Leaked documents link Chinese firms to IRGC missile fuel network
Iran International has obtained documents indicating that a Chinese company, working with firms in Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, helped Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) acquire chemicals used in the production of ballistic missiles.
The documents, obtained by the hacker group Prana and shared with Iran International, suggest Chinese entities also played a role in facilitating the transactions through a network of companies designed to navigate US sanctions.
The documents also link the deadly explosion at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas on April 26, 2025, to a shipment of sodium perchlorate, a chemical used in solid missile fuel production.
According to the documents, the blast and existing sanctions made it increasingly difficult to find vessels willing to transport such cargo to Iran.
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Iran International has obtained documents indicating that a Chinese company, working with firms in Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, helped Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) acquire chemicals used in the production of ballistic missiles.
The documents, obtained by the hacker group Prana and shared with Iran International, suggest Chinese entities also played a role in facilitating the transactions through a network of companies designed to navigate US sanctions.
The documents also link the deadly explosion at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas on April 26, 2025, to a shipment of sodium perchlorate, a chemical used in solid missile fuel production.
According to the documents, the blast and existing sanctions made it increasingly difficult to find vessels willing to transport such cargo to Iran.
Central to the network described in the documents is Haokun Energy, a company that for years acted as an intermediary in the sale of IRGC oil to Chinese refineries and was sanctioned by the United States four years ago for financing the IRGC's Quds Force.
A source familiar with the matter told Iran International that the company still owes the IRGC more than $1 billion in oil revenues.
In one document, Haokun refers to an agreement with a company called Golden Globe Demir Celik (GDCP) concerning the supply of chemical products for special equipment. The document states that, to preserve confidentiality, export-related permits were issued through classified channels.
In another section, Haokun says it established a company called Mosta to obtain bank guarantees. The company is reportedly controlled by GDCP because, for sanctions-related reasons, no Iranian national can serve on its board of directors.
Haokun says that, in coordination with Chinese customs authorities, activities were conducted through confidential channels and requested that its Iranian counterpart prevent any disclosure of information.
Elsewhere, Haokun says it planned to ship 2,000 tons of sodium chlorate and 10,000 tons of sodium perchlorate to Iran through GDCP. The documents indicate that quantity would be sufficient to produce solid fuel for roughly 2,500 ballistic missiles. The shipment was valued at $43 million.
GDCP is registered in Turkey, but leaked emails from the company were signed by an Iranian national, Mohammadreza Sadr. In its correspondence, Haokun identifies GDCP as belonging to the Islamic Republic. One of the leaked emails included a Haokun letter addressed to “Commander Mohammadzadeh.”
The individual appears to be Ahmad Mohammadzadeh, the former deputy coordinator of the IRGC Navy and a former governor of Bushehr under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Iran International previously reported that he was among the key figures in the Pourjafari Headquarters, an IRGC oil-sales network that used a complex structure to import gold in exchange for oil exports.
The documents also link GDCP to other figures associated with the IRGC’s commercial and procurement networks. According to the documents, the company is responsible for procuring raw materials used in ballistic missile fuel and for selling oil on behalf of the IRGC.
One document shows GDCP preparing to sell two million barrels of oil from Kharg Island to Fortune Company in the United Arab Emirates. Another records a transfer of roughly $3 million in cryptocurrency to GDCP, while a separate document indicates the funds were deposited into an account at the Borj-e Aseman branch of Tourism Bank in Tehran.
According to the documents, a significant portion of oil-sale revenues is being used to purchase sodium perchlorate from China. Haokun, which brokers the transactions, is attempting to repay hundreds of millions of dollars owed to the IRGC through the sale of weapons, missile-fuel materials and other goods.
A year ago, the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) reported that, as part of an oil-for-goods barter arrangement, Haokun sold two Airbus A330 passenger aircraft to the Islamic Republic for $116 million, despite their market value being estimated at roughly $60 million.
Reports of sodium perchlorate shipments from China to Iran have surfaced repeatedly over the past year.
On March 7, The Washington Post reported that two sanctioned vessels linked to the Islamic Republic had departed China's Gelaowan Port bound for Iranian waters carrying sodium perchlorate, a key component in solid missile fuel. On April 3, The Telegraph reported that five ships carrying sodium perchlorate had arrived at Iranian ports.
Neither Beijing nor Tehran has publicly confirmed such shipments. The documents reviewed by Iran International provide what appears to be the clearest documentary evidence to date linking Chinese entities to efforts to supply the IRGC with materials used in ballistic missile fuel production.
On May 12, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused China of assisting the IRGC in acquiring components used in ballistic missiles. China rejected the allegation.
A week later, US President Donald Trump said that China's president had assured him that no weapons would be supplied to Iran.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has submitted an official letter of resignation to the Office of the Supreme Leader, a source familiar with the matter told Iran International.
In the letter sent on Sunday, Pezeshkian stressed that the president and the government have effectively been excluded from major and vital decision-making processes in the country, and that the vacuum created by this situation has enabled hardline factions within the IRGC to take control of affairs, the source said.
Pezeshkian added that under such circumstances he is unable to run the government and carry out his legal responsibilities, and for that reason has requested to step down immediately.
It is not yet clear whether Mojtaba Khamenei will accept the president's resignation, but the contents of the letter point to a deep and unprecedented rift at the highest levels of power.
This comes after months of tensions between the government and the Islamic Republic’s military-security institutions. Iran International previously reported that the IRGC had gradually restricted many presidential powers and effectively taken control of key parts of the government.
According to informed sources, the situation has left Pezeshkian’s administration trapped in a political and executive deadlock, preventing diplomatic negotiations from moving forward and the completion and implementation of desired changes to the cabinet structure.
Despite Tehran’s firm demands for the immediate and unconditional release of $12 billion in cash upon the signing of an initial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the United States, Qatari officials rejected the
According to a source close to a Qatari official involved in the discussions, Doha refused to transfer the funds directly or in cash to Iran. Instead, the money will only be made available as credit for Tehran to purchase essential goods and products directly from Qatar.
The restriction comes amid strong US opposition to granting Iran direct, unrestricted access to liquid financial assets.
The recent high-stakes visit of a senior Iranian delegation to Doha, led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, has ended in a major diplomatic setback for Tehran, an informed source with knowledge of the negotiations told Iran International.
Despite Tehran’s firm demands for the immediate and unconditional release of $12 billion in cash upon the signing of an initial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the United States, Qatari officials rejected the request, agreeing to release only half of the amount under strict limitations, the source said.
According to a source close to a Qatari official involved in the discussions, Doha refused to transfer the funds directly or in cash to Iran. Instead, the money will only be made available as credit for Tehran to purchase essential goods and products directly from Qatar.
The restriction comes amid strong US opposition to granting Iran direct, unrestricted access to liquid financial assets.
Washington raised concerns that direct cash injections would provide the Iranian government with vital economic breathing room, allowing it to pay delayed public salaries and procure military equipment or other goods from foreign countries during a time of intense regional strain.
Iran International previously reported that Tehran had set the unrestricted release of the $12 billion held in Qatar as a strict, non-negotiable precondition before it would advance any preliminary diplomatic understanding or sign the proposed framework agreement.
While Speaker Ghalibaf explicitly requested liquid financial assistance to ease Iran's severe domestic economic pressures, Qatar’s counteroffer effectively bars Iran from using the capital at its own discretion in a blow to Tehran’s strategy in US talks.
Rather than gaining direct access to the cash, Tehran is now forced to spend the capped credit line solely within the Qatari market for essential commodities.
To prevent the dispute from derailing the broader, highly sensitive framework talks with the United States, which aim to secure a regional ceasefire and reopen the strategic Strait of Hormuz, all participating parties have reportedly agreed to keep the details of this financial disagreement strictly confidential.
A source close to the Tehran-Washington negotiations told Iran International there are doubts over whether Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and the Islamic Republic’s negotiating team are fully coordinated with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.
The source said there were serious ambiguities over how much Khamenei knows about the talks and the extent of the negotiating team’s understanding with the Trump administration.
Ghalibaf and Araghchi’s recent trip to Qatar, coupled with the negotiating team’s reluctance to go to Pakistan or continue talks in Tehran, has deepened questions over who is coordinating the process inside the Islamic Republic, Information received by Iran International indicates