The platform’s transparency panels now show the cluster accessing X through Iran’s App Store while routing traffic via VPN servers in the Netherlands, UKDJ reported on Sunday.
The outlet said it had tracked a sample of the accounts for months, citing synchronized posting patterns, near-identical creation timelines and AI-generated profile images.
The accounts, analysts said, mimicked Scottish independence supporters but repeatedly boosted pro-Iran narratives.
All accounts tracked by UKDJ also went offline during Iran’s nationwide internet blackout in June, a synchronized silence that had previously been circumstantial but now aligns with the confirmed Iranian connection.
“The initial UKDJ investigation focused on a handful of accounts that appeared at first glance to be ordinary pro-independence users… and all of those under close observation fell silent at the exact moment Iran suffered a nationwide blackout in June,” the UK Defense Journal said.
The new data “provides the proof that was previously unavailable,” the report said, noting that creation dates, username changes and regimented posting rhythms matched across the cluster.
Coordinated inauthentic behavior
UKDJ said the accounts boosted one another within seconds and repeated the same slogans, creating a manufactured impression of a large grassroots movement.
It added that after connectivity in Iran was restored, many briefly resurfaced with pro-Iran or anti-Western messages before switching back to Scottish independence content.
The report said that the findings do not call Scotland’s genuine independence movement into question, but instead illustrate how fabricated personas can skew perceptions of public sentiment.
The findings show “Iran, as well as countries such as Russia and our other enemies, are actively seeking to subvert our democracy and discourse,” Scottish MP Graeme Downie told UKDJ.
Connection to Iran-focused concerns
The revelations emerged as Iranian users vented anger over X’s new location display, which has put a spotlight on tiered internet access and privileged “white SIM cards.”
Journalist Hossein Bastani said the change also exposed pro-government Iranian personas posing as foreign supporters, including an account named “Jessica” that presented itself as a Scottish activist before appearing to post from inside Iran.
UKDJ’s findings mirror similar cases involving Gaza-advocacy personas after X’s transparency data showed several accounts saying to be based in Gaza were in fact operating from Pakistan, London and other locations.
Like the Scottish-themed cluster, those accounts relied on localized imagery and political language until the location tags revealed their origins. Israel’s Persian-language foreign ministry account later branded one such operator a “deceiver.”
Wider pattern of foreign influence
UKDJ said Iranian information operations have repeatedly latched onto divisive political debates in Western democracies, making Scotland’s constitutional question “a suitable channel” for influence activity.
The report has also renewed calls for political actors to vet online material more carefully.
Downie urged parties to be “much more alive to this threat” and to push back against misinformation, including when it is “shared by their own elected officials.”