Iran's reported $200 million Hezbollah aid angers cash-strapped citizens

Information provided to Iran International by an international intelligence agency shows that Hezbollah began contacting foreign students at Al-Mustafa International University five years ago. Those recruited have received training in weapons handling, sabotage, cyberattacks and espionage.

The recruitment operation is conducted in coordination with the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force and targets students at Al-Mustafa. The state-run institution was established 18 years ago on the orders of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and has branches in more than 60 countries.

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Iran International’s sources identified Mohammad Hassan, an Indonesian national and Al-Mustafa graduate, as the person overseeing Hezbollah’s operation in Iran. Under the supervision of Quds Force commanders, Hassan works for Talal Hamiyah, head of Hezbollah’s Unit 910, the group’s external operations unit.

Under Hassan’s direction, Hezbollah’s recruits maintain numerous safe houses, known as “operations houses,” across Iran. Iran International obtained the locations of four such properties in Qom and Tehran.

Hassan uses an apartment in Kashaneh 2 Tower in Qom’s Velayat district, near Hakim and Payambar-e Azam boulevards, as a safe house for recruitment and training. In Tehran, the network uses properties on Seventh Kish Street in the Naft neighborhood, Third West Sarvestan Street in Rah Ahan and Sarv Alley off Alborz Street in Pounak.

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The Quds Force and Hezbollah use the properties as cover to shelter newly recruited members, who also receive training there.

The US Treasury designated Hamiyah a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2012 for supporting Hezbollah’s terrorist activities in the Middle East and around the world. The State Department’s Rewards for Justice program offers up to $7 million for information on him.

The unit’s first commander was Imad Mughniyeh, a senior Hezbollah figure who was killed in 2008. Hezbollah’s external operations unit initially included four prominent figures: Mughniyeh, Mustafa Badreddine, Talal Hamiyah and Ahmad Vahidi, then commander of the Quds Force and now commander-in-chief of the IRGC.

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After Badreddine was killed, Hamiyah took command of the unit. Mohammad Hassan is now recruiting for him in Qom.

Iran International’s sources identified cleric Habib Mustafa Zaatar as another participant in the recruitment operation. Born in Lebanon’s Jabal Amel region, he lives in Qom. The sources said Zaatar is a US citizen and travels to the United States several times a year. Zaatar teaches Sharh al-Lum‘ah and its section on hudud punishments at Qom’s religious seminary.

Serving as an adviser at the Noor Islamic Center and Hikmat International Academy in Qom, he teaches Shia religious subjects in English. Tuition for his course at Hikmat Academy is 835,000 tomans per month.

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Habib Mustafa Zaatar also has close ties to the Najaf religious seminary. He is a lecturer and researcher at the Al-Abbas shrine in Iraq and has translated several well-known Shia religious books. His command of English gives him a key role in recruiting foreign nationals studying at Al-Mustafa and Qom seminaries.

Iran International also identified four people recruited by Hezbollah who have been training for years as members of a sleeper cell in Iran.

One is Mohammad Zaki Fathoni. He heads the regional leadership council of Indonesia’s Ahlul Bayt Foundation and is a member of the Al-Mustafa alumni association. He represented Indonesia at the Fourth International Congress on Nahj al-Balagha and Alawi Governance, held at Iran’s presidential complex in Tehran in fall 2025, with President Masoud Pezeshkian in attendance.

Another recruit is Ahmad Dzilal Mukhlis. He is also a member of the Al-Mustafa alumni association.

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Another Indonesian national in Qom, Seyyed Mohammad Mahdi Ali al-Attas, has also been recruited by Hezbollah. He heads the association of Indonesian students studying in Iran and is a member of Indonesia’s Ahlul Bayt Council. Al-Attas hosts a podcast in which he strongly supports the Islamic Republic and speaks against Israel and Zionism.

A photograph reviewed by Iran International shows al-Attas attending a government-organized Quds Day march in Qom.

The fourth Hezbollah recruit in Iran is Mohammad Saleh. He is an Al-Mustafa student and a member of a religious seminary students’ association. On January 29, 2026, Saleh met Reza Ramazani, secretary-general of the Ahlul Bayt World Assembly, as a member of the Indonesian, Thai and Malaysian religious students’ associations.

According to a photograph published by media outlets inside Iran, Saleh attended a pro-government march in September 2022, days before the protests that followed Mahsa Amini’s death, and called for compulsory hijab for Iranian women. He is active in Qom’s religious circles.

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All these activities take place under the cover of Al-Mustafa, which received 1.8 trillion tomans in state funding for the Iranian year that began in March 2026.

Al-Mustafa describes its mission as educating Muslim students in other countries. The United States sanctioned the institution over alleged links to the Quds Force’s military and intelligence activities.

Recent US measures have targeted Iran’s national railway system and major automakers including Iran Khodro and SAIPA, alongside foreign facilitators involved in their supply chains, while pressure has also expanded across aviation, maritime transport and financial networks.

The pattern has prompted some Iranian commentators to warn of what they describe as “network encirclement”: rather than trying to stop Iranian trade at a single chokepoint, sanctions raise the cost of moving money and goods across multiple routes simultaneously.

But Iranian economists and industry analysts are divided over how much additional pressure that can produce after years in which businesses have adapted to sanctions, and whether domestic dysfunction now poses a greater threat to industry than new US designations.

Closing alternative routes

Moderate outlet Khabar Online described the emerging strategy as “network encirclement,” arguing that modern economic blockades do not require borders to be physically sealed.

Instead, pressure can be applied simultaneously through financial sanctions, transport restrictions, higher insurance and compliance costs, and measures targeting companies and intermediaries that facilitate trade.

The importance of alternative routes was illustrated in a recent report by Mehr News Agency examining how Iran has sought to compensate for restrictions on maritime trade and rising insurance costs in the Persian Gulf.

The report highlighted truck traffic through northwestern crossings including Bazargan, Astara and Jolfa, connecting Iran with Turkey, the Caucasus and Russia. It argued that expanding land and rail corridors could reduce dependence on maritime shipping.

But Washington is increasingly targeting some of those alternatives as well.

Recent US sanctions have included Iran’s national railway system and major automakers, while also targeting facilitators in the UAE, Turkey, Hong Kong and India involved in supply chains.

Donya-e-Eghtesad described the measures as an expansion of pressure from maritime routes to overland trade, including networks used to obtain automotive parts.

An economy that has learned to adapt

Whether that approach can substantially increase pressure on Iran is less clear.

Industry analysts cited by Donya-e-Eghtesad said major Iranian automakers have developed extensive domestic sourcing after years of sanctions and reduced dependence on direct relationships with foreign manufacturers.

Eqtesad News went further, arguing that the latest measures against automakers and rail companies may carry greater political and psychological significance than immediate economic consequences.

Iran’s automotive industry has operated without direct partnerships with major international manufacturers for more than eight years and already relies heavily on intermediaries to obtain foreign components, it said.

The outlet argued that sanctions may therefore be producing diminishing returns, while domestic problems including price controls, supply-chain mismanagement and regulatory bottlenecks increasingly constrain production.

Economist Rasoul Safarahang made a similar argument in Khabar Online, saying an economy that has spent years adapting to sanctions is likely to respond to additional pressure by developing informal workarounds rather than immediately altering government policy.

Pressure extends to aviation

Aviation represents another potential pressure point because of its dependence on international maintenance, insurance, fuel and other services.

Iranian media have reported that US restrictions now cover 27 Iranian airlines, potentially affecting not only passenger travel but also time-sensitive cargo and the movement of industrial equipment and other goods.

Khabar Online estimated that restrictions on commercial aviation could cause between $3.5 billion and $5.2 billion in losses through reduced trade, tourism and supply-chain disruption, although the report did not provide sufficient detail to independently assess that estimate.

The outlet argued that longer transport times and more expensive alternative routes could ultimately feed through into higher domestic prices.

The debate in Iranian media therefore reflects two competing assessments of Washington’s strategy.

One sees sanctions as closing the routes Iran has used to adapt to earlier restrictions. The other sees an economy already so accustomed to sanctions that additional designations produces less leverage, while Iran’s own structural economic problems pose the greater threat.

In a sharply worded column Wednesday, Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari argued that Ghalibaf’s appointment had effectively sidelined parliament for seven months and said those responsible should explain why they had allowed one of Iran’s central institutions to become largely inactive during wartime.

“If those who made this decision knew that its consequence would be the closure of parliament, they must answer this question: What was their purpose in shutting down parliament?” he wrote. “And if they were unaware of the consequence, that is regrettable.”

Iran’s parliament largely suspended its normal work following the outbreak of war in February, with security conditions and Ghalibaf’s negotiating responsibilities limiting its activities.

‘Coordinated with the Leader’

The criticism is striking because Mahmoud Nabavian, a senior hardline lawmaker, said on April 10 that Khamenei had specifically stipulated that Ghalibaf should lead negotiations with Washington.

Nabavian said the selection had been made “with the opinion and coordination of the leadership.”

Ghalibaf has played a central role in talks with Washington since negotiations began in Islamabad in April. He subsequently said he had not volunteered for the role and took it on following a decision by the country’s governing institutions, while describing the negotiations as having proceeded with Khamenei’s authorization.

Shariatmadari did not name Khamenei or directly question his role in the appointment. But his criticism leaves unclear whom he holds responsible for a decision publicly attributed to Iran’s highest authority.

Who watches the negotiator?

The Kayhan editor went further, arguing that Ghalibaf’s roles as parliament speaker and chief negotiator were fundamentally incompatible.

Parliament is responsible for overseeing the negotiating team, Shariatmadari wrote, meaning Ghalibaf is effectively expected both to supervise the negotiations and to be subject to that supervision.

The argument amounts to a challenge to Ghalibaf’s continued combination of the two roles while negotiations with Washington remain unresolved.

Shariatmadari, a longtime hardline figure appointed to Kayhan by the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, publicly clashed with Ghalibaf in August over his support for negotiations.

Ghalibaf responded by defending diplomacy as a tool of statecraft, writing that negotiations were neither inherently valuable nor taboo and that Iran should “talk when necessary, and fight when necessary.”

Ghalibaf has also acknowledged divisions within the establishment, criticizing both those who reject diplomacy altogether and those he accuses of advocating concessions to Washington.

Shariatmadari’s latest intervention goes further. Rather than challenging Ghalibaf over what he is negotiating, it questions whether the parliament speaker should have been given the job in the first place.

Investigative journalist Yashar Soltani said he had obtained documents indicating that Mojtaba Zolnouri, a lawmaker from Qom and a figure associated with the hardline Paydari Front, was involved in unauthorized digging for historical artifacts and treasure.

“After oil, the Paydari camp is now after treasure,” Soltani wrote on X on Tuesday.

“I have obtained documents indicating that Mojtaba Zolnouri, the lawmaker representing Qom, was involved in unauthorized excavation in search of historical artifacts and treasure,” he added.

Soltani did not publish the documents or say where or when the excavation allegedly took place. The allegation has not been independently verified, and Zolnouri has not publicly responded.

Parliament examining excavation case

Journalist Zahra Abdollahi separately said the issue of a lawmaker involved in excavation for buried treasure had been raised at a recent meeting of parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee and referred to the body that oversees lawmakers’ conduct.

“At a recent meeting of parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee, the issue of a lawmaker’s misconduct in connection with digging for treasure and buried antiquities was raised, and it was decided that the matter should be reviewed by the board overseeing lawmakers’ conduct,” she wrote on X.

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Abdollahi did not identify the lawmaker, meaning there is no public evidence establishing that the parliamentary case concerns Zolnouri.

She said she had obtained an official document addressed to a prosecutor concerning excavation at a residential property in a historically sensitive area. According to her account, the letter called for the work to be halted.

Abdollahi said she planned to release further details of the document.

Paydari link comes amid oil-sales scrutiny

Soltani tied his latest allegation to a separate controversy surrounding Iran’s sanctions-era oil sales.

“I previously said that one of the four recipients of 85 million barrels of oil was the son-in-law of the Paydari Front spokesperson,” he wrote.

The reference was to Ruhollah Razavi, whose name has appeared in reporting on the network of trusted intermediaries, known in Iran as “trustees,” used to sell sanctioned oil and move the proceeds back to the country.

The wider system has come under growing scrutiny over billions of dollars in oil revenues that were not returned to Iran. An Iran International investigation found that members of one network collectively failed to repatriate $11 billion, while confidential documents showed 86 million barrels of oil had been assigned to four intermediaries who already owed money from previous sales.

Iran International also reported this week that senior IRGC commander Hossein-Reza Sadeghi and his son Saeed played central roles in efforts to preserve an IRGC Intelligence oil-sales network and shift its financial operations from the United Arab Emirates to Russia.

What they reveal much less clearly is what kind of change Iranians actually want, partly because answering such questions openly can carry serious consequences.

One, presented by Ebrahim Hajiani, a former director of the state-affiliated Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA), says the proportion of Iranians seeking "fundamental political change" has risen from 8 to 67 percent in two decades.

The other, supervised by Ali Rabiei, social adviser to President Masoud Pezeshkian, found that about 53 percent supported fundamental reforms, 19 percent wanted regime change and 13 percent favored minor structural adjustments. Only 9 percent supported preserving the status quo.

Despite their different methodologies and categories, the findings converge on one broad conclusion: dissatisfaction with Iran's political and social institutions is deep, and relatively few respondents appear content with the status quo. Hajiani's "fundamental political change," however, cannot automatically be equated with regime change.

The trust figures are similarly stark.

According to Hajiani, only 7 to 8 percent of respondents trust political officials, while trust in the three branches of government ranges between 25 and 30 percent.

Rabiei's survey found trust in the judiciary at just over 30 percent, against more than 54 percent who expressed distrust. The executive branch was trusted by just over 25 percent, while more than 59 percent expressed distrust. Parliament was trusted by 23 percent, with more than 59 percent saying they distrusted it.

The security institutions fare better. Hajiani found that 53 percent trust the regular Army, while both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the police are trusted by 46 percent.

Both researchers describe the findings in terms of an institutional crisis. Hajiani speaks of a "crisis of authority" or "crisis of reference," while Rabiei identifies a "crisis of efficiency, trust and political representation."

Hajiani also identifies 2022, the year the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising erupted, as a social watershed, dividing Iranian society into a "before" and "after" in attitudes towards dress codes, family dynamics, religion and the role of women.

Rabiei, meanwhile, argues that a "broad social middle" still exists: a large segment of society that is dissatisfied but seeks reform, stability and gradual improvement rather than upheaval. He says this constituency is poorly represented in the media, political parties and state institutions.

His figures provide some support for that interpretation, but the conclusion should be treated cautiously. The surveys themselves illustrate why.

Hajiani says around 70 percent of those approached by pollsters do not respond. That raises an obvious question over whether those willing to participate are representative of those who refuse, particularly when questions concern the legitimacy of the political system.

Sharq newspaper has previously noted that refusals and evasive answers are particularly common on questions touching on the legitimacy of the government and political system.

In an environment where opposition activity can bring serious consequences, respondents may have reason to be cautious about openly expressing support for replacing the Islamic Republic.

That does not necessarily mean the polling itself is dishonest. Even a methodologically rigorous survey can produce guarded responses when the questions are politically sensitive.

There are other limitations. Neither of the reports as publicly presented provides sufficient detail about sample size, methodology or response rates to allow a full assessment of representativeness.

Their institutional connections also warrant caution: Rabiei is a presidential adviser, while Hajiani is a former head of a state-affiliated polling organization.

A potentially more consequential problem is harder to measure: who agrees to answer sensitive questions, how those questions are framed, and which findings ultimately become public.

That makes precise conclusions about how many Iranians want reform, fundamental change or the replacement of the Islamic Republic difficult to draw from these surveys alone.

Still, even research emerging from institutions connected to Iran's establishment describes a society in which confidence in political leaders is extremely low, demand for substantial change is widespread and only a small minority appears satisfied with the status quo.