence that his service was compulsory.

The officer accepted that the service was mandatory and found him inadmissible anyway, writing that there is "no exemption for individuals whose membership arose through mandatory service." The application was refused.

In a separate case, an August 6 letter acknowledges that the applicant completed "mandatory military service" with the Guards as a soldier between 2009 and 2010, with duties that included kitchen and canteen work and occasional driving.

"I am therefore concerned that you served in the IRGC and that you may be inadmissible to Canada," the officer wrote, citing the provision of Canadian immigration law covering membership in an organization believed to engage in terrorism. The applicant was given 30 days to respond.

The consequences can reach beyond the former conscript. In another letter reviewed by Iran International, the government told the wife of one man that her application could also be refused if her husband is found inadmissible over his service.

‘Now we are the victims’

"Fatima," who asked Iran International to use only her first name because of security concerns, moved to Canada with her husband and two daughters in 2022.

Her husband completed compulsory military service between 2003 and 2005. The family applied for permanent residence in March 2024, before Canada designated the entire Revolutionary Guards a terrorist entity.

"We brought our children here to give them more opportunity, to give them a better life," Fatima told Iran International. "How come we were supporters of this regulation and now we are the victims of that?"

Iran International reviewed the family's immigration correspondence along with official documentation confirming the husband's service.

A document issued by Iran's Public Conscription Organization states that he completed 20 months of compulsory service and received a military service completion card; the family later obtained further verification of the record's authenticity from the same body.

Fatima said her husband, who holds a bachelor's degree in computer science, spent his conscription assigned to a small repair room fixing personal computers that personnel brought in. "He wasn't doing anything for the organization," she said. "People brought their computers there if there was an issue."

The stakes run through the whole family. If her husband is found inadmissible, so are their daughters, one of whom is 18 and has been accepted into a program at the University of British Columbia.

"If IRCC refuses our PR application because of my husband's conscription, and if we are inadmissible to Canada, then both my daughters are going to be inadmissible too," Fatima said.

Sam, a member of the Unheard Conscript Advocacy Network, said the 500-plus letters documented inside the group are likely a fraction of the national total. The group argues that former conscripts are effectively being asked to prove a negative: that compulsory service did not amount to voluntary membership in the Guards.

Canada was warned about the distinction

Canada's own immigration system has examined the difference between conscription and membership.

In a 2022 Response to Information Request on Iran's armed forces, the Immigration and Refugee Board cited Saeid Golkar, a scholar specializing in the Guards and the Basij, who explained that men subject to compulsory service apply through the Public Conscription Organization, which assigns them to the regular army, the police or the Guards.

Sources consulted by the board indicated conscripts do not choose the branch in which they serve. Golkar has also argued that conscription should not provide a blanket exemption from scrutiny.

The distinction was raised in Parliament days before Canada listed the Guards. Appearing before the House of Commons foreign affairs committee on June 10, 2024, University of Ottawa professor Thomas Juneau warned that broad measures could sweep up people who were never the target.

"There are hundreds of thousands of current and former members," Juneau told MPs, warning that "innocents" could be caught in the net. He argued for "targeted" and "surgical" measures while stressing that genuine Guards activity in Canada posed a serious threat.

Nine days later, on June 19, 2024, Canada formally listed the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code. Iran International has previously reported on former conscripts whose immigration cases became uncertain after the designation.

Political pressure grows

Correspondence obtained by the advocacy network this year deepens the confusion over how Ottawa applies the policy.

In a February letter, Aaron McCrorie, vice-president of the Canada Border Services Agency's intelligence and enforcement branch, wrote that the 2024 designation made "anyone that had served in the Guard Corps inadmissible to Canada." The same letter says all cases are "reviewed, assessed, and decided on an individual basis." The two sentences describe two different policies.

Iran International asked Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada what standard officers use to distinguish compulsory service from voluntary membership, whether uniform national guidance exists, how many former conscripts have received procedural fairness letters, and how many have been found inadmissible.

IRCC spokesperson Anahita Beladi said compulsory service in the Guards does not automatically make an applicant inadmissible and that each case is assessed individually. Procedural fairness letters, she said, are not final findings but a chance for applicants to explain their service.

"The final decision is made by an IRCC officer after considering the applicant's response, all relevant information, applicable jurisprudence, and any recommendations made by partners, including the Canada Border Services Agency and Canadian Security Intelligence Service."

Beladi said the agency does not currently hold data in a form that would show how many applicants completed compulsory service in the Guards, or how many letters have been issued over it.

The issue has now spilled into federal politics.

At an Iranian community town hall in North Vancouver, British Columbia, on Saturday, Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre accused the government of risking action against the wrong people.

"I think they're risking going after law-abiding decent people who are actually against the IRGCs, but who have already been victimized through conscription," Poilievre told Iran International.

"The listing of terrorist organizations was meant to go after the perpetrator, not the victim. I would encourage the government to go after the actual terrorists, not their victims."

Conservative candidate Stephen Curran said Parliament should challenge the practice if conscripts are being swept into enforcement.

"They are targeting people that are innocent... victims of the regime in Tehran," Curran said. "If this is actually taking place, I think we would have to raise a very strong critique of it in Parliament and make sure that we're calling it out."

For Fatima, the policy debate is no longer abstract. Her family, she said, publicly supported Canada's designation of the Guards and joined demonstrations against the Islamic Republic.

"We supported that policy, IRGC as a terrorist organization," she said. "Now we are the victim of that."

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The three snakes of Zahhak

Aug 16, 2026, 18:50 GMT+1
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Roger Macmillan
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«ضحاک دختران جمشید را به حضور می‌خواند»، نسخه‌ای مصور که در دهه ۱۵۲۰ میلادی در تبریز، ایران، با جوهر، طلا و آبرنگ مات روی کاغذ خلق شده است. عکس از مجموعه خلیلی / CC-BY-SA 3.0 IGO.

In the Persian classic Shahnameh, Ferdowsi tells the story of Zahhak, the usurper king who is kissed on each shoulder by Ahriman, the spirit of evil, and finds two black snakes growing from the wounds.

Cut them off and they grow back. The only way to keep them quiet is to feed them, every day, with the brains of two young men. Zahhak reigns for a thousand years on a diet of sacrificed youth, propped up not by loyalty but by appetite.

The story has always worked as a parable for Iranian tyranny. What I think it misses, applied to the Islamic Republic today, is the arithmetic. Ali Khamenei did not build two snakes. He built three.

The Artesh, Iran’s conventional army, was the first snake, inherited from the Shah and never fully trusted. The IRGC was the second, created in 1979 specifically because the revolution did not trust the first. The Basij was folded into the IRGC as its third head.

It is worth remembering that all three answer, on paper as much as in practice, to a single neck. The Iranian constitution names the Supreme Leader as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in their entirety, Artesh, IRGC and Basij alike. There is no independent chain of command outside the Supreme Leader’s authority for a general to retreat into. Politicians and Western commentators in both London and Washington keep waiting for one of these heads to turn on the body. They’re waiting for the wrong signal, because they’re analysing 1979, not 2026.

When the Shah’s generals stood aside in February 1979, they did so because the Artesh of that era was a conscript institution led by officers who owed their careers to a monarch, not a movement, and who had no ideological stake in what came next. That Artesh is not today’s Artesh.

Ali Khamenei spent decades solving exactly that problem. Senior appointments in today’s Artesh are subject to security and ideological vetting tied to the Supreme Leader’s military apparatus. The Middle East Forum has documented how senior promotions require approval from the Supreme Leader’s office following scrutiny of an officer’s security and ideological background. The men at the top of the Artesh are appointees of the system, not survivors of it.

This is why this month’s move to complete the integration of the Armed Forces General Staff with the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters matters more than it has been given credit for. Mojtaba Khamenei, who inherited a system his father spent more than four decades constructing, has now moved to formalise a process of centralisation that had earlier been discussed but was not visibly underway in operational terms.

The lesson learned from 2025 and the Twelve-Day War, according to Iran’s own state reporting, was that redundant command structures slow decision-making. The latest restructuring is intended to reduce that redundancy and further narrow the distinction between the operational command of the Artesh and the IRGC. The underlying logic is clear: the system has little interest in preserving institutional space in which one military arm might begin to think or act independently of the others.

I would also gently push back on those looking for salvation in Iran’s reformists. Pezeshkian’s presidency provides a civilian face and international cover for the negotiating track, and that function matters. But it is not independence.

Ghalibaf is a former senior IRGC commander who has spent decades inside the Islamic Republic’s political and security establishment. Araghchi is a capable diplomat entrusted with representing Tehran in negotiations. Both men operate inside the system’s tolerances, not outside them. Reading their willingness to negotiate as evidence of a moderate faction pulling against a hardline one mistakes tactics for structure.

When Iran has had to cede ground, at Bürgenstock or Islamabad, it has ceded it in the way a company reprices a product: reluctantly, and only as far as survival requires. Ghalibaf gets attacked by the influential ultra-hardline Paydari Front for talking to Americans, and he absorbs it, because someone in the system has to run the diplomatic track.

None of this means the system is stable in the way it looks stable. Ali Khamenei is dead. His son, who has still not been seen or heard in public, inherited the office by appointment and is still consolidating the very apparatus his father designed. The strain is real. But strain inside a structure is not the same as a fracture between its parts. The three heads bicker over how much brain they are fed and by whom, not over whether to keep feeding.

So when I hear commentary asking whether this is the moment the Artesh finally breaks from the regime, or whether Ghalibaf represents the pragmatic wing that might yet reform the system from within, I think of Zahhak.

Nobody in that story is saved by one of the snakes deciding it has had enough. The snakes do not turn on the king. The rupture comes from outside the machinery of the court: Kaveh the blacksmith rises first, turning private grievance into public revolt, rallying the people and creating the conditions for Fereydun’s return. Fereydun then defeats Zahhak and binds him at Damavand. Until that structure itself breaks, all three snakes answer to the same shoulders.

Iran weighs gasoline rationing as fuel deficit widens

Aug 16, 2026, 12:08 GMT+1
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Men are seen at a gasoline station in Qom, Iran.

Iran’s government is considering three proposals to curb gasoline consumption as war damage, import difficulties and a widening gap between domestic production and demand put growing pressure on fuel supplies.

The options include imposing a daily cap on supplies to filling stations, tightening vehicle quotas and allowing additional gasoline to be sold at market rates, or transferring fuel allocations from vehicles to individuals and permitting citizens to trade them.

No proposal has been approved, and the government has not announced any immediate change to subsidized gasoline prices.

Esmail Saghab-Esfahani, a vice president and head of Iran's Strategic Energy Policy and Management Organization, outlined the three scenarios on state television and said the public would be informed before any decision was implemented.

Daily supplies could be capped

Under the first proposal, existing prices would remain unchanged, but filling stations nationwide would receive a combined 121 million liters of gasoline per day.

Saghab-Esfahani said pumps would stop operating once that amount had been sold, effectively imposing a nationwide daily supply ceiling without formally increasing prices.

The second proposal would divide the same 121 million liters among registered vehicles through a stricter quota system. Motorists exceeding their allocation would have to purchase additional gasoline at an unsubsidized market rate.

The third option would transfer gasoline quotas from vehicles to individuals. Every citizen would receive about 30 liters per month, whether or not they owned a vehicle, and could use or sell the allocation.

  • Fear of unrest complicates Iran’s gasoline dilemma

    Fear of unrest complicates Iran’s gasoline dilemma

Around 30 million liters per day would separately be reserved for public transportation, conventional taxis and ride-hailing services under that proposal, in an effort to prevent fare increases.

Saghab-Esfahani said the third plan would be accompanied by a three-year program to electrify 400,000 motorcycles, convert 130,000 pickup trucks to natural gas and add 7,300 buses. He did not explain how the program would be financed or provide a detailed implementation schedule.

Conflicting production figures

In his latest remarks, Saghab-Esfahani put daily gasoline production at about 121 million liters and consumption at around 135 million, implying a shortfall of approximately 14 million liters per day.

Tehran-based news website Rouydad24 cited earlier remarks by the official that put production at about 112 million liters. The reason for the nine-million-liter discrepancy was not explained and may reflect different reporting periods or production conditions.

President Masoud Pezeshkian has said Iran spent about $6 billion importing gasoline during the Iranian year that ended March 20, 2026. Officials say falling revenue, limited access to foreign currency and obstacles affecting import routes have made that approach increasingly difficult.

Kerman plan halted before launch

The debate intensified after authorities abruptly announced and then suspended a plan to sell gasoline consumed beyond existing quotas at a sharply higher rate in southern Kerman province.

The plan was halted hours before it was due to begin following talks between Kerman’s governor and national officials. Provincial authorities said the existing system would remain in place while the proposal underwent further review.

Neither the Oil Ministry nor the government disclosed the legal basis for the plan or how the new price had been calculated. Officials also did not clarify whether Kerman had been selected for a local anti-smuggling initiative or as a test for wider changes.

Legacy of the 2019 protests

Gasoline pricing remains among the most politically sensitive issues in Iran.

An overnight nationwide price increase in November 2019 triggered protests in more than 100 cities. Rights groups documented hundreds of deaths in the ensuing crackdown, during which authorities imposed a near-total internet shutdown.

Pezeshkian promised during his 2024 presidential campaign that gasoline prices would not be increased without public consent and that more fuel-efficient vehicles would be made available before any increase.

Government officials have said no immediate price rise is planned, but all three proposals now under consideration would restrict consumption or redistribute subsidies.

The proposals leave the government seeking to address a growing supply deficit without an abrupt policy change that could further strain household finances and renew public anger over gasoline prices.

Iran lawmaker played direct role in deadly protest crackdown, witnesses say

Aug 16, 2026, 09:22 GMT+1
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Farzad Fattahi
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Jafar Pourkabgani, a lawmaker representing the southern Iranian province of Bushehr and a former longtime member of the IRGC and Basij, personally fired at protesters during nationwide demonstrations in January, witnesses told Iran International.

Armed forces opened fire on protesters on January 8 and 9 from the rooftops of the Quran Mosque, a nearby Basij facility and surrounding buildings on Ashouri Street in the city of Bushehr, witnesses said.

Several people who said they were present identified Pourkabgani as one of the armed men in the area. Some said he carried a handgun, while others described him as holding a Kalashnikov-style rifle.

One witness said Pourkabgani shouted “Labbaik ya Khamenei,” an expression of allegiance to then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as he fired.

Other accounts described the lawmaker as a leading figure among the armed personnel deployed in the area.

Gunfire against at least 19 people attributed to Pourkabgani

Accounts collected by Iran International attributed the shooting of at least 19 people to Pourkabgani. Witnesses said at least two of those struck by his gunfire have died.

It was not immediately possible to independently establish the identities of all those shot, the weapons used or the precise circumstances of the deaths.

Some residents of Bushehr refer to Pourkabgani by the nickname “Jafar the Axe,” according to local accounts.

Pourkabgani has longstanding ties to the Quran Mosque, one of the locations from which witnesses said gunfire was directed at protesters. Public accounts identified him as head of the mosque’s board of trustees for at least part of the period between 2014 and 2022.

Pressure on bereaved families

One local source with knowledge of the matter said that Pourkabgani visited the homes of some bereaved families after protesters were killed and sought to persuade them to say their children had been killed by “terrorists,” which the families rejected.

Pourkabgani has not publicly addressed the allegations that he personally fired at protesters or pressured bereaved families.

Decades in security and local government roles

Pourkabgani joined the IRGC in the early 1980s and subsequently held security, executive and political positions in Bushehr.

In 2004-05, while holding the rank of IRGC colonel, he headed the local Basij unit responsible for enforcing the Islamic Republic’s doctrine of “enjoining good and forbidding wrong.” Accounts of the unit’s activities included searches of homes, confiscation of equipment and arrests.

He served as governor of Bushehr from about 2005 to 2013 and headed the county’s election headquarters during the disputed 2009 presidential election.

Pourkabgani later served on the Bushehr City Council, including as its chairman, before entering parliament as the representative for Bushehr, Ganaveh and Deylam.

Residents have also said that he was involved in the authorities’ response to the November 2019 protests and the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protests.

During the 2022 protests, Pourkabgani was injured in a knife attack in Bushehr’s Kouti neighborhood while serving on the City Council.

Calls for harsh punishment

After the January 2026 protests, Pourkabgani publicly described demonstrators as “rioters” and the demonstrations as a “terrorist operation.”

He called on the judiciary to identify protesters and create official files on them, further demanding that they face the “harshest punishment.”

Viewers who contacted Iran International pointed to what they described as a stark contradiction between Pourkabgani’s position as a representative of the public and the allegations that he fired at the people he was elected to represent.

More than 36,500 Iranians were killed by security forces during the January 8-9 crackdown on nationwide protests, making it the deadliest two-day protest massacre in history, according to documents reviewed by Iran International's Editorial Board.

Iran International's Editorial Board confirmed the death toll on January 25 after reviewing classified documents, field reports, and accounts from medical staff, witnesses, and victims’ families.

Qatar rejects Iran's claim it captured three Su-24 pilots alive

Aug 15, 2026, 20:24 GMT+1
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An Iranian military pilot gestures from the cockpit of a fighter jet in this file photo.

Qatar on Saturday dismissed the Iranian military’s claim that it had detained and held three pilots from two Su-24 bombers shot down in March, saying it recovered only one pilot’s remains and had invited Tehran to review the search.

Qatar’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Majed Al Ansari said in a post on X that Doha was “surprised by these misleading statements” amid ongoing diplomatic efforts to de-escalate regional tensions.

The denial came after Mohammad Bagherzadeh, commander of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff’s committee for missing personnel, said three pilots had been captured alive and held by Qatar for about six months.

Bagherzadeh identified the pilots as Javad Salehi, Abdolmajid Dashtian and Omran Beh-Raveshian in a letter to the International Committee of the Red Cross published by IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency.

Al Ansari said Qatari forces established contact with the Iranian pilots after they violated Qatar’s airspace and their targeting trajectory had been confirmed.

He said the pilots failed to respond to attempts to communicate and that Qatar then took “the necessary measures” to defend its territory in accordance with international law and its rules of engagement.

Qatar’s Defense Ministry said in March that two Iranian Su-24 aircraft had been shot down during an operation that reportedly targeted Al Udeid Air Base, which hosts US troops.

CNN reported at the time, citing two sources briefed on the operation, that Qatari forces warned the Iranian jets by radio but received no response before a Qatari F-15 engaged them and shot them down.

Qatar says one pilot’s remains were recovered

Al Ansari said Qatari search-and-rescue teams subsequently searched for the pilots’ remains.

He said Qatar coordinated with Iran to hand over the remains of one pilot who was found and invited an Iranian team in April to visit Qatar and review details of the search-and-rescue operation.

Al Ansari said Tehran had yet to respond to the invitation.

Iranian officials had previously said the fate of the three pilots remained unclear. Earlier this month, a senior Iranian Air Force official said authorities still lacked definitive information about them.

The dispute comes as Qatar remains involved in mediation between Tehran and Washington, with Al Ansari pointing to ongoing diplomatic efforts to reduce regional tensions.

Iran’s rulers turn attention to the threat from within

Aug 15, 2026, 18:00 GMT+1
•
Negar Mojtahedi
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Iranian protestors met with security forces during January uprisings.

As Iran confronts military pressure abroad and mounting economic strain at home, signs are emerging that the Islamic Republic is increasingly turning its attention to another potential threat: renewed unrest on its own streets.

While veteran hardliners are returning to key positions overseeing forces responsible for domestic repression, cobblestones are being ripped out of historic pedestrian areas and replaced with asphalt.

Municipal officials have described the work as traffic management, but Iran International reporter Mehdi Sepahvand’s reporting suggests it could make the areas easier for security forces to penetrate and control during unrest.

Analysts say the developments, against a backdrop of uncertainty over the country’s new leadership, suggest the state is thinking beyond the current war to the possibility of another confrontation at home.

The return of Hossein Taeb, one of the Islamic Republic’s most feared security figures, to command the Basij is perhaps the clearest signal.

Omid Memarian, a senior Iran analyst at the think tank DAWN, said Taeb’s return shows the state is prioritizing control of the population.

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Photo of Hossein Taeb

‘An undeclared coup’

“They are very much nervous, concerned about people and their demands,” Memarian told Eye for Iran, adding that the leadership understands “the domestic situation can explode at any moment.”

Taeb, Memarian said, was brought back not to reconcile with Iranians, but to consolidate loyalists and signal that authorities are prepared to “crush any dissent.”

For Kamran Bokhari, a senior resident fellow at the Middle East Policy Council and strategic forecaster, the reshuffle raises a more fundamental question: who is making these decisions?

With Iran’s new Supreme Leader remaining unseen and unheard publicly, Bokhari questioned the extent of his authority and argued that a small group within the security establishment may effectively be running the system.

“The point is who is making these appointments?” he said.

Bokhari went further, describing the emerging arrangement as an “undeclared coup” by the Revolutionary Guards, in which he believes the IRGC is consolidating authority while preserving the appearance of a functioning constitutional system.

Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, offered a different reading, seeing a diffusion of power in the absence of a visible Supreme Leader capable of imposing decisions across the system.

Survival is not stability

Former CIA Iran specialist Mark Fowler said the Islamic Republic has absorbed severe military damage without collapsing.

“Surviving is winning for the Iranian regime right now,” Fowler told Iran International’s Eye for Iran.

But survival does not mean stability. With Washington seeking to intensify economic pressure, Fowler said there was no single inflation rate or economic threshold at which unrest became inevitable.

“It’s just a question of who cries uncle first,” he said.

Authoritarian governments can tolerate considerable hardship among their populations because their leadership is insulated from much of it, Fowler said.

“They’re more than happy to allow people to suffer,” he added.

Economic hardship does not automatically produce revolt. But the longer it persists, the more consequential the state’s ability to contain discontent becomes.

Beneath people’s feet

Perhaps the most striking sign cited by those who see preparations for future unrest can be found not in the leadership compound, but beneath people’s feet.

In central Tehran, cobblestones are being removed from historic pedestrian areas and replaced with asphalt.

The changes affect parts of central Tehran around District 12 and the Grand Bazaar, historically an important center of political mobilization, as well as areas near universities where students have repeatedly participated in protests.

Cobblestones can be dislodged and used as projectiles. Pedestrian streets also contain bollards, benches, trees and restaurant tables that can impede motorcycles and security vehicles while giving protesters places to congregate or seek cover.

Turning them into vehicle-accessible thoroughfares could change that equation.

“By changing these pedestrian zones into thoroughfares for cars, they are actually paving the way for swift action during protests,” Sepahvand said.

The changes, he added, create “plain sight and direct shooting range” for security forces.

Sepahvand said authorities have also put pressure on restaurants and gathering places where Iranians, including women appearing without mandatory hijab, have carved out small spaces of social freedom.

Those spaces allow communities to form, he said, something authorities understand can eventually translate into collective action.

“The government is sure that they are going to be facing more and more protests,” Sepahvand said.

The Islamic Republic is bringing veterans of repression back into senior positions, positioning the Basij for a greater domestic role and, according to Sepahvand’s reporting, altering public spaces in ways that could make future protests easier to suppress.

The Islamic Republic has survived the war so far. Its next test may come not from across its borders, but from the streets at home.