Leaked documents link Chinese firms to IRGC missile fuel network

In the letter sent on Sunday, Pezeshkian stressed that the president and the government have effectively been excluded from major and vital decision-making processes in the country, and that the vacuum created by this situation has enabled hardline factions within the IRGC to take control of affairs, the source said.

Pezeshkian added that under such circumstances he is unable to run the government and carry out his legal responsibilities, and for that reason has requested to step down immediately.

It is not yet clear whether Mojtaba Khamenei will accept the president's resignation, but the contents of the letter point to a deep and unprecedented rift at the highest levels of power.

This comes after months of tensions between the government and the Islamic Republic’s military-security institutions. Iran International previously reported that the IRGC had gradually restricted many presidential powers and effectively taken control of key parts of the government.

According to informed sources, the situation has left Pezeshkian’s administration trapped in a political and executive deadlock, preventing diplomatic negotiations from moving forward and the completion and implementation of desired changes to the cabinet structure.

That debate is becoming increasingly urgent as Washington and Tehran move closer to a potential agreement that could extend the current ceasefire and launch a new phase of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.

President Donald Trump has suggested a deal may be within reach, while officials on both sides have signaled progress despite major unresolved disputes.

For supporters of the military campaign, the logic is straightforward: Iran entered the talks weaker than it has been in years. For critics, the concern is that diplomacy could give Tehran breathing room just as years of economic pressure, domestic unrest and military setbacks had left it vulnerable.

Speaking to Eye for Iran, former US Treasury official Miad Maleki and national security expert Thomas Juneau offered different answers to the same question: what exactly did the war achieve?

A Regime under pressure

While the two experts differ on what should happen next, both agree that the Islamic Republic emerged from the conflict significantly weakened.

"They've never been so weak. They've never been so vulnerable that they are today, militarily, politically, economically," Maleki said.

The Islamic Republic, he argued, faces mounting economic pressure at home while struggling to maintain the image of strength it has projected for decades. Tehran’s military infrastructure has suffered significant damage, senior figures have been killed, and the economy was already under strain before the conflict began.

Juneau reached a similar conclusion, though from a different angle.

"The regime was clobbered," he said.

Beyond the military and economic damage, Juneau argued that one of Tehran’s core strategic assumptions collapsed during the conflict.

For decades, Iran invested heavily in Hezbollah, Hamas and other regional allies as part of what officials often described as a forward defense strategy. The idea was that any direct attack on Iran would trigger retaliation across the region, deterring adversaries from striking the country itself.

"That failed," Juneau said.

Maleki argues that the regime's losses go beyond military hardware.

The conflict exposed weaknesses in Iran’s air defenses, damaged key infrastructure and further strained a system already struggling with economic collapse, inflation and public discontent. In his view, Tehran entered negotiations not from a position of strength, but because it had few alternatives.

Victory, leverage or lifeline?

Where the two experts diverge is over what happens next.

For Maleki, the central question is why negotiations are taking place now, at a moment when many observers believe the Islamic Republic is under greater pressure than at any point in recent years.

He pointed to growing frustration among some Iranians who believe the conflict exposed vulnerabilities that could have accelerated political change.

"There's some level of disappointment that the fact that the US is negotiating with this regime is bad for the future of a free Iran," he said.

The concern is not that Iran emerged stronger from the war. Rather, it is that Tehran survived a period of extraordinary pressure and may now receive economic or diplomatic relief before those pressures fully take effect.

Juneau sees a different risk.

While acknowledging that the regime has been weakened, he argues that ordinary Iranians may ultimately bear the greatest cost.

"The Iranian people have been thrown under the bus," he said.

The economy, already battered by sanctions, corruption and years of mismanagement, now faces the additional burden of reconstruction. At the same time, Juneau warns that a weakened regime does not necessarily become a more moderate one.

In fact, he believes future protests could face even harsher repression than previous waves of unrest.

"This is a regime now that will have even less tolerance for any kind of popular protests in the future," he said.

The disagreement reflects a broader uncertainty surrounding the talks themselves.

If the objective of the war was to weaken the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities, there is broad agreement that it succeeded. Iran’s regional posture has been damaged, key infrastructure has been hit and some of its most senior figures are gone.

But if the objective was to fundamentally alter Tehran’s behavior, improve conditions for ordinary Iranians or create a pathway toward meaningful political change, the answer remains far less clear.

Maleki believes the conflict became unavoidable as Iran expanded its missile, drone and regional capabilities.

"The conflict was unavoidable. It was coming sooner or later," he said.

Juneau is more cautious.

Asked whether the war was ultimately worth it, he declined to offer a simple yes-or-no answer.

"The negative implications of the war outweigh the positive implications," he said.

That may ultimately be the central dilemma facing policymakers in Washington and the region.

The war weakened the Islamic Republic. Few dispute that.

The unanswered question is whether the diplomacy now taking shape will build on that weakness or alleviate it.

Despite Tehran’s firm demands for the immediate and unconditional release of $12 billion in cash upon the signing of an initial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the United States, Qatari officials rejected the

According to a source close to a Qatari official involved in the discussions, Doha refused to transfer the funds directly or in cash to Iran. Instead, the money will only be made available as credit for Tehran to purchase essential goods and products directly from Qatar.

The restriction comes amid strong US opposition to granting Iran direct, unrestricted access to liquid financial assets.

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Despite Tehran’s firm demands for the immediate and unconditional release of $12 billion in cash upon the signing of an initial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the United States, Qatari officials rejected the request, agreeing to release only half of the amount under strict limitations, the source said.

According to a source close to a Qatari official involved in the discussions, Doha refused to transfer the funds directly or in cash to Iran. Instead, the money will only be made available as credit for Tehran to purchase essential goods and products directly from Qatar.

The restriction comes amid strong US opposition to granting Iran direct, unrestricted access to liquid financial assets.

Washington raised concerns that direct cash injections would provide the Iranian government with vital economic breathing room, allowing it to pay delayed public salaries and procure military equipment or other goods from foreign countries during a time of intense regional strain.

Iran International previously reported that Tehran had set the unrestricted release of the $12 billion held in Qatar as a strict, non-negotiable precondition before it would advance any preliminary diplomatic understanding or sign the proposed framework agreement.

While Speaker Ghalibaf explicitly requested liquid financial assistance to ease Iran's severe domestic economic pressures, Qatar’s counteroffer effectively bars Iran from using the capital at its own discretion in a blow to Tehran’s strategy in US talks.

Rather than gaining direct access to the cash, Tehran is now forced to spend the capped credit line solely within the Qatari market for essential commodities.

To prevent the dispute from derailing the broader, highly sensitive framework talks with the United States, which aim to secure a regional ceasefire and reopen the strategic Strait of Hormuz, all participating parties have reportedly agreed to keep the details of this financial disagreement strictly confidential.

A source close to the Tehran-Washington negotiations told Iran International there are doubts over whether Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and the Islamic Republic’s negotiating team are fully coordinated with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

The source said there were serious ambiguities over how much Khamenei knows about the talks and the extent of the negotiating team’s understanding with the Trump administration.

Ghalibaf and Araghchi’s recent trip to Qatar, coupled with the negotiating team’s reluctance to go to Pakistan or continue talks in Tehran, has deepened questions over who is coordinating the process inside the Islamic Republic, Information received by Iran International indicates