Iran International political analyst
Tehran may be preparing for confrontation rather than calm, if the recent remarks of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei are any indication, preferring the uncertainties of further conflict over meeting US peace demands seen as humiliating.
In a speech on Monday, Khamenei dismissed any Mideast-wide peace deal, threatened renewed missile attacks and derided Donald Trump—all at a moment when the US president was taking credit for brokering the Gaza ceasefire.
Despite visible fatigue within the political establishment and the military setbacks that followed the June war, 86-year-old Khamenei continues to project defiance. His choice of language suggests a leader who sees few acceptable alternatives.
Even amid widening divisions, those around him seem to recognize that Iran faces two narrow paths—negotiation on terms seen as humiliating, or confrontation whose outcome remains uncertain.
For now, the veteran leader appears inclined toward the latter. Negotiations, in his view, offer neither leverage nor time.
Hardball in Washington
Trump has made clear he would accept nothing short of dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, curbing its missile capabilities, and ending support for armed allies in the region—conditions that Tehran reads as surrender.
The most recent talks, which were cut short by US-Israeli strikes, appear to have convinced the decision-makers in Tehran that diplomacy to buy time may no longer be viable.
Still, for Khamenei and his closest advisers, war may appear the less constraining option—one that carries risks but also the potential for unexpected outcomes that preserve or even strengthen their rule.
One factor shaping this outlook is a belief that Washington and its allies are reluctant to open another front. With strategic focus fixed on China and Russia, the West appears more interested in containing instability than deepening it.
From Tehran’s perspective, that caution could reduce the likelihood of sustained military engagement and therefore make confrontation a manageable gamble.
Diplomacy with predetermined outcomes, in that calculation, holds little appeal.
The succession factor
Since the June ceasefire, speculation about life after Khamenei has become more open.
With power struggles simmering, no faction wishes to inherit leadership while Iran’s confrontation with Israel and the West remains unresolved. Any successor would bear the stigma of defeat.
Some insiders therefore appear willing to let Khamenei shoulder responsibility for the current standoff, expecting that his eventual departure could clear the way for a recalibration of policy.
Events since Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel have highlighted Iran’s limited capacity to protect its regional allies and assets. Yet Khamenei’s rhetoric continues to emphasize endurance and faith in ultimate victory.
A parallel pattern is evident at home, where intensified repression and executions signal an attempt to assert authority and restore control in the face of uncertainty.
Khamenei’s current stance seems driven less by confidence than by constraint—a conviction that confrontation, though perilous, still allows the system to act rather than be acted upon.
Whether that belief prolongs the system’s survival or deepens its vulnerabilities remains unclear.
For now, Iran’s leadership appears to have chosen uncertainty over surrender—a gamble that may define the final phase of Khamenei’s rule.
The current state of China–Iran relations is unusually difficult to assess. Both governments continue to affirm their “strategic partnership,” but beyond the rhetoric the reality is less clear.
On paper, the two countries are bound by a 25-year cooperation agreement signed in 2021, covering trade, infrastructure, energy and security.
Yet China has remained notably cautious during Iran’s recent crises. Despite being Tehran’s largest oil customer and a key diplomatic partner, Beijing largely stayed on the sidelines as Israeli strikes hit Iranian territory.
In practice, the partnership operates within strict limits. While Sino-Iranian economic relations have been stagnating, China’s ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies have expanded dramatically.
Expectations meet caution
During the 12-day confrontation with Israel, some Chinese analysts urged a more proactive role—mediation, public condemnation of Israeli strikes or closer military cooperation.
But Beijing did little, triggering accusations in Tehran that it failed to grasp the Islamic Republic’s strategic value in its rivalry with the United States.
China should have done more, many asserted, rarely elaborating on what that more could look like.
Direct military or political backing, however, would have risked confrontation with Washington and jeopardized China’s broader regional network.
Oil as quiet support
Where China’s support has been most tangible is in energy trade. The world's top importer of oil is Iran's main, almost sole, customer.
Despite sanctions, imports of Iranian crude have continued to grow in 2025, with tankers often re-flagged or disguised to evade detection. This provides Tehran with a crucial lifeline.
For Beijing, the motive is less political than practical: discounted Iranian oil fits its strategy of stockpiling reserves and securing cheap energy while global prices remain low.
Dependence by default
With UN sanctions back in force, Iran faces renewed isolation from global finance, trade, and technology. That leaves Tehran even more dependent on a handful of partners—above all, China.
A recent review of Iranian media published by the ChinaMed Project confirms this.Iran’s leaders—or at least parts of the elite—prize strategic autonomy and resent reliance on any single power, yet options are scarce.
Russia, itself sanctioned and weakened, offers little beyond rhetoric. China, by contrast, provides trade, energy purchases, and a degree of diplomatic cover, making it Iran’s indispensable partner whether Tehran likes it or not.
The trajectory of Iran-Saudi relations will be decisive. If détente holds, Tehran may find limited room to maneuver; if it collapses, dependence on Beijing will only deepen.
Looking ahead
The return of UN sanctions on Iran coincides with Donald Trump’s unveiling of a new peace plan.
Beijing’s official line is that it “welcomes all efforts” toward peace based on a two-state solution. Chinese experts, however, are skeptical, arguing that peace will be impossible without recognizing Palestinian statehood—a position long enshrined in Chinese diplomacy.
Many Chinese commentators also see Trump’s plan as a US bid to reassert dominance, protect Israel’s interests, and strengthen Arab-Israeli ties.
Beijing opposes none of these in principle, but grows wary when they appear designed to isolate Tehran further, potentially undermining China’s own mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Beijing’s challenge is to sustain its balancing act: maintaining economic ties with Tehran, preserving partnerships with Iran’s Arab neighbors, and avoiding direct confrontation with Washington.
For Tehran, choices are narrowing. The more isolated it becomes, the more it must rely on China, even if that means accepting a subordinate position in the relationship.
China’s support for Iran remains significant but measured, rooted more in calculation than ideology. As sanctions bite and isolation deepens, Beijing’s role may grow—but within limits that protect China’s own interests above all.
“What once felt dangerous has become routine. For many, normalizing these threats is no longer a choice" said Sato on a social media post written in Persian on X.
A group of United Nations human rights experts joined Sato in a statement in August saying threats and harassment of BBC Persian and Iran International journalists have surged since a 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June.
Journalists abroad and their families inside Iran have faced death threats, surveillance, and smear campaigns, while some relatives have been interrogated, detained, or had their passports confiscated.
They said women journalists face particularly violent gender-based harassment, both online and through intimidation of their relatives inside Iran.
Iran International filed an urgent appeal in August with the experts urging them to take action against Iran over serious risks to the lives and safety of their journalists worldwide and relatives inside Iran.
UN experts said several UK-based journalists have required police protection, with some forced to move into safe houses or relocate abroad.
The experts said such actions violate fundamental rights including freedom of expression, privacy, and personal security, urging Tehran to halt all intimidation and investigate the attacks.
Sato added that Iranian journalists and activists told her they had “normalized” living under constant threat, redefining what it means to feel safe. That normalization, she warned, has led to self-censorship, withdrawal from public life and in some cases, abandoning their work entirely.
“Many journalists and human-rights defenders I spoke with have begun to normalize transnational repression — they see constant threats, phishing attempts, and cyberattacks as part of daily life," said Sato.
Her comments follow similar findings by the UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee, which reported at least 15 Iranian-linked kidnapping or assassination attempts in Britain since 2022.
Iran’s government has denied the allegations, calling them politically motivated.
In its response to the UN, Iran’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva described BBC Persian and Iran International as “propaganda outlets” and said any actions taken against them were lawful measures to protect national security.
Rights groups had previously reported that the child, identified as Zolfaghar Sharafi, was killed by direct police fire. New information suggests that officers left the scene without assisting the wounded boy or his family.
The sources said police allegedly opened fire after stopping the vehicle for lacking a license plate, injuring Zolfaghar and his younger sister, Tahani.
They said the officers then departed, leaving the injured family by the roadside. The boy died at the scene from heavy bleeding after failing to receive medical treatment in time.
Tahani, who sustained gunshot wounds to her arms and pelvis, was later taken to Ahvaz Golestan Hospital, where the cause of injury was recorded as a “conflict with the state,” according to sources.
Her family was told to pay 150 million tomans (around $1,400) for surgery, which was delayed for three days due to financial hardship before being performed at another hospital.
The sources, citing statements by government officials, said that the officers involved in the shooting have been arrested, but no information has yet been released about their identities or current status.
Rights organizations have documented repeated incidents of security forces firing at civilian vehicles in recent years, often resulting in the deaths of passengers, including children.
The killing of Zolfaghar Sharafi adds to a growing list of minors allegedly shot by security personnel in various provinces, incidents that have rarely led to public accountability.
“If any aggression is committed against Iran, our response will be stronger than the 12-day war and we will turn the region into hell for the enemy,” Pakpour said, quoted by state broadcaster IRIB.
He added that Iran’s missile systems had performed with “power and precision” during the June war with Israel.
Pakpour made the remarks during a meeting in Tehran with Iraq’s National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji.
According to Iranian state media, Al-Araji emphasized Iraq’s commitment to security cooperation with Iran and saying his country would not allow its territory to be used for hostile acts against Tehran.
Iran’s top military officials have repeatedly warned they are monitoring regional adversaries and will respond forcefully if provoked.
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Abdolrahim Mousavi said on Monday that Tehran was not seeking war but would deliver a completely different response if attacked.
An Iranian lawmaker also warned on Tuesday that Iran would destroy enemy bases in the region if attacked.
“If the enemy is not attacking now, it is because it cannot,” Esmaeil Siavoshi said on Tuesday, according to state media. “It knows that if it attacks, we will destroy all its bases in the Persian Gulf.”
Pakpour said cooperation between Iran and Iraq was essential to prevent foreign interference and to ensure border security, adding that both countries had agreed to strengthen coordination through a joint field committee.
