'They finished him off': father recounts hospital killing of teen protester

The sentences were issued on February 6, the source said, despite the defendants’ claims that they were trapped inside the building after it was set ablaze.

Mohammad Amin Biglari, 19, and six other men were convicted of arson of public property, “corruption on earth,” collusion against national security, and “enmity against God”—capital charges under Iranian law.

The others sentenced to death are Shahin Vahedparast Kalur, Shahab Zohdi, Abolfazl Salehi Siavashani, Amirhossein Hatami, Yaser Rajaeifar and Ali Fahim.

Their lawyer, Hassan Aghakhani, told the Emtedad news outlet that the defendants were tried jointly before Judge Abolghasem Salavati, who is under US sanctions, and received the maximum punishment.

Aghakhani said he had been denied access to the case file and that it remained unclear what confession his client was alleged to have made.

State television previously aired what it described as confessions by several detainees. In the broadcast, men with blurred faces and closely shaved heads said they had entered the building but did not set it on fire and were trapped inside after others ignited the entrance, blocking their exit.

The charges stem from a January 7 fire at the Kaveh Basij Base near Namjoo Street in eastern Tehran.

Two eyewitnesses who spoke to Iran International said they saw several men set motorcycles ablaze outside the base before others were pushed inside and the entrance was set on fire. One witness said security forces were present but did not intervene.

Iran International cannot independently verify these accounts.

Biglari, who works at a men’s hair salon, was arrested on January 7 and is being held in Qezel Hesar prison, according to information received by Iran International. The detention conditions of the other six defendants remain unclear.

Iran’s judiciary has previously announced thousands of indictments linked to arrests made during the January protests.

In a message from Tehran's Evin prison, the couple said they would reach fourteen months in detention on March 4, 2026, and vowed to continue their hunger strike until they are freed.

The Foremans, both in their 50s, were arrested in January 2025 while on a motorcycle trip through Iran. Their family says they had valid visas, a licensed guide and an approved itinerary. They deny the espionage charges.

In their letter, the couple said their detention violates Iran’s own constitution, citing Article 39, which guarantees dignity, and Article 37, which presumes innocence.

They described being summoned on January 24, 2025, for questioning.

“We were then aggressively bundled into the back of an unmarked car… We were blindfolded and aggressively maneuvered to a 2.5-meter square dirty, furniture-less cell, after stripping naked and given prison clothes to wear,” they wrote.

‘No explanation’

They said they received “no explanation, no information” and were held in solitary confinement for 56 days, spending up to nearly 24 hours a day alone.

Within 24 hours, they said, interrogators told them: “We know you are a spy, no one is coming to save you, and we will show you how bad we can be unless you cooperate fully.”

The couple said repeated requests to choose their own lawyer were denied. Their first court-appointed lawyer met them more than three months after their arrest and submitted a defense letter “declaring our innocence."

‘No proof’

Lindsay Foreman said she was repeatedly questioned about her personal beliefs.

“I was told I was a Jew, I was told I was a feminist, I was told I supported Israel, and I was told I thought that Iran was dark,” she wrote.

On July 29, 2025, they said they were informed they had been convicted of espionage “with no accompanying proof and no trial.”

The only evidence presented against her, Lindsay Foreman said, was “a photo of a conference pass for the European Positive Psychology Conference, showing the name of a man who may have been from Israel.”

“For Craig, there is no evidence whatsoever,” they wrote. “We’ve had no justice in the seven months since our first court session.”

Britain’s foreign secretary, Yvette Cooper, called their sentence “completely appalling and totally unjustifiable,” pledging to pursue the case “relentlessly” until they are returned to the UK.

Majid Khademi, head of intelligence for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), said in an interview published on February 19 that a total ban on foreign social media platforms is intended to “prevent enemy plots and immunize Iranians against them.”

He also revealed that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had tasked him with overseeing the expansion of Iran’s domestic intranet, often referred to as the “national internet,” and stressed the importance of what he described as “proper governance of the Internet.”

“Sianat”—meaning protection—is the term Iranian officials use to describe legislation aimed at restricting social media under the stated goal of shielding citizens from perceived dangers.

The original proposal, often referred to as Sianat-1, was approved by parliament in March 2022 but implementation was halted shortly afterward amid concerns among senior officials that sweeping restrictions could provoke public backlash.

Since then, the bill has remained under discussion among parliament, the Guardian Council and the Supreme National Security Council.

Targeting platforms

Despite the absence of a comprehensive ban, access to major platforms remains restricted, with most users relying on virtual private networks (VPNs). Recent media reports suggest that WhatsApp, which had previously been accessible, has faced renewed restrictions, while authorities continue expanding policies granting limited access to selected users.

In recent weeks, Iranian media outlets have reported renewed efforts to advance what has been informally described as “Sianat-2,” a broader initiative aimed at strengthening state oversight of online activity and expanding domestic internet infrastructure.

Leaked information cited by Iranian media suggests audiovisual content on platforms such as Instagram, YouTube and Telegram could face tighter regulation, potentially placing greater authority in the hands of state institutions including the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), which holds a legal monopoly over broadcasting.

‘Urban terrorism’

Authorities imposed a near-total internet blackout during the widespread protests of January 8 and 9, cutting off access to global platforms and isolating much of the country digitally.

The shutdown coincided with a violent crackdown in which human rights organizations and independent media reported large numbers of protesters killed, injured and detained.

Khademi framed such measures as necessary to counter foreign threats. He accused outside actors of attempting to spread instability, encourage “urban terrorism,” and undermine public trust in the government, though he did not provide evidence.

“These platforms are used to organize and guide hostile activities,” he said, adding that Khamenei had instructed him: “Do not forget the proper governance of the Internet.”

The blackout in January highlighted the central role of internet controls in Iran’s response to political unrest—a strategy that officials have increasingly framed as a matter of national security.

Khademi’s confirmation of the IRGC’s leadership role underscores the extent to which internet governance has become integrated into Iran’s broader security strategy.

Security forces have used threats against players’ families and relatives, contract deductions and exclusion from team training to silence top-league players, sources said.

Authorities have also sought to pressure athletes by offering inducements to some individuals to monitor their teammates, while female players have been threatened with judicial action and long prison sentences if they express support for the protests, the sources added.

Football federation officials have meanwhile warned players that reacting publicly to the killings could result in multi-year bans from professional football activity, according to the sources.

The measures are aimed at preventing women footballers from expressing solidarity with the protests or participating in related commemorations, the sources said.

The pressure campaign follows the resignations of two players from Iran’s women’s national football team — Zahra Alizadeh and Kosar Kamali — in protest at the crackdown on nationwide protests in early January which left at least 36,500 dead.

Alizadeh, a national team player who competes for top-flight club Gol Gohar Sirjan, was the first athlete to step down from the squad. Kamali, a player for Ista, later announced her withdrawal from the national team in a social media post.

Niloufar Mirkarimi, a futsal referee operating under Iran’s football federation, also resigned from officiating, widening the protest beyond players to officials within the sport.

Posts announcing the resignations of Alizadeh and Kamali were removed from their Instagram pages hours after publication, according to people familiar with the matter.

Any protest-related posts or social media stories published by players have faced immediate security repercussions, the sources added.

Iran experienced in January its most widespread and sustained unrest since the founding of the Islamic Republic, as protests spread across cities and provinces and authorities responded with an escalating crackdown that analysts say reflects a deepening crisis of legitimacy at the core of the state.

Speaking during a special Iran International Insight town hall on Wednesday, experts said the scale, persistence and decentralization of the unrest signal a structural rupture between state and society - one repression alone may no longer be able to contain.

In what participants described as one of the harshest security responses in recent years, tens of thousands have been killed, detained or interrogated. Rather than restoring order, panelists argued, the severity of the crackdown underscores mounting anxiety within the leadership about the durability of its authority.

A widening legitimacy gap

Political scientist Mohammad Ghaedi said each protest cycle deepens what he described as a structural legitimacy deficit.

“In democracies, when we ask why leaders should rule, the answer is because they are elected by the nation,” he said. “But if you ask that question of Iranians, there is no clear answer — because 47 years ago, Ayatollah Khomeini deceived the nation.”

According to Ghaedi, the leadership is fully aware of this vulnerability.

“They have to respond in a way that makes the nation unwilling to protest again. That explains the brutality of the repression,” he said.

From mega-triggers to permanent volatility

Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, a senior Iran analyst and Head of Digital at Iran International, said the protest landscape has fundamentally shifted.

“Iranian society has wisely moved from demonstrations triggered by mega-triggers to minor triggers,” he told the panel moderated by Gelareh Hon. “Minor triggers are very difficult for the government to contain because they're not centralized, they're unpredictable and they're emotionally charged.”

Instead of singular catalytic events driving nationwide mobilization, grievances now simmer across economic, social and political spheres — producing recurring, localized flare-ups that strain security forces and steadily erode the state’s ability to project control.

Sharafedin framed the crisis around three central actors: Ali Khamenei, Donald Trump and the Iranian public.

“The social contract between Khamenei and the people has expired,” he said. “Either the Supreme Leader reaches a deal with Trump at the expense of the people, or Trump sides with the people against the Islamic Republic. In both scenarios, Khamenei loses,”

Economic hardship and ideological erosion

Mohammad Machine-Chian, a senior journalist at Iran International and a former researcher at the University of Pittsburgh, argued that the unrest reflects both deep economic distress and mounting ideological rejection.

“Demanding a normal material life is in and of itself a rejection of Khomeinism — the whole ideology of the Islamic Republic, which prescribes abandonment of material life and demands sacrifice for the state” he said.

He cited soaring prices as a daily pressure reshaping public sentiment.

“Inflation is nearly 60%. Food inflation is about 72%. If we go deeper, it gets uglier — cooking oil around 200%, and red meat over 100%. This is the reality people are dealing with.”

Beyond inflation, he said, the regime’s traditional pillars are weakening. The Islamic Republic was historically sustained by an alliance between the bazaar and the mosques — institutions that once anchored its social legitimacy.

“The bazaar is finally breaking completely with the Islamic Republic,” he said. “Mosques now have detention centers. They no longer serve a social or civil purpose in Iranian society.”

Panelists also highlighted what they described as a significant psychological shift within society: foreign assistance, once politically taboo, is now openly debated.

Audience questions addressed policy trade-offs in the United States, concerns in Turkey over possible regional escalation, and the apparent weakening of Tehran’s regional proxy network.

The town hall concluded that the Islamic Republic faces converging pressures — eroded legitimacy, weakened institutions, economic deterioration and a society increasingly detached from the ideological foundations of the state. While repression may buy the leadership time, panelists said it no longer restores authority or rebuilds public consent.