Iranian University Imposes Restrictions On Dissident Students
Beheshti University in Tehran has declared that students with disciplinary convictions are ineligible to pursue higher education through the Exceptional Talents program.
Beheshti University in Tehran has declared that students with disciplinary convictions are ineligible to pursue higher education through the Exceptional Talents program.
It will penalize students punished for offences such as non-conformity with compulsory hijab laws and those supporting the 2022 uprising. Students from various universities play a significant role in the anti-regime movement, with university campuses witnessing extensive protests, sit-ins, and gatherings.
The protests continued for several months, during which hundreds of students were violently detained or banned from entering. Government security forces attacked student dormitories at various universities multiple times.
Beheshti University asserted its right “to take action against students with such convictions, even after enrollment or during study breaks, in accordance with regulations.”
ISNA noted that “the decision is in line with the guidelines and regulations of the Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology, as well as the executive directive approved by the Council of Exceptional Talents at Beheshti University of Tehran.”
Reports of confrontations with students, expulsions, and disciplinary committee sessions have continued to surface since the beginning of the Iranian academic year. Some female students opposing compulsory hijab have faced rulings canceling residence in dormitories.
The United Students account on the X social network criticized the decision, terming it as "legitimizing illegal deprivation of education" and stating that such decisions are independently made by the university not the Exceptional Talents Organization.
The 10 pages of the document reviewed revealed the names of seven members of Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-IO), who work as interrogators in major corruption cases that usually involve people with links to the regime. Each of these IRGC officials – the so-called ‘judicial enforcers’ -- has received money from several people charged with economic crimes.
The document exposes high-ranking officials, including Mohammad Mehdi Badi, IRGC-IO's deputy interrogator for economic crimes, who accepted huge sums of money. Only in one case, he received $400,000 and €60,000 from Rouhollah Danialzadeh, known as the “Sultan of Steel” in Iran because of his mafia-like network over the steel industry.
Danialzadeh was one of the key people indicted in the court case involving Akbar Tabari, the Iranian Judiciary’s former Executive Vice President and Finance Director for over two decades, who ran a bribery network. His network orchestrated a massive corruption and bribery scheme involving numerous officials, most of whom evaded accountability, as is often the case with individuals tied to the Islamic Republic. Danialzadeh’s verdict, including a 15-year prison term, was overturned several months after it was issued. It is not clear from the document if his conviction was overturned because of bribery.
According to Iran International’s Mojtaba Pourmohsen, IRGC's Badi also received tens of thousands of dollars from Esmaeil Khalilzadeh, the former chairman of the board of directors of Tehran’s Esteghlal Football Club and the owner of a large hotel in Iran’s northern Gilan province. He was arrested by the IRGC-IO in 2021 on charges of financial corruption in a big case about a silk factory.
The document also revealed that another business crime boss called Hadi Darvishvand, who owns Kermanshah Refinery in eastern Iran, gave the IRGC-IO's deputy interrogator for economic crimes $47,000, €48,000 and 150 gold coins.
Another senior IRGC-IO interrogator who received handsome bribes was Behnam Hajipour Khireh-Masjedi, who was one the interrogators in the case of Sina Estavi, the CEO of a cryptocurrency exchange company. Estavi’s case, involving over $20 million in embezzlement, has 51,000 complainants, mostly ordinary citizens who lost their money in Estavi’s cryptocurrency scam. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison, 75 lashes, fines, asset forfeiture, and a travel ban. He escaped from Iran in November.
According to journalist Mohsen Sazegara, such cases are proof that the Islamic Republic’s measures to address economic corruption are "nothing but empty promises." He told Iran International that the IRGC-IO is the biggest intelligence service in Iran and is closely tied to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his son Mojtaba, claiming that “It is also the most corrupt intelligence outfit of Iran.”
Major corruption cases in Iran involve regime insiders, officials and their business partners. If a case is exposed by rival factions, usually there is a lack of transparency involving legal proceedings. Some of the accused can avoid any consequences as a clear and full picture never emerges.
Economics professor, Vahid Shahri, told local media that the government’s annual budget deficit of a few billions of dollars is not the most serious issue. What is crucial is the declining energy and water resources in the country, serious imbalances in the economy, lack of money in the government pension funds and other shortages. These imbalances will add pressure to the government every year and require larger operating budgets.
“The government should consider all of these deficits in its economic analysis, and the problem lies in the fact that the government does not see these deficits, even though it will be responsible for financing every single one of them,” Shahri argued.
Iran is facing a serious economic crisis since the United States withdrew from the JCPAO nuclear accord and imposed sanctions in 2018. However, the country’s economic vows go much deeper, as the Islamic regime failed to leverage its oil export revenues to properly invest in infrastructure and development since the 1990s. It is estimated that Iran sold around $1.5 trillion of oil in the past two decades, yet it faces a bankrupt government that has a stranglehold over 80 percent of the economy.
Shahri explained that in order to prevent a catastrophic situation, the government needs to spend $100-150 billion annually in the next few years. If this investment is not made, the cumulative effect of imbalances can lead to the collapse of the system.
Restricted by US oil export sanctions, Iran sells its crude at lower prices to China and earns around $30 billion per year, with no other significant revenues in hard currencies. This does not even cover the annual budget of the government and there are no other funds for long-term investment.
Government officials have recently admitted that most of the $150-billion National Development Fund, or the sovereign wealth fund has been spent, since 2012, leaving nothing for investment. Foreign investments are also virtually non-existent due to sanctions and lack of political confidence in the Islamic Republic regime that has adversarial relations with Western countries and a government-controlled economy.
A report in Tehran media on Monday showed that there are more than 2,000 registered quasi-governmental companies that are often exempt from taxes, enjoy monopolies and avoid any accountability. These companies are run by regime insiders as their private fiefdoms, and often when they lose money, they turn to borrow from government banks, which are also run through the same political network of government loyalists.
Shahri argued that the fundamental imbalances also exacerbate Iran’s high annual inflation rate, which hovers at around 50 percent.
“If we cannot address these deficits, Iran will enter a hyperinflation path. It should be noted that hyperinflation does not mean a 40% inflation growth per year; rather, it means a 50% inflation growth every month. In this case, Iran will face unprecedented conditions. If we cannot control the imbalances, we are destined for hyperinflation in the next 5 years,” the economist emphasized.
Most commentators in Iran, along with many regime politicians, frequently attribute the current economic difficulties to President Ebrahim Raisi's weak administration. This perspective often overlooks the country's foreign policy, which is typically viewed as the domain of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. US and European sanctions and a lack of foreign investments have left Iran with sole reliance on limited oil exports.
Additionally, commentators often neglect to address the fundamental causes of economic inefficiencies, which critics argue stem from a government-controlled economy that fosters corruption and nepotism.
