Iran International
Two surveys emerging from within or around Iran's political establishment paint a bleak picture of public confidence: deep skepticism toward state institutions, single-digit trust in political officials and overwhelming demand for change.
What they reveal much less clearly is what kind of change Iranians actually want, partly because answering such questions openly can carry serious consequences.
One, presented by Ebrahim Hajiani, a former director of the state-affiliated Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA), says the proportion of Iranians seeking "fundamental political change" has risen from 8 to 67 percent in two decades.
The other, supervised by Ali Rabiei, social adviser to President Masoud Pezeshkian, found that about 53 percent supported fundamental reforms, 19 percent wanted regime change and 13 percent favored minor structural adjustments. Only 9 percent supported preserving the status quo.
Despite their different methodologies and categories, the findings converge on one broad conclusion: dissatisfaction with Iran's political and social institutions is deep, and relatively few respondents appear content with the status quo. Hajiani's "fundamental political change," however, cannot automatically be equated with regime change.
The trust figures are similarly stark.
According to Hajiani, only 7 to 8 percent of respondents trust political officials, while trust in the three branches of government ranges between 25 and 30 percent.
Rabiei's survey found trust in the judiciary at just over 30 percent, against more than 54 percent who expressed distrust. The executive branch was trusted by just over 25 percent, while more than 59 percent expressed distrust. Parliament was trusted by 23 percent, with more than 59 percent saying they distrusted it.
The security institutions fare better. Hajiani found that 53 percent trust the regular Army, while both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the police are trusted by 46 percent.
Both researchers describe the findings in terms of an institutional crisis. Hajiani speaks of a "crisis of authority" or "crisis of reference," while Rabiei identifies a "crisis of efficiency, trust and political representation."
Hajiani also identifies 2022, the year the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising erupted, as a social watershed, dividing Iranian society into a "before" and "after" in attitudes towards dress codes, family dynamics, religion and the role of women.
Rabiei, meanwhile, argues that a "broad social middle" still exists: a large segment of society that is dissatisfied but seeks reform, stability and gradual improvement rather than upheaval. He says this constituency is poorly represented in the media, political parties and state institutions.
His figures provide some support for that interpretation, but the conclusion should be treated cautiously. The surveys themselves illustrate why.
Hajiani says around 70 percent of those approached by pollsters do not respond. That raises an obvious question over whether those willing to participate are representative of those who refuse, particularly when questions concern the legitimacy of the political system.
Sharq newspaper has previously noted that refusals and evasive answers are particularly common on questions touching on the legitimacy of the government and political system.
In an environment where opposition activity can bring serious consequences, respondents may have reason to be cautious about openly expressing support for replacing the Islamic Republic.
That does not necessarily mean the polling itself is dishonest. Even a methodologically rigorous survey can produce guarded responses when the questions are politically sensitive.
There are other limitations. Neither of the reports as publicly presented provides sufficient detail about sample size, methodology or response rates to allow a full assessment of representativeness.
Their institutional connections also warrant caution: Rabiei is a presidential adviser, while Hajiani is a former head of a state-affiliated polling organization.
A potentially more consequential problem is harder to measure: who agrees to answer sensitive questions, how those questions are framed, and which findings ultimately become public.
That makes precise conclusions about how many Iranians want reform, fundamental change or the replacement of the Islamic Republic difficult to draw from these surveys alone.
Still, even research emerging from institutions connected to Iran's establishment describes a society in which confidence in political leaders is extremely low, demand for substantial change is widespread and only a small minority appears satisfied with the status quo.
Ali Rafiei, head of Tehran's police department responsible for monitoring businesses and public venues, said cafes must operate strictly within the activities covered by their licenses.
“Cafes must operate only within their licensed line of business,” Rafiei said. “Serving hookah, hosting live music or DJs, and gambling-related activities are among the violations that will be dealt with.”
He said police would take action as soon as such activities were identified. Businesses could first receive warnings and be required to provide written assurances, while repeated violations could result in their licenses being revoked.
Cafes face wider scrutiny
The warning follows a series of closures targeting cafes, restaurants, shops, gyms and cultural venues across Iran in recent months.
At least 42 businesses were reported sealed between late July and mid-August in different cities.
Authorities in Ardabil also announced the closure of three coffee shops and the arrest of 16 people during the same period.
Closures have not been limited to entertainment or licensing violations. Businesses have also been sealed over the enforcement of Iran's mandatory hijab rules and over support for nationwide protests.
Young people and public space
Rafiei said police monitoring of cafes extended beyond activities inside the establishments.
He pointed to Tehran's Sanai and Iranshahr streets, saying cars cruising through the area, sidewalk setups by cafes and groups of young people gathering without what he described as a clear purpose had contributed to congestion and complaints.
He said blocking sidewalks or public space could also lead to enforcement action. Police generally issue a warning and seek a written commitment from the operator before sealing a business, he added.
Continued violations could ultimately result in the cancellation of a business license, according to Rafiei.
Protest support has also drawn penalties
The pressure on cafe operators has also extended to owners who supported the January protests.
In one case, Iran's Supreme Court in September upheld the prison sentence and confiscation of assets imposed on Sadegh Saedinia, the head of Saedinia Properties and Industries and a supporter of the protests.
Saedinia was sentenced to 12 years, six months and one day in prison and barred from working in the cafe industry for two years after completing his sentence. All branches of his cafe business were sealed following his arrest.
The judiciary said the case involved social media posts, participation in gatherings, closing cafes and shops, and encouraging employees to take part in protests.
The latest police warning adds live music, DJs and hookah service to a growing list of activities that can expose cafe operators to sanctions, alongside mandatory hijab enforcement, use of public space and support for demonstrations.
President Masoud Pezeshkian initially rejected Paknejad’s resignation, submitted some time earlier because of “personal issues,” but accepted it after the minister again pressed to step down, deputy presidential communications chief Mehdi Tabatabaei said.
Paknejad’s departure, the first by a minister from Pezeshkian’s cabinet, followed weeks of Iranian media reports linking his position to disputes over sanctioned oil sales, major energy projects and management of Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC).
Pezeshkian appointed National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) managing director Hamid Bovard as acting oil minister. The government has not indicated whether Bovard will remain a caretaker or be nominated for the post.
Export crisis raises questions
Several Iranian outlets had linked Paknejad’s resignation to disagreements with Pezeshkian during cabinet meetings over the oil ministry’s handling of sanctioned crude sales.
Other reported disputes concerned delays to major projects, including development of the South Pars gas field, and the network of intermediaries entrusted with selling Iranian oil and returning the proceeds while circumventing sanctions.
Paknejad left as Iran’s floating oil inventories were approaching exhaustion and questions mounted over around 80 million barrels handed to intermediaries, Rouydad24 wrote.
The website questioned whether “personal reasons” adequately explained the timing, arguing that replacing the official overseeing the sector would not resolve falling exports, foreign currency shortages, unpaid oil revenues and the opaque structure of sanctioned sales.
Eghtesad Online website similarly questioned why Pezeshkian accepted a resignation that had been pending for some time when Iranian oil exports had approached zero.
Billions at stake in trustee system
The use of trusted intermediaries to sell crude under sanctions has become a central controversy surrounding the oil ministry, with lawmakers and media raising questions over unpaid revenues and the allocation of oil.
One intermediary, Hassan Aghayari, owed several billion dollars, ILNA reported on September 13, citing a letter Bovard sent to a senior supervisory body while serving as NIOC chief.
The contract allowing Aghayari to sell oil was concluded on the minister’s order without approval from the sanctions-countering task force, Bovard wrote, according to ILNA. The oil ministry denied the report.
Around 80 million barrels were separately handed to four intermediaries following the Islamabad agreement, lawmaker Valiollah Bayati told Hamshahri newspaper. Hossein Shamkhani, son of former Supreme National Security Council secretary Ali Shamkhani, was among them, Bayati said.
More than 86 million barrels were allocated to trustees without guarantees, lawmaker Hossein Samsami said. Around 30 million barrels reached final buyers, leaving the status of more than 56 million barrels unclear, according to Samsami.
The accounts have raised questions over how intermediaries were selected, what guarantees were required and why further allocations went to people who allegedly owed money from previous oil sales.
Battle over petrochemical giant
Paknejad’s departure has also been linked to a dispute with Mohammad Shariatmadari, head of PGPIC, Iran’s largest petrochemical holding company.
The oil ministry sought to replace Shariatmadari with Hassan Abbaszadeh in July 2026. PGPIC rejected the move, saying it lacked the procedures required under stock-market regulations and board approval. Shariatmadari remained with support from the presidential office.
Paknejad was unwilling to remain as minister if Shariatmadari kept his position, Iranian media reported. Meetings ordered by Pezeshkian failed to settle the dispute, according to those reports.
Shortly before the resignation was accepted, editor of the oil-focused outlet Miz-e Naft Vahid Hajipourwrote on X that Paknejad had been given an ultimatum at a cabinet meeting over Shariatmadari’s continued tenure.
“Paknejad did not accept,” Hajipour wrote, adding that Pezeshkian consequently decided to end cooperation with the minister.
Political pressure
Political pressure offers another explanation. Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was angered by the removal of his ally Hossein Ghorbanzadeh from PGPIC’s board and Paknejad’s refusal to reinstate him, journalist Hatef Salehi wrote on X on October 1.
Ghalibaf subsequently pressed Pezeshkian to remove Paknejad, Salehi said.
“If the oil minister is replaced in the coming days, the roots of the decision should be sought in Ghorbanzadeh’s longstanding friendship and relationship with Ghalibaf, not in the government’s strategy,” Salehi wrote.
The competing accounts leave no single explanation for Paknejad’s departure, placing it instead at the intersection of an export crisis, disputed sanctioned oil sales, a battle over one of Iran’s biggest companies and reported political pressure over control of key posts.
The latest warning came from Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, secretary of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace and head of the National Cyberspace Center, who raised the possibility of treating satellite internet infrastructure as a military target.
“If satellite internet infrastructure is used as a tool of war, naturally this infrastructure can become a legitimate military target,” Aghamiri said Monday at a conference on online businesses organized by Iran’s cyber police.
Aghamiri described satellite internet and Starlink as potential threats and said the Islamic Republic was technically prepared to counter them.
Referring to the January protests as a “coup,” Aghamiri said authorities had succeeded in disabling Starlink terminals during the unrest.
Officials and state media have repeatedly described anti-government protests as riots or attempted coups and attributed them to foreign actors, including the United States and Israel.
Internet shutdowns and protests
Internet restrictions have long been used by Iranian authorities during periods of widespread unrest.
The Islamic Republic imposed a sweeping internet shutdown during the November 2019 protests and has since restricted or cut connectivity at different points, including during the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, the 12-day war and the January 2026 protests.
After the 40-day war began in late February, authorities again cut internet access. The restrictions lasted 88 days, becoming the longest digital blackout in the world.
Concerns surrounding Starlink have grown alongside an increased US military presence in the region, worsening economic conditions and domestic discontent.
Internet and cybersecurity expert Davoud Sajjadi told Iran International on October 1 that Starlink allows users to bypass filtering and other government mechanisms designed to control internet access.
The ability to connect outside those systems has made the technology a growing concern for officials, Sajjadi said.
Diplomatic pressure and Starlink seizures
Iran has also pursued diplomatic and law-enforcement measures against the satellite service.
The Foreign Ministry summoned Norway’s ambassador on Sunday to protest continued Starlink operations in Iran.
Norway is the country through which the Starlink network is registered with the International Telecommunication Union, and Iranian authorities say Oslo is therefore responsible for preventing what they describe as unauthorized operations inside Iran.
Foreign Ministry delivered a formal protest to the Norwegian ambassador and called on Norway to take action to halt Starlink operations in Iran.
Authorities have simultaneously intensified efforts to stop the import and distribution of Starlink equipment.
Hossein Rahimi, head of Iran’s Economic Security Police, previously said police seized 997 Starlink devices and related equipment during the first four months of the current Iranian year, which started in mid-March, and arrested 163 people in connection with their import and distribution.
Efforts to stop the entry and distribution of Starlink equipment increased after the 12-day war, Rahimi added.
Official warns Starlink could force power cuts
The extent of official concern was underscored by a Communications Ministry official who warned that widespread Starlink access could undermine the government’s existing mechanisms for controlling cyberspace.
“The spread of Starlink drives the final nail into the coffin of cyberspace governance,” Mohammad Hafez Hakami, deputy minister for technology, innovation and international affairs at the Communications Ministry, said on September 30.
“Those concerned about Starlink have been warning about it for two years, but not even a single line of policy has been developed on the issue,” Hakami said. “If this trend continues, we will be forced to cut electricity in the next crisis.”
Hakami also warned that the expansion of Starlink and direct-to-cell technology could render mechanisms such as device registration and user identification ineffective.
“Starlink, as a new tool that evades governance, is fundamentally no longer based on our network,” Hakami said.
Direct-to-cell technology allows mobile phones to connect directly to satellites without relying on conventional telecommunications towers.
The prospect of satellite connections operating independently of domestic networks poses a particular challenge to authorities because shutting down conventional internet infrastructure would no longer necessarily disconnect users.
Starlink enters broader debate over information access
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also highlighted Starlink during his September 24 address to the United Nations General Assembly, holding up one of the devices while discussing access to information in Iran.
“The Iranian regime is especially afraid when their people have this. This is a communications device, Starlink, that allows people to access truth, to exercise choice and to exercise freedom of thought and freedom of speech.”
Netanyahu said Starlink could give Iranians access to what he called “truth,” as well as choice, freedom of thought and freedom of speech.
The growing focus on Starlink now extends across several arms of the Iranian state, from diplomatic pressure and equipment seizures to technical countermeasures and warnings of military action.
