Iran's state media projects calm as crackdown, blackout persist

That effort is being carried out through the handful of government-owned media outlets still permitted to operate, and increasingly through individuals granted internet access via so-called “white SIM cards,” who portray a peaceful, orderly Iran.

As of midday January 16, state television’s rolling news channel, IRINN, had aired more than two dozen times an old video showing families visiting a ski resort in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province near Isfahan. “People are enjoying the beautiful snowfall,” the narrator says.

Nowhere on the channel is the still-simmering nationwide discontent mentioned.

‘No tension, no police’

Other bulletins highlight news of a a “major oil contract”—not with a foreign partner, but with a group of well-connected domestic contractors authorized to sell Iranian oil on the black market using a “ghost fleet” geared toward evading US sanctions.

“The sooner this contract bears fruit, the sooner it will be a win-win agreement,” President Masoud Pezeshkian said of the deal in a clip posted on Telegram by the Revolutionary Guards-affiliated Fars News outlet.

On social media, one widely shared clip shows a street on the western edge of Tehran’s Grand Bazaar. Cars move quickly along empty roads, with no pedestrians and no open shops.

“There is no tension in the streets even without security forces present,” the voice in the video says.

The account does not explain why calm streets should appear unusual, though residents note that armored vehicles and machine-gun-mounted vans patrol other neighborhoods openly, especially after dark.

The clip raises another question: how the account’s administrator was able to access the internet while driving in a city that has been largely cut off from the outside world for more than 200 hours by January 16.

‘Cut Trump’s finger’

In another IRINN report, security chief Ali Larijani said he had spoken with his Swiss counterpart “about bilateral ties.”

Around the same time, international media reported that Switzerland—along with several other European countries—had summoned Iran’s ambassador to protest the violent treatment of demonstrators.

State television and state-aligned social media accounts have ignored the suspension of operations by several embassies in Tehran, including that of the United Kingdom, and more recently those of Portugal and New Zealand.

Notably, senior officials have largely disappeared from public view. Airtime has instead been given to former figures such as Mohsen Rezai, the Revolutionary Guards' first commander, who threatened to “cut off Trump’s finger if it is on the trigger” during a televised appearance.

State TV reported that President Pezeshkian thanked Russia for supporting Tehran at the United Nations during a phone call, but otherwise officials remain conspicuously absent.

It may be some time before they reappear. It may take even longer for the public to forget what they did—and failed to say—during the crackdown.

Among Iranians inside the country and across the diaspora, the pause is increasingly interpreted not as restraint but as a dangerous limbo.

Calls for decisive military action are now openly framed as a necessary step to halt executions and mass violence, while hesitation is seen as compounding an already unbearable strain.

In Persian-language commentary circulating widely online, Trump’s posture is described as calculated ambiguity rather than caution.

Trump’s public gestures, including a post thanking Iran’s leadership and authorities for not executing detained protesters, are dismissed by critics as deliberate misdirection. They say the aim is to buy time while the United States strengthens its offensive and defensive military position in the Persian Gulf.

“The shadow of a Trump attack on Iran has not disappeared. He uses his intelligence for deception more than for anything else. His post thanking Khamenei and the authorities is also deceptive. He is buying time to reach a strong offensive and defensive military position in the Persian Gulf and to decide on a surprise strike at the optimal moment,” wrote a user.

For many, the conclusion is blunt: military confrontation is inevitable.

“A military attack on the clerics is inevitable. You shouldn’t get too caught up in daily noise. The same fluctuations existed before the 12-day war. The only course is to keep documenting the clerics’ crimes and to keep demanding and applying pressure on the United States and Israel for a maximal attack,” wrote another one.

Trump remarks fuel disbelief and anger

Trump’s own comments have inflamed skepticism. "We have been told that the killing in Iran is stopping, it has stopped, it's stopping," he told reporters in the Oval Office Wednesday afternoon. "And there's no plan for executions or an execution or executions. So, I've been told that on good authority. We'll find out about it."

He also said on Friday: "Nobody convinced me, I convinced myself. You had yesterday scheduled over 800 hangings. They didn't hang anyone. They cancelled the hangings. That had a big impact."

Public reaction to Trump’s remarks was colored by memories of past crises and government narratives that later unraveled.

“Sure, Mr. Trump,” one user wrote, “they also told us they didn’t shoot down the Ukrainian plane.”

The post referenced Flight PS752, which Iranian authorities denied downing in 2020 for several days before acknowledging it was downed by Iranian missiles, hardening skepticism.

Ambiguity seen as tactic to preserve leverage

A recurring theme was Trump’s communication style. “This is Trump’s usual way,” one post read. “Maybe they called me, maybe I’ll negotiate, maybe I’ll attack, maybe I’ll attack first then negotiate. He uses this tactic to confuse his audience.”

Others argued the statements were designed to establish a record. “Politics is complex,” one user wrote. “He said that so if an attack happens tomorrow, the world won’t grab him asking why you struck. He can say, ‘I warned them and they didn’t listen.’”

Debate over patience, pressure and timing

Social media has also become a forum for strategic debate among Iranians about the role of time, restraint and foreign intervention. “This movement didn’t begin with hope for an American attack,” one wrote. “It shouldn’t end with despair over not getting one.”

Others emphasized endurance. “As long as people remain in the streets, we won’t lose hope,” another post said, arguing that internal pressure, not foreign strikes, would determine outcomes – even if outside action could shorten the path.

A more tactical strand of discussion focused on military logistics. Users pointed to reports of aircraft carrier movements, troop redeployments and regional preparations as signs that delay does not equal abandonment. “All these movements mean money, cost,” one post read. “Even if Trump orders it today, it takes weeks – equipment, transport, doctors, food.”

One argued that an immediate strike could trigger indiscriminate retaliation across the region – from Iraq and the Persian Gulf to Israel – and even false-flag attacks blamed on outside powers, invoking the PS752 precedent. In that view, delay allows for planning aimed at minimizing civilian casualties.

Some took a more psychological angle. “The fact that Trump hasn’t attacked yet has frayed your nerves,” one user wrote, “imagine what it’s doing to the nerves of the security forces.” The argument suggests waiting itself can function as pressure, exhausting those tasked with maintaining control.

Some also expressed relief that no strike had occurred, arguing that a rushed or limited attack could be politically symbolic rather than decisive, allowing leaders to disengage without addressing deeper risks. “Trump isn’t looking for a battle he can’t win,” one post said, suggesting preparation signals calculation rather than retreat.

For a society already accustomed to crisis, the waiting has become its own ordeal. Each day without action brings more frustration. As one user put it, half-joking and half-resigned, “Until news of an attack on Iran comes directly from Trump’s account, I won’t believe anything anymore.”

In the absence of certainty, Iranians continue to debate, wait and endure at one of the most sensitive moments in the country’s modern history where thousands have been killed.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Fox News on Wednesday that Tehran had “no plan to execute protesters.” President Donald Trump told reporters he had it “on good authority” that the killing of protesters had stopped.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters on Thursday that Tehran had halted 800 executions slated for the previous day following warnings by Trump.

Taken at face value, such statements by Iranian officialdom appear to mark official restraint. A closer look at the Islamic Republic’s record suggests otherwise.

Tehran has rarely—perhaps never—executed individuals under the formal charge of participating in an illegal gathering. Under Iran’s Islamic Penal Code, that offense does not carry the death penalty and is typically punishable by imprisonment.

In that narrow, technical sense, officials can plausibly claim that the state does not execute people for protesting. The distinction, however, lies in how protesters are subsequently defined.

Renaming protesters

Across successive protest movements, Iranian authorities have routinely reframed demonstrations by dividing participants into shifting categories: first “peaceful protesters” and “rioters,” and more recently “vandals,” “saboteurs” and “terrorists.”

These labels are not merely rhetorical. Each carries specific legal consequences.

“Security forces and the judiciary will show no tolerance whatsoever toward saboteurs," Iran's Supreme National Security Council said in a statement on Jan. 9.

The stark warning came a day after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said Tehran would accept legitimate economic protests but stop "rioters."

Once a detainee is removed from the category of protester, prosecutors gain access to a separate set of charges—including moharebeh (warring against God), efsad-fel-arz (corruption on earth), terrorism, armed action or collaboration with hostile states—all of which can carry the death penalty.

The underlying conduct may remain the same, but its legal classification changes.

In this way, the state’s claim that it does not execute protesters is technically consistent with its practice. Executions occur only after protest-related activity has been reclassified as a more serious offense.

The real danger

This approach is also reflected in the government’s longstanding assertion that it “recognizes the right to protest” while opposing only “chaos” or “violence.” In practice, independent demonstrations have not been permitted for decades.

Pro-government rallies, often organized by state institutions, proceed without restriction, while applications for lawful protests by independent political groups, civil organizations and even officially registered parties are routinely denied, regardless of legal compliance.

The result is a system in which the boundary between lawful protest and criminal conduct is not defined in advance, but determined after the fact. Legal terminology becomes flexible, allowing prosecutors to retrofit charges once arrests have been made.

This history helps explain why assurances based on terminology alone offer little protection.

In the absence of an independent judiciary, transparent trials or due process safeguards, commitments not to execute “protesters” leave ample room for coercive confessions, security-driven indictments and capital charges under different names.

The danger, then, is not that the Islamic Republic will execute people for protesting. It is that those who protest may still face execution once they have been renamed.

The remarks he made in a video message seek to define what Iran would do in practical terms across security, diplomacy, energy, governance, and the economy after the fall of the clerical system.

Rather than focusing on personalities or transitional mechanics, Pahlavi presents a policy-based framework that contrasts sharply with the Islamic Republic’s record of confrontation, sanctions exposure, and institutional opacity. The message is structured around specific sectors, each tied to measurable shifts in behavior and outcomes.

Ending confrontation as a security doctrine

“In security and foreign policy, Iran’s nuclear military program will end. Support for terrorist groups will cease immediately. A free Iran will work with regional and global partners to confront terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and extremist Islamism,” said Pahlavi in his message.

Iran’s security posture has been the principal driver of its isolation for more than four decades. Sanctions linked to the nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for armed groups have cut Iran off from large parts of the global economy since the mid-1990s. Even during periods of diplomacy, such as after the 2015 nuclear agreement, parallel regional policies limited normalization and kept secondary sanctions risks alive for investors.

Pahlavi’s proposal centers on abandoning confrontation as a governing doctrine. Ending any military dimension of the nuclear program would place Iran fully back under international nonproliferation norms, reopening the path to inspections, sanctions relief, and structured security dialogue. Cooperation on transnational crime and drug trafficking – areas where Iran’s geography makes it a key transit state – would align Tehran with existing UN and regional initiatives rather than leaving it outside them.

From regional spoiler to regional stakeholder

“Iran will act as a friend and a stabilizing force in the region. And it will be a responsible partner in global security,” the exiled prince added.

The Islamic Republic’s regional strategy has relied heavily on influence through allied militias and political networks, particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. While this approach expanded Iran’s footprint, it also generated sustained pushback from Arab states and contributed to cycles of escalation that raised economic and military costs.

Recasting Iran as a regional stakeholder would imply a shift toward formal state-to-state engagement, confidence-building measures with Persian Gulf neighbors, and participation in multilateral security mechanisms. Practical steps could include joint maritime security arrangements, border coordination, and structured regional dialogue – tools that have been largely absent from Iran’s regional policy toolkit.

A clean break with four decades of diplomatic estrangement

“In diplomacy, relations with the United States will be normalized and our friendship with America and her people will be restored. The State of Israel will be recognized immediately,” said Pahlavi.

“We will pursue the expansion of the Abraham Accords into the Cyrus accords bringing together a free Iran, Israel, and the Arab world.”

Diplomatic normalization sits at the center of the proposed reset. Iran has lacked formal relations with the United States since 1980 and with Israel since 1979, a rupture that has shaped its entire foreign policy architecture. Recognition and normalization would reverse this trajectory, embedding Iran in the same regional diplomatic frameworks that have expanded since 2020.

Such a shift would have concrete effects: reopening embassies, restoring direct financial channels, enabling aviation and trade links, and allowing Iran to participate in regional investment and infrastructure projects from which it has long been excluded.

Turning vast reserves into predictable supply

“In energy, Iran holds some of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world. A free Iran will become a reliable energy supplier to the free world,” the son Iran’s former Shah said.

“Policy-making will be transparent. Iran’s actions will be responsible. Prices will be predictable.”

Iran holds roughly 10 percent of global proven oil reserves and about 15 percent of natural gas reserves, yet sanctions and underinvestment have kept production well below potential. Oil output has fluctuated between 2 and 3.8 million barrels per day over the past decade, often constrained by export restrictions and opaque trading practices.

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  Iran’s crisis and the limits of sovereignty

A transparent energy policy would enable long-term contracts, foreign investment in aging infrastructure, and integration into global pricing systems. Predictability – rather than leverage – would become the sector’s defining feature, turning energy exports into a stabilizing economic anchor rather than a geopolitical liability.

Governance as the foundation of credibility

“In transparency and governance, Iran will adopt and enforce international standards. Money laundering will be confronted. Organized corruption will be dismantled. Public institutions will answer to the people.”

Iran’s exclusion from global banking networks has been driven not only by sanctions but also by persistent concerns over financial transparency and institutional accountability. Failure to meet international anti–money laundering and counter-terror financing standards has limited access to correspondent banking even during diplomatic openings.

Adopting international governance standards would have immediate economic implications, enabling banks, insurers, and investors to reengage. More broadly, institutional accountability would shift the state from discretionary rule toward predictable administration, a prerequisite for sustained economic growth.

Reconnecting Iran’s economy to global capital and trade

“In the economy, Iran is one of the world’s last great untapped markets. Our population is educated, modern, with a diaspora that connects it to the four corners of the world,” said Pahlavi.

“A democratic Iran will open its economy to trade, investment, and innovation. And Iran will seek to invest in the world.”

With a population of around 90 million and high tertiary education rates, Iran has long been viewed by economists as a middle-income economy with unrealized potential. Years of sanctions, capital controls, and politicized regulation have instead driven capital flight and underinvestment.

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  Iran crossed a political threshold

Opening the economy would involve restoring property rights, stabilizing currency policy, and reintegrating Iran into global trade and financial systems. The Iranian diaspora – numbering in the millions – represents a ready source of capital, expertise, and global connectivity if legal and political barriers are removed.

A future defined by national interest, not ideology

“This is not an abstract vision. It is a practical one. Grounded in national interest, stability, and cooperation,” reads Pahlavi’s latest message.

The roadmap for Iran’s reintegration into the global system contrasts sharply with the Islamic Republic’s record of isolation driven by ideology, sanctions exposure, and institutional opacity.

By anchoring change in measurable policy shifts – rather than slogans – Pahlavi’s framework addresses a central question for international audiences: not whether Iran can rejoin the world, but what rules it would follow if it does.

Officials assert that dozens of mosques and shrines across the country were deliberately attacked during protests.

Reports by eyewitnesses point to multiple mosques set ablaze in Tehran and Gilan province and in other major cities including Karaj and Isfahan.

In the past week, due to the near-total ongoing internet shutdown, state media have effectively become the primary source of visual material related to alleged damaged during the protests for many Iranians.

Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani said on Thursday that more than 61 mosques were torched during unrest in the capital. President Masoud Pezeshkian echoed the condemnation on January 12, stating that “Iranian society does not accept those who burn mosques.”

Pezeshkian went further, saying: “They have trained some people inside and outside, brought terrorists into the country from abroad, and they burn mosques.”

State media are widely circulating images of charred interiors and half-burned copies of the Quran in Abu Dhar Mosque in Tehran and CCTV footage from an unnamed mosque in Isfahan that appears to show individuals setting fire to the building and its contents.

In pro-government rallies, some participants were seen holding half-burned Qurans, and the state TV showed several interviews with them reinforcing the narrative that demonstrators were “terrorists” attacking Islam itself.

Amplification beyond Iran

The images have not remained confined to Iranian media. They have been reshared widely on social platforms by supporters of the Islamic Republic, including some foreign influencers.

Accounts such as “Partisan Girl” (Sirin Girl) and Hamza Adi reposted the images, accusing supporters of Reza Pahlavi of burning the Quran.

Even amid internet restrictions, many pro-government users inside Iran continued to circulate the material online.

The repeated sharing has helped frame the unrest in some Muslim countries such as Pakistan as an attack on religious sanctities rather than a political protest.

Criticism and Fact-Checking

Some opponents of the government argue that the information released is selective and misleading. They say the extensive focus on mosque imagery by outlets such as state broadcaster IRIB aims to discredit protesters and provoke religious sentiment against them.

Iranian fact-checking website Factnameh wrote: “What is being presented is an incomplete and misleading picture of reality, designed to stir religious emotions and mobilize the government’s religious supporters, as well as to inflame Muslim public opinion against protesters in Iran.”

At the same time, some anonymous social media accounts have explicitly encouraged attacks on religious sites. An account posting under the name “Imam Tusi” wrote on X: “People burned Fatemeh Zahra Mosque in Isfahan, too. People should torch all shrines, mosques, and religious seminaries together with the mullahs in them.”

Most mosques and religious employees receive state backing in the Islamic theocracy.

Some opposition figures have implicitly acknowledged mosque burnings.

Darya Safai, an Iranian-born member of the Belgian parliament, wrote on X: “In western Tehran, a great mosque burned. For forty-seven years, its minarets echoed with ‘Allahu Akbar,’ and in that name, Iranian women and men were chained, silenced and broken.”

Yet other observers blamed authorities for the damage,

“They did this themselves to provoke the people—impaling the Quran on spears, setting fires, and destroying the mosque are just the tools of deception used by these hypocrites,” a user posting as Hatam wrote on X, without providing evidence.

Mosques as security hub

Iran has an estimated 75,000 mosques, around two-thirds of which are believed to be largely inactive. Tehran's critics argue that unlike in other Muslim-majority countries, mosques in Iran function not only as religious spaces but also serve as function halls for the state's repressive apparatus, including the Basij militia which quashed protests.

Iranian authorities openly acknowledge this role. On January 9, Revolutionary Guards commander Hossein Yekta called on government supporters via state television to gather in mosques and Basij bases to confront “the enemies of the revolution.”

In August 2024, Iranian media quoted Brigadier General Heydar Baba-Ahmadi, head of the Mosques and Neighborhoods Affairs of Basij militia force, as saying that “79 percent of Basij resistance bases are located in mosques, with another 5 percent in other religious sites.”

Factnameh estimates suggest nearly 50,000 Basij bases operate within mosques nationwide.

During the 2021–2022 protests, CNN reported on networks of secret detention sites, some allegedly located inside mosques. The report asserted that these spaces were used for temporary detention and torture of protesters, run by Basij units based in mosques.