Iran turns to Iraq’s Umm Qasr as new hub to bypass US blockade

The Iraqi port is now being used to move some Iran-bound cargo, including cars, after shipments are first transferred from ports in the United Arab Emirates on vessels flying non-Iranian flags, sources with knowledge of the matter Iran International.

The shift adds a new layer to Iran’s effort to keep trade moving through indirect routes after the US blockade, which began on April 13, closed the main passages in the Strait of Hormuz to Iranian ships and vessels linked to the Islamic Republic.

Iran International previously reported that the small Omani port of Khasab, on the Musandam Peninsula near the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, had become one of the main alternatives for moving goods into Iran.

Cargoes that once moved through standard UAE-Iran channels have been transferred from Emirati ports to Khasab, then loaded onto Iranian vessels bound for ports on Iran’s southern coast.

But trade sources said the route has become slower in recent weeks as demand has risen.

The number of vessels gathering in Khasab has increased, while the port’s limited capacity has made loading and transfers more time-consuming and more expensive than in the first days after the ceasefire, the sources said.

Oman, which had previously imposed limited restrictions or charges on some cargoes, has also introduced new costs for certain goods in recent weeks.

One trade source said some shipments, including cars, are now subject to charges based on the value of the goods.

Against that backdrop, Umm Qasr, Iraq’s main Persian Gulf port, has become a complementary route.

How the new route works

Sources told Iran International that cars have been among the cargoes moved from Umm Qasr toward Iran. There is no confirmed information on whether other categories of goods are being transferred through the same route.

In this method, cars or other Iran-bound cargo are first shipped from docks in the UAE, including Dubai, to Umm Qasr under flags other than Iran’s.

From there, the cargo can move into Iran by land or by water.

On the land route, shipments travel from Umm Qasr to Basra, then to Iran's Shalamcheh border crossing, before reaching Khorramshahr and other destinations in Iran.

On the water route, vessels heading for Khorramshahr must enter the Shatt al-Arab, known in Iran as the Arvand River, and continue from there to Iranian piers.

Some cargoes can also move from Umm Qasr through Khor Abdullah toward southern Iranian ports, including Bandar Lengeh, according to the information obtained by Iran International.

Khasab, however, remains attractive to many traders despite congestion and higher costs.

One reason is that goods can reach Oman by both land and sea.

Some shipments can be moved from the UAE into Oman overland, and trade sources say monitoring of certain cargoes traveling by land to Oman is less strict than on fully maritime routes.

The Umm Qasr route is different.

Cargoes moving from the UAE to the Iraqi port generally have to be loaded at official docks in Dubai or other Emirati ports, where trailers and containers pass through scanning systems and face more stringent controls.

Umm Qasr’s location still makes it useful for Iran’s trade network.

The port lies about 60 kilometers south of Basra and is one of Iraq’s most important Gulf terminals. A significant share of Iraq’s imports of basic goods, including grain and sugar, moves through the port, which connects Iraq to Gulf trade routes.

Its proximity to Basra, the Shalamcheh crossing and Iran’s Khuzestan province has made it a practical option for shipments headed toward southwestern Iran.

Iranian local officials had previously referred to the use of this route.

Javad Kazem-Nasab Al-Baji, deputy governor of Khuzestan for economic affairs, said in May during a meeting with the head of Iran’s customs administration that agreements had been reached for the entry of basic goods and relief items through Iraq’s Umm Qasr port.

But the route also carries risks. The IRGC Navy recently targeted a commercial vessel at Umm Qasr, calling it “American-Israeli.” The IRGC said the attack was carried out in retaliation for a US strike on the Iranian vessel Lian Star.

The incident showed that even alternative routes through Iraq are not insulated from the military and security tensions surrounding the blockade.

For traders and transport intermediaries, however, pressure on Iran’s traditional maritime routes has made even more complicated and risky options part of the calculation.

According to the information obtained by Iran International, the order to keep Paydari supporters away from the gatherings was issued after requests by President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who also heads Tehran’s negotiating team.

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Protesters carrying placards opposing concessions on the nuclear issue have also been removed from the state-backed rallies, according to the same information.

The move points to an effort by senior figures in the Islamic Republic to contain ultra-hardline pressure at a sensitive moment, as Tehran and Washington continue talks over a possible understanding involving the ceasefire, the Strait of Hormuz, frozen Iranian assets and nuclear-related terms.

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The Paydari Front and its allies have been among the most vocal opponents of negotiations with the United States. In recent days, figures close to the camp have criticized Ghalibaf and the negotiating team, warning against concessions and arguing that talks with Washington amount to a mistake.

The reported removals came as the Islamic Republic held the first anniversary ceremony for Ruhollah Khomeini since the killing of Ali Khamenei, without the former supreme leader’s presence.

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  Hardline MP draws backlash over post seen as swipe at Mojtaba Khamenei

During the ceremony on Thursday, Mojtaba Khamenei issued a message warning against what he called doubt, despair, fear and suspicion.

The message, read by Mohammad-Javad Haj-Ali-Akbari, Tehran’s interim Friday prayer leader, said any action that causes public pessimism or disillusionment amounts to helping the enemy.

Iran International has obtained documents indicating that a Chinese company, working with firms in Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, helped Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) acquire chemicals used in the production of ballistic missiles.

The documents, obtained by the hacker group Prana and shared with Iran International, suggest Chinese entities also played a role in facilitating the transactions through a network of companies designed to navigate US sanctions.

The documents also link the deadly explosion at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas on April 26, 2025, to a shipment of sodium perchlorate, a chemical used in solid missile fuel production.

According to the documents, the blast and existing sanctions made it increasingly difficult to find vessels willing to transport such cargo to Iran.

Read the full article here.

The documents, obtained by the hacker group Prana and shared with Iran International, suggest Chinese entities also played a role in facilitating the transactions through a network of companies designed to navigate US sanctions.

The documents also link the deadly explosion at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas on April 26, 2025, to a shipment of sodium perchlorate, a chemical used in solid missile fuel production.

According to the documents, the blast and existing sanctions made it increasingly difficult to find vessels willing to transport such cargo to Iran.

Central to the network described in the documents is Haokun Energy, a company that for years acted as an intermediary in the sale of IRGC oil to Chinese refineries and was sanctioned by the United States four years ago for financing the IRGC's Quds Force.

A source familiar with the matter told Iran International that the company still owes the IRGC more than $1 billion in oil revenues.

In one document, Haokun refers to an agreement with a company called Golden Globe Demir Celik (GDCP) concerning the supply of chemical products for special equipment. The document states that, to preserve confidentiality, export-related permits were issued through classified channels.

In another section, Haokun says it established a company called Mosta to obtain bank guarantees. The company is reportedly controlled by GDCP because, for sanctions-related reasons, no Iranian national can serve on its board of directors.

Haokun says that, in coordination with Chinese customs authorities, activities were conducted through confidential channels and requested that its Iranian counterpart prevent any disclosure of information.

Elsewhere, Haokun says it planned to ship 2,000 tons of sodium chlorate and 10,000 tons of sodium perchlorate to Iran through GDCP. The documents indicate that quantity would be sufficient to produce solid fuel for roughly 2,500 ballistic missiles. The shipment was valued at $43 million.

GDCP is registered in Turkey, but leaked emails from the company were signed by an Iranian national, Mohammadreza Sadr. In its correspondence, Haokun identifies GDCP as belonging to the Islamic Republic. One of the leaked emails included a Haokun letter addressed to “Commander Mohammadzadeh.”

The individual appears to be Ahmad Mohammadzadeh, the former deputy coordinator of the IRGC Navy and a former governor of Bushehr under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

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Iran International previously reported that he was among the key figures in the Pourjafari Headquarters, an IRGC oil-sales network that used a complex structure to import gold in exchange for oil exports.

The documents also link GDCP to other figures associated with the IRGC’s commercial and procurement networks. According to the documents, the company is responsible for procuring raw materials used in ballistic missile fuel and for selling oil on behalf of the IRGC.

One document shows GDCP preparing to sell two million barrels of oil from Kharg Island to Fortune Company in the United Arab Emirates. Another records a transfer of roughly $3 million in cryptocurrency to GDCP, while a separate document indicates the funds were deposited into an account at the Borj-e Aseman branch of Tourism Bank in Tehran.

According to the documents, a significant portion of oil-sale revenues is being used to purchase sodium perchlorate from China. Haokun, which brokers the transactions, is attempting to repay hundreds of millions of dollars owed to the IRGC through the sale of weapons, missile-fuel materials and other goods.

A year ago, the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) reported that, as part of an oil-for-goods barter arrangement, Haokun sold two Airbus A330 passenger aircraft to the Islamic Republic for $116 million, despite their market value being estimated at roughly $60 million.

Reports of sodium perchlorate shipments from China to Iran have surfaced repeatedly over the past year.

On March 7, The Washington Post reported that two sanctioned vessels linked to the Islamic Republic had departed China's Gelaowan Port bound for Iranian waters carrying sodium perchlorate, a key component in solid missile fuel. On April 3, The Telegraph reported that five ships carrying sodium perchlorate had arrived at Iranian ports.

Neither Beijing nor Tehran has publicly confirmed such shipments. The documents reviewed by Iran International provide what appears to be the clearest documentary evidence to date linking Chinese entities to efforts to supply the IRGC with materials used in ballistic missile fuel production.

On May 12, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused China of assisting the IRGC in acquiring components used in ballistic missiles. China rejected the allegation.

A week later, US President Donald Trump said that China's president had assured him that no weapons would be supplied to Iran.

In the letter sent on Sunday, Pezeshkian stressed that the president and the government have effectively been excluded from major and vital decision-making processes in the country, and that the vacuum created by this situation has enabled hardline factions within the IRGC to take control of affairs, the source said.

Pezeshkian added that under such circumstances he is unable to run the government and carry out his legal responsibilities, and for that reason has requested to step down immediately.

It is not yet clear whether Mojtaba Khamenei will accept the president's resignation, but the contents of the letter point to a deep and unprecedented rift at the highest levels of power.

This comes after months of tensions between the government and the Islamic Republic’s military-security institutions. Iran International previously reported that the IRGC had gradually restricted many presidential powers and effectively taken control of key parts of the government.

According to informed sources, the situation has left Pezeshkian’s administration trapped in a political and executive deadlock, preventing diplomatic negotiations from moving forward and the completion and implementation of desired changes to the cabinet structure.

IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency denied Iran International’s report, citing an informed government source as saying President Masoud Pezeshkian had not resigned and was continuing to carry out his duties.

Separately, Seyed Mehdi Tabatabaei, deputy head of communications and information at the president's office, dismissed the report in a post on X and said Pezeshkian would not step back from serving the people.