The Houthi attack on Saudi Arabia's main international airport drew condemnation from European leaders, the United Nations and regional governments, while Iranian officials warned of further military action and invoked the Strait of Hormuz on Sunday.
The attack on Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport prompted warnings to travelers, expressions of solidarity with Saudi Arabia and calls for an end to attacks on civilian infrastructure.
International condemnation of Houthi attack
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said Iran-backed Houthi forces are destabilizing regional transport and energy infrastructure.
“These attacks by Iran’s proxies are pushing the region into a spiral of violence,” von der Leyen said.
She described the airport strike as a dangerous escalation and called for an immediate end to attacks on civilians.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas also condemned the strike, calling it an “appalling act of terror.”
“There can be no justification for indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure,” Kallas said.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for an immediate halt to attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure.
“Attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure are a violation of international law,” Guterres said.
German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul described the strike as “a terrorist act against Saudi Arabia and civil aviation,” while British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband urged British nationals to avoid Riyadh airport and follow Saudi authorities' instructions.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni censured the attack and expressed solidarity with Saudi Arabia and the victims' families.
“Attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure are unacceptable and must stop,” Meloni wrote on X.
Meloni said Italy would continue working with regional partners to promote stability and freedom of navigation.
France also condemned the attack, describing it as “heinous” and expressing its “total solidarity” with Saudi Arabia, the French Foreign Ministry said on Sunday.
France would continue supporting Saudi Arabia in defending its territory and infrastructure, including through its military assistance, the ministry said. It also called on the Houthis to immediately stop attacks and provocations destabilizing the region.
Russia also condemned the attack on Riyadh's international airport, Interfax news agency reported on Sunday.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney condemned the attack and offered condolences to the families of those killed.
“There can be no justification for attacks on civilian infrastructure,” Carney said.
The Arab League and Syria also condemned the strike. Syria's Foreign Ministry said a Syrian citizen had been killed and called for international action to prevent further attacks on civilian facilities.
Pakistan reaffirmed its commitment to Saudi Arabia's security under the two countries' joint defense agreement.
“Pakistan stands in unwavering solidarity with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its leadership and brotherly people,” Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said.
The Houthis subsequently renewed their warning to airlines, airport workers and travelers against using Saudi airports, saying Saudi Arabia bore responsibility for failed interceptions.
Iranian officials warn of further military action
Iranian military and political officials issued a series of threats against the United States and Israel, warning of further attacks.
An adviser to the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps said that any new attack involving missiles or aircraft would trigger a stronger Iranian response.
“Any provocation or attack with missiles or aircraft will be met with a heavier and crushing response,” Mohammad Reza Naghdi said on Sunday.
Iranian Army Deputy Coordinator Habibollah Sayyari said the military had previously struck vessels and remained prepared to do so again.
“We defended firmly and will continue to do so,” Sayyari said. “Wherever necessary, we will act to strike the enemy.”
Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said that Iran's response to any new military action would differ from its previous responses.
“Our response in the 40-day war was different from the 12-day war, and we hope our adversaries will show some rationality,” Gharibabadi said.
Gharibabadi also described the Strait of Hormuz as an Iranian waterway and said the country would use it as an instrument against its adversaries.
Lawmaker Hassan Ghashghavi said support for reviewing Iran's nuclear doctrine was growing among officials, experts and the public.
Ghashghavi also argued that Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz was strengthening and that the waterway could not reopen until the Islamic Republic's conditions were met.
Separately, the newspaper Khorasan, which is close to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, wrote that Washington and Israel had already decided to launch another war and that recent diplomatic exchanges were unlikely to alter that decision.
Nuclear dispute and maritime pressure continue
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran chief Mohammad Eslami criticized international institutions and the International Atomic Energy Agency for their response to attacks on Iranian nuclear and non-nuclear facilities.
“The silence and selective approach of international institutions and the IAEA toward direct attacks on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear and non-nuclear facilities represent an obvious and disastrous contradiction in the international system,” Eslami said.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi separately maintained that US-Israeli strikes on Iranian oil and energy infrastructure had created environmental hazards, including the possible contamination of air, soil and water.
Maritime developments added another dimension to the day's security concerns.
The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations agency reported an encounter involving a tanker and military forces in the Gulf of Oman, hours after the US military announced that it had struck a vessel attempting to breach its naval blockade of Iran.
The agency advised vessels to remain alert as authorities examined the circumstances.
The international condemnation of the Houthi attack on Riyadh airport came alongside renewed threats from the Houthis and Iranian officials, raising concerns about further attacks on civilian infrastructure and commercial shipping across the region.
The US blockade and tighter sanctions enforcement are cutting into Iran’s oil income and targeting financial networks that sustain the Islamic Republic, but may still fall short of forcing Tehran into concessions, experts said at an Iran International town hall in Washington.
The discussion, hosted by Fardad Farahzad, brought together Kerri Bitsoff, a former senior official at the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC); Patrick Clawson, the Morningstar senior fellow at the Washington Institute; and Mohammad Machine-Chian, a senior economist and analyst at Iran International.
“The thing about sanctions, if they’re on the books but not enforced, they only hurt the people,” Bitsoff said, arguing that the current US campaign differed from previous rounds by focusing more heavily on enforcement and the financial intermediaries sustaining Iran’s economy.
Blockade bites
Iran faces declining oil revenues alongside damage to its energy infrastructure following the war, raising the prospect of severe economic difficulties during the coming winter, Clawson said.
President Masoud Pezeshkian had acknowledged that Iran could not export oil during the initial blockade, according to Clawson, who said the country subsequently sought alternative routes for limited shipments.
Iran had also relied on oil previously stored aboard vessels and in China, but those reserves were approaching exhaustion, he said.
Damage to natural gas infrastructure could compound the difficulties, potentially forcing greater reliance on mazut, a heavily polluting fuel used for electricity generation.
Iran depends on natural gas for approximately 69 percent of its energy requirements, making disruptions particularly consequential for households and industry, Clawson said.
Machine-Chian estimated that between $21 and $23 billion in export proceeds had not returned to Iran and that the blockade could cost the country another $35 billion in oil revenue.
Hitting financial networks sustaining Iran's leadership
The current campaign differs from previous sanctions because Washington is concentrating on enforcement and the intermediaries sustaining Iran's economy rather than simply announcing additional restrictions, Bitsoff said.
She pointed to restrictions imposed by the United Arab Emirates, measures against Iranian airlines and Turkish action against banks connected to Iranian transactions.
Such measures could influence officials and business figures whose continued support for the Islamic Republic depends on financial privileges and access to international markets.
Earlier sanctions had often pushed legitimate commerce underground while allowing networks connected to the Revolutionary Guards to profit, Bitsoff said.
Machine-Chian described the emergence of wealthy intermediaries, sometimes called sanctions merchants, who benefited from moving Iranian oil and money through opaque arrangements.
Those networks subsequently became obstacles to negotiations and economic normalization because their commercial interests depended on maintaining the existing system, he said.
Machine-Chian distinguished between sanctions that impose prolonged hardship without producing results and measures designed to achieve specific objectives within a foreseeable period.
The loss of the UAE, Machine-Chian added, as a major commercial and financial intermediary has further complicated Iran's position.
Dubai previously provided an important channel for Iranian transactions, but restrictions have forced businesses to seek alternatives through Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Machine-Chian said.
Those routes, he said, have limited capacity and cannot quickly replace the financial infrastructure previously available through the Emirates.
China and regional allies face financial constraints
China remains Iran's principal oil customer, but its commercial relationship offers fewer advantages to the Islamic Republic than commonly assumed, Bitsoff said.
Independent Chinese refineries purchase Iranian crude at substantial discounts, while payments in yuan often remain in China and are largely available for purchasing Chinese goods.
Major Chinese banks generally avoid Iranian transactions, leaving smaller intermediaries to facilitate much of the remaining trade, she said.
The blockade also allows Washington to restrict Iranian oil exports without directly confronting major Chinese financial institutions, Clawson said.
Targeting those institutions could provoke Chinese retaliation affecting broader US economic interests.
The financial pressure is also affecting Iran's regional allies.
Hezbollah has struggled to maintain basic financial obligations and social support programs since the blockade began, Bitsoff said.
Machine-Chian argued that Iran's relationships with allied armed groups had become increasingly transactional, making continued financial assistance essential to sustaining their loyalty.
Political survival and prospects for negotiations
Despite the mounting pressure, the panelists differed over whether the Islamic Republic would ultimately accept Washington's demands.
Economic hardship alone was unlikely to persuade Iran's leadership to abandon its objectives, Bitsoff said.
Instead sustained pressure could influence members of the security apparatus whose loyalty depends on salaries, privileges and expectations of continued stability.
Clawson considered negotiated concessions possible, pointing to previous occasions when Iran reversed positions it had presented as nonnegotiable.
He suggested Iran could accept a three-year suspension of uranium enrichment, particularly because its facilities had been damaged and were not operational.
Machine-Chian was more skeptical, arguing that abandoning regional ambitions and nuclear objectives would challenge central elements of the Islamic Republic's political identity.
The blockade's sustainability also remains a concern because maintaining naval operations places substantial demands on American ships, crews and maintenance resources, Bitsoff said, although she expected the operation to continue.
The discussion highlighted a central uncertainty: whether sustained economic pressure will produce concessions, weaken the leadership's support structures or prolong Iran's economic difficulties without fundamentally changing its political direction.
A deadly Houthi attack on Riyadh’s main airport drew a Saudi vow of retaliation on Saturday, as President Donald Trump raised the possibility of joining strikes on the group and resuming attacks on Iran.
Saudi Arabia’s civil aviation authority said 12 people were killed and 309 injured at King Khalid International Airport, making it the kingdom’s deadliest attack since a 2015 mosque bombing in the eastern city of Qatif. An American citizen was among those killed.
The Saudi-led military coalition blamed Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis, called the attack a “war crime” and promised a decisive response, without specifying what action it would take. Hours later, it reported that a projectile had landed near King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, eastern Saudi Arabia.
Trump initially said Washington could join Riyadh in striking the Houthis and resume attacks on Iran. Asked later whether Saudi Arabia could defend itself against the group, he praised the kingdom’s capabilities.
“They're able to defend. The Saudis are good fighters. But I think the attack was a terrible thing,” he said.
The United States, Britain, Germany and Spain warned their citizens to avoid the Riyadh airport. The dead included four Saudis, two Bangladeshis, one American, one Egyptian, one Jordanian, one Syrian, one Palestinian and one Sudanese, according to the Saudi aviation authority.
Trump warns Tehran
The prospect of renewed US attacks on Iran also featured in Trump’s remarks in Tennessee on Saturday, where he accused Iranian leaders of potentially seeking to damage him politically before the November 3 midterm elections.
“They'll probably do a little bit extra before the election thinking it's going to hurt us, but we could end it really quick. They don't know how nice I've been to them.”
Trump called Iran a “lunatic country” and mocked its leaders for repeatedly threatening to kill their enemies.
US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee more directly linked the Saudi attacks to Tehran, arguing that curbing Iranian support was essential to stopping the Houthis.
“Why are the Houthis even capable of doing these things? Because they're funded and they're empowered and they're trained by Iran,” Huckabee told Newsmax.
He described Washington’s confrontation with Tehran as an effort to constrain Iran-backed groups, including the Houthis, Hamas and Hezbollah.
“Getting the Iranian regime reined in is the only way to stop some of this aggression that we're seeing through the proxies,” he said.
Huckabee also argued that military and economic pressure under Trump had left Iran in its weakest position since 1979.
Calls to stand behind Saudi Arabia
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that an American had been killed in the Riyadh attack and demanded an immediate halt to Houthi strikes. He said Washington stood with Saudi Arabia and offered condolences to the victims’ families.
“These reprehensible attacks demonstrate a blatant disregard for innocent civilian life. They must stop now,” Rubio said.
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif invoked his country’s joint defense pact with Riyadh in underscoring Islamabad’s commitment to Saudi security.
“In accordance with the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement and the enduring bonds of brotherhood between our two countries, we reaffirm our steadfast commitment to Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and security.”
Former Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani urged Persian Gulf states to unite behind Saudi Arabia against threats he said originated in Yemen but were directed from abroad.
“It has now become clear that Iran is our main enemy,” he wrote on X, marking a sharp change from his advocacy in 2023 of negotiations with Tehran and opposition to confrontation.
Moscow would rather live with an Iranian nuclear weapon than with a change of regime in Tehran, senior Russia scholar Mark Katz told Iran International, arguing that a pro-Western Iran is the outcome Russia actually fears.
Western policy has long treated Iran’s nuclear program as the crisis and the government in Tehran as the address for a deal. Katz, a professor at George Mason University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, said Moscow has not shared that order of priorities.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed Moscow’s support for Tehran during talks with President Masoud Pezeshkian in Turkmenistan on Thursday, offering to help end the war.
But during last year’s 12-day war, which focused mainly on Iranian nuclear facilities, “the Russians weren’t very helpful,” Katz said.
They would prefer that Iran not acquire a bomb, but they are “not hysterical about it” in the way Israel and some other states in the region are.
An Iran with nuclear weapons is the outcome US policy has spent years trying to block. Katz said Moscow does not put it in the same category.
“For them, the worst case is a pro-Western Iran.” Even an anti-Western Iran has pursued interests that clash with Russia’s. A government in Tehran aligned with the West, he said, “would have complete contempt for Russia.”
“But they want the regime to survive, that’s for sure.”
A nuclear partnership with limits
Moscow has nevertheless provided Tehran with diplomatic protection over its nuclear program.
On September 17, Russia and China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution extending independent monitoring of sanctions on Iran. The veto blocked the monitoring mechanism, not the sanctions themselves.
Russia also took part in the Iranian nuclear negotiations, and some diplomats credited it with being useful in the 2000s and 2010s, when Moscow and Tehran still differed on the issue.
Katz said that gap has since closed. Russian pressure on the nuclear issue continued through the end of 2021. Once the war in Ukraine began, “the Russians are simply not focusing on the Iranian nuclear issue.”
“I don’t think that they would be that sad if Iran acquired nuclear weapons,” he added, because those weapons would be aimed at others, not at Russia.
Cooperation stops short of defense
The military relationship between Russia and Iran has deepened considerably since Moscow invaded Ukraine in 2022.
Iran supplied Russia with Shahed drone technology. Western governments have also accused Tehran of supplying short-range ballistic missiles for use against Ukraine.
The two countries formalized their growing cooperation in a strategic partnership treaty signed in January 2025. But the agreement, despite provisions for closer military cooperation, contains no mutual defense obligation.
“Russia’s assistance is to help Iran target US facilities and, of course, the facilities in other Middle Eastern states,” Katz said. “They’re helping Iran make attacks. They’re not defending Iran from attack.”
With Russian forces tied down in Ukraine, a US and Israeli campaign serious enough to threaten the Iranian government would leave Moscow unsure it could help.
Katz said Russia appears to be betting that no such attack will come, drawing confidence from the lesson of earlier this year: strikes on military and nuclear sites do not, by themselves, change who rules in Tehran.
Why Putin will not trade Tehran away
Katz rejected the idea that Iran is expendable, or a gun for hire. Moscow does not control Tehran, and Iran has done things Russia has disliked. For the most part, though, Iran does what Russia wants because of its hostility to the West.
The outcomes Moscow does not want are the fall of the regime or a Trump visit to Tehran “like Nixon in China.” Iranian fears of being traded away, Katz said, misread Putin.
Saudi Arabia tried that bargain in 2015 and 2016, offering more business in the hope Russia would cut back on Iran. Moscow took the business and kept the Iranian relationship.
“I don’t think there’s anything that we could give him that he would be willing to give up relations with Iran for.”
The US-Iran conflict pulls Washington’s attention away from Ukraine and, if Persian Gulf oil shipments are interrupted, lifts the price at which Russia sells its own crude.
Katz said Putin believes he will prevail in Ukraine and feels no need, for now, to give the West anything.
But if Russia prevailed in Ukraine and the United States pulled back from Europe and the Middle East, a more ambitious Iran could clash with Russian interests in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.
“The weaker America’s position in the Middle East, the more likely we’re going to see clashes of interests between Russia and Iran,” Katz argued.
A revisionist argument is emerging in Tehran over Iran’s nuclear strategy: that its longstanding policy of nuclear ambiguity failed its most important test when it did not deter the United States and Israel from attacking, and should now be reconsidered.
Nezamoddin Mousavi, a former conservative lawmaker with longstanding ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), gave unusually explicit expression to that argument this week, declaring that “nuclear ambiguity did not prevent war” and raising the prospect of revisiting Iran’s nuclear doctrine and even its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Mousavi, who helped found IRGC-linked media outlets, made the remarks in an interview with Ensaf News, a website close to President Massoud Pezeshkian.
Senior Iranian officials have previously hinted that Tehran could change its nuclear doctrine if sufficiently threatened. But such warnings have generally been directed outward, rather than framed as criticism of an established policy favored by slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Mousavi, however, is effectively arguing that a policy intended to preserve strategic uncertainty while stopping short of weaponization failed to provide the deterrence its architects expected.
That diagnosis feeds into a wider debate over what lesson Iran should draw from the war: whether the failure was one of deterrence, requiring greater military leverage, or of escalation management, requiring a different approach to diplomacy.
Iran has long cited Khamenei’s fatwa prohibiting the possession and use of nuclear weapons when confronted with accusations that it might seek a bomb.
Critics, however, have questioned how absolute that prohibition would prove in an existential crisis, especially since Khamenei’s predecessor and founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomeini, held that preserving the state was paramount, taking precedence even over religious obligations.
Against that backdrop, Mousavi said Tehran should reassess its international commitments, the value of NPT membership and its broader deterrence strategy following attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
He stopped short of explicitly advocating the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
His reasoning amounts to three premises and a conclusion: Iran refrained from building a nuclear weapon; ambiguity was supposed to contribute to deterrence; yet Iran was attacked and senior leaders and military commanders were killed. The assumptions underlying Iran’s deterrence strategy, he argues, must therefore be reconsidered.
Beyond Khamenei
Mousavi also ventured into another sensitive subject: whether Khamenei’s death would fundamentally alter Iran’s strategic direction.
He argued that he would not expect dramatic change. Foreign and security policy, he said, is not simply the product of one individual but of institutional thinking and long-term calculations developed over decades.
It reflects a distinctly conservative view of regime continuity: leaders matter, but institutions matter more. Major strategic directions, in this reading, are unlikely to change abruptly regardless of who occupies the highest office.
That also gives the nuclear debate greater significance. If Iran’s strategic direction is fundamentally institutional rather than dependent on one leader, the lessons the establishment draws from the war could outlast the present leadership.
Deterrence or de-escalation?
Not everyone in Tehran is drawing the same lesson.
An article published Wednesday in Etemad newspaper highlighted a competing strand of Iranian political thinking. Where Mousavi sees a failure of deterrence, more moderate voices see a failure to manage escalation.
The hardline argument holds that the United States and Israel seek to weaken Iran regardless of its diplomatic behavior and that negotiations cannot guarantee security while military pressure continues.
The more moderate argument sees the conflict as the product of a broader strategic environment shaped by political, regional, military and economic pressures. For this camp, the lesson is not necessarily that Iran needs greater deterrence, but that it needs more effective crisis management.
The emerging argument in Tehran, then, appears to be shifting from how this war ends to what lesson should be drawn from it: whether greater military and potentially nuclear deterrence offers the best protection against another conflict, or whether security ultimately depends on preventing the next escalation before it begins.
For the first time in Iran’s history, revenue from crude oil and condensate exports could dry up entirely by mid-December if the US blockade remains in place, according to the head of crude oil analysis at Kpler.
“Revenues from crude and condensate will drop to zero for the first time ever,” Homayoun Falakshahi told Iran International's Eye for Iran, warning that Tehran could lose between $3 billion and $6 billion in monthly oil income.
That makes December the critical month as the last Iranian oil shipments already outside the blockade zone make their way to Chinese buyers.
According to Kpler, just eight million barrels of Iranian crude remain on the water outside the blockade, down from nearly 90 million barrels in mid-July. Falakshahi expects those remaining shipments to be discharged by around October 18.
With Chinese refiners typically taking another one to two months to settle payments, Tehran could receive its final proceeds from those shipments by mid-December.
The looming revenue shortfall follows a halt in Iranian oil shipments. Kpler data shows that Iran loaded no crude oil or condensate onto tankers throughout September, the first full month without loadings since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
The last recorded loading took place around August 26 or 27.
Even during the 1979 revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and successive rounds of Western sanctions, Iranian crude continued reaching international buyers. During the COVID-19 pandemic, shipments fell as low as 300,000 barrels per day in some months, compared with typical volumes of around 1.7 million to 1.8 million, but never stopped entirely.
“This is a first in history,” Falakshahi said.
A financial lifeline under threat
Oil exports remain Iran’s largest source of foreign currency despite years of efforts to reduce the government’s dependence on petroleum income.
Falakshahi said much of Iran’s oil trade with China continues to be settled in dollars despite US sanctions, making the disappearance of those payments particularly consequential for an economy already struggling with currency depreciation.
He said expectations of dwindling oil income may have contributed to the rial’s recent decline. A prolonged loss of foreign exchange could put further pressure on the currency and government finances.
The squeeze could also affect Tehran’s ability to finance regional allies, although Falakshahi said the extent would depend on government priorities. Tehran could choose to preserve such support while cutting spending at home.
Sustained economic pressure could also affect Tehran’s negotiating calculus with Washington, he said, though he doubted the leadership was ready to make significant compromises over its nuclear program.
Why sanctions-evasion methods may not work
Iran has spent decades developing networks to circumvent Western sanctions and maintain oil exports, but Falakshahi said a physical blockade makes those methods far more difficult to replicate.
Unlike financial restrictions, which Tehran has historically navigated through intermediaries, disguised shipments and alternative trading arrangements, the current blockade prevents tankers from physically leaving Iranian waters.
One potential workaround has attracted attention as independent Chinese refiners increasingly turn to Iraqi crude to replace Iranian supplies: transporting Iranian oil through Iraq and disguising its origin before exporting it to China.
But moving even 50,000 to 70,000 barrels per day across the Iraqi border would require thousands of truck movements, Falakshahi said.
“You’d probably see videos of it on the internet,” he said.
He estimated that moving enough crude by truck to fill a single large tanker could take around 20 days, compared with roughly one large tanker Iran previously loaded each day.
Iraq continues to import Iranian natural gas, but payments owed to Tehran are held in a restricted account at Iraq’s central bank because of US sanctions. Falakshahi said Baghdad would be unlikely to facilitate large-scale Iranian oil shipments at the risk of further US sanctions.
Overland routes offer little relief
Rail offers limited alternatives. Falakshahi said the connection to China reaches Tehran, far from Iran’s main oil-producing regions, while the pipeline supplying the capital has capacity of only around 200,000 barrels per day.
Turkmenistan is also reportedly restricting rail transit through its territory over concerns about US sanctions.
Even if Tehran managed to move small quantities through neighboring countries, road and rail would be unlikely to replace the volumes previously exported by sea.
“Iran has a history of evading sanctions successfully to an extent,” Falakshahi said. “But this seems a lot more challenging.”
Pressure extends beyond oil
The blockade is also restricting Iran’s ability to import commodities as oil revenue approaches a potential halt.
Falakshahi said shipments of agricultural products, including corn and wheat, have declined sharply, while alternative supply routes through the Caspian Sea offer only a fraction of the capacity available through Persian Gulf ports.
For Tehran, the immediate question is whether the blockade will remain in place long enough to exhaust the final payments from oil already sold.
If it does, December could mark the first time in Iran’s modern oil-producing history that crude and condensate export revenue falls to zero, cutting off the Islamic Republic’s principal source of foreign exchange with no clear route to restoring exports while the blockade remains in place.
