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INSIGHT

Iran looks for escape routes as US sanctions close in

Behrouz Turani
Behrouz Turani

Iran International

Oct 8, 2026, 00:00 GMT+1
File photo: Trucks at the Bazargan border crossing between Iran and Turkey, with Mount Ararat in the background.
File photo: Trucks at the Bazargan border crossing between Iran and Turkey, with Mount Ararat in the background.

The widening reach of US sanctions across Iran’s transport and industrial networks has raised alarms in Tehran that Washington is seeking to close off the alternative trade routes the country has relied on to circumvent years of economic pressure.

Recent US measures have targeted Iran’s national railway system and major automakers including Iran Khodro and SAIPA, alongside foreign facilitators involved in their supply chains, while pressure has also expanded across aviation, maritime transport and financial networks.

The pattern has prompted some Iranian commentators to warn of what they describe as “network encirclement”: rather than trying to stop Iranian trade at a single chokepoint, sanctions raise the cost of moving money and goods across multiple routes simultaneously.

But Iranian economists and industry analysts are divided over how much additional pressure that can produce after years in which businesses have adapted to sanctions, and whether domestic dysfunction now poses a greater threat to industry than new US designations.

Closing alternative routes

Moderate outlet Khabar Online described the emerging strategy as “network encirclement,” arguing that modern economic blockades do not require borders to be physically sealed.

Instead, pressure can be applied simultaneously through financial sanctions, transport restrictions, higher insurance and compliance costs, and measures targeting companies and intermediaries that facilitate trade.

The importance of alternative routes was illustrated in a recent report by Mehr News Agency examining how Iran has sought to compensate for restrictions on maritime trade and rising insurance costs in the Persian Gulf.

The report highlighted truck traffic through northwestern crossings including Bazargan, Astara and Jolfa, connecting Iran with Turkey, the Caucasus and Russia. It argued that expanding land and rail corridors could reduce dependence on maritime shipping.

But Washington is increasingly targeting some of those alternatives as well.

Recent US sanctions have included Iran’s national railway system and major automakers, while also targeting facilitators in the UAE, Turkey, Hong Kong and India involved in supply chains.

Donya-e-Eghtesad described the measures as an expansion of pressure from maritime routes to overland trade, including networks used to obtain automotive parts.

An economy that has learned to adapt

Whether that approach can substantially increase pressure on Iran is less clear.

Industry analysts cited by Donya-e-Eghtesad said major Iranian automakers have developed extensive domestic sourcing after years of sanctions and reduced dependence on direct relationships with foreign manufacturers.

Eqtesad News went further, arguing that the latest measures against automakers and rail companies may carry greater political and psychological significance than immediate economic consequences.

Iran’s automotive industry has operated without direct partnerships with major international manufacturers for more than eight years and already relies heavily on intermediaries to obtain foreign components, it said.

The outlet argued that sanctions may therefore be producing diminishing returns, while domestic problems including price controls, supply-chain mismanagement and regulatory bottlenecks increasingly constrain production.

Economist Rasoul Safarahang made a similar argument in Khabar Online, saying an economy that has spent years adapting to sanctions is likely to respond to additional pressure by developing informal workarounds rather than immediately altering government policy.

Pressure extends to aviation

Aviation represents another potential pressure point because of its dependence on international maintenance, insurance, fuel and other services.

Iranian media have reported that US restrictions now cover 27 Iranian airlines, potentially affecting not only passenger travel but also time-sensitive cargo and the movement of industrial equipment and other goods.

Khabar Online estimated that restrictions on commercial aviation could cause between $3.5 billion and $5.2 billion in losses through reduced trade, tourism and supply-chain disruption, although the report did not provide sufficient detail to independently assess that estimate.

The outlet argued that longer transport times and more expensive alternative routes could ultimately feed through into higher domestic prices.

The debate in Iranian media therefore reflects two competing assessments of Washington’s strategy.

One sees sanctions as closing the routes Iran has used to adapt to earlier restrictions. The other sees an economy already so accustomed to sanctions that additional designations produces less leverage, while Iran’s own structural economic problems pose the greater threat.

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Kayhan attacks Ghalibaf’s role in talks. Didn’t Khamenei approve it?

Oct 7, 2026, 19:01 GMT+1
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Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf speaks with a lawmaker during a parliamentary session in Tehran, September 29, 2026

An editorial questioning Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf’s role as Iran’s lead negotiator has raised an awkward question in Tehran: who exactly is Kayhan criticizing, given that senior officials have said the parliament speaker was given the job with the Supreme Leader’s approval?

In a sharply worded column Wednesday, Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari argued that Ghalibaf’s appointment had effectively sidelined parliament for seven months and said those responsible should explain why they had allowed one of Iran’s central institutions to become largely inactive during wartime.

“If those who made this decision knew that its consequence would be the closure of parliament, they must answer this question: What was their purpose in shutting down parliament?” he wrote. “And if they were unaware of the consequence, that is regrettable.”

Iran’s parliament largely suspended its normal work following the outbreak of war in February, with security conditions and Ghalibaf’s negotiating responsibilities limiting its activities.

‘Coordinated with the Leader’

The criticism is striking because Mahmoud Nabavian, a senior hardline lawmaker, said on April 10 that Khamenei had specifically stipulated that Ghalibaf should lead negotiations with Washington.

Nabavian said the selection had been made “with the opinion and coordination of the leadership.”

Ghalibaf has played a central role in talks with Washington since negotiations began in Islamabad in April. He subsequently said he had not volunteered for the role and took it on following a decision by the country’s governing institutions, while describing the negotiations as having proceeded with Khamenei’s authorization.

Shariatmadari did not name Khamenei or directly question his role in the appointment. But his criticism leaves unclear whom he holds responsible for a decision publicly attributed to Iran’s highest authority.

Who watches the negotiator?

The Kayhan editor went further, arguing that Ghalibaf’s roles as parliament speaker and chief negotiator were fundamentally incompatible.

Parliament is responsible for overseeing the negotiating team, Shariatmadari wrote, meaning Ghalibaf is effectively expected both to supervise the negotiations and to be subject to that supervision.

The argument amounts to a challenge to Ghalibaf’s continued combination of the two roles while negotiations with Washington remain unresolved.

Shariatmadari, a longtime hardline figure appointed to Kayhan by the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, publicly clashed with Ghalibaf in August over his support for negotiations.

Ghalibaf responded by defending diplomacy as a tool of statecraft, writing that negotiations were neither inherently valuable nor taboo and that Iran should “talk when necessary, and fight when necessary.”

Ghalibaf has also acknowledged divisions within the establishment, criticizing both those who reject diplomacy altogether and those he accuses of advocating concessions to Washington.

Shariatmadari’s latest intervention goes further. Rather than challenging Ghalibaf over what he is negotiating, it questions whether the parliament speaker should have been given the job in the first place.

Tehran divided over $2 billion plan to prop up rial

Oct 7, 2026, 16:46 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee
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Iran’s central bank is offering as much as $2 billion in cash dollars to the public in an effort to slow the rial’s slide, triggering a fierce debate over whether the intervention can stabilize the currency or merely burn through increasingly scarce foreign reserves.

The dollar traded at nearly 2.7 million rials on Tuesday, after crossing the psychologically important threshold of 2.5 million last week, despite repeated efforts by authorities to contain the currency’s decline.

Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati said Monday that the bank would take whatever measures it deemed necessary to manage the foreign exchange market.

The central bank announced on Sept. 30 that it would offer up to $2 billion in banknotes at a rate below the free-market price, beginning with $1 billion sold through selected banks and bank-affiliated exchange offices. Individuals can buy up to $10,000.

The rial’s decline has intensified public anxiety over the cost of living and the value of savings. Iranian news sites now routinely publish daily prices not only for currencies, gold and cars but even staples such as meat.

‘Structural problems’

Economists have questioned whether selling dollars can have more than a temporary effect while the forces driving the currency’s decline remain unchanged.

Kamran Nadari, an economist and university professor, told Rokna that the intervention could temporarily stabilize the exchange rate if its purpose was to meet speculative demand.

“The main problems in the foreign exchange market are declining foreign currency revenues, difficulties in transferring money and sanctions,” Nadari said. “Selling banknotes cannot solve these structural problems.”

He also warned that selling dollars below the free-market rate creates an opportunity for arbitrage, allowing buyers to obtain currency from the central bank and resell it for a profit.

“As a result, part of these $2 billion could go toward speculation and arbitrage rather than meeting genuine demand,” he said.

Hardliners attack the policy

The intervention has also triggered unusually strong criticism from hardliners in parliament.

Mehdi Kuchakzadeh, a prominent member of the hardline Paydari Party, argued that ordinary Iranians struggling with living costs could not afford the roughly 25 billion rials needed to purchase the maximum $10,000 allocation.

He called the central bank’s action a “crime” and urged parliament to intervene immediately.

“If I were not afraid of hell because of the shortcomings I have committed against you, the people, I would set myself on fire in front of the central bank,” Kuchakzadeh said.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf said he agreed with Kuchakzadeh’s concerns and would personally follow up on the issue, which he said could be raised at a parliamentary oversight session.

Rouhollah Abbaspour, a member of parliament’s Industries and Mines Committee, argued that the program would primarily benefit people with money to invest, who could also pay others to use their national ID cards to obtain additional dollars.

A fight over scarce dollars

The conservative newspaper Jomhouri Eslami described the policy as putting $2 billion of Iran’s foreign reserves “up for auction.”

It questioned the decision as Iran contends with reduced oil sales, difficulties repatriating export earnings and increased government costs from war-related destruction.

The criticism strikes at a broader vulnerability for Tehran. Oil exports have been heavily constrained by the US maritime blockade, depriving Iran of its principal source of foreign currency just as the rial has fallen to successive record lows.

Tabnak, a website considered close to former IRGC commander and National Security Council secretary Mohsen Rezaei, described the measure as “Hemmati’s controversial gift to the rich.”

A question of transparency

Supporters of the policy argue that selling dollars directly through banks makes the allocation of scarce foreign currency more transparent and reduces opportunities for connected intermediaries to profit.

Former communications minister Mohammad-Javad Azari-Jahromi sarcastically suggested that critics apparently preferred a system in which dollars passed through “insiders” and currency dealers without transparency over who obtained them or at what price.

Economist Sadegh al-Hosseini made a similar argument.

“Central banks everywhere manage markets by buying or selling foreign currency,” he wrote on Instagram. “The only question is: whom should the dollar be sold to—a particular exchange office, a few acquaintances and trusts, or everyone equally?”

The dispute has exposed a deeper dilemma for Iran as its foreign currency revenues shrink: whether scarce dollars should be used to defend the rial in the market, and whether doing so can have any lasting effect without addressing the sanctions, falling revenues and barriers to bringing export earnings back into the country.

Parsian Exchange transferred millions of dollars for Iran despite sanctions

Oct 7, 2026, 13:30 GMT+1
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Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, Amirhadi Anvari
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Iran’s Bank Parsian, under US sanctions, used its foreign-exchange arm to move millions of dollars abroad through a network of intermediaries, according to an Iran International investigation based on leaked internal correspondence and transaction records.

The documents, covering the period from November 2022 to May 2023, show how Iran’s central bank and other financial institutions used Parsian Exchange, also known as Sarrafi Parsian, to facilitate payments outside Iran.

The transactions involved multiple layers of banks, companies and individuals, according to the records.

Bank Parsian is a private-sector Iranian bank that the US Treasury designated in October 2018, in an action against a network of companies financing the Basij paramilitary force.

The correspondence shows that four years after the designation, Bank Parsian was still arranging international payments through layered channels.

In most cases, no foreign currency actually left Iran. Foreign currency proceeds from oil, petrochemical and other exports were held in accounts overseas. At Bank Parsian’s instruction, Parsian Exchange transferred funds held in those accounts to overseas bank accounts designated by Iranian importers.

But the payments did not appear to come from the Iranian government, sanctioned banks or the Central Bank of Iran (CBI). Instead, they appeared to originate from private companies, with Parsian Exchange acting as an intermediary.

The process

In a typical transaction documented in the files, an Iranian importer—such as carmaker Iran Khodro—sought foreign currency from the CBI to pay a supplier overseas.

The CBI sold the foreign currency to Bank Parsian, according to the documents. The funds were then held at another Iranian bank in an account belonging to a separate individual or company, described in the records as a “trustee”.

The documents showed that Parsian Exchange facilitated the movement of this money between foreign accounts.

Many of the recipient accounts identified in the documents were held at banks in the United Arab Emirates, China and Hong Kong.

The documents show that, by structuring the transactions through these layers, Parsian Exchange obscured the money trail.

Iran International found no evidence that the banks in the UAE and China knowingly facilitated Iran’s efforts to circumvent US sanctions.

Bank Parsian and Parsian Exchange did not respond to Iran International’s requests for comment.

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People behind the letters

Parsian Exchange is a subsidiary of Bank Parsian. The bank directly owns 90% of the company, with the remaining roughly 10% held through Parsian Financial Group, its investment arm.

Iran International identified 33 instruction letters in the leaked documents that directed the movement of UAE dirhams, Chinese yuan and US dollars, with a total value of roughly $36 million.

Almost all the letters were signed by Alireza Alaei, Bank Parsian’s head of international affairs. He joined Parsian Exchange’s board as vice chairman in early 2020 and has served as chairman since mid-2020.

Many of the letters were addressed to Rasoul Salehi Oskouei, Parsian Exchange’s chief executive. Official records show he joined the company’s board in early 2018 and has served as vice chairman and chief executive since early 2020.

Salehi Oskouei had also served at another bank-owned exchange company. More than 12 years before joining Parsian Exchange, he sat on the board of Sepehr Exchange, an affiliate of Bank Saderat, from early 2006 to mid-2008

A review of Parsian Exchange’s current and former executives shows a recurring pattern of ties to Bank Parsian and Setad, the economic conglomerate controlled by Iran’s supreme leader.

Alaei joined the company’s board in early 2020 as a representative of Tamin Andish Pars, a Bank Parsian affiliate, and remains on the board. He also served on the board of Parsis Kish starting in 2015, representing Parsian Insurance.

Hesam Shams Alam, who served on Parsian Exchange’s board from 2010 to 2014, had also sat on the board of Bank Parsian. In 2013, he joined the board of Tadbir Investment Group as a representative of Tadbir Industry and Mine Development, an affiliate of Setad.

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Instructions for payments

The letters follow a consistent pattern. Alaei sent them to the international departments of other Iranian banks, including Saman, Shahr, Eghtesad Novin, Tourism Bank, Bank Melli and Bank Mellat, all sanctioned by the United States.

The letters were typically sent about 10 days after the banks purchased foreign currency from the Central Bank of Iran. In its letters to the other banks, Bank Parsian said the foreign currency had been “purchased from the central bank” and was being held “in a trustee account” at the recipient bank.

This is where Parsian Exchange came in. Bank Parsian asked the third-party bank to transfer the funds through Parsian Exchange to the ultimate beneficiary.

The subject line of each letter described the funds as being transferred via an intermediary, meaning the payment abroad was made in the name of a private individual or company rather than an Iranian bank or the state.

In a letter dated early 2023, Alaei sent a letter to the international division of the Tourism Bank. He asked the bank to transfer $990,000 held in a trustee account to an account belonging to SEALION General Trading Limited. A review of public records shows the company was active in Hong Kong.

In May 2023, Alaei asked Tourism Bank’s international affairs division to transfer $750,000 to an account held by SAHERI TRADING LIMITED, also registered in Hong Kong.

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Bank-owned exchanges

More than 500 licensed exchange companies are currently registered in Iran, 28 of them owned by banks.

By revenue, Parsian Exchange ranks second among them.

Adjusted to September 2026 prices, Melli Exchange, affiliated with Bank Melli, reported annual operating revenue of 1,253 trillion rials. Parsian Exchange ranked second with 1,168 trillion rials, followed by Omid Sepah Exchange, affiliated with Bank Sepah, with 1,129 trillion rials.

Iranian banks began setting up exchange companies more than two decades ago.

Sepehr Exchange, owned by Bank Saderat, was the first exchange company established by an Iranian bank on 25 July 2004. Parsian Exchange followed two weeks later.

Sepah, the state-owned bank with long-standing ties to the armed forces, owns three separate exchange companies. Bank Melli also operates Melli Exchange.

Sanctions

Parsian Exchange has never been named on the US sanctions list. Under US rules, however, a company owned 50 percent or more by a sanctioned entity is automatically covered by the same sanctions, so US persons are already barred from dealing with it.

In April 2026 the U.S. Treasury sanctioned a company it identified as Bank Parsian’s “rahbar”—a private firm that manages the bank’s overseas payments—and in July 2026 an exchange house it said had contracts with the bank.

The United States has targeted bank-owned exchange companies since 2008, when it sanctioned the exchange arm of the Export Development Bank of Iran.

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For about a decade, no new sanctions were imposed targeting exchange companies linked to the Islamic Republic until 2018.

By September 2026, the United States had sanctioned a total of 20 exchange companies based in Iran, including six bank-owned exchanges: Export Development Exchange, Dey Exchange, Sina Exchange, and Hekmat Iranian, Ansar and Omid exchanges, all three of which are subsidiaries of Bank Sepah.

More than three years after Joe Biden took office as president, Washington sanctioned five Iranian exchange companies on June 25, 2024: Hekmat Iranian Exchange, affiliated with the former Hekmat Iranian Bank; Omid Exchange, affiliated with Bank Sepah; Sadaf Exchange; Siavash Nourian Exchange; and Atropars Exchange.

It was the largest round of sanctions targeting Iranian exchange houses since Trump left office.

After Trump returned to the presidency, a new wave of sanctions on Iranian exchange houses began in 2025. By September 2026, the United States had sanctioned 11 more exchange houses.

Iran lawmaker named in alleged illegal treasure excavation

Oct 7, 2026, 10:15 GMT+1
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A senior hardline Iranian lawmaker has been named in an allegation involving unauthorized excavation for antiquities and treasure, while parliament is also examining a reported excavation case involving an unnamed member of the legislature.

Investigative journalist Yashar Soltani said he had obtained documents indicating that Mojtaba Zolnouri, a lawmaker from Qom and a figure associated with the hardline Paydari Front, was involved in unauthorized digging for historical artifacts and treasure.

“After oil, the Paydari camp is now after treasure,” Soltani wrote on X on Tuesday.

“I have obtained documents indicating that Mojtaba Zolnouri, the lawmaker representing Qom, was involved in unauthorized excavation in search of historical artifacts and treasure,” he added.

Soltani did not publish the documents or say where or when the excavation allegedly took place. The allegation has not been independently verified, and Zolnouri has not publicly responded.

Parliament examining excavation case

Journalist Zahra Abdollahi separately said the issue of a lawmaker involved in excavation for buried treasure had been raised at a recent meeting of parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee and referred to the body that oversees lawmakers’ conduct.

“At a recent meeting of parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee, the issue of a lawmaker’s misconduct in connection with digging for treasure and buried antiquities was raised, and it was decided that the matter should be reviewed by the board overseeing lawmakers’ conduct,” she wrote on X.

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Abdollahi did not identify the lawmaker, meaning there is no public evidence establishing that the parliamentary case concerns Zolnouri.

She said she had obtained an official document addressed to a prosecutor concerning excavation at a residential property in a historically sensitive area. According to her account, the letter called for the work to be halted.

Abdollahi said she planned to release further details of the document.

Paydari link comes amid oil-sales scrutiny

Soltani tied his latest allegation to a separate controversy surrounding Iran’s sanctions-era oil sales.

“I previously said that one of the four recipients of 85 million barrels of oil was the son-in-law of the Paydari Front spokesperson,” he wrote.

The reference was to Ruhollah Razavi, whose name has appeared in reporting on the network of trusted intermediaries, known in Iran as “trustees,” used to sell sanctioned oil and move the proceeds back to the country.

The wider system has come under growing scrutiny over billions of dollars in oil revenues that were not returned to Iran. An Iran International investigation found that members of one network collectively failed to repatriate $11 billion, while confidential documents showed 86 million barrels of oil had been assigned to four intermediaries who already owed money from previous sales.

Iran International also reported this week that senior IRGC commander Hossein-Reza Sadeghi and his son Saeed played central roles in efforts to preserve an IRGC Intelligence oil-sales network and shift its financial operations from the United Arab Emirates to Russia.

Iran’s own surveys reveal demand for 'fundamental change'

Oct 7, 2026, 07:30 GMT+1
•
Behrouz Turani
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Two surveys emerging from within or around Iran's political establishment paint a bleak picture of public confidence: deep skepticism toward state institutions, single-digit trust in political officials and overwhelming demand for change.

What they reveal much less clearly is what kind of change Iranians actually want, partly because answering such questions openly can carry serious consequences.

One, presented by Ebrahim Hajiani, a former director of the state-affiliated Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA), says the proportion of Iranians seeking "fundamental political change" has risen from 8 to 67 percent in two decades.

The other, supervised by Ali Rabiei, social adviser to President Masoud Pezeshkian, found that about 53 percent supported fundamental reforms, 19 percent wanted regime change and 13 percent favored minor structural adjustments. Only 9 percent supported preserving the status quo.

Despite their different methodologies and categories, the findings converge on one broad conclusion: dissatisfaction with Iran's political and social institutions is deep, and relatively few respondents appear content with the status quo. Hajiani's "fundamental political change," however, cannot automatically be equated with regime change.

The trust figures are similarly stark.

According to Hajiani, only 7 to 8 percent of respondents trust political officials, while trust in the three branches of government ranges between 25 and 30 percent.

Rabiei's survey found trust in the judiciary at just over 30 percent, against more than 54 percent who expressed distrust. The executive branch was trusted by just over 25 percent, while more than 59 percent expressed distrust. Parliament was trusted by 23 percent, with more than 59 percent saying they distrusted it.

The security institutions fare better. Hajiani found that 53 percent trust the regular Army, while both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the police are trusted by 46 percent.

Both researchers describe the findings in terms of an institutional crisis. Hajiani speaks of a "crisis of authority" or "crisis of reference," while Rabiei identifies a "crisis of efficiency, trust and political representation."

Hajiani also identifies 2022, the year the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising erupted, as a social watershed, dividing Iranian society into a "before" and "after" in attitudes towards dress codes, family dynamics, religion and the role of women.

Rabiei, meanwhile, argues that a "broad social middle" still exists: a large segment of society that is dissatisfied but seeks reform, stability and gradual improvement rather than upheaval. He says this constituency is poorly represented in the media, political parties and state institutions.

His figures provide some support for that interpretation, but the conclusion should be treated cautiously. The surveys themselves illustrate why.

Hajiani says around 70 percent of those approached by pollsters do not respond. That raises an obvious question over whether those willing to participate are representative of those who refuse, particularly when questions concern the legitimacy of the political system.

Sharq newspaper has previously noted that refusals and evasive answers are particularly common on questions touching on the legitimacy of the government and political system.

In an environment where opposition activity can bring serious consequences, respondents may have reason to be cautious about openly expressing support for replacing the Islamic Republic.

That does not necessarily mean the polling itself is dishonest. Even a methodologically rigorous survey can produce guarded responses when the questions are politically sensitive.

There are other limitations. Neither of the reports as publicly presented provides sufficient detail about sample size, methodology or response rates to allow a full assessment of representativeness.

Their institutional connections also warrant caution: Rabiei is a presidential adviser, while Hajiani is a former head of a state-affiliated polling organization.

A potentially more consequential problem is harder to measure: who agrees to answer sensitive questions, how those questions are framed, and which findings ultimately become public.

That makes precise conclusions about how many Iranians want reform, fundamental change or the replacement of the Islamic Republic difficult to draw from these surveys alone.

Still, even research emerging from institutions connected to Iran's establishment describes a society in which confidence in political leaders is extremely low, demand for substantial change is widespread and only a small minority appears satisfied with the status quo.