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British couple remain on hunger strike in Tehran prison, rights group says

Jul 6, 2026, 18:00 GMT+1

British nationals Craig and Lindsay Foreman remain on hunger strike in Tehran’s Evin prison and have been denied adequate medical care, essential medicine and family phone calls, US-based rights group HRANA reported on Monday.

The report said Lindsay Foreman had not received a medical checkup for about 10 days and was suffering from dizziness, body tremors, severe weakness and more than 14 kg of weight loss. Craig Foreman had lost about 16 kilograms, it added.

HRANA cited an informed source as saying the couple had recently been allowed phone contact with their lawyer but remained barred from speaking to their family, children and each other.

The source said pressure on the couple intensified after interviews with BBC World in which they discussed executions in Iran.

Craig and Lindsay Foreman were sentenced to 10 years in prison in February on espionage charges, which they deny.

The couple were first detained in the southeastern city of Kerman, where they spent 30 days in solitary confinement before being transferred to Tehran, the family has said, adding that, they had entered Iran with valid visas, a licensed guide and a cleared itinerary.

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Tailored Quran verses at Khamenei funeral spark diplomatic debate
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INSIGHT

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  • Iran’s energy growth slows to a crawl as demand races ahead
    INSIGHT

    Iran’s energy growth slows to a crawl as demand races ahead

  • Iran buries Khamenei as fight over his power continues
    ANALYSIS

    Iran buries Khamenei as fight over his power continues

  • After the war, Iran’s rulers face their biggest question
    PODCAST

    After the war, Iran’s rulers face their biggest question

  • Behind the funeral: Khamenei’s coffin becomes stage for Iran’s wounded power
    ANALYSIS

    Behind the funeral: Khamenei’s coffin becomes stage for Iran’s wounded power

  • Iran hardliners warn Hormuz authority slipping to US-backed Omani route
    INSIGHT

    Iran hardliners warn Hormuz authority slipping to US-backed Omani route

  • Funeral expenses deepen anger over Ali Khamenei's week-long burial
    VOICES FROM IRAN

    Funeral expenses deepen anger over Ali Khamenei's week-long burial

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Iran's costly farewell for supreme leader draws backlash

Jul 6, 2026, 14:01 GMT+1
•
Saba Heidarkhani
Iran's costly farewell for supreme leader draws backlash
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Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's funeral procession in Tehran on July 5, 2026.

The Islamic Republic's state funeral for Ali Khamenei has drawn criticism over its attendance, the extensive public resources devoted to the event and what many Iranians described as an unsuccessful attempt to project political strength, following the burial ceremony.

Images and videos from Tehran's prayer ground complex prompted widespread discussion among Iranians, with many saying attendance fell short despite an extensive state mobilization effort.

Messages sent to Iran International argued authorities relied on government employees, security forces, organized transportation, free meals and public holidays to maximize turnout, yet still failed to fill the designated venue.

For many, the relatively sparse gathering represented more than a logistical disappointment. They viewed it as evidence of a widening gap between the establishment and society, arguing the Islamic Republic could no longer convincingly stage large public displays of popular support.

  • Funeral expenses deepen anger over Ali Khamenei's week-long burial

    Funeral expenses deepen anger over Ali Khamenei's week-long burial

Several citizens contrasted the official portrayal of the funeral as a demonstration of national unity with what they described as a subdued public response after nearly five decades of clerical rule.

Symbolism meets economic hardship

Many reactions focused on the economic contrast between the scale of the ceremony and the financial pressures facing ordinary Iranians.

Iranians questioned the use of public resources for an elaborate state funeral at a time when inflation, declining purchasing power and rising living costs continue to dominate daily life.

Several described households that have reduced or eliminated meat and other protein from their diets, arguing that spending on ceremonial events appeared disconnected from the country's economic realities.

Others said successive crises – including war, sanctions, regional isolation and economic decline – had not altered what they viewed as the system's priority of funding state institutions and political messaging ahead of public welfare.

Contradictory political messaging

Another frequently discussed issue involved videos circulating on social media showing participants symbolically pelting an image of US President Donald Trump with stones during the funeral events.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's funeral procession in Tehran on July 5, 2026.
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Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's funeral procession in Tehran on July 5, 2026.

Some citizens highlighted what they saw as a contradiction between anti-US demonstrations and expectations that Iranian and US officials could resume negotiations in the near future.

They argued that confrontational domestic messaging has repeatedly existed alongside diplomatic engagement, reflecting what they described as two parallel tracks in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy.

Questions over the cost

No official estimate has been released for the total cost of the funeral and burial ceremonies.

Nevertheless, many messages attempted to estimate the overall expenditure by citing security deployments, temporary infrastructure, transportation, accommodation, food distribution, ceremonial preparations and construction work carried out along the procession route.

Some suggested the total bill could approach $800 million, although no official evidence has been presented to support that figure.

  • Behind the funeral: Khamenei’s coffin becomes stage for Iran’s wounded power

    Behind the funeral: Khamenei’s coffin becomes stage for Iran’s wounded power

The estimate prompted comparisons with recent funerals for other world leaders.

Several people pointed to the funeral of Elizabeth II in 2022, which the British government estimated cost around £162 million – roughly $200 million at contemporary exchange rates. The event included days of public lying-in-state, thousands of police and military personnel, extensive international participation and worldwide television coverage.

Others referred to the funerals of Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Said and Kuwaiti Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, both of which followed Islamic tradition with relatively swift burial ceremonies. Although no comprehensive official costs were released, participants noted those events appeared considerably more modest despite taking place in wealthy Persian Gulf monarchies.

Debate over public priorities

Many also drew comparisons with the Islamic Republic's longstanding criticism of the lavish celebrations marking the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Emire under the Pahlavi dynasty.

They questioned why authorities that had long condemned those celebrations as wasteful were now directing substantial public funds toward a funeral ceremony during a period of economic hardship.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's funeral procession in Tehran on July 5, 2026.
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Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's funeral procession in Tehran on July 5, 2026.

Several messages further said that the system has never devoted comparable financial and organizational resources to national celebrations such as Nowruz, Yalda Night or Chaharshanbe Suri, despite their broad cultural significance.

For many, the debate surrounding the funeral extended beyond attendance or cost. They said the ceremony reflected broader concerns about state priorities, economic management and political legitimacy.

Rather than reinforcing the image of a confident political system, citizens argued the funeral underscored the difficulties facing a regime confronting deep economic challenges and declining public trust, even as it sought to present the burial of its longtime leader as a demonstration of continuity and authority.

Iran keeps Ejei as judiciary chief, preserving hardline course

Jul 6, 2026, 11:42 GMT+1
•
Naeimeh Doostdar
Iran keeps Ejei as judiciary chief, preserving hardline course
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Iran's Judiciary Cheif Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei

Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei was recently reappointed as judiciary chief for another five-year term, reinforcing the Islamic Republic’s security-focused judicial system and offering an early indication of how Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei intends to manage power.

The appointment, issued under Article 157 of Iran’s constitution, leaves one of the Islamic Republic’s longest-serving judicial and intelligence figures at the head of an institution that has played a central role in prosecuting dissent, overseeing political cases and implementing the state’s domestic security policies.

Mohseni Ejei, 69, has spent more than four decades moving between the Revolutionary Courts, the Intelligence Ministry and the judiciary, making him one of the few senior officials with experience across all three pillars of Iran’s security establishment.

Unlike many first-generation clerics who rose through purely religious institutions, Mohseni Ejei also earned a master's degree in private international law. That legal education, however, has done little to shape his public image, which has instead been defined by security cases, political prosecutions and harsh judicial policies.

  • Mass arrests, intensifying crackdown sweep Iran amid attacks

    Mass arrests, intensifying crackdown sweep Iran amid attacks

His rise began during the 1980s, when he served as an investigator in the case against Mehdi Hashemi, the brother-in-law of the late Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. The prosecution helped weaken Montazeri's political standing before he was removed as the designated successor to the Islamic Republic's founder, Ruhollah Khomeini.

That early role established Mohseni Ejei as an official closely associated with politically sensitive investigations, forced confessions and cases that blurred the boundary between judicial procedure and national security.

Security insider

Official biographies highlight his studies at the Haqqani Seminary and his involvement in prominent corruption prosecutions during the 1990s, including cases involving businessman Fazel Khodadad and former Tehran mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi.

His career expanded further when he became intelligence minister under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad before being dismissed in 2009. He was subsequently appointed prosecutor general, later became first deputy judiciary chief and assumed the judiciary's top post in 2021.

The combination of intelligence, prosecutorial and judicial experience has made Mohseni Ejei one of the Islamic Republic's most trusted officials for handling politically sensitive files involving opposition figures, corruption allegations and national security matters.

Supporters portray him as an experienced administrator familiar with every layer of Iran's judicial system. Critics argue his career reflects the increasing integration of intelligence agencies and the courts, turning judicial institutions into instruments for enforcing political control.

Mohseni Ejei has also maintained an unusually low public profile outside official duties. Unlike many senior Iranian politicians, he rarely projects a personal image or family life through the media, appearing primarily in court proceedings, official meetings and state broadcasts.

'The man who bites'

Among many Iranians, Mohseni Ejei's public reputation extends beyond his judicial decisions.

One of the most enduring stories surrounding him dates to 2004, when journalist Isa Saharkhiz accused Mohseni Ejei of throwing a cube-sugar bowl and biting his shoulder during a dispute at a meeting of Iran's Press Supervisory Board. The account became one of the defining anecdotes associated with his public image.

His international profile, however, has been shaped more by human rights concerns than by personal controversies.

The United States Department of the Treasury sanctioned Mohseni Ejei in September 2010 over his role in serious human rights abuses following Iran's disputed 2009 presidential election. The sanctions placed him alongside other senior Iranian security officials accused of involvement in post-election repression.

The European Union also imposed human rights sanctions on him, citing his role in unfair trials and severe prison and death sentences against political activists and protesters.

Judiciary under scrutiny

During his first term as judiciary chief, Mohseni Ejei said wants to promote themes including judicial reform, anti-corruption efforts and reducing court delays.

Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, recently appointed to a new five-year term, attends a ceremony alongside President Masoud Pezeshkian (left) and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (center).
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Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, recently appointed to a new five-year term, attends a ceremony alongside President Masoud Pezeshkian (left) and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (center).

Human rights organizations, however, have argued the judiciary became more deeply involved in suppressing political opposition, particularly following the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protests triggered by the death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody.

Mohseni Ejei publicly defended death sentences imposed on some protesters after those demonstrations.

Amnesty International said in September 2025 that Iran had executed more than 1,000 people that year, describing it as the highest annual total recorded by the organization in at least 15 years. The group said authorities had increasingly relied on capital punishment following the Woman, Life, Freedom protests.

The Iran Human Rights annual report recorded at least 1,639 executions during 2025, saying more than 93% were never officially announced and that Revolutionary Courts handed down 852 execution sentences during the year.

Following the recent conflict involving Israel and the United States, rights groups have also accused Iranian authorities of accelerating political prosecutions under wartime conditions.

Amnesty International said in May 2026 that Iranian authorities had intensified mass arrests, expedited trials and politically motivated executions, documenting at least 42 executions on political charges since late February after proceedings it described as unfair.

  • Amnesty says Iran drove global surge in executions in 2025

    Amnesty says Iran drove global surge in executions in 2025

Mohseni Ejei's reappointment follows days of speculation that Iran's new leadership might replace him to demonstrate a change of direction. Instead, retaining him suggests continuity rather than restructuring at the judiciary.

The decision shows that, at least in the early phase of Mojtaba Khamenei's leadership, judicial authority will remain closely aligned with Iran's security institutions, reinforcing a model in which the courts continue to play a central role in maintaining political control rather than signaling a broader opening of the country's legal system.

Cattle feeding on hospital waste expose risks at Iran landfill

Jul 5, 2026, 09:10 GMT+1
Cattle feeding on hospital waste expose risks at Iran landfill
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Cattle forage among piles of garbage at a landfill in Talesh, Gilan Province, northern Iran, while a close-up image shows discarded plastic medical waste mixed with refuse.

Cattle have been filmed feeding on hospital waste at a landfill in northern Iran, exposing failures in waste management that risk contaminating livestock, soil and the human food chain, according to a report by Rokna website on Saturday.

The video from the landfill in Talesh shows cattle roaming through piles of refuse, including hospital waste, highlighting the apparent lack of effective segregation, containment and disposal measures for hazardous materials.

Hazardous waste enters food chain

Hospital waste ranks among the most dangerous categories of refuse because it can contain infectious materials, contaminated equipment, sharp objects and hazardous chemicals. Allowing livestock to graze in direct contact with such waste, according to the report, raises concerns that contaminants could spread through meat, milk and other agricultural products consumed by people.

The footage also points to broader shortcomings in landfill management beyond the presence of medical waste. Open dumping without effective isolation, daily cover or barriers preventing animal access leaves waste exposed to livestock, wildlife and the surrounding environment.

Such conditions, Rokna wrote, can contaminate soil, generate polluted leachate that may seep into groundwater, attract disease-carrying insects and animals, and release foul odors and harmful gases. When cattle graze freely in these areas, the potential for biological and chemical contaminants to enter the food chain increases.

The risks, based on the report, are particularly acute in Talesh, where mountains, forests, farmland, residential areas and the Caspian Sea lie in close proximity, allowing pollution to spread more rapidly through interconnected ecosystems.

Environmental and public health concerns

Environmental degradation extends beyond the immediate health risks. Large volumes of uncovered waste can damage natural habitats, reduce land quality and increase the likelihood of contaminants spreading into surrounding soil and water resources, added the report.

The conditions documented by Rokna also suggest failures in basic waste management practices, including separating hazardous medical waste from ordinary refuse, safely treating infectious materials and preventing livestock from entering disposal sites.

Without urgent measures to improve waste segregation, strengthen landfill controls and restrict animal access, the Talesh landfill risks becoming a continuing source of contamination affecting livestock, the environment and public health, the report added.

After the war, Iran’s rulers face their biggest question

Jul 4, 2026, 22:20 GMT+1
•
Negar Mojtahedi
After the war, Iran’s rulers face their biggest question
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Iranian officials at Ali Khamenei's funeral on July 3, 2026. From left to right: Abbas Araghchi, Sadegh Amoli Larijani, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Masoud Pezeshkian, Mohsen Rezaei

The Iran-US truce has exposed a deeper battle inside Tehran, where public rifts over censorship, negotiations and the system’s future point to a survival debate that could reshape or further destabilize the regime, experts told the Eye for Iran podcast.

In the days since the fighting subsided, Iran's political establishment has offered an unusually public glimpse into divisions that have long remained largely behind closed doors.

State television abruptly cut short a pre-recorded interview with Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf as he discussed the use of blocked Iranian funds abroad, prompting accusations that politically sensitive remarks had been censored. State broadcaster IRIB insisted the interview had always been scheduled to air in two parts.

Elsewhere, hardliners heckled Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi during a visit to Karbala, chanting "death to the appeaser" and "we don't want pretense" as Tehran pursues negotiations with Washington. Establishment commentators have also begun openly discussing ideas that, until recently, would have been politically difficult to imagine entering the public conversation.

Individually, each episode could be dismissed as another example of factional politics inside the Islamic Republic.

Taken together, however, they point to something more significant.

They suggest the post-war debate inside Tehran is no longer simply about diplomacy, sanctions or military strategy.

It is increasingly about how the Islamic Republic must adapt if it is to preserve power in the wake of one of the greatest shocks in its 47-year history.

"The question isn't whether they're engaging in soul-searching," Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, told Eye for Iran. "They have to."

For Vatanka, the significance of this moment is not that the Islamic Republic has suddenly embraced reform.

It is that the war appears to have stripped away old assumptions.

"I think there is a lot more clarity today than there was before the war," he said. "The regime knows the old model failed. The question now is what comes next."

He believes survival—not reform—is driving the conversation.

"If you're in the business of surviving, you don't want this to happen to you again," he said. "Maybe this is the moment you change course."

That should not be mistaken for moderation.

"You don't do it because you love the people of Iran," Vatanka said. "You do it because you want to survive."

The debate itself could prove destabilizing.

"When the knives are out within the regime, they go after each other in vicious ways," Vatanka warned, arguing that competition between rival factions could intensify as different camps attempt to shape the Islamic Republic's post-war future.

Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior director of the Iran Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, argues that understanding those debates first requires understanding the nature of the political system itself.

"It is not straight-up Islamic theocracy," he said.

Instead, he described the Islamic Republic as a political project drawing on multiple ideological traditions.

"A traditional Shia marja has basically taken Karl Marx, the Quran and Plato and put it together and created a political system on top of that."

That, Taleblu argues, is why outsiders should be careful not to confuse adaptation with transformation.

"I think it is a real battle within this regime of how best to preserve the prerogatives and the privileges of power while also sacrificing as little as possible on the ideology."

Even if institutions evolve, he says, the guiding principles may not.

"Real transformation comes with behavior. It comes with substance—not style."

Historian Shahram Kholdi remains skeptical that the current debate represents a genuine break with the past.

"Any difference that has existed between any of these people, in my opinion, has always been one of degree rather than in kind," he said. "Tactics are different. Worldviews, strategies, expectations and demands are all the same."

Rather than seeing reform, Kholdi sees a political elite trying to preserve the system after one of its most serious crises.

But he also believes the post-war period could intensify competition among rival centers of power.

"If Ghalibaf and his ilk manage to get the upper hand... the rest of the gang would feel completely insecure, and that intra-conflict then would materialize into a hot conflict within them," he said.

"And that may very well spell their final doom once and for all."

Whether that prediction proves correct remains to be seen.

What is already clear is that the conversation unfolding inside Tehran has moved beyond the immediate consequences of the war.

It has become a debate about the future of the Islamic Republic itself.

In July 2006, Henry Kissinger argued that Iran's leaders would eventually have to decide whether they were governing "a cause or a nation."

Today, that question is no longer being asked only by foreign observers. Increasingly, it appears to be one the Islamic Republic is asking itself.

Iran's new IRGC Navy chief emerges without formal decree: who is Ali Azmaei?

Jul 4, 2026, 20:04 GMT+1
Iran's new IRGC Navy chief emerges without formal decree: who is Ali Azmaei?
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New IRGC Navy commander Ali Azmaei (right) and his slain predecessor Alireza Tangsiri

Iranian state media on Saturday published a message from Rear Admiral Ali Azmaei that identified him as commander of the IRGC Navy, marking the first public indication that he has replaced Alireza Tangsiri, who was killed during the war in March.

No formal appointment decree has been published for Azmaei, whose predecessor was killed in an attack on Bandar Abbas on March 26.

Top IRGC appointments are normally announced through decrees issued by the supreme leader, but no such decree has been published by Mojtaba Khamenei who has not been seen in public since he reportedly suffered injuries in the early hours of the war.

In a message issued Saturday for the funeral of Iran’s slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Azmaei said IRGC naval forces and “guardians of the strategic Strait of Hormuz” would continue Khamenei’s path, adding that “divine revenge” against what he called US and Israeli terrorists was not far off.

Azmaei had commanded the IRGC Navy’s Fifth Naval Region since its formation in 2012 and previously served as deputy commander of the IRGC Navy’s First Naval Region.

He was promoted to brigadier general by Ali Khamenei in April 2022 and has been under US sanctions since 2019. The US has sanctioned him as Ali Ozma’i.

The announcement comes as several senior military posts in the Islamic Republic have changed hands without the publication of formal decrees since Khamenei’s death.