Iran International
The Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has appointed a new commander to its overseas assassination unit and renamed it to Unit 600 after its personnel and structure were exposed, two sources close to the IRGC-QF told Iran International.
Esmail Qaani, commander of the IRGC’s overseas arm, recently appointed Mojtaba Hagh-Lesan to lead the unit previously known as Unit 840, the sources said.
Hagh-Lesan, 64, previously headed the unit’s intelligence department. He replaces Yazdan Mir, also known as Haj Asghar Bagheri, who was killed in a targeted Israeli strike on April 6.
The unit had been without a commander since Mir’s killing, the sources said. Hagh-Lesan’s appointment puts an existing senior member in charge of a formation linked to plots against Iranian dissidents, journalists, former US officials and Israeli targets abroad.
The sources provided Iran International with the unit’s latest command chart, identifying its leadership and the officials responsible for operations across several regions.
Command structure revealed
According to the chart, Mohammad-Reza Ansari serves as Hagh-Lesan’s deputy and oversees the Israel portfolio.
Mohsen Boroujeni heads special operations for the United States and Europe, while Morteza Babaei leads the department responsible for the Middle East and Africa. Javad Sharfaei oversees special operations in Asia.
The chart identifies Meysam Sahraei as an operative involved in preparing attacks in Africa and India. It also names Gholamhossein Hosseini and Mohammad Hosseinpour as prominent operatives involved in the department’s activities.
The sources said the reliance on existing personnel reflected a crisis in the command structure following the killing of senior IRGC officers. They said it had also raised doubts among Quds Force members about the organization’s effectiveness.
Hagh-Lesan’s published work includes two articles in Strategic Studies, a journal published by the Expediency Council’s Center for Strategic Research.
“Regional Unrest and Domestic Security” appeared in the combined fifth and sixth issues, published on September 23, 1999. “US Intervention in the Bosnian Crisis” was published on November 22, 2004.
From US officials to Israeli businessmen
Unit 840 emerged from Unit 400 in the early 2010s on the orders of then-Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. Unit 400 is a covert special operations formation with close ties to Hezbollah.
A photograph of Mir alongside Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and senior IRGC commanders Mohammad Reza Zahedi and Mohammad Hejazi illustrates those connections.
Informed sources told Iran International that a Western intelligence service identified and attacked the unit’s headquarters in Damascus in 2020.
The unit subsequently became the focus of investigations into assassination plots abroad.
In August 2022, the US Justice Department charged IRGC member Shahram Poursafi with plotting to assassinate John Bolton, who served as national security adviser during President Donald Trump’s first administration.
Prosecutors said Poursafi offered $300,000 for Bolton’s killing, likely in retaliation for the US strike that killed Soleimani in January 2020.
Iran International’s subsequent investigation, based on information provided by the Black Door hacking group, identified Ansari as the Syria-based Unit 840 commander who led the failed operation against Bolton and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
According to that reporting, Poursafi worked under Ansari, and the network sought to hire non-Iranians to conceal Tehran’s involvement. The person recruited to arrange the killings was an FBI informant.
In June 2023, the US Treasury sanctioned Ansari and Poursafi, saying Ansari, with Poursafi’s support, had planned and attempted to assassinate two former US government officials.
Ansari was also linked to a foiled plot against two Israeli businessmen in Colombia. Iran International reported in December 2022, citing an investigation by Infobae, that he had directed the operation through locally recruited criminals.
The businessmen and their families left Bogota under tight security after Colombian intelligence authorities warned them of the threat, according to that reporting.
Criminal networks and journalist targets
Unit 840 has repeatedly sought to use criminal gangs and traffickers to carry out operations abroad.
In Germany, Iran International previously reported that Ramin Yektaparast, an Iranian-German member of the Hells Angels motorcycle gang, organized attacks against synagogues in Bochum and Essen on behalf of the Quds Force.
The investigation, citing a Western intelligence source and a source within the IRGC, also linked him to a failed plot to assassinate Iranian rapper Shahin Najafi at a concert in Hanover in September 2023.
Yektaparast was shot four times and killed in Tehran on April 28, 2024. Following reports of possible Mossad involvement, the IRGC-linked Tasnim news agency denied he had ties to the Guards and said he was killed in a dispute over “personal matters.”
His funeral notice nevertheless described his death as a “martyr-like ascension,” and he was buried in Section 19 of Tehran’s Behesht-e Zahra cemetery, reserved for fallen IRGC and Basij members.
In Britain, an ITV News investigation exposed a Unit 840 plot, codenamed “the wedding,” to kill Iran International journalists Fardad Farahzad and Sima Sabet.
ITV reported in December 2023 that Iranian operatives had offered a people-smuggler $200,000 to arrange the murders. It identified Ansari as the commander behind the plot.
The plan failed because the smuggler was working as a double agent for a Western intelligence service and passed details to his handler, according to the investigation. Iran’s embassy in London rejected ITV’s findings as baseless.
In Sweden and Denmark, the Quds Force used Rawa Majid, leader of the Foxtrot criminal network, to attack Israeli-linked targets, according to Iran International’s previous reporting.
Swedish investigative journalist Diamant Salihu told the BBC that Majid fled to Tehran in October 2023 and that his links with Iranian authorities developed afterward. Iran International reported in April 2025 that he was living in Iran under IRGC protection.
Britain sanctioned Majid and Foxtrot in 2025. Iran’s embassy in London denied Tehran’s links to the network.
Repeated intelligence setbacks
The unit has suffered a series of blows through the exposure of its personnel and operations.
In May 2022, footage emerged of an interrogation attributed to Mossad in which Mansour Rasouli, a trafficker linked to Unit 840, said he had been tasked with killing an Israeli citizen in Turkey, a senior US general in Germany and a journalist in France.
Later that month, Hassan Sayyad Khodaei, a senior figure in the unit, was shot dead in central Tehran. The New York Times, citing an intelligence official, reported that Israel had told the United States it was responsible.
Those setbacks were followed in June by the removal of Hossein Taeb as head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization.
The following month, Iran International reported that Mossad agents had interrogated Yadollah Khedmati, an IRGC logistics and support commander, near Tehran. Footage of that interrogation was also released.
More recently, Israel announced the disruption of another IRGC network accused of planning attacks on strategic infrastructure and Israeli and Jewish targets abroad.
In a joint statement on April 20, Mossad, the Israeli military and Shin Bet said an operation in Azerbaijan had foiled plans to attack the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Israeli embassy, a synagogue in Baku and Jewish community leaders.
Azerbaijani authorities arrested members of the cell and seized explosive drones and other explosives smuggled from Iran, according to the Israeli account. The suspects had conducted surveillance and photographed targets under orders from handlers in Tehran.
The US, Britain and European Union have imposed sanctions on figures linked to overseas assassination plots. Alongside the US measures against Ansari and Poursafi, Britain sanctioned Unit 840 and Ansari in January 2024. The EU sanctioned Ansari in July 2025, accusing him of ordering the assassination of journalists critical of the Islamic Republic.
Reorganization amid calls for revenge
According to Iran International’s sources, the Quds Force decided to reorganize Unit 840 after its structure and personnel were exposed. Six months after Mir’s killing, Hagh-Lesan’s appointment restores a commander to a unit responsible for covert operations against Iranian government opponents, critical journalists and Israeli targets worldwide.
The reorganization follows public calls for revenge over the killing of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
In July, Hossein Shariatmadari, the supreme leader’s representative at the hardline Kayhan newspaper, urged authorities to declare Trump and pilots involved in Khamenei’s killing people whose killing was a religious obligation.
Kayhan also said the security of Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had been permanently destroyed. Tehran municipal murals threatened both leaders, including one bearing the English words “We will kill Trump.”
Iranian authorities have also expanded efforts to collect information about government opponents abroad.
In September, the IRGC-affiliated Fars news agency announced a system called “Alaj” to identify and track such individuals. It urged government supporters to submit information through the system’s website and the Telegram and Bale messaging platforms.
Iranian state television has begun referring to the country’s northern sea as Caspian in Persian, a departure from the customary Khazar, after airing claims that the older familiar name serves alleged Israeli ambitions in the Caucasus.
Caspian takes its name from the Caspians, an ancient people who lived along the sea’s southwestern shores in modern Iran. Khazar refers to the Khazars, a medieval Turkic people whose state lay to the north and northwest of the sea and whose ruling elite adopted Judaism.
It remains unclear whether Iran’s state broadcaster has issued a formal directive to change its terminology across programs. However, the name change brings attention to competing arguments over history and national identity.
Supporters of Caspian describe it as a restoration of Iranian heritage, while opponents say Khazar is itself a deeply rooted geographical name whose use does not endorse the people it originally described.
State TV’s website features a segment from IRGC-affiliated Ofogh channel’s “War Headquarters” program with commentator and academic Ahmad Kazemi under the title “The Zionists’ plot to change the name of the Caspian Sea to Khazar.”
In remarks also shared by the IRGC-affiliated Fars News, Kazemi portrayed the use of Khazar as supporting an Israeli historical claim.
“By using the non-Iranian word Khazar today, we are effectively helping Israel’s thesis that seeks to prove the existence of a Jewish empire in the Caucasus,” he said.
Kazemi said people outside Iran mocked Iranians for using what he described as a foreign name while others used Caspian. He described the Caspians as an Iranian people who had lived across areas stretching from Kashan to Mazandaran and the Caspian coast.
His remarks did not provide evidence of an Israeli effort to influence the sea’s Persian name.
An appeal to Iranian heritage
For English-speaking audiences, the distinction can be easy to miss: the body of water is already called the Caspian Sea in English. The question is what Iranians should call it in Persian.
Campaigns to replace Khazar predate the television material. A petition addressed to the parliament speaker, the head of state broadcasting and the education minister calls for Caspian to be used in official sources, describing it as an authentic Iranian name.
Mohammad Ebrahim Zarei, then acting head of Iran’s Research Institute of Cultural Heritage and Tourism, also proposed using Caspi or Caspian at an annual gathering of Iranian archaeologists in 2025, arguing that it was the older name.
Caspian derives from the Caspians, an ancient people who lived along the sea’s southwestern shores. Encyclopedia Iranica identifies them in ancient sources while noting uncertainties about their precise location and linguistic background.
Khazar, meanwhile, derives from the medieval Khazars, whose state lay to the north and northwest of the sea. The name has been used in regional geographical writing for centuries.
The sea has also been known in Iran as the Mazandaran Sea, a name previously used in official contexts. During Mohammad Khatami’s presidency, a 2002 naming decision standardized Khazar for domestic use and Caspian for foreign texts and international agreements.
That policy favored an already established name over alternatives such as Mazandaran, rather than introducing Khazar for the first time.
Objections to replacing Khazar
Political geographer Pirouz Mojtahedzadeh offers a different argument, saying established geographical names should not be changed because of political, ethnic or religious objections to their origins.
He argued that abandoning Khazar over alleged Israeli claims to the region would accept the premise of those claims rather than challenge them. He also warned that changing the sea’s name would undermine Iran’s opposition to attempts to rename the Persian Gulf.
“Would you not, in practice, have justified and endorsed Arab efforts to change the geographical name of the Persian Gulf?” he asked supporters of replacing Khazar.
More recently, objections to the campaign have appeared on the website of the Islamic Revolution Documents Center.
In an August article, Arash Nasiri challenged the argument that the Khazars’ ethnic origins, military history or association with Judaism justified abandoning the name.
Some Khazar rulers adopted Judaism, but treating the entire population as uniformly Jewish oversimplified the historical record, he wrote.
Nasiri also argued that using a geographical name did not mean endorsing the conduct or beliefs of the people from whom it originated. Khazar had become an established part of Persian usage, extending beyond its association with a medieval people.
Caspian was historically valid, he wrote, but presenting the choice as “Iranian Caspian” versus “foreign Khazar” reduced a complex history to a political distinction.
The deadly attacks on Riyadh’s main airport mirror Iranian warnings to disrupt regional air travel in response to US sanctions, analysts say, while serving the Houthis’ own goal of pressuring Saudi Arabia over its support for rival forces in Yemen.
A Houthi missile strike on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport on Saturday killed 13 people and injured more than 300, according to Saudi authorities. A follow-up attack on Sunday killed one and wounded 11 others, prompting officials to extend flight suspensions on Monday.
Among the dead were an Indian national traveling with his family for Umrah, an Egyptian flight attendant and a Saudi pilot. Footage released by Saudi authorities shows passengers waiting inside a terminal before an explosion sends them fleeing through smoke and debris.
The attacks came weeks after Tehran warned it would disrupt regional aviation if US sanctions isolated Iranian airlines. No public evidence has established that Iran ordered the strikes, but analysts said they were consistent with its threats.
Yemeni-American analyst Fatima Abo Alasrar described the escalation as part of a familiar pattern in which Tehran seeks to export its economic hardship to its neighbors.
"Just as the United States said that it's going to conduct Operation Economic Outcast and impose sanctions on Tehran, Tehran is also doing economic outcast for Saudi Arabia through this pressure," said Abo Alasrar, a scholar at Ideology Machine.
Tehran's aviation threats
Senior Iranian officials issued the warnings as Washington intensified its economic campaign against Tehran.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent recently announced measures aimed at shutting Iranian airlines out of global airspace, warning foreign airports, ground crews and fuel suppliers that aiding Iranian carriers would trigger exclusion from the dollar-based financial system.
"If they land, you cannot provide them with fuel, you cannot provide them with landing services, you cannot sell them tickets, or you will be knocked out of the dollar system," Bessent said.
Tehran responded with direct threats.
"If Iran cannot fly and receive airport services, no country in the region will have that possibility either," Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, wrote on social media.
Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, similarly warned that neighboring airports would be forced to shut down if they complied with US restrictions.
Behnam Ben Taleblu, Iran Program director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, placed the subsequent airport attacks within Tehran’s broader efforts to recover regional influence.
"This is a game of cross-domain escalation," he told Iran International.
"We can't forget that the strategic backdrop is Iran losing leverage in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz and trying to gain it back via proxy."
Iran has played a major role in developing the Houthis’ military capabilities since the group seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014.
A 2024 United Nations report found that the Houthis’ transformation into a powerful military organization was made possible by weapons transfers, training and technical assistance from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iraqi specialists.
In July, Reuters reported that Iran had flown IRGC commanders, military advisers and missile- and drone-related equipment into Yemen during the current war, according to sources familiar with the transfers.
Tehran has repeatedly denied supplying the Houthis with weapons, while the group maintains that it makes its own military decisions."
The battle for Bab al-Mandab
The airport attacks coincide with military setbacks for the Houthis along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, where Saudi-backed government forces have recaptured territory near the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait.
Abo Alasrar said the Houthis have an immediate objective of their own: forcing Riyadh to reconsider its support for Yemen’s internationally recognized government.
"The Houthis have both Tehran's intentions and their own aims on the ground," she said.
In her assessment, a sustained government advance toward Hodeidah, a major port on Yemen’s western coast, could threaten Houthi access to the sea and restrict routes used to move weapons and military components into their territory.
Losing their remaining coastal access could leave the Houthis effectively landlocked, a development Abo Alasrar described as a worst-case scenario for both the group and Tehran.
While Riyadh has strong incentives to de-escalate, she warned that concessions intended to secure a short-term settlement could allow the Houthis to rebuild their military capabilities.
Restoring access to airports or coastal territory, she argued, could reopen routes for smuggling missile components and other military supplies, setting the stage for another round of escalation.
A battle for public opinion
The killing and endangering of civilians in Saudi Arabia also risk undermining the Houthis’ efforts to portray themselves as defenders of Muslims, Abo Alasrar said.
"It exposed the hypocrisy of the Houthis, who have continuously been saying death to America, death to Israel, but then they're lobbing the missiles towards Muslim population," she said.
Images of passengers fleeing explosions have also become part of an information war unfolding alongside the military confrontation.
"The Saudi news channel Al Arabiya has adopted an unusually graphic approach, broadcasting harrowing footage of explosions and destruction reportedly inside Riyadh airport," Middle East political analyst and journalist Mohamed Fahmy told Iran International.
Fahmy said footage of the attacks, along with social media clips of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman offering condolences to a slain pilot’s father, appeared intended to prepare Saudis for further confrontation and reinforce confidence in the kingdom’s leadership.
Increased firepower alone was unlikely to end the confrontation, he said. A durable outcome would require deterrence, intelligence cooperation, political engagement and a military strategy for ending Yemen’s civil war.
Diplomacy amid escalation
Even as the Houthis continue their attacks, Tehran has sought to present itself as a potential diplomatic intermediary.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke with his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, on Sunday about the conflict.
A senior Houthi official subsequently claimed that Saudi Arabia had considered proposals for a temporary ceasefire, although the group rejected them.
Fahmy said Tehran’s diplomatic outreach allows it to project an image of regional engagement while distancing itself from the actions of its armed partners.
A protest over the name of a newly created county in central Iran turned violent after security forces moved to disperse demonstrators, with videos sent to Iran International capturing gunfire, tear gas and injured protesters.
The gathering took place on Sunday in Meymeh, a city in Isfahan province, where residents have objected to the new administrative district being named “Meymeh and Vazvan” rather than simply “Meymeh.”
Videos received by Iran International show demonstrators in the streets, tear gas in the area and people with bloodied clothing receiving medical treatment. Gunshots can also be heard, although it was not immediately clear what type of ammunition was used.
The number of people injured or detained remains unclear.
Local dispute over county name
Residents of Meymeh had campaigned for around two decades for their district to be upgraded to county status. The government eventually approved the change but in August 2024 named the new county Meymeh and Vazvan, combining the names of two cities.
Some Meymeh residents argue that their city’s historical identity should be reflected in the county name and have repeatedly called for the decision to be reversed. Officials have said the name should also recognize Vazvan.
The dispute culminated in Sunday’s street protest shortly before the new county administration was due to begin operating.
Footage showed some protesters carrying Islamic Republic flags and portraits of late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, underscoring the local nature of the dispute rather than an explicitly anti-government demonstration.
Security presence increases
The protest continued into the evening before security forces intervened and fired tear gas, according to videos and information received by Iran International.
Witnesses told Iran International that several protesters were wounded and detained, including some who were later taken into custody at hospitals. Iran International could not independently establish the number of arrests or verify the circumstances of each reported injury.
Reports from Meymeh on Tuesday indicated an increased security presence following the confrontation.
The Revolutionary Guards said on Tuesday that five members of an alleged kidnapping cell and one of its personnel were killed near Zahedan, while separate reports said more than 20 members of an Iran-backed militia were killed or wounded in the area.
The IRGC Ground Force’s Quds regional headquarters said its forces located the group in the Kurin area after an engineer working on construction projects west of Zahedan was abducted a day earlier.
It said five members of the group were killed, the hostage was freed and one member of its forces was killed during the operation.
According to the statement, the kidnappers had links to armed groups and intended to take the engineer across Iran’s border into a neighboring country.
The statement supersedes an earlier report by the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news agency, which had put the number of people killed in the operation at three.
More than 20 Fatemiyoun fighters reported killed or wounded in Taftan
Haalvsh, which covers developments in Sistan-Baluchestan, said more than 20 Fatemiyoun members were killed or wounded in fighting that continued for more than seven hours on Tuesday in the mountainous Chah Ahmad and Arzan Tak areas of Taftan County.
Citing local sources and eyewitnesses, Haalvsh said the first group sent into the area at around 6 a.m. included Fatemiyoun fighters traveling on about 18 motorcycles from a nearby base.
The outlet said armed men who had taken positions in the mountains opened heavy fire on the group. It said the dead and wounded were later removed in military vehicles.
Fatemiyoun is an Iran-backed Shiite militia made up largely of Afghan fighters and organized with support from the Revolutionary Guards. Its members have fought alongside Iranian forces in regional conflicts.
Haalvsh said reinforcements arrived in more than 40 vehicles, accompanied by reconnaissance and combat drones.
The outlet reported continued mortar and heavy-weapons fire toward the surrounding heights after some of the armed men withdrew from the main area of fighting. It also said residents could hear drones overhead.
The identities and affiliation of the armed men involved in the Taftan clashes remained unclear.
Attacks on police and military personnel
Sistan-Baluchestan, which borders Pakistan and Afghanistan, has seen a series of armed attacks and security operations in recent weeks.
On October 9, Iranian state media reported that Nosrat Eftekhari, a senior police official responsible for cultural and social affairs in the province, was killed in a roadside bombing on the Cheshmeh Ziarat road near Zahedan.
A day earlier, a member of a police commando unit was killed in an armed attack near Nosratabad. A separate attack on a vehicle carrying Iranian Army personnel near Nikshahr killed another serviceman.
On September 23, an armed confrontation in Saravan killed Hossein Zarifi, a commander with the IRGC’s Sajjad base, according to the Guards’ Quds regional headquarters. Haalvsh separately reported that another intelligence official was killed and at least 13 other personnel were wounded.
At least five members of the Fatemiyoun, an Iran-backed Shiite militia made up largely of Afghan fighters and organized with support from the Revolutionary Guards, were also reported killed in an armed attack near Zahedan on October 2.
More than 90 killed since March - HRANA
The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency said Monday that at least 94 people had been killed and 33 wounded in 63 armed incidents across southeastern Iran between March 31 and October 10.
HRANA said attacks on patrol vehicles and military convoys were the most common incidents it recorded, followed by targeted shootings. It also reported increased use of mines, rocket-propelled grenades and heavier weapons by armed groups, while government forces used drones, artillery and armored vehicles in some operations.
The group said the People’s Fighters Front, an alliance formed in December 2025 that includes Jaish al-Adl and several smaller Baluch armed groups, had taken responsibility for six incidents documented in its report. Most attacks remained unattributed or could not be reliably linked to a particular group, HRANA said.
Sistan-Baluchestan, one of Iran’s poorest provinces and home to much of the country’s Sunni Baluch minority, has long seen armed confrontations between government forces and Baluch groups. Recent incidents have increasingly involved attacks on police posts, military vehicles and senior security personnel.
Washington could support the Saudi campaign against the Houthis at little direct cost by lifting political objections to its operations, but deeper military involvement risks appearing to widen the Iran war, senior Middle East analyst Ryan Bohl told Iran International.
Recent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, including Riyadh’s international airport, have sharpened questions about how far Washington and other governments are prepared to go in supporting the kingdom.
Bohl, a senior analyst at the risk intelligence firm RANE, said the least costly US option would be to drop objections similar to those Washington raised over Saudi-led military operations before the 2022 truce. Those concerns included civilian casualties from airstrikes and the humanitarian consequences of an offensive on the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah.
Washington helped push for a halt to the offensive on Hudaydah in 2018. The UN-brokered Stockholm Agreement established a ceasefire there later that year.
“That will cost the United States virtually nothing,” Bohl said of lifting political objections, referring to munitions, troops and additional spending.
Greater intelligence support, assistance in targeting Houthi forces or direct American airstrikes would carry military, economic and especially political costs, he said.
“It will look like President Trump is now expanding the war that he seems to be trapped in with the Iranians.”
Air power has limits
Air power alone is unlikely to defeat the Houthis, Bohl said, but could help capable ground forces advance and hold territory.
He pointed to Yemeni units backed by the Saudi-led coalition, including the Giants Brigades, whose ability to capture and retain territory could depend heavily on tactical air support.
The question is whether those forces have recovered sufficiently from recent Houthi advances to mount a sustained counteroffensive.
Bohl said forces aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognized government had appeared disorganized after a Houthi advance toward the southern end of the Red Sea coast. Some units were now regrouping and resuming offensive operations, he said, but their ability to coordinate remained uncertain.
“The big question is, will they gain enough coherence in order to push back the Houthi advances around Taiz, and more importantly, push up the Red Sea coast towards Hudaydah.”
More support for defense than offense
Foreign governments are more willing to help defend Saudi Arabia than to support a campaign to recapture Houthi-held territory, Bohl said.
He cited Pakistani military support and Turkish preparations to provide defensive assistance as examples of efforts to protect the kingdom. Such support, he said, was primarily aimed at defending Saudi airspace and preventing further attacks.
An offensive inside Yemen would be a harder commitment to secure.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is seeking Saudi consent through US mediation for Israel to join the campaign against the Houthis, Haaretz reported on Monday.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman opposes Israeli participation over concerns about a public backlash, the newspaper said. Netanyahu reportedly hopes cooperation would strengthen ties with Riyadh and help advance normalization.
Many governments see the country as “a geopolitical black hole that their forces will disappear into and that they’ll never achieve victory,” Bohl said.
They also look to Washington to provide military capabilities they cannot deploy at comparable scale. Turkey could influence events in its neighborhood, he said, but would face greater constraints in sustaining an extensive campaign as far away as Yemen.
Whether an effective offensive coalition emerges will depend heavily on Washington’s objectives, Bohl said. Those could range from reversing recent Houthi gains to supporting a broader effort to recapture territory, potentially including Sanaa.
The United States’ 2025 air campaign ended with an Oman-brokered ceasefire with the Houthis in May that year. A campaign supporting territorial advances would raise a different question: how far Washington was prepared to help allied ground forces go.
“America’s role in it will be instrumental in us understanding whether or not a coherent offensive coalition can actually be put together and have an impact on conditions on the ground.”
