Oil, gas and Iran economic analyst
Despite facing a growing domestic gas deficit and widespread use of highly polluting fuel oil, Iran’s gas deliveries to Turkey have continued to surge according to official Turkish energy statistics.
Newly released data from Turkey’s Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA), affiliated with the Ministry of Energy show that Iran supplied more than 5.5 billion cubic meters of gas to Turkey during the first nine months of 2025—17% more than in the same period last year and 45% higher compared to 2023.
Buffeted by stiff Western and international sanctions, Tehran appears to be seeking revenue from abroad even as it faces severe gas shortages at home.
A confidential Oil Ministry document obtained by Iran International in mid-2025 showed an annual jump by nearly half in fuel oil, or mazut, consumption last year.
This is despite its being one of the most polluting forms of fossil fuel on earth.
It is not yet clear how much mazut consumption has risen this year, but the deputy oil minister says Iran is expected to face a daily gas deficit of 300 million cubic meters during this winter’s peak demand. Last year, the shortfall was 250 million cubic meters; in 2023, it was about 200 million.
Bleak outlook
With the onset of cold weather and rising household gas demand across large parts of the country, industries and power plants have increasingly switched to burning mazut, causing dangerous air pollution in major cities including the capital Tehran.
A recent report by Iran’s Department of Environment on the mazut and diesel supplied to Tehran-area power plants shows sulfur content 10 to 100 times higher than international standards.
Had Iran halted its gas shipments to Turkey, the statistics show it could have reduced domestic fuel oil consumption by roughly 20 million liters per day, given that natural gas is the cleanest fossil fuel alternative.
Yet the Islamic Republic insists on maintaining its gas exports to Turkey and supplies roughly the same amount to Iraq.
Last year, Iran exported 15 billion cubic meters of gas, equivalent to 15 billion liters of mazut in energy content. If exports had been suspended, not only would Iran have avoided burning mazut domestically, it would have also saved 7 million liters of diesel per day.
Why does Iran have a gas shortage?
Part of Iran’s gas deficit stems from the slowdown in the development of gas production projects due to the government’s financial constraints and the limited technological capabilities of domestic oil companies.
Stiff Western and international sanctions have made updating the country's already creaky energy infrastructure yet more difficult.
For example, between 2010 and 2020, Iran’s gas output grew at an average annual rate of 5.2%, but growth has dropped to 1–2% in recent years, according to BP statistics.
Another critical factor is the decline in pressure at Iran’s section of the South Pars gas field, shared with Qatar—a decline that began in 2024. South Pars supplies over two-thirds of Iran's gas.
Years ago, Qatar collaborated with major Western energy companies to install 20,000-ton platforms—15 times heavier than Iran’s current offshore platforms—along with huge compressors in the Qatari section (the North Field).
But neither Iran nor its Chinese partners possess the technical capacity to manufacture such large-scale equipment.
Declining pressure
About nine months ago, Iran’s Oil Ministry signed a $17 billion contract with four domestic firms to implement pressure-boosting operations at South Pars. However, instead of installing 20,000-ton platforms, the plan calls for 4,000-ton structures, and for using weaker compressors instead of the massive units required.
An Iranian-British oil and gas engineer—designer of a BP mega-platform in Azerbaijan’s Caspian waters and currently working on the Qatari side of South Pars—told Iran International that the specifications of platforms and compressors outlined in the Iranian contract are inadequate to resolve the field’s pressure decline.
The engineer, who requested anonymity, added that restoring pressure on the Iranian side requires much larger platforms capable of hosting a full power plant, giant compressors and facilities for separating various gas streams and condensates.
The pressure in Iran’s section of South Pars was about 120 bar until two years ago, but has since been dropping by 6 bar per year, significantly reducing gas output.
Mohammad Oliya, CEO of MAPNA—one of the four companies awarded the $17 billion contract—said earlier this month that “no funding has yet been allocated” for the pressure-boosting project.
At the same time, the Revolutionary Guards-linked Tasnim news agency reported that although the contract was signed in March, no action beyond a series of study meetings and initial assessments has occurred.
MuddyWater, also known as Mango Sandstorm or TA450, has links to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and National Security and has targeted government and infrastructure in the Middle East and beyond since at least 2017.
Researchers said victims in Israel included technology, engineering, manufacturing, local government and education sectors. They said the group used new custom tools to improve its ability to hide and stay active inside networks, including a backdoor called MuddyViper that can gather system data, run commands, move files and steal Windows credentials and browser data.
The report said the attackers used Fooder, a loader that reflects malware into memory and at times imitates the classic Snake game, to deploy MuddyViper. It said the group also used several credential stealers and avoided interactive sessions to reduce detection.
Researchers said the campaign relied on spearphishing emails that sent victims to installers for remote monitoring tools hosted on free file sharing sites. They said the operators used a range of malware, including VAX One, which imitates products such as Veeam and AnyDesk.
Past MuddyWater operations include attacks in Saudi Arabia and campaigns that overlapped with Lyceum, suggesting the group may serve as an initial access broker for other Iran linked actors.
