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Kayhan attacks Ghalibaf’s role in talks. Didn’t Khamenei approve it?

Oct 7, 2026, 19:01 GMT+1
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf speaks with a lawmaker during a parliamentary session in Tehran, September 29, 2026
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf speaks with a lawmaker during a parliamentary session in Tehran, September 29, 2026

An editorial questioning Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf’s role as Iran’s lead negotiator has raised an awkward question in Tehran: who exactly is Kayhan criticizing, given that senior officials have said the parliament speaker was given the job with the Supreme Leader’s approval?

In a sharply worded column Wednesday, Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari argued that Ghalibaf’s appointment had effectively sidelined parliament for seven months and said those responsible should explain why they had allowed one of Iran’s central institutions to become largely inactive during wartime.

“If those who made this decision knew that its consequence would be the closure of parliament, they must answer this question: What was their purpose in shutting down parliament?” he wrote. “And if they were unaware of the consequence, that is regrettable.”

Iran’s parliament largely suspended its normal work following the outbreak of war in February, with security conditions and Ghalibaf’s negotiating responsibilities limiting its activities.

‘Coordinated with the Leader’

The criticism is striking because Mahmoud Nabavian, a senior hardline lawmaker, said on April 10 that Khamenei had specifically stipulated that Ghalibaf should lead negotiations with Washington.

Nabavian said the selection had been made “with the opinion and coordination of the leadership.”

Ghalibaf has played a central role in talks with Washington since negotiations began in Islamabad in April. He subsequently said he had not volunteered for the role and took it on following a decision by the country’s governing institutions, while describing the negotiations as having proceeded with Khamenei’s authorization.

Shariatmadari did not name Khamenei or directly question his role in the appointment. But his criticism leaves unclear whom he holds responsible for a decision publicly attributed to Iran’s highest authority.

Who watches the negotiator?

The Kayhan editor went further, arguing that Ghalibaf’s roles as parliament speaker and chief negotiator were fundamentally incompatible.

Parliament is responsible for overseeing the negotiating team, Shariatmadari wrote, meaning Ghalibaf is effectively expected both to supervise the negotiations and to be subject to that supervision.

The argument amounts to a challenge to Ghalibaf’s continued combination of the two roles while negotiations with Washington remain unresolved.

Shariatmadari, a longtime hardline figure appointed to Kayhan by the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, publicly clashed with Ghalibaf in August over his support for negotiations.

Ghalibaf responded by defending diplomacy as a tool of statecraft, writing that negotiations were neither inherently valuable nor taboo and that Iran should “talk when necessary, and fight when necessary.”

Ghalibaf has also acknowledged divisions within the establishment, criticizing both those who reject diplomacy altogether and those he accuses of advocating concessions to Washington.

Shariatmadari’s latest intervention goes further. Rather than challenging Ghalibaf over what he is negotiating, it questions whether the parliament speaker should have been given the job in the first place.

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Tehran divided over $2 billion plan to prop up rial

Oct 7, 2026, 16:46 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee
100%

Iran’s central bank is offering as much as $2 billion in cash dollars to the public in an effort to slow the rial’s slide, triggering a fierce debate over whether the intervention can stabilize the currency or merely burn through increasingly scarce foreign reserves.

The dollar traded at nearly 2.7 million rials on Tuesday, after crossing the psychologically important threshold of 2.5 million last week, despite repeated efforts by authorities to contain the currency’s decline.

Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati said Monday that the bank would take whatever measures it deemed necessary to manage the foreign exchange market.

The central bank announced on Sept. 30 that it would offer up to $2 billion in banknotes at a rate below the free-market price, beginning with $1 billion sold through selected banks and bank-affiliated exchange offices. Individuals can buy up to $10,000.

The rial’s decline has intensified public anxiety over the cost of living and the value of savings. Iranian news sites now routinely publish daily prices not only for currencies, gold and cars but even staples such as meat.

‘Structural problems’

Economists have questioned whether selling dollars can have more than a temporary effect while the forces driving the currency’s decline remain unchanged.

Kamran Nadari, an economist and university professor, told Rokna that the intervention could temporarily stabilize the exchange rate if its purpose was to meet speculative demand.

“The main problems in the foreign exchange market are declining foreign currency revenues, difficulties in transferring money and sanctions,” Nadari said. “Selling banknotes cannot solve these structural problems.”

He also warned that selling dollars below the free-market rate creates an opportunity for arbitrage, allowing buyers to obtain currency from the central bank and resell it for a profit.

“As a result, part of these $2 billion could go toward speculation and arbitrage rather than meeting genuine demand,” he said.

Hardliners attack the policy

The intervention has also triggered unusually strong criticism from hardliners in parliament.

Mehdi Kuchakzadeh, a prominent member of the hardline Paydari Party, argued that ordinary Iranians struggling with living costs could not afford the roughly 25 billion rials needed to purchase the maximum $10,000 allocation.

He called the central bank’s action a “crime” and urged parliament to intervene immediately.

“If I were not afraid of hell because of the shortcomings I have committed against you, the people, I would set myself on fire in front of the central bank,” Kuchakzadeh said.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf said he agreed with Kuchakzadeh’s concerns and would personally follow up on the issue, which he said could be raised at a parliamentary oversight session.

Rouhollah Abbaspour, a member of parliament’s Industries and Mines Committee, argued that the program would primarily benefit people with money to invest, who could also pay others to use their national ID cards to obtain additional dollars.

A fight over scarce dollars

The conservative newspaper Jomhouri Eslami described the policy as putting $2 billion of Iran’s foreign reserves “up for auction.”

It questioned the decision as Iran contends with reduced oil sales, difficulties repatriating export earnings and increased government costs from war-related destruction.

The criticism strikes at a broader vulnerability for Tehran. Oil exports have been heavily constrained by the US maritime blockade, depriving Iran of its principal source of foreign currency just as the rial has fallen to successive record lows.

Tabnak, a website considered close to former IRGC commander and National Security Council secretary Mohsen Rezaei, described the measure as “Hemmati’s controversial gift to the rich.”

A question of transparency

Supporters of the policy argue that selling dollars directly through banks makes the allocation of scarce foreign currency more transparent and reduces opportunities for connected intermediaries to profit.

Former communications minister Mohammad-Javad Azari-Jahromi sarcastically suggested that critics apparently preferred a system in which dollars passed through “insiders” and currency dealers without transparency over who obtained them or at what price.

Economist Sadegh al-Hosseini made a similar argument.

“Central banks everywhere manage markets by buying or selling foreign currency,” he wrote on Instagram. “The only question is: whom should the dollar be sold to—a particular exchange office, a few acquaintances and trusts, or everyone equally?”

The dispute has exposed a deeper dilemma for Iran as its foreign currency revenues shrink: whether scarce dollars should be used to defend the rial in the market, and whether doing so can have any lasting effect without addressing the sanctions, falling revenues and barriers to bringing export earnings back into the country.

Iran lawmaker named in alleged illegal treasure excavation

Oct 7, 2026, 10:15 GMT+1
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A senior hardline Iranian lawmaker has been named in an allegation involving unauthorized excavation for antiquities and treasure, while parliament is also examining a reported excavation case involving an unnamed member of the legislature.

Investigative journalist Yashar Soltani said he had obtained documents indicating that Mojtaba Zolnouri, a lawmaker from Qom and a figure associated with the hardline Paydari Front, was involved in unauthorized digging for historical artifacts and treasure.

“After oil, the Paydari camp is now after treasure,” Soltani wrote on X on Tuesday.

“I have obtained documents indicating that Mojtaba Zolnouri, the lawmaker representing Qom, was involved in unauthorized excavation in search of historical artifacts and treasure,” he added.

Soltani did not publish the documents or say where or when the excavation allegedly took place. The allegation has not been independently verified, and Zolnouri has not publicly responded.

Parliament examining excavation case

Journalist Zahra Abdollahi separately said the issue of a lawmaker involved in excavation for buried treasure had been raised at a recent meeting of parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee and referred to the body that oversees lawmakers’ conduct.

“At a recent meeting of parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee, the issue of a lawmaker’s misconduct in connection with digging for treasure and buried antiquities was raised, and it was decided that the matter should be reviewed by the board overseeing lawmakers’ conduct,” she wrote on X.

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Abdollahi did not identify the lawmaker, meaning there is no public evidence establishing that the parliamentary case concerns Zolnouri.

She said she had obtained an official document addressed to a prosecutor concerning excavation at a residential property in a historically sensitive area. According to her account, the letter called for the work to be halted.

Abdollahi said she planned to release further details of the document.

Paydari link comes amid oil-sales scrutiny

Soltani tied his latest allegation to a separate controversy surrounding Iran’s sanctions-era oil sales.

“I previously said that one of the four recipients of 85 million barrels of oil was the son-in-law of the Paydari Front spokesperson,” he wrote.

The reference was to Ruhollah Razavi, whose name has appeared in reporting on the network of trusted intermediaries, known in Iran as “trustees,” used to sell sanctioned oil and move the proceeds back to the country.

The wider system has come under growing scrutiny over billions of dollars in oil revenues that were not returned to Iran. An Iran International investigation found that members of one network collectively failed to repatriate $11 billion, while confidential documents showed 86 million barrels of oil had been assigned to four intermediaries who already owed money from previous sales.

Iran International also reported this week that senior IRGC commander Hossein-Reza Sadeghi and his son Saeed played central roles in efforts to preserve an IRGC Intelligence oil-sales network and shift its financial operations from the United Arab Emirates to Russia.

Iran’s own surveys reveal demand for 'fundamental change'

Oct 7, 2026, 07:30 GMT+1
•
Behrouz Turani
100%

Two surveys emerging from within or around Iran's political establishment paint a bleak picture of public confidence: deep skepticism toward state institutions, single-digit trust in political officials and overwhelming demand for change.

What they reveal much less clearly is what kind of change Iranians actually want, partly because answering such questions openly can carry serious consequences.

One, presented by Ebrahim Hajiani, a former director of the state-affiliated Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA), says the proportion of Iranians seeking "fundamental political change" has risen from 8 to 67 percent in two decades.

The other, supervised by Ali Rabiei, social adviser to President Masoud Pezeshkian, found that about 53 percent supported fundamental reforms, 19 percent wanted regime change and 13 percent favored minor structural adjustments. Only 9 percent supported preserving the status quo.

Despite their different methodologies and categories, the findings converge on one broad conclusion: dissatisfaction with Iran's political and social institutions is deep, and relatively few respondents appear content with the status quo. Hajiani's "fundamental political change," however, cannot automatically be equated with regime change.

The trust figures are similarly stark.

According to Hajiani, only 7 to 8 percent of respondents trust political officials, while trust in the three branches of government ranges between 25 and 30 percent.

Rabiei's survey found trust in the judiciary at just over 30 percent, against more than 54 percent who expressed distrust. The executive branch was trusted by just over 25 percent, while more than 59 percent expressed distrust. Parliament was trusted by 23 percent, with more than 59 percent saying they distrusted it.

The security institutions fare better. Hajiani found that 53 percent trust the regular Army, while both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the police are trusted by 46 percent.

Both researchers describe the findings in terms of an institutional crisis. Hajiani speaks of a "crisis of authority" or "crisis of reference," while Rabiei identifies a "crisis of efficiency, trust and political representation."

Hajiani also identifies 2022, the year the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising erupted, as a social watershed, dividing Iranian society into a "before" and "after" in attitudes towards dress codes, family dynamics, religion and the role of women.

Rabiei, meanwhile, argues that a "broad social middle" still exists: a large segment of society that is dissatisfied but seeks reform, stability and gradual improvement rather than upheaval. He says this constituency is poorly represented in the media, political parties and state institutions.

His figures provide some support for that interpretation, but the conclusion should be treated cautiously. The surveys themselves illustrate why.

Hajiani says around 70 percent of those approached by pollsters do not respond. That raises an obvious question over whether those willing to participate are representative of those who refuse, particularly when questions concern the legitimacy of the political system.

Sharq newspaper has previously noted that refusals and evasive answers are particularly common on questions touching on the legitimacy of the government and political system.

In an environment where opposition activity can bring serious consequences, respondents may have reason to be cautious about openly expressing support for replacing the Islamic Republic.

That does not necessarily mean the polling itself is dishonest. Even a methodologically rigorous survey can produce guarded responses when the questions are politically sensitive.

There are other limitations. Neither of the reports as publicly presented provides sufficient detail about sample size, methodology or response rates to allow a full assessment of representativeness.

Their institutional connections also warrant caution: Rabiei is a presidential adviser, while Hajiani is a former head of a state-affiliated polling organization.

A potentially more consequential problem is harder to measure: who agrees to answer sensitive questions, how those questions are framed, and which findings ultimately become public.

That makes precise conclusions about how many Iranians want reform, fundamental change or the replacement of the Islamic Republic difficult to draw from these surveys alone.

Still, even research emerging from institutions connected to Iran's establishment describes a society in which confidence in political leaders is extremely low, demand for substantial change is widespread and only a small minority appears satisfied with the status quo.

Iran, US back to ‘square one’ as diplomacy stalls

Oct 6, 2026, 17:31 GMT+1
•
Behrouz Turani
100%
A portrait of Iran's slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is displayed during a Janfada rally in Mashhad, October 6, 2026

Rhetoric is hardening on both sides of the Iran-US standoff, with even Iranian analysts traditionally optimistic about diplomacy warning that relations are slipping back to “square one” as military and economic pressure intensifies.

President Masoud Pezeshkian added to that sense of a narrowing diplomatic opening this week, declaring that “talks are meaningless” while Washington maintains what he described as a naval siege and fails to honor its existing commitments.

Pezeshkian said Tehran would not negotiate under military pressure or abandon its seven conditions for de-escalation, a position that leaves little obvious room for compromise as the US builds up forces in the region and tensions around the Strait of Hormuz continue.

Veteran foreign policy analyst Ali Bigdeli, who has traditionally taken a relatively optimistic view of diplomacy with Washington, told Fararu on Tuesday that Iran-US relations had effectively returned to “square one,” with deep mistrust and uncertainty prevailing in both capitals.

He also warned that the increased US military presence in the region, combined with mounting economic pressure on Iran, raised the risk of miscalculation.

Hardline newspaper Kayhan seized on Pezeshkian’s remarks, calling for an immediate and complete withdrawal from Qatar-mediated diplomatic channels.

The English-language Tehran Times portrayed his refusal to negotiate under naval pressure as “a principled rejection” of unilateral Western coercion.

On Monday night, international maritime security agencies issued four attack warnings within four hours following new projectile strikes on commercial oil tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

Seven attacks on commercial vessels have been reported in the strait in the past week, according to maritime intelligence reports, which also describe direct radio warnings from the Revolutionary Guards Navy ordering some tankers to turn around.

IRGC-linked daily Javan highlighted the rapid succession of attack advisories and radio interdictions as evidence that CENTCOM’s naval presence has failed to guarantee freedom of navigation through the waterway.

But the same confrontation that hardliners portray as evidence of Iranian leverage is also generating warnings about its economic cost.

Economic daily Donya-ye Eghtesad argued that shadow fleets and off-radar transfers may allow crude oil to continue moving, but cannot reliably provide the raw materials needed by Iranian industry.

Once existing stocks of industrial inputs are exhausted, the newspaper warned, the combination of disrupted shipping and severed formal banking channels could push domestic industry into deeper decline.

Some Iranian outlets have increasingly focused on the possibility that a single security incident could upset the fragile balance altogether.

Moderate outlet Rouydad24 pointed to reports that American bombers were moved from RAF Fairford in Britain amid concerns about a possible Iranian or IRGC drone threat, as well as a US national security meeting last week with Iran and Yemen on the agenda.

The outlet warned that a single security incident could become a political trigger for escalation, sharply narrowing the distance between negotiation and confrontation.

Diplomatic channels have not disappeared, but harder positions in Tehran and Washington, an expanding US military presence, repeated incidents around Hormuz and growing economic pressure leave increasingly little room for error.

The emerging message from Iranian commentary is that a prolonged stalemate carries risks in either direction: deeper economic deterioration if it continues, and potentially rapid military escalation if it breaks.

Why Iran’s oil minister quit at a critical moment for exports

Oct 6, 2026, 08:34 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee
100%
Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad

Iran’s oil minister left office as exports fell sharply and questions mounted over billions of dollars in sanctioned crude sales, bringing disputes over oil intermediaries, corporate management and political pressure into focus.

President Masoud Pezeshkian initially rejected Paknejad’s resignation, submitted some time earlier because of “personal issues,” but accepted it after the minister again pressed to step down, deputy presidential communications chief Mehdi Tabatabaei said.

Paknejad’s departure, the first by a minister from Pezeshkian’s cabinet, followed weeks of Iranian media reports linking his position to disputes over sanctioned oil sales, major energy projects and management of Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC).

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Pezeshkian appointed National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) managing director Hamid Bovard as acting oil minister. The government has not indicated whether Bovard will remain a caretaker or be nominated for the post.

Export crisis raises questions

Several Iranian outlets had linked Paknejad’s resignation to disagreements with Pezeshkian during cabinet meetings over the oil ministry’s handling of sanctioned crude sales.

Other reported disputes concerned delays to major projects, including development of the South Pars gas field, and the network of intermediaries entrusted with selling Iranian oil and returning the proceeds while circumventing sanctions.

Paknejad left as Iran’s floating oil inventories were approaching exhaustion and questions mounted over around 80 million barrels handed to intermediaries, Rouydad24 wrote.

The website questioned whether “personal reasons” adequately explained the timing, arguing that replacing the official overseeing the sector would not resolve falling exports, foreign currency shortages, unpaid oil revenues and the opaque structure of sanctioned sales.

Eghtesad Online website similarly questioned why Pezeshkian accepted a resignation that had been pending for some time when Iranian oil exports had approached zero.

Billions at stake in trustee system

The use of trusted intermediaries to sell crude under sanctions has become a central controversy surrounding the oil ministry, with lawmakers and media raising questions over unpaid revenues and the allocation of oil.

One intermediary, Hassan Aghayari, owed several billion dollars, ILNA reported on September 13, citing a letter Bovard sent to a senior supervisory body while serving as NIOC chief.

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The contract allowing Aghayari to sell oil was concluded on the minister’s order without approval from the sanctions-countering task force, Bovard wrote, according to ILNA. The oil ministry denied the report.

Around 80 million barrels were separately handed to four intermediaries following the Islamabad agreement, lawmaker Valiollah Bayati told Hamshahri newspaper. Hossein Shamkhani, son of former Supreme National Security Council secretary Ali Shamkhani, was among them, Bayati said.

More than 86 million barrels were allocated to trustees without guarantees, lawmaker Hossein Samsami said. Around 30 million barrels reached final buyers, leaving the status of more than 56 million barrels unclear, according to Samsami.

The accounts have raised questions over how intermediaries were selected, what guarantees were required and why further allocations went to people who allegedly owed money from previous oil sales.

Battle over petrochemical giant

Paknejad’s departure has also been linked to a dispute with Mohammad Shariatmadari, head of PGPIC, Iran’s largest petrochemical holding company.

The oil ministry sought to replace Shariatmadari with Hassan Abbaszadeh in July 2026. PGPIC rejected the move, saying it lacked the procedures required under stock-market regulations and board approval. Shariatmadari remained with support from the presidential office.

Paknejad was unwilling to remain as minister if Shariatmadari kept his position, Iranian media reported. Meetings ordered by Pezeshkian failed to settle the dispute, according to those reports.

Shortly before the resignation was accepted, editor of the oil-focused outlet Miz-e Naft Vahid Hajipourwrote on X that Paknejad had been given an ultimatum at a cabinet meeting over Shariatmadari’s continued tenure.

“Paknejad did not accept,” Hajipour wrote, adding that Pezeshkian consequently decided to end cooperation with the minister.

Political pressure

Political pressure offers another explanation. Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was angered by the removal of his ally Hossein Ghorbanzadeh from PGPIC’s board and Paknejad’s refusal to reinstate him, journalist Hatef Salehi wrote on X on October 1.

Ghalibaf subsequently pressed Pezeshkian to remove Paknejad, Salehi said.

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“If the oil minister is replaced in the coming days, the roots of the decision should be sought in Ghorbanzadeh’s longstanding friendship and relationship with Ghalibaf, not in the government’s strategy,” Salehi wrote.

The competing accounts leave no single explanation for Paknejad’s departure, placing it instead at the intersection of an export crisis, disputed sanctioned oil sales, a battle over one of Iran’s biggest companies and reported political pressure over control of key posts.