The Middle East may be entering a period in which ceasefires no longer end wars but manage them, as the warring sides trade limited strikes below the threshold of an all-out war, experts told Iran International’s townhall held in Washington DC.
The discussion, hosted by Iran International’s Negar Mojtahedi, centered on whether the latest ceasefire in Lebanon marks the end of a war or the beginning of a more dangerous phase: a regional conflict in which Iran increasingly treats attacks on its proxies as attacks on itself.
A ceasefire that does not end the war
Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, said Iran’s latest posture toward Lebanon should be viewed against the long arc of the Islamic Republic’s presence there.
He noted that it has been more than four decades since the first official officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps arrived in Lebanon, making the country a central pillar of Tehran’s regional project.
For years, Vatanka said, Iran used Lebanon and Hezbollah to project power, particularly against Israel. But recent events suggest Tehran may now be entering “a new chapter,” one in which the distinction between Iran and its proxy network becomes more blurred.
“An attack on Hezbollah, an attack on the Houthis, an attack on the Hashd al-Shaabi is going to, from now onward, be considered an attack on Iran,” Vatanka said, describing what Iranian officials have presented as a new defense doctrine.
He cautioned that if taken literally, such a doctrine could mean an open-ended regional confrontation. Any strike on Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, or Iran-backed militias in Iraq could invite a direct Iranian response, turning local battlefields into triggers for wider escalation.
Vatanka said Tehran appears to be defending its proxy strategy at a moment when many analysts had expected the opposite. After October 7 and the heavy blows inflicted on Iran-backed groups, some believed the Islamic Republic might conclude that its “forward defense” strategy had failed. Instead, he said, influential voices in Tehran appear to be arguing that this is precisely the moment to double down.
Iran’s umbrella over Lebanon
Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute, said Lebanon is now caught between two competing visions of its future.
“There are two competing realities in Lebanon,” Satloff said. “One reality is Iran asserting its umbrella to control Lebanon... The other reality is Lebanon and Israel negotiating a security agreement, potentially a peace agreement.”
That contrast may define the next phase of the conflict. In one scenario, Iran tries to reassert control through Hezbollah and make clear that Lebanon remains part of its regional security architecture. In the other, Lebanon’s government attempts to reclaim sovereignty and pursue security arrangements with Israel, with US backing.
Satloff said Iran’s attempt to claim Lebanon under its umbrella has not succeeded, but neither has the effort to fully disarm Hezbollah. He described the challenge as a contest between Iran’s regional power projection and a fragile Lebanese state trying to implement commitments it has made before but repeatedly failed to fulfill.
He also argued that Iran’s latest direct attack on Israel showed weakness rather than strength. Compared with previous barrages involving hundreds of missiles, he said, the latest attack was limited and intercepted, exposing the degradation of Iran’s capabilities rather than demonstrating strategic confidence.
Hezbollah down, but not out
Ambassador David Hale, a distinguished diplomatic fellow at the Middle East Institute and former US ambassador to Lebanon, Jordan and Pakistan, said one of the most striking changes is Hezbollah’s current vulnerability.
“Hezbollah is so degraded, it's down but not out, but it's so degraded that it can't defend itself,” Hale said. “Iran is coming in to defend its proxy. It's always the other way around.”
For Hale, that reversal is significant. Hezbollah was long understood as one of Iran’s most powerful deterrent tools, a force capable of threatening Israel and shaping Lebanese politics on Tehran’s behalf. Now, he said, Iran’s direct intervention suggests Hezbollah can no longer perform its traditional role with the same effectiveness.
Still, Hale warned against assuming that Lebanon can resolve the Hezbollah question through military action alone. He said sovereignty is not “a light switch,” and disarming Hezbollah will require a political process as well as military pressure.
Lebanon’s state institutions, he said, remain weak by design, reflecting the country’s sectarian balance. Although President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have shown willingness to engage in a new direction, Hale said the Lebanese Armed Forces are unlikely to simply move into Hezbollah-controlled areas “guns blazing.” A durable solution would require humanitarian support, political alternatives for Lebanon’s Shiite community, and a credible state presence in the south.
The US as the decisive variable
The panelists agreed that whether this becomes the region’s new normal depends heavily on Washington.
Satloff said Iran’s attacks across the region, including against Kuwait, Bahrain and a US base in Jordan, should remind Arab states “who the real aggressor is” and create an opportunity for President Donald Trump to rally regional partners against Tehran. But he warned that the moment could be lost if Washington quickly returns to seeking any deal it can get.
Hale said the United States should rely less on public rhetoric and more on sustained pressure. He argued that Tehran understands violence and intimidation, and that Washington must be prepared to respond with persistent military, economic and political pressure.
But the panel also raised doubts about the coherence of US strategy. Vatanka said he was struck by how much planning appeared to have gone into the military side of the confrontation, and how little into the political endgame. The stated US goal, he noted, has shifted from encouraging Iranians to challenge the regime to narrower objectives such as the nuclear file, trade and the Strait of Hormuz.
That uncertainty may be what makes the current moment so dangerous. A ceasefire may reduce the intensity of the fighting, but if Iran continues to defend its proxies as extensions of itself, Israel continues to strike perceived threats, Arab states are drawn into the line of fire, and Washington alternates between pressure and dealmaking, the region could remain trapped in a cycle of calibrated escalation.
Audience questions turn to Washington’s endgame
The audience Q&A shifted the discussion from battlefield dynamics to whether Washington has a political strategy to match its military pressure on Tehran.
Asked about regime change, Hale warned against raising expectations among Iranians without being prepared to follow through.
Satloff said Washington should instead invest in tools that prepare the ground for change, including stronger broadcasting to Iranians, internet access, and visa or asylum pathways for dissidents.
Vatanka said the deeper problem remains the lack of a coherent US strategy toward Iran.
The exchange underscored a central point of the townhall: without a political endgame, military pressure alone may leave the region trapped in a cycle of ceasefires, strikes and retaliation.
For now, the experts suggested, the Middle East is not clearly moving from war to peace. It may instead be settling into a volatile gray zone: a ceasefire era in which the guns never fully fall silent.
Home Office minister David Hanson, said the government wanted the bill passed so the Home Secretary could make judgments on state threats and take action that, if approved by both Houses of Parliament, could lead to sentences of up to 14 years for those convicted.
“We are trying to put in place a framework for legislation where we can act on any potential state threat,” Hanson told the House of Lords.
He added: “The Government condemns antisemitism and is very much aware of the Iranian state threat.”
Lord Henry Bellingham welcomed the legislation and said “the use of these proxies, behind which obviously countries like Iran are hiding, are doing untold harm.”
He said the issue was “not just the IRGC,” pointing also to the Iran-linked Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya, which he said had claimed responsibility for recent antisemitic attacks.
Hanson said any future designation would be for the Home Secretary to assess once the bill becomes law, adding: “We take the threats from Iran extremely seriously and we will continue to monitor that.”
Lord John Cryer said the bill was welcome but overdue, citing the case involving an attack on Iran International journalist Pouria Zeraati and saying IRGC proxies and agents had targeted British Jews and Jewish institutions.
Lord Stuart Polak urged ministers to look beyond the IRGC itself and examine “what’s going on in the charity world here,” saying money was being raised in Britain, including British taxpayers’ money, “towards helping the IRGC.”
Hanson said Britain had already sanctioned more than 550 Iranian individuals and organizations, including the IRGC in its entirety, and had placed Iran under the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme.
“What this power will do will give the Secretary of State, if passed by both Houses, an additional power to take action against any state threat the Secretary of State deems to be a threat to the United Kingdom,” he said.
Soleimani Ardestani, a religious scholar, former Mofid University professor and member of a reformist association of Qom seminary teachers and researchers, is being held in Qom’s prison.
According to Mojtaba Lotfi, an official from the office of the late dissident cleric Hossein Ali Montazeri, the court convicted him on all eight charges brought against him.
Lotfi said Soleimani Ardestani does not plan to appeal unless the court agrees to hold a public hearing.
In a letter from prison, Soleimani Ardestani said the charges against him included disturbing public opinion, insulting sacred values, insulting the leadership in relation to Ali Khamenei and his son Mojtaba, taking part in a gathering over the house arrest of Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and assembly and collusion against domestic security.
Mousavi, a former prime minister, has been under house arrest since 2011 after rejecting the official result of Iran’s disputed 2009 presidential election and becoming one of the symbols of the Green Movement protests.
Soleimani Ardestani also listed accusations such as propaganda against the system, spreading falsehoods online, insulting senior religious authorities, damaging the dignity of the clergy and “mind control and psychological suggestion” – a striking charge even by the standards of Iran’s broad political indictments.
He has called the indictment weak and baseless, criticized his arrest and solitary confinement, and said he wrote his defense not to seek acquittal but to leave a record for history.
The case began with remarks in a debate with pro-government cleric Hamed Kashani. Soleimani Ardestani questioned long-promoted Shiite accounts about the death of Fatemeh Zahra, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammed and wife of Ali, the first Shiite Imam.
In Iran, the story of Fatemeh’s martyrdom is not only a religious narrative but part of a vast state-backed culture of mourning, ritual and political identity.
Soleimani Ardestani argued that if Ali had merely watched his wife being attacked and had not intervened, then the traditional account would raise questions about his justice. He later said he had not insulted Fatemeh and was challenging what he called the “stories told by religious singers or eulogists (maddahs).”
He also questioned mourning ceremonies for Muhammad Taqi, the ninth Shiite Imam, saying his death was linked to jealousy by his wife after he remarried and that mourning the event 1,300 years later was meaningless.
The backlash was immediate. Pro-government eulogists, who play an influential role in mobilizing religious crowds, attacked him with vulgar and sexist language. Reports also emerged of a group attack on his home.
Hardline figures called for prosecution and defrocking, while some religious voices went further, suggesting that denial of Fatemeh’s martyrdom could amount to leaving Shiite doctrine.
The controversy also split parts of the political middle ground. Reformist figures criticized Soleimani Ardestani’s tone and timing, while others warned that violent threats, home attacks and denunciations violated freedom of belief.
The sentence is significant because it shows how quickly the Islamic Republic can convert a dispute over religious history into a security case.
Soleimani Ardestani was not an outside critic of clerical rule. He was a cleric from inside the seminary world, which makes his challenge more sensitive.
By sentencing him to prison and stripping him of clerical status, the system is not only punishing one man. It is policing the boundaries of who is allowed to interpret religion, how far internal debate can go, and what happens when religious scholarship collides with the political theology of the state.
