As efforts continue to revive talks with the United States, Iranian lawmakers and state-linked outlets are increasingly calling for secrecy around negotiations.
The growing calls for secrecy may reflect an effort to control the narrative as divisions emerge at home over how far Iran should go in any negotiations.
Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, told reporters on Monday that “not everything about the negotiations needs to be stated openly.”
He compared diplomacy to marriage negotiations, where each side conceals parts of its background until after an agreement is reached, insisting that secrecy does not contradict transparency with the public.
As efforts continue to revive talks with the United States, Iranian lawmakers and state-linked outlets are increasingly calling for secrecy around negotiations.
The growing calls for secrecy may reflect an effort to control the narrative as divisions emerge at home over how far Iran should go in any negotiations.
Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, told reporters on Monday that “not everything about the negotiations needs to be stated openly.”
He compared diplomacy to marriage negotiations, where each side conceals parts of its background until after an agreement is reached, insisting that secrecy does not contradict transparency with the public.
Iran used similar tactics at least twice in recent history: during the release of American hostages in January 1981 after 444 days in captivity, and in August 1988 when it accepted the ceasefire that ended the eight-year war with Iraq.
On Tuesday, ultraconservative lawmaker Amir Hossein Sabeti, a prominent anti-US figure, called for “nuclear ambiguity,” arguing that the United States and Israel would have used nuclear weapons against Iran had they known the exact location of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles.
His remarks coincided with similar statements from other lawmakers urging officials not to speak publicly about Iran’s positions on the nuclear issue or the Strait of Hormuz—two of the central obstacles in diplomatic efforts to break the deadlock in Iran-US relations.
US President Donald Trump said on Tuesday that Tehran had told Washington it wanted the Strait of Hormuz reopened “as soon as possible,” suggesting efforts to revive talks may include discussions over shipping through the strategic waterway.
In a Truth Social post, Trump said Iran was in a “state of collapse” and was trying to resolve “their leadership situation,” though Tehran has not publicly commented on the claim.
In Tehran, conflicting public statements have underscored divisions within the political establishment over the talks.
Ultraconservative MP Ali Khezrian told state broadcaster that all doors of negotiation with the United States were shut down” adding that no messages were being exchanged through intermediaries.
Yet other lawmakers have acknowledged that talks are continuing, including Ardestani, who said, “we cannot stop negotiating … we have won the war, and we need to establish our victory in negotiations.”
Khezrian and Ardestani both said hardline cleric and lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian—who accompanied the Iranian delegation to Islamabad during the first round of talks—was there only to brief parliament afterward.
Nabavian later said it had been “a mistake” to include the nuclear issue in the discussions.
In a report published on April 27, Khabar Online cited conservative commentator Mohammad Mohajeri criticizing lawmakers and some officials for making “uncalculated” statements on foreign-policy matters, including Iran’s position on the Strait of Hormuz.
According to the report, remarks about imposing taxes on shipping, proposing a “new legal regime” for the waterway, or using the term “closure of the strait” instead of “control” have raised concerns they could harm Iran’s national interests and create legal complications.
Khabar Online also warned lawmakers not to undermine the authority of the Supreme National Security Council, which coordinates national-security and foreign-policy positions.
In Tehran, Abbas Araghchi’s whirlwind regional tour is being presented as evidence that Iran still has diplomatic options and regional leverage.
But behind the official narrative, even Iranian media and senior officials are beginning to acknowledge a harsher reality: talks with Washington are stalled, allies are limited and the country’s room to maneuver is narrowing.
The reformist daily Shargh wrote on Monday that the visits revealed “clear signs of a deadlock in negotiations with Washington.”
In an interview with ISNA, Araghchi himself acknowledged that “the first round of talks in Islamabad failed to reach its objectives,” blaming what he described as “the United States’ excessive demands.”
Read the full article here.
In Tehran, Abbas Araghchi’s whirlwind regional tour is being presented as evidence that Iran still has diplomatic options and regional leverage.
But behind the official narrative, even Iranian media and senior officials are beginning to acknowledge a harsher reality: talks with Washington are stalled, allies are limited and the country’s room to maneuver is narrowing.
The reformist daily Shargh wrote on Monday that the visits revealed “clear signs of a deadlock in negotiations with Washington.”
In an interview with ISNA, Araghchi himself acknowledged that “the first round of talks in Islamabad failed to reach its objectives,” blaming what he described as “the United States’ excessive demands.”
Media in Tehran have portrayed Araghchi’s visits to Pakistan, Oman and Russia as part of an effort to break the impasse with Washington through regional diplomacy.
But leaks in US media suggest Tehran’s message remains uncompromising: end the US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz as a precondition for immediate talks on Iran’s nuclear program.
That demand underscores the gap between Tehran’s public message of diplomacy and the harder line it may still be taking behind closed doors.
The idea that Tehran can quickly repair relations with neighboring states also appears optimistic. Regional capitals still vividly remember Iran’s recent strikes on the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.
While Tehran insists diplomatic channels remain open, only a handful of neighbors appear willing—or able—to engage.
Oman, traditionally a trusted mediator, may have less incentive to play that role after Tehran’s recent actions and amid Washington’s hesitation. Russia, meanwhile, is increasingly viewed with suspicion inside Iran, where critics accuse Moscow of exploiting Tehran’s isolation without offering meaningful support.
Yet despite the impasse, signs of a possible diplomatic opening remain.
Pakistan’s active mediation has positioned Islamabad as an important hub for indirect US-Iran communication, suggesting both sides still see value in keeping channels open.
In Washington, President Donald Trump’s recent references to an “agreement in principle,” including possible limits on uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief, suggest discussions may have moved from whether to talk toward what terms might be acceptable.
Economic pressure is also pushing both sides toward pragmatism.
In Iran, the economy is buckling under war, inflation and disruption to oil exports. In the United States, rising gasoline prices are creating domestic political pressure.
The so-called pragmatists in Tehran appear increasingly willing to pursue compromise to preserve stability. Hardliners, especially among a younger generation of officials, increasingly frame the conflict as existential and may see concessions as surrender.
If they conclude Washington’s ultimate goal is regime change rather than policy change, pressure could grow for nuclear escalation rather than restraint.
Washington’s insistence that Iran halt all uranium enrichment and remove previously enriched material remains a central sticking point. The Strait of Hormuz is another.
The United States has reportedly conditioned any pause in military action on the complete and safe reopening of the waterway. Any renewed Iranian interference with shipping could trigger immediate retaliation and collapse diplomacy.
Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear or leadership targets—or retaliatory actions by Hezbollah or the Houthis—could drag both Tehran and Washington into a cycle neither fully controls.
For now, the immediate question is no longer whether Washington and Tehran are talking. It is whether either side is prepared to soften their demands before events overtake diplomacy.
And in Tehran, where the costs of war are rising by the day, that question is becoming harder to ignore.
Reports that Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf may have been sidelined from Iran’s negotiations with the United States have revived an old question from Soviet history: can an insider reform a rigid ideological system without becoming one of its casualties?
Ghalibaf may be emerging not as Iran’s Mikhail Gorbachev, but as something closer to Nikita Khrushchev—an establishment figure attempting controlled change not to dismantle the Islamic Republic, but to preserve it.
The Majles speaker, a former IRGC commander with deep ties inside the security establishment, has in recent weeks appeared to sit at the center of Tehran’s debate over diplomacy or confrontation.
Supporters of diplomacy see negotiations as a way to stabilize the system and prevent further confrontation with the West. Hardline factions warn that concessions would undermine the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic.
US President Donald Trump, intentionally or not, has helped fan the flames by publicly portraying Iran’s leadership as divided, echoing the way Washington’s rivalry with the Soviet Union often intensified internal debates in Moscow.
The comparison with Gorbachev has appeared before in Iranian politics. During the reform movement of the late 1990s, President Mohammad Khatami was frequently described as “Iran’s Gorbachev.”
Hardliners used the label to attack him, while parts of the opposition embraced it in the hope that his reforms might accelerate the system’s collapse.
In reality, neither Khatami nor his allies accepted that role. Their reforms were framed as an effort to strengthen the Islamic Republic rather than dismantle it. More importantly, the structure of power at the time made a Gorbachev-style transformation nearly impossible.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei held ultimate authority and maintained the balance between rival factions, limiting both reformist ambitions and hardline overreach.
The conditions today are markedly different. Iran has endured direct external military pressure, and the legitimacy of the system has been shaken by recent protests. A younger generation appears deeply alienated from the ideological foundations of the state.
At the same time, the supreme arbiter who once managed factional competition no longer appears able—or willing—to impose the same discipline.
In such circumstances, change may come not from a reformist outsider but from a figure embedded within the system itself. Ghalibaf fits that description. His background in the IRGC, his political experience, and his connections across multiple factions give him a platform few others possess.
Yet any move toward accommodation with Washington provokes resistance from ideological loyalists who view compromise as betrayal, even as warnings grow that without meaningful change the system could buckle under pressure from abroad and deepening discontent at home.
Here the Soviet analogy becomes harder to ignore.
Khrushchev’s reforms were intended to strengthen the Soviet system, not dismantle it. But attempts to modernize rigid structures often produce consequences their architects cannot control.
In 1964, Khrushchev was quietly pushed aside by his colleagues and officially “retired due to old age and ill health.”
If Iran’s leadership ultimately chooses a path of limited reform to preserve the state, Ghalibaf could still emerge in such a role. But if the system rejects even controlled adaptation, he may instead become an early casualty of its resistance to change.
Assertions by US President Donald Trump that Iran’s leadership is divided, and Tehran’s increasingly coordinated effort to deny it, have thrust the issue of unity to the center of the standoff between the two countries.
Trump has repeatedly cast Iran’s leadership as fractured and disorganized. In one post, he wrote: “Iran is having a very hard time figuring out who their leader is! They just don’t know!”
As speculation spread, President Masoud Masoud Pezeshkian sought to set the tone in a social media post declaring: “In Iran there are no ‘hardliners’ or ‘moderates.’ We are all Iranians and revolutionaries.”
The message was reposted verbatim by senior officials across the political and military establishment, including judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, underscoring the coordinated nature of the response.
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