Iran-based and Iranian-linked actors have used two leading US artificial intelligence platforms to place articles under fake journalist identities and help develop targeting recommendations against US naval forces, according to separate investigations by OpenAI and Anthropic.
The latest disclosure came Thursday, when OpenAI said it disrupted an Iran-origin influence operation that used ChatGPT to help fake journalist personas place almost 100 articles in roughly a dozen online outlets around the world.
OpenAI dubbed the campaign “Bogus Bylines.”
The operators used seven fake journalist identities to pitch English-language articles, primarily about the US-Iran conflict. ChatGPT was used to refine drafts according to outlets’ submission requirements and prepare emails pitching them to editors.
The personas presented themselves as Western journalists, usually Americans. One, Ervin B. Hoskins, described himself as an “American freelance writer” and maintained accounts on X, Facebook, Instagram and Threads.
But OpenAI said platform transparency information showed the accounts were operated from Iran.
OpenAI identified articles under the operation’s bylines dating from July 2025 through October 2026 and said publication increased significantly after the US-Iran conflict began.
Some outlets subsequently promoted the articles through their own social media accounts, potentially exposing the material to audiences the operators could not otherwise reach.
The operators also used ChatGPT to produce batches of social media comments. Some were generated in response to posts promoting their own articles and praised or endorsed the stories, which OpenAI assessed was likely intended to make them appear more popular.
Other prompts requested comments portraying the United States as the aggressor in the conflict, Israel as an unreliable US ally and Iran as a defiant but resilient victim.
The operation generated more than two dozen batches of hostile Persian-language responses to posts by Iran International.
OpenAI said the replies it found generally received low engagement and rated that component Category 2 on its six-level IO Breakout Scale. The article-placement campaign was more successful, reaching Category 4 after repeatedly getting material published by media outlets.
OpenAI said the overall activity was consistent with a commercial actor running an influence campaign for hire but said it could not identify the actor behind it.
From influence to military targeting
The OpenAI findings follow a September report from Anthropic documenting Iranian-linked use of Claude for activities extending beyond influence operations.
Anthropic said it disrupted an “Iran-nexus threat actor” that used Claude to collect and analyze publicly available information to develop targeting recommendations against US naval forces in the region.
The actor used Claude to help construct a Python pipeline for tracking naval positions and compiling targeting handbooks.
The material included US personnel identified from captions on publicly available military photographs, ship and aircraft transponder identifiers, scripts for querying commercial satellite imagery and lists of public websites exposing US naval movements.
The actor also directed Claude to research vulnerabilities in shipboard systems, including maritime satellite communications terminals, Cisco communications equipment and industrial control products.
OpenAI and Anthropic have documented misuse by actors linked to several countries, including for cyber operations, influence campaigns and intelligence gathering, suggesting generative AI is increasingly being incorporated into activities that long predate the technology.
OpenAI concluded that the influence operations it uncovered resembled campaigns from the pre-AI era, with artificial intelligence making parts of the workflow easier.
The two investigations suggest AI is being used less to invent entirely new forms of influence and intelligence activity than to accelerate existing ones: drafting and pitching articles, manufacturing online responses, processing surveillance data, writing software and assembling open-source military intelligence.
Jurors at Woolwich Crown Court were taken through photographs, messages and phone records documenting communications among the three defendants and between Mostafa Sepahvand and two men in Iran.
Sepahvand, 41, Farhad Javadi Manesh, 46, and Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori, 57, have all pleaded not guilty to charges under Britain’s National Security Act 2023.
Prosecutors say they gathered information for Iranian intelligence to prepare for serious violence against at least one target, with Sepahvand expected to carry out an attack and the others helping to plan it.
Locations and social media
In an exchange on December 19, 2024, Sepahvand received a postcode from a UK mobile number and forwarded it to Javadi Manesh, the court heard.
The prosecutor told jurors the postcode identified the location of Volant Media, Iran International’s parent company. Sepahvand also forwarded the telephone number from which he had received it.
Messages from December 24 showed Sepahvand sending Javadi Manesh a photograph of Hosseini, a link to his Instagram account and information about Iran International’s website.
In one message, Sepahvand wrote: “go to insta and you will see both the dog and the car”.
The prosecution also reminded jurors of a video Noori had sent to Sepahvand showing a park where Hosseini walked his dog, Niko. Other messages referred to the dog’s name and a blue Volkswagen.
Jurors were shown photographs recovered from Noori’s phone depicting Malthouse Court in Brentford from several angles, taken from inside a car.
Prosecutors had previously told the court that Iran International journalist Mojtaba Pourmohsen lived there between 2019 and 2023, but the defendants appeared unaware he had moved.
Money and contacts in Iran
The prosecution examined records of Sepahvand’s communications with Mostafa Ghorbani and another contact saved as “Amin Mostafa’s Friend”, both in Iran.
The exchanges included discussions about transferring money to Sepahvand and references to an account in his name at the Workers Welfare Bank.
Jurors also heard messages concerning Sepahvand’s court case in Iran. In one, Ghorbani wrote: “haji says your case will be fine”.
Sepahvand sent Ghorbani two Iranian court documents concerning vehicles linked to him. The documents included instructions to impound the vehicles and arrest Sepahvand if he was found driving them.
Shortly after sending the documents, Sepahvand called Ghorbani and the two spoke for nearly a minute and a half, according to the records presented to the jury.
In later exchanges, Sepahvand complained that nothing had happened with his case. The logs showed repeated attempts to reach Ghorbani, including unanswered calls in early January.
Prosecutors previously said Sepahvand wanted help resolving an Iranian criminal conviction, which they consider relevant to his motivation. Jurors were told not to treat the conviction itself as evidence against him.
A police witness was questioned about the dates, times and durations of calls and messages recorded in the logs, rather than asked to draw conclusions about their significance.
Defendants dispute prosecution’s account
According to the prosecution’s account of his defense, Sepahvand accepts conducting surveillance for Iran but says he feared the consequences of refusing and deliberately did a poor job. Prosecutors reject that account.
Javadi Manesh and Noori accept visiting locations and taking photographs and videos but say they did not know they were assisting Iranian intelligence, according to the prosecution.
More than 56,000 people took part in the October 8 poll, with 68% saying ordinary people bear the greatest burden of US pressure. Another 23% said both the public and the government suffer, while 9% said the authorities are affected most.
Men accounted for approximately 76% of respondents and women for 24%.
The largest age group was 25 to 34, representing about 38% of participants, followed by those aged 35 to 44 at 29%. Respondents aged 18 to 24 and 45 to 54 each accounted for 12%.
Thousands of comments accompanying the poll reflected differing views on the economic consequences of US pressure, the Islamic Republic's responsibility for worsening living conditions and whether external pressure could bring political change.
Rising prices dominate concerns
The most common concern among respondents who believed ordinary Iranians were suffering most was the deterioration in daily living conditions.
Many cited rising prices, declining purchasing power, shrinking incomes and the growing financial burden on low-income households.
Others pointed to difficulties accessing medicine and medical treatment, arguing that people with fewer financial resources were particularly vulnerable to economic restrictions.
"Only ordinary people are being crushed under the pressure," one respondent wrote.
Several participants argued that even when US measures target the Islamic Republic, their economic consequences ultimately reach households through higher prices and reduced access to essential goods.
Officials seen as insulated from hardship
Another recurring theme was the perceived gap between the living standards of ordinary Iranians and those of government officials.
Some respondents argued that access to wealth, foreign currency, privileged positions and state resources allowed officials and their associates to avoid some of the hardships experienced by the wider population.
"The main burden falls on the people. The government would even be happy to see people becoming poorer every day," one respondent wrote.
Other participants said the Islamic Republic also suffers from economic restrictions through reduced revenues and limited access to financial resources, but can pass some of those costs on to the public.
For these respondents, the issue was not simply whether sanctions hurt the government or the public, but how the economic burden was distributed.
Economic hardship versus hopes for political change
The sharpest disagreement concerned whether the immediate economic costs of US pressure could be justified by the prospect of political change.
Some respondents acknowledged that ordinary Iranians were suffering but considered the hardship acceptable if it weakened the Islamic Republic or helped bring about a different political system.
"People will endure it because this suffering is worth it for a free Iran tomorrow," one wrote.
Others questioned whether worsening economic conditions would produce meaningful political change.
They argued that household finances could deteriorate far more quickly than external pressure could affect the country's political leadership.
Several respondents held both US policies and the Islamic Republic's economic management responsible for the hardships facing Iranians.
Some likened sanctions to a painful medical treatment, reflecting a willingness among certain supporters of external pressure to accept short-term suffering in pursuit of longer-term political goals.
Others rejected that calculation, arguing that the prospect of political change remained uncertain while the immediate costs to families were already evident.
A divided view of US pressure
Although 68% of respondents believed ordinary Iranians were bearing the greatest burden, their answers did not necessarily show opposition to all forms of US pressure.
Some viewed the economic consequences as unacceptable, while others regarded them as a painful but potentially necessary means of weakening the Islamic Republic.
Likewise, respondents who believed the government was suffering most did not necessarily dismiss the economic difficulties facing households.
"Don't ask when Iran will enter Gaza. Ask when it will leave," Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief of the hardline Kayhan newspaper, said a few weeks after the October 2023 attack.
The remark captured a contradiction in Tehran's approach. Iranian officials denied directing the Hamas operation while celebrating its consequences and presenting the so-called axis of resistance as evidence of the Islamic Republic's growing regional influence.
“Axis of Resistance” is the term Tehran uses for a network of Iran-backed groups in the region, including Palestinian militant groups, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and the Houthis in Yemen.
The calculation rested on two assumptions: that time favored Iran and that its network of allied armed groups could simultaneously pressure Israel and shield Tehran from direct confrontation.
Three years later, both assumptions have been tested by wars that have weakened Iran's regional allies and brought military confrontation onto Iranian territory.
Celebrating an attack while denying responsibility
On October 10, 2023, then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei praised the Palestinian fighters behind the Hamas operation while denying Iranian involvement in planning it.
The distinction was deliberate. Tehran sought to benefit politically from the operation without assuming direct responsibility or risking a wider war with Israel and the United States.
Former Iranian vice president Mohammad Bagher Nobakht warned officials against remarks suggesting Iran had directly orchestrated the attack. Meanwhile, figures within the establishment argued that Hamas's weapons, tactics and organization would inevitably be associated with Iranian support.
The competing messages reflected a broader strategic dilemma: Tehran wanted its regional allies to appear powerful enough to deter its adversaries, but sufficiently independent to insulate Iran from retaliation.
Hossein Salami, then commander of the Revolutionary Guards, described the Hamas operation as Israel's greatest defeat since its establishment.
Iranian officials and military figures portrayed the attack as evidence of a shifting regional balance of power and declining US and Israeli influence.
The underlying expectation was that Israel would struggle to sustain a prolonged conflict across multiple fronts, eventually strengthening Iran's position without requiring direct Iranian military intervention.
The regional shield breaks down
For decades, the Islamic Republic invested in a network of armed allies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Iraqi militias and the Houthis in Yemen.
These groups provided Tehran with influence beyond its borders and the ability to impose military costs on adversaries without committing Iranian forces directly.
But the wars following October 7 exposed the limitations of that arrangement.
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria deprived Iran of a central regional ally and a critical link in its network of influence.
Hezbollah suffered major military losses, including the killing of its leader Hassan Nasrallah, while Hamas and other Iran-aligned groups faced mounting military and political pressure.
The weakening of these allies preceded direct confrontation between Iran and Israel.
During the 12-day war, Israeli strikes damaged Iran's air defenses and killed senior military commanders, including figures who had spent years developing the Islamic Republic's regional network.
The subsequent 40-day war exposed further weaknesses. The United States and Israel killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the outset of the conflict, while Hezbollah entered the fighting against Israel.
The Houthis later launched ballistic missiles toward Israel, and Iraqi militias targeted American positions in Iraq.
Although these operations imposed costs, they failed to prevent continued military action against Iran and its allies.
Fighting in southern Lebanon continued even after Tehran presented the cessation of hostilities as covering multiple fronts, underscoring its limited ability to protect regional partners.
The network once intended to keep war away from Iranian territory had become increasingly unable to perform that function.
From regional proxies to strategic waterways
With its regional military network weakened, Tehran increasingly turned to geography as an instrument of pressure.
The Strait of Hormuz, a vital passage for global energy shipments, became central to Iran's efforts to raise the economic cost of military confrontation.
By restricting maritime traffic, the Islamic Republic sought to exert pressure not only on its immediate adversaries but also on Persian Gulf countries and the wider international economy.
Tehran also looked toward the Houthis and their ability to threaten shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, another critical maritime chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to international trade routes.
The strategy marked a shift from relying primarily on allied armed groups to using disruption of international commerce as leverage.
Yet it carried significant limitations.
Economic pressure on global markets did not necessarily translate into military deterrence against adversaries already prepared for confrontation.
At the same time, restrictions on shipping and the resulting increases in transportation costs placed additional pressure on Iran's own economy.
The Islamic Republic was therefore attempting to use economic disruption as a strategic weapon while facing increasingly severe economic constraints itself.
The cost of a strategy built on time
One assumption has remained remarkably consistent since October 2023: that prolonged confrontation will ultimately work in Iran's favor.
Tehran's strategy continues to depend on the belief that economic pressure on Persian Gulf states, disruption to global markets and the cost of sustained American military involvement will eventually strengthen its negotiating position.
But the conditions under which that calculation operates have changed substantially.
Iran now faces US pressure extending across maritime, air and land routes, alongside the consequences of war and the erosion of its regional military partnerships.
The pressure has exposed a contradiction in Tehran's strategy. Measures intended to raise the cost of confronting Iran have also increased the economic burden on the country itself.
In 2023, the Islamic Republic sought to use the strength of its allies to force concessions from its adversaries while avoiding direct war.
Three years later, it is attempting to preserve its regional influence with fewer military buffers, a weakened economy and greater reliance on the strategic importance of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab.
The central question is no longer whether Iran's allies can exhaust Israel through prolonged confrontation, but whether Tehran can construct a credible form of deterrence after the weakening of the regional network on which its strategy depended.
The Islamic Republic entered the post-October 7 period expecting time and geography to strengthen its hand. Three years later, it must determine whether those same instruments can compensate for the military and economic costs of its original calculation.
