Trump willing to end Iran war without nuclear deal – WSJ
President Donald Trump was willing to end the Iran war without securing a nuclear agreement if Tehran fully reopened the Strait of Hormuz, the Wall Street Journal reported on Sunday, citing US officials.
Trump had privately floated the option to senior aides after weeks of preparing to declare victory if Iran restored free passage through the strategic waterway, according to the report.
That path became more difficult on Saturday when Iran demanded billions of dollars in US payments, the withdrawal of American troops from the region and an end to the US naval blockade, among other conditions, the WSJ reported.
The demands marked Iran’s highest price yet for allowing traffic to flow freely through the strait, according to the newspaper.
Residential apartment blocks on the outskirts of Tehran.
Average advertised monthly rent in Tehran has climbed above 720 million rials, roughly three times the earnings of many Iranian workers, exposing a widening affordability gap as some tenants face increases of up to 100%, market data showed in late July.
Tindex, an Iran-focused economic data platform tracking housing listings and other market indicators, put average advertised monthly apartment rent in Tehran at about 723 million rials, or roughly $389 at an open-market exchange rate of 1.86 million rials to the dollar, in its late-July data.
The figure is based on advertised properties rather than completed rental agreements, but provides a snapshot of prices confronting tenants searching for homes in the capital.
Monthly salaries for many Iranian workers are commonly put at around 200 million to 250 million rials, equivalent to roughly $108 to $134 at the same exchange rate. That means the average advertised rent can approach three times the upper end of that monthly salary range.
Rent increases reach 100%
The pressure becomes greater when tenants seek to renew their leases.
Rokna News reported on Sunday that rents have risen by 70% to 100% in parts of Tehran, far exceeding the 25% ceiling set for the capital by the Supreme Housing Council.
Prospective tenants look at property listings displayed at a real estate agency in Tehran, Iran.
The findings point to a wide divide between restrictions imposed by authorities and the increases some landlords demand from tenants.
A member of parliament’s construction committee also acknowledged that government rent restrictions are widely disregarded.
“The 25% rent increase is clearly not being observed, and in practice landlords do not implement it,” Alireza Novin said.
Some landlords justify increases of more than 50% by pointing to inflation of around 60%, but rents should not simply rise at the same rate as broader prices, Novin said.
Weak government oversight has left the housing market largely unchecked, according to Novin, who called for stronger enforcement against those who disregard the restrictions.
“If we identify 10 violators and close their places of business, others will also understand that the law must be implemented,” Novin said.
Tenants can file complaints against landlords who breach the ceiling, but pursuing a case can lead to legal proceedings and uncertainty over whether the landlord and tenant can subsequently reach an agreement, according to Novin.
Housing costs reshape how Iranians live
Iran has been grappling with a prolonged housing affordability crisis as property prices and rents have risen faster than wages. Years of high inflation, currency depreciation and rising construction costs have pushed homeownership beyond the reach of many ordinary Iranians while increasing pressure on renters.
The pressure is particularly acute in Tehran, where roughly half of residents are renters.
Buying a home presents an even greater obstacle. Tindex put the average advertised value of a Tehran home at more than 240 billion rials, or about $129,000 at the open-market exchange rate, in late July, placing ownership far beyond the purchasing power of households dependent on ordinary salaries.
The widening gap between incomes and housing costs has also changed how some Iranians live. Tenants have moved from Tehran to cheaper cities or peripheral areas, returned to their parents’ homes or begun sharing smaller apartments with others to divide housing costs.
Housing experts have warned that continued movement toward cheaper areas on the outskirts of major cities could contribute to further expansion of informal settlements.
A view of residential buildings in central Tehran.
The government has sought to ease the burden through rent ceilings, deposit loans and measures intended to protect tenants. But the increases documented in Tehran show how difficult those policies are to enforce when housing costs continue to outrun earnings.
For workers earning around 200 million to 250 million rials a month, an average advertised Tehran rent above 720 million rials amounts to roughly three months of individual pay – before food, transport and other basic household expenses are considered.
Commercial vessels are seen in waters near the Strait of Hormuz amid ongoing negotiations over shipping arrangements and the reopening of the waterway.
Iran says the Strait of Hormuz will not reopen until the United States meets its conditions, even as Tehran and Oman move closer to an agreement on a temporary shipping route.
Mohammad-Bagher Zolghadr, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said Saturday that the waterway would remain closed until Washington “corrects its behavior,” spelling out the conditions in a written message.
“Correcting its behavior means that Iran must never again be threatened or humiliated, aggression against Iran and its allies must end permanently, the naval blockade must be lifted, US naval and air forces must withdraw from around Iran, war damages must be compensated, sanctions must be lifted and Iran’s frozen assets must be released,” Zolghadr said.
“The Supreme National Security Council will never back down, whether in war or in negotiations,” he added.
The demands came even as Iran and Oman moved closer to an agreement on a temporary shipping route through the strait.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Saturday that the two countries were “very close” to completing negotiations on the route, which is intended as an interim arrangement while technical and legal work continues on a new permanent Traffic Separation Scheme, or TSS.
Araghchi said an agreement with Oman on the route “does not necessarily mean the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.”
He said reopening remained subject to separate conditions, including the United States compensating for what Tehran considers violations of the Islamabad memorandum of understanding.
The IRGC reinforced that distinction earlier Saturday, saying the Iran-Oman negotiations and a decision to reopen the strait were separate issues.
“Whenever America accepts Iran’s conditions, the Strait of Hormuz will certainly reopen,” IRGC spokesperson Hossein Mohebi said.
Oman, which has been negotiating the shipping arrangements with Tehran, described the talks as proceeding in a “positive and constructive” atmosphere. Its Foreign Ministry also condemned repeated attacks on vessels transiting the strait and urged all sides to avoid actions that could undermine progress in the negotiations.
From Washington, Vice President JD Vance said Iran had told the United States it had no plans to impose tolls in the Strait of Hormuz and that Tehran and Persian Gulf states, particularly Oman, were discussing arrangements for safe passage.
Vance said those discussions included demining and a commitment from Iran not to fire on commercial vessels. Washington expected oil and gas flows from the Persian Gulf to return to pre-conflict levels, he said, but would judge Tehran by its actions.
“We don’t trust, we verify,” Vance said in an interview aired by Fox News Saturday.
US officials have also linked relief from Washington’s pressure campaign to the restoration of shipping. The Wall Street Journal reported Friday that Washington had told mediators it would not accept Iranian restrictions or tolls and that the Trump administration would lift its blockade on Iranian ports if Tehran reopened the waterway without impediments.
President Masoud Pezeshkian, meanwhile, called the United States “untrustworthy” but said Saturday that now was the “best time” to reach an agreement. He said Tehran was discussing diplomacy almost daily in an effort to move Iran out of a state of “neither war nor peace.”
“You cannot fight forever; at some point, it has to be brought to an end,” Pezeshkian said.
The negotiations with Oman may therefore settle how vessels would move through the Strait of Hormuz, but Iranian officials say the decision to reopen it remains contingent on Washington meeting broader demands set by Tehran.
A poster for the third season of Iranian reality show Eternal Love
Persian-language reality shows filmed outside Iran are giving young Iranians freedoms that would be impossible on television under the Islamic Republic, while revealing another side of life abroad: uncertainty over work, residency, identity and where ultimately to belong.
A new generation of Persian-language reality television has taken shape beyond the Islamic Republic’s borders, largely in Turkey and on YouTube, where programs built around dating, fashion, relationships and competition can show forms of social life that would be prohibited or heavily censored inside Iran.
The most prominent example is Eternal Love, a Persian-language dating show filmed in Turkey whose format resembles Love Island: young single men and women live together, form relationships and compete for love and prize money.
What looks familiar to international reality-TV audiences carries a different weight in the Iranian context. Contestants flirt, dance and drink, men and women date and touch openly, and women appear without the compulsory dress rules imposed inside Iran — all beyond what broadcasters operating under the Islamic Republic could show.
The popularity of such programs therefore reflects an unusual feature of contemporary Iranian culture: shows that could not legally be made for television at home are produced a short distance away and streamed back to viewers inside the country. Yet behind the relationships, arguments, clothes, tattoos and social-media controversies lies a broader story about migration, changing relations between women and men, economic insecurity, internet celebrity and a generation living somewhere between departure and arrival.
The contestants do not represent all young Iranians. Participation itself requires a degree of selection: the ability to leave Iran, willingness to expose private life, comfort before a camera and the capacity to turn oneself into a media personality. Their significance lies less in statistical representation than in how clearly they display some of the contradictions confronting a section of Iran’s younger generation.
Turkey as destination or waiting room?
For many Iranians, Turkey is not necessarily the final destination of migration but one of its first stops. Geographic proximity, comparatively easy travel and established Iranian communities have turned it into a space between origin and destination, close enough to remain tied culturally and socially to Iran while lying outside the Islamic Republic’s direct restrictions.
At the end of 2025, more than 3.6 million foreign nationals were living in Turkey, according to the International Organization for Migration, including 1,151,969 people with various forms of residence permits. Iranians were also among the main nationalities represented among applicants for and holders of international protection.
The more revealing issue, however, is not simply how many migrants are there but how temporary stays become prolonged lives. Someone who expected to spend months in Turkey may remain for years without knowing whether they will settle there, move to Europe or North America, or eventually return to Iran.
Under those conditions, temporary status becomes more than an immigration category. It shapes decisions about employment, money, relationships and family because long-term planning becomes harder when the country in which someone will live several years from now remains uncertain.
This is one of the central contradictions visible in the reality shows produced abroad. Leaving Iran can bring considerably greater freedom over clothing, dating, appearance and behavior in public, and the contrast is particularly stark in programs such as Eternal Love, where conduct that is ordinary in international reality television would be virtually impossible to broadcast from inside Iran.
A poster for the third season of Iranian reality show Eternal Love
Yet personal freedom does not necessarily bring stability. A migrant may have far greater authority over whom to date or what to wear while holding a temporary residence permit, working irregularly and remaining uncertain about the next country they will be able to call home. Migration therefore becomes more complicated than a simple movement from repression to freedom: someone may gain control over their body and private life while losing certainty over their economic and geographical future.
When attention becomes income
In those circumstances, appearing on a widely watched reality show can have value far beyond entertainment. Visibility itself can become an economic asset, particularly for migrants who may lack secure employment, savings or straightforward access to the labor market.
A contestant who enters a program with a modest following can emerge with thousands of new followers and convert that attention into advertising for clothing stores, beauty services, restaurants and other businesses aimed at Persian-speaking customers. Views and followers acquire monetary value, meaning the competition often continues after filming ends as former contestants try to preserve public attention and convert it into income.
This helps explain the continuing cycle of breakups, disputes, new relationships, accusations and public responses surrounding reality-show participants on social media. It does not mean that every conflict is manufactured, but platforms reward novelty and confrontation, allowing private life itself to become content. Romance, jealousy, friendship and heartbreak can produce views, turning experiences that once belonged largely to private life into part of a person’s professional capital.
The tattoos, piercings, clothing and carefully constructed appearances of many contestants can also be read within this broader context. For someone whose residency, employment and future country may lie partly outside their control, the body remains one of the areas over which they can exercise immediate authority.
For audiences inside Iran, that carries another meaning. The Islamic Republic has spent decades regulating appearance, particularly that of women, through compulsory dress rules and state intervention. A woman appearing freely before a camera without compulsory hijab therefore represents more than a different fashion choice; she also embodies the distance between two systems of living.
At the same time, leaving Iran does not necessarily erase attitudes formed there. Men and women may interact far more freely than Iranian state television permits, yet jealousy, controlling behavior, gender stereotypes and unequal expectations can survive in the new environment. Crossing a political border does not mean every social and cultural boundary has been left behind.
Those seeking fame and those trying to keep it
The sense of suspension extends beyond younger contestants. Some Persian-language programs made abroad are hosted by performers who achieved considerable fame inside Iran before leaving the country, creating a revealing contrast between participants hoping to become public figures and established celebrities trying to preserve or rebuild their careers before an audience they once reached through Iranian cinema or television.
Migration places the two groups in different circumstances but also gives them something in common: uncertainty over what comes next. For a well-known actor living abroad, hosting a YouTube program may offer a lucrative contract, continued access to a large Persian-speaking audience and the beginnings of a new professional life, but it may equally represent a temporary stage or a substitute for a career no longer available in Iran.
The uncertainty becomes clearer when the possibility of return is considered. Migration is not necessarily a one-way journey. Someone may live in Turkey today, try to move to Europe tomorrow and years later return to Iran for family, financial, professional or personal reasons.
There have been cases of Iranians who worked abroad before returning and later distancing themselves in Islamic Republic media from aspects of their previous activities or positions. Such examples cannot be generalized to the diaspora, but they illustrate how fragile the apparent finality of migration can be: someone convinced today that they have left permanently cannot know with certainty where they will live several years from now or what relationship they may then have with the country they left.
Watching possible futures
This may also help explain why reality shows made outside Iran attract such interest among audiences still living inside the country. Viewers are not simply watching young people date, argue or dress differently; they are seeing several possible futures compressed into the same screen — greater personal freedom, migration, unstable work, internet income, fame, failure, onward movement and even return.
That is what makes the shows more revealing than their often superficial plots suggest. They offer a view of a generation that can no longer be divided neatly into those who stayed in Iran and those who left. Some remain closely tied to Iran through language, family, culture and audience while living daily lives that no longer fully belong to the society inside its borders, without yet having put down durable roots elsewhere.
Even the media ecosystem surrounding them reflects that condition. The programs are Iranian in language, audience and cultural reference points but geographically foreign, watched inside Iran while being produced outside the Islamic Republic’s legal and social restrictions. Their participants address an Iranian public while trying to construct careers and identities in another country.
The deeper limbo, then, may not simply be between Iran and Turkey or Iran and Europe, but between a lost certainty and a future that has yet to take shape. Home is no longer only the place that was left behind, while the destination is not necessarily somewhere that has already been reached. The past remains present in language, relationships, fears and habits, while the future may still be too unstable to support a durable new identity.
In that setting, visibility can become more than the pursuit of celebrity. It can offer a way to build status, income and a sense of place when other fixed markers of life — country, profession, community and social position — have become uncertain.
Reality television did not create this condition and cannot explain an entire generation, but by moving Iranian lives into villas and studios outside the country and streaming them back across the border, it has made one part of that experience unusually visible: people who have escaped some of the restrictions of one society without yet acquiring the security of another.
For them, the defining question may no longer be simply whether to leave Iran, remain abroad or return, but where, amid greater freedom and persistent instability, it is possible finally to belong.
A file photo of the Iranian national football team in Australia
Late last month, Iran's finest striker sat across from the country's judiciary chief and asked him to help her find a job. Last week, two of her former teammates became Australian citizens. Between those two scenes lies everything the Islamic Republic offers its sportswomen.
In the video, Afsaneh Chatrenoor, a national team forward and four-time top scorer of Iran's women's league, faces Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, the cleric who runs the judiciary. She recites her sporting record and asks him to intervene so that she can be formally employed, so that there is something for her when the football ends.
In a normal country, an athlete's livelihood is not the judiciary's business, and no one petitions a security official for a paycheck. The scene works differently in Iran, where basic rights are routed out of ordinary channels and reissued as favors, dependent on the recommendation, the intercession, the mercy of an official.
A woman footballer is first stripped of what makes an athletic career a career: professional contracts, job security, broadcast rights, media coverage, a visible future. Then, for a fraction of what was taken, she must sit before power and ask.
No one expects a footballer to become a dissident against a state that has answered protest with mass executions. But there is a long distance between fighting the system and petitioning it for mercy, and the space between those two points is where the rest of her team now lives.
The one who spoke
Zahra Alizadeh chose a different point on that line. When security forces massacred protesters in January, the forward announced she was leaving the national team in protest. Within hours, her post vanished from Instagram, amid reports of security threats against players and their families and pressure to delete anything that read as dissent.
Alizadeh was no fringe squad member. In the qualifiers that sent Iran to the Women's Asian Cup in Australia, she scored against Bhutan and set up a goal against Singapore. She was never called up again, and within months she walked away from football altogether.
The message to every woman still in the squad was unambiguous: the right to play lasts exactly as long as the silence about the killing does.
The ones who left, and the ones brought back
Weeks later in Australia, the quiet broke. Seven members of the traveling party moved to seek humanitarian protection, a walkout confirmed at the time by Iran International, with US President Donald Trump publicly urging Canberra to take them in.
Five reversed course and flew home. The reversal is not simple to read: it happened in an atmosphere of dread, fear for families in Iran, the watchful presence of federation security officers, and reports of pressure both direct and oblique, with threats attributed to the Revolutionary Guards.
Neither staying nor returning, as the circumstances stood, can honestly be called a free choice.
What the government did next completed the picture. The returned players were paraded at Tehran's Valiasr Square, presented as proof of love of homeland and the collapse of what officials called the asylum plot. The crisis became a pageant.
The star nobody recognized
One moment from that pageant deserves to outlive it.
Golnoush Khosravi, herself a national team player and one of the figures in the Australia episode, was handed a microphone and sent into the crowd at a state rally to ask people what they thought of the women's team and the affair she had been part of. The answers were warm.
People thanked the returned players, said they loved them, said they were proud of them.
Not one of them recognized the national team player holding the microphone.
That is the Islamic Republic's relationship with women's football, compressed into a single scene: a state that buses in crowds to celebrate players it has spent decades making invisible.
Women's matches are almost never broadcast; photography is restricted; the players compete in mandated full cover.
The country's champions can walk any street unrecognized, and when the government finally needed their faces for its own story, it discovered the erasure had worked too well.
In its pageant, the player is not an athlete with an identity, a record and professional rights; she is a prop for a narrative, thanked on camera by people who do not know that the woman interviewing them is on the team.
The invisibility of the women who play has an older twin in the women who watch. Stadiums have been closed to female fans since shortly after the 1979 revolution, a ban that took the life of Sahar Khodayari, the fan who set herself on fire in 2019 facing prison for sneaking into a match, and that has since eased only in small, revocable concessions extracted under FIFA pressure.
The ledger abroad
Meanwhile, the world keeps collecting what Iran discards. Taekwondo fighter Kimia Alizadeh, once the country's only female Olympic medalist, left declaring herself one of millions of oppressed Iranian women and won Olympic bronze for Bulgaria. Chess players Sara Khadem, Mitra Hejazipour and Dorsa Derakhshani now play for Spain, France and the United States. This month, weightlifter Yekta Jamali, who left as a teenage medal prospect, was named best lifter of the German Bundesliga final, according to Persian-language media reports.
And on Wednesday, in Brisbane, Fatemeh Pasandideh, 22, and Atefeh Ramezanisadeh, 34, the two who did not board the plane home, received Australian citizenship at a ceremony attended by Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke.
Both now train with Brisbane Roar's women's side, and their passports make them eligible, one day, to play for the country that took them in.
"This citizenship is more than a certificate; it is a symbol of hope, safety and the opportunity to build a new future," Ramezanisadeh wrote. Pasandideh remembered "those who lost their lives or remain in prison."
Four roles, no future
One was erased for a sentence of protest. Some left home without the chance to say goodbye. Some came back and were placed inside a propaganda frame. And one, the best striker in the country, sat before the head of the judiciary and asked for a job.
These are not the same choices, and the women who made them do not bear the same responsibility. But they are all products of one structure, a system that recognizes only a few roles for a woman who plays football: silent, exiled, an instrument on a stage, or a supplicant before power.
What appears in none of these frames is the thing itself: an independent athlete whose success could buy her dignity, security and a future in her own country.
Chatrenoor says she does not regret coming home. Pasandideh is 22, with a passport, a club and a career ahead of her. Same team, same tournament, one flight's difference.
Iran is moving to ratify the Caspian treaty it left dormant for seven years, choosing the depths of a war to settle the status of its one quiet frontier, and reopening the oldest wound in its modern diplomacy: the belief that Tehran signed away half a sea.
President Masoud Pezeshkian's government has sent the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea to parliament for ratification, ending years in which the treaty sat untouched and reviving a charged argument over the country's historical rights, energy interests and position in the strategically vital basin.
The convention, signed by the leaders of Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the Kazakh port of Aktau in August 2018, takes effect only once all five littoral states ratify it. The other four completed the process long ago. Tehran, alone, held back.
The charge that shadows the bill is older than the bill itself: a belief, widely held in Iran and rooted in readings of its 1921 and 1940 treaties with Moscow, that the country was entitled to half the Caspian and stands to end up with barely a tenth.
The convention in fact allocates no national shares at all, but the ghost of the fifty percent has trailed every Iranian discussion of the sea since Aktau.
The timing sharpens the argument. The move lands in the middle of a war that has set Iran's southern coast under nightly strikes and closed the Strait of Hormuz, leaving the Caspian corridor to Russia carrying an outsized share of the country's commerce and its strategic weight.
What the treaty actually does is narrower than either its champions or its critics suggest.
It defines the Caspian as a "special and unique landlocked body of water," placing it outside the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Each coastal state receives 15 nautical miles of fully sovereign territorial waters and a further 10 nautical miles of exclusive fishing rights, with the remaining surface designated a shared navigation zone.
The wealth, however, is postponed. Article 8 leaves ownership and delimitation of the seabed and its oil and gas to "bilateral or multilateral agreements between the states concerned."
Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have largely settled their boundaries in the sea's north; the lines involving Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan remain unresolved, tangled in the complexity of dividing energy-rich waters.
A century-old dispute over Iran's share
Before the Soviet collapse, the Caspian was governed by the 1921 and 1940 treaties between Tehran and Moscow, which recognized equal navigation and fishing rights but drew no maritime boundaries.
The Soviet breakup turned two littoral states into five, and Iran has argued since that the sea should be divided equally, 20 percent to each.
Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan instead adopted a modified median-line method, a formula that, because of Iran's concave coastline, would shrink Tehran's share of the sea and its bed to roughly 11 to 13 percent. Iran has never accepted that division.
The government's case: a sealed northern flank
The government presents ratification as completing the Caspian's legal framework, deepening cooperation among the littoral states and, above all, keeping outside powers away.
Officials point to Article 3, which bars the armed forces of non-coastal countries from the Caspian, as the convention's central security prize, a provision long championed by both Tehran and Moscow.
Defa Press, an outlet affiliated with Iran's armed forces, wrote that the clause would "turn Iran's northern borders into a secure region, far removed from scenarios of foreign military intervention," at a moment when the country faces pressure along its southern and western frontiers.
The critics' case: ratifying before the real negotiation
Opponents argue parliament is sequencing the deal backwards: locking in the framework before the seabed, where the money lies, has been divided.
They note that the northern states have already parceled out much of the seabed and pressed ahead with oil and gas development, while fields shared with Iran, including Alborz, remain in limbo.
Dariush Safarnejad, an international affairs analyst, told the Revolutionary Guards-linked Javan newspaper that lawmakers should return the bill to the government, since supplementary agreements that were meant to be completed within six months of the 2018 signing have never been finalized.
Approving the convention without them, he warned, "could provide other Caspian states with legal grounds in the future and influence the security, political and geopolitical dynamics of the Caspian region."
Shoaib Bahman, an international relations analyst focused on Eurasia, told the same paper that ratifying before the seabed boundaries are set would "effectively reduce Iran's legal leverage in future negotiations and could undermine its claim to a 20% share of the Caspian Sea."
Pipelines, corridors and the Turkic map
The critics' second front is Article 14, under which undersea pipelines require the consent only of the states whose sectors they cross, not all five. Bahman argued the clause could open the way for eastern Caspian producers to export oil and gas directly toward Europe, eroding Iran's transit position.
Mehdi Seif-Tabrizi, a Russia specialist, offered a more measured reading to the news website Fararu. Iran's 15 miles of territorial waters and 10 miles of fishing rights are guaranteed, he said, and "the real dispute concerns the seabed and subsoil," not the surface percentages that dominate the public argument.
Yet he shares the strategic worry: that the long-discussed Trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan could finally be built.
"That could strengthen Azerbaijan's position and, in turn, reinforce the Zangezur corridor and the so-called Turkic World project," he said. "If Iran ratifies the convention, it would remove one of the most important legal obstacles to implementing those projects."
The opposition joins the attack
Criticism has come from beyond the establishment's factions. Exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi wrote on X that ratifying the agreement without the Iranian people's mandate and without "a clear and comprehensive guarantee of Iran's historic rights" is "deeply concerning and constitutes a serious threat to Iran's national interests."
Iran's rights in the Caspian, he added, "are not negotiable, nor can they be relinquished. Any action that undermines these rights will be recorded in the historical memory of the Iranian nation, and those responsible will ultimately be held accountable by the people of Iran."
Saeed Ghasseminejad, a senior Pahlavi adviser, went further, alleging that Hassan Rouhani's government had already "ceded Iran's share of the Caspian Sea" and that Pezeshkian and parliament speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf now seek to "legalize and make that concession permanent."
He called the move "the biggest surrender of Iran's land and waters to foreign powers since the Qajar-era humiliations."
