A Canadian federal judge has upheld an immigration officer’s decision to deny permanent residency to an Iranian asylum seeker because of his mandatory military service in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
In a decision issued on Monday, Justice Anne Turley dismissed Mohammadreza Vadiati’s application for judicial review, finding that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) had acted fairly and reasonably when it ruled him inadmissible under section 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which bars members of terrorist organizations.
Vadiati, who served two years as a conscript in the IRGC before seeking asylum in Canada, argued that his service was involuntary and that immigration officials failed to account for coercion or the impact on his family.
The court rejected those claims, saying he was given a full opportunity to respond to officials’ concerns.
“The applicant has failed to establish any procedural unfairness in the decision-making process,” Justice Turley wrote, concluding that conscription in the IRGC “does not negate membership in the group” under the immigration law.
Ottawa formally listed the IRGC as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code in June 2024.
Under Canada’s anti-terrorism laws, membership in or support for a listed terrorist entity can result in inadmissibility, asset freezes, and criminal penalties.
The listing of the IRGC – which Canada blames for human rights abuses and the 2020 downing of flight PS752 – has broad implications for thousands of Iranian nationals who performed compulsory service.
Canadian politicians, including MP Kevin Vuong and Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc, have said the listing aims to curb Tehran’s influence in Canada and prevent IRGC-linked individuals from operating on Canadian soil.
The court also confirmed that humanitarian or family reunification arguments cannot override terrorism-related inadmissibility findings under the IRPA.
About 52 million barrels of Iranian oil were sitting in floating storage, the most since May 2023, with roughly half of the volumes parked off Malaysia, data from shipping-intelligence firm Kpler showed.
The offshore build has nearly doubled from a month earlier, the data indicated, and has risen sharply from early-2025 levels as cargoes wait for buyers.
Traders said the backlog has widened discounts on Iranian grades such as Iran Light, in some cases to as much as $8 a barrel below ICE Brent, compared with around $4 in late summer.
Reuters reported this week that that China’s official crude imports from Indonesia have surged to levels far above what Indonesia actually exports, prompting traders and analysts to say the barrels are likely sanctioned Iranian oil being rebranded after ship-to-ship transfers near Malaysia.
They said Iran’s suppliers have long masked origins by labeling cargoes as Malaysian, but tougher scrutiny of Malaysian oil by banks and Malaysia’s clampdown on at-sea transfers have pushed dealers to use Indonesia as a new paper origin.
On Monday, Indonesia announced it will auction the seized Iranian tanker MT Arman 114 and its 1.245 million barrels of crude oil starting December 2.
Even with the relabeling shift, analysts cited by Reuters said most Iranian crude bound for China is still transferred between tankers off Malaysia, and Kpler estimates China has taken about 1.37 million barrels per day of Iranian or suspected Iranian crude this year, mainly via such transfers.
The accumulation comes as the global oil market is well supplied, with OPEC+ easing production curbs and non-OPEC producers adding output, pressuring prices this year.
Despite US sanctions, Iranian exports are still running at their fastest pace in years, leaving more barrels vulnerable to congestion when demand slows.
China remains the dominant buyer of Iranian crude, largely through independent “teapot” refineries that import discounted barrels.
Traders said many teapots have nearly exhausted the import quotas they need to bring in overseas crude, cooling their appetite for new Iranian shipments.
Recent USsanctions on Chinese firms and terminals accused of handling Iranian oil, including the Rizhao Shihua crude terminal, have further complicated offloading, forcing some tankers to divert to alternative ports.
The report said a Tehran-based nuclear diagnostics firm, Imen Gostar Raman Kish, advertised that several of its radiation-safety devices use Geiger-Müller radiation-detection tubes produced by Centronic Ltd, a company that supplies the UK Ministry of Defense and was acquired last year by French defense-electronics group Exosens.
According to the report, Imen Gostar is run by senior figures tied to Iran’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The United States has sanctioned SPND, describing it as the successor to Iran’s pre-2004 nuclear weapons effort, while Tehran says its nuclear program is purely peaceful.
The Financial Times said corporate filings show Imen Gostar is chaired by Mohammad Reza Zare' Zaghalchi (Zoghalchi), an SPND official sanctioned by the US Treasury in October for procurement work it said had “direct applications to nuclear-weapons development.”
It added that the company’s vice-chair is Ali Fouladvand, SPND’s head of research, who is also under US sanctions.
Some of Imen Gostar’s equipment is promoted for export in brochures issued by the Mindex Center, Iran’s defense ministry export agency, which also markets Shahed drones, Ghadir submarines, and several ballistic missiles.
Centronic told the outlet it had no record of any transaction or commercial relationship with Iranian entities.
The company said it applies strict export-control procedures, systematically evaluates customers for re-export risks, and would investigate how its components may have ended up in Iranian devices.
Financial Times said it found no evidence that Centronic or any other Western manufacturer knowingly exported items to Iran or to sanctioned Iranian military or nuclear-linked companies.
The FT said it was unclear how the UK-made parts were obtained, noting that Iranian entities have a record of using intermediaries and front companies to source Western dual-use items amid sanctions.
It said the discovery fits a wider pattern of alleged SPND-linked procurement networks in Europe and Asia and follows earlier FT reporting on covert scientific outreach to Russia for technologies US officials say could have nuclear-weapons-related applications.
An investigation by Iran International earlier this year documented a Vienna-based hub tied to SPND-linked front firms purchasing neutronics-related and other sensitive components with potential applications in nuclear weapons design.
Washington has sanctioned more than 30 SPND scientists and multiple affiliated entities, saying the organization oversees “dual-use research and development activities applicable to nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems.”
In 2024, Iran’s parliament formally recognized SPND under Iranian law, placed it under the authority of the Supreme Leader and exempted its budget from parliamentary oversight.
Heydari had led Iran’s Army Ground Forces for more than seven years before being replaced on November 22 by Brigadier General Ali Jahanshahi, as part of a wider reshuffle across Iran’s military following the June war.
Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters is the unified combatant command under the Armed Forces General Staff, responsible for operational design and coordination across the army and the Revolutionary Guards.
The deputy post was previously held by Major General Hossein Hassani Sa'di, according to Iranian news agency ISNA, while Major General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi currently commands the headquarters.
The platform’s transparency panels now show the cluster accessing X through Iran’s App Store while routing traffic via VPN servers in the Netherlands, UKDJ reported on Sunday.
The outlet said it had tracked a sample of the accounts for months, citing synchronized posting patterns, near-identical creation timelines and AI-generated profile images.
The accounts, analysts said, mimicked Scottish independence supporters but repeatedly boosted pro-Iran narratives.
All accounts tracked by UKDJ also went offline during Iran’s nationwide internet blackout in June, a synchronized silence that had previously been circumstantial but now aligns with the confirmed Iranian connection.
“The initial UKDJ investigation focused on a handful of accounts that appeared at first glance to be ordinary pro-independence users… and all of those under close observation fell silent at the exact moment Iran suffered a nationwide blackout in June,” the UK Defense Journal said.
The new data “provides the proof that was previously unavailable,” the report said, noting that creation dates, username changes and regimented posting rhythms matched across the cluster.
Coordinated inauthentic behavior
UKDJ said the accounts boosted one another within seconds and repeated the same slogans, creating a manufactured impression of a large grassroots movement.
It added that after connectivity in Iran was restored, many briefly resurfaced with pro-Iran or anti-Western messages before switching back to Scottish independence content.
The report said that the findings do not call Scotland’s genuine independence movement into question, but instead illustrate how fabricated personas can skew perceptions of public sentiment.
The findings show “Iran, as well as countries such as Russia and our other enemies, are actively seeking to subvert our democracy and discourse,” Scottish MP Graeme Downie told UKDJ.
Connection to Iran-focused concerns
The revelations emerged as Iranian users vented anger over X’s new location display, which has put a spotlight on tiered internet access and privileged “white SIM cards.”
Journalist Hossein Bastani said the change also exposed pro-government Iranian personas posing as foreign supporters, including an account named “Jessica” that presented itself as a Scottish activist before appearing to post from inside Iran.
UKDJ’s findings mirror similar cases involving Gaza-advocacy personas after X’s transparency data showed several accounts saying to be based in Gaza were in fact operating from Pakistan, London and other locations.
Like the Scottish-themed cluster, those accounts relied on localized imagery and political language until the location tags revealed their origins. Israel’s Persian-language foreign ministry account later branded one such operator a “deceiver.”
Wider pattern of foreign influence
UKDJ said Iranian information operations have repeatedly latched onto divisive political debates in Western democracies, making Scotland’s constitutional question “a suitable channel” for influence activity.
The report has also renewed calls for political actors to vet online material more carefully.
Downie urged parties to be “much more alive to this threat” and to push back against misinformation, including when it is “shared by their own elected officials.”
The feature, rolled out in recent days, appears to flag which accounts are connecting from inside Iran, sparking online claims that some prominent users are posting via so-called “white SIM cards” – privileged, unrestricted mobile lines widely believed to be reserved for senior officials or security-linked bodies.
“A new feature on the X platform that displays users’ approximate locations has revealed that many Islamic Republic officials, pro-government activists, and affiliated journalists have access to privileged internet,” political activist Hossein Ronaghi said in a post on X.
“This means they are using unrestricted, unfiltered internet despite the censorship, through so-called white SIM cards.”
White SIM cards are special lines exempt from state filtering policies, enabling uninterrupted access to platforms blocked for most of the population, including Instagram, Telegram and WhatsApp.
Over the past year, officials have floated extending this kind of unrestricted access to tourists and some technical specialists, while political insiders and parts of the media are now widely understood to already use such lines.
Public anger quickly focused on high-profile figures whose X profiles showed Iran as their connection country, including former and current lawmakers, government’s spokeswoman and several media personalities – even as some of them had previously said online that they use VPNs.
Users argued that if those individuals were genuinely connecting through VPNs, their accounts would not still appear to be logged in from inside Iran.
They said the discrepancy undercut those figures’ past public frustration over internet filtering and raised fresh questions about whether they had access to privileged lines.
Critics also pointed to the accounts of former TV host Reza Rashidpour and news presenter Elmira Sharifi-Moghaddam, whose profiles displayed Iran as the country of connection.
Many accounts linked to pro-government figures, however, changed their region settings shortly after the controversy escalated.
Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani, who had previously been asked whether she used an unrestricted line, said she relied on VPNs.
“I use filters like everyone else, and my son and daughter-in-law help me with the setups,” she said in response.
After screenshots circulated showing her apparent connection country as Iran, users accused her of being dishonest.
One user pointed to the location on the account of Amirhossein Sabeti, a lawmaker and a staunch supporter of internet filtering, and – mocking his use of an iPhone – wrote: “An American phone, an American app, white internet. What he prescribes for the public: ‘resistance economy.’”
Another user on X wrote: “These days the truth doesn’t stay hidden. It pops out through locations and exposes who is breathing under the shelter of a white SIM card and who is choking in the cage of filters.”
Technical doubts complicate the debate
Other users pushed back, posting screenshots showing X still listed Iran as their connection country even while they said they were using VPNs.
The digital-rights group IRCF echoed that point, warning that some widely used circumvention tools can leak signals that leave a user’s underlying Iranian connection partly visible.
“If you are using popular protocols like Warp or Mask, or serverless configurations, the Iran country tag can still appear because the underlying IP originates from Iran,” IRCF wrote in a post.
“This does not necessarily mean the person has white internet, though it can still be one factor in a broader assessment.”
An Iranian trainer at X called Shayan, identified by users as working on the platform’s infrastructure, also described “exceptions and bugs” that can affect the region display.
“If the location shows Iran without an alert icon, it usually means the user is reaching X with an Iranian IP.”
“I’ve seen people say that if someone uses Warp, Mask, serverless services or similar tools, their IP still shows as being in Iran and it’s not considered a white line. However, I don’t have precise information about this,” he said in a short exchange.
X itself has said that the Country/Region indicator may be imprecise and can be influenced by VPNs, proxies or default settings of local internet providers.
Politicized arguments escalate
The controversy quickly swept through Iran’s polarized social media sphere. Former government adviser Abdolreza Davari said that some anti-government accounts posting from inside Iran were themselves using white SIM cards.
Journalist Hossein Bastani, meanwhile, pointed to pro-government personas whose profiles appeared to connect from Iran despite presenting themselves as overseas supporters.
“One of these self-described Scottish independence activists turns out to be posting from Iran with public funds,” Bastani wrote.
Government-aligned users who dismissed critics as “bots” were met by others noting that many ordinary Iranians mask their IP addresses for safety.
Some also cited cases in which prominent officials’ connection locations later shifted to Middle East or West Asia after the backlash, suggesting changes to account settings rather than definitive proof of privileged access.
Broader frustration over filtering
The intensity of the reaction reflects a deeper public grievance with longstanding filtering policies.
President Masoud Pezeshkian promised relief during his campaign, but aside from the recent unblocking of WhatsApp and Google Play, wider restrictions remain.
Critics said the uproar has thrown a spotlight on the structural inequalities built into Iran’s digital system. Many argue that public anger is less about a single setting on X than about a long-running double standard.
One user, reacting to screenshots that seemed to show Communications Minister Sattar Hashemi connecting from Iran, wrote that people are furious because they are forced to live with filters, and officials step around them effortlessly.
Some activists used the moment to demand universal access rather than selective privileges. “Make all 90 million lines white,” one user wrote.
