Senior IRGC commander claims all US bases in region ‘inoperable’
All US bases in the region have been rendered “inoperable” and “turned into piles of rubble,” a senior IRGC commander claimed.
Aziz Ghazanfari, deputy political commander of the IRGC, said the bases had been intended to provide security for the United States and countries in the region.
“All US bases in the region have been rendered inoperable,” Ghazanfari said. “These bases were supposed to ensure the security of regional countries and the United States, but they have been turned into piles of rubble.”
Workers sort freshly harvested dates in a palm grove in Bushehr province, southern Iran, September 15, 2026
Iran’s economic hardship has grown so acute that senior government officials are increasingly acknowledging in public the scale of the pressure on ordinary households.
“We are ashamed that the public’s income does not cover their expenses, especially for wage earners,” First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said Thursday. “You cannot increase salaries by 20% when inflation is running above 60–70%.”
Government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani has disclosed a roughly 310-trillion-toman shortfall in expected tax revenues during the first half of the current year, while the head of the Food and Drug Administration says medicine prices have risen roughly 103% this year.
President Masoud Pezeshkian has offered an equally stark assessment of the public mood, invoking the 2019 fuel-price protests as a warning against imposing further economic pressure.
“People are now on the edge; if I impose another pressure, they may fall off,” he said.
The warning has not prevented the government from doubling the gasoline price for high-volume consumers, highlighting the difficult choices facing Tehran as it tries to contain household pressure while confronting the economic costs of war.
The household squeeze
The free-market dollar has traded at around 2.30–2.33 million rials this week, with the Iranian currency losing roughly 44% of its value against the dollar over the past six months.
Food and beverage inflation has officially exceeded 127% year on year, contributing to a sharp contraction in consumption of protein, dairy products and legumes among urban working-class households.
State-run ILNA has published unusually blunt reports on the cost of living, including unofficial bread-price increases in Tehran, families cutting meat from their diets and rents doubling.
The financial daily Donya-ye Eghtesad has warned of signs of a “new inflationary regime” in which persistent price rises are shaping contracts, expectations and everyday economic decisions, making confidence in the rial increasingly difficult to restore.
The approaching academic year provides another measure of the squeeze.
According to Donya-ye Eghtesad, equipping a single primary or secondary-school student with basic uniforms, a schoolbag, shoes and stationery now costs between 150 million and 200 million rials.
A basic pack of notebooks that cost around 3.5 million rials last year now costs approximately 15 million, forcing some lower-income families to reuse old school supplies.
War adds to the strain
Iranian oil exports have reportedly fallen from around 2 million barrels per day before the war to approximately 220,000–255,000 barrels per day in August, sharply reducing one of Tehran’s principal sources of foreign currency.
The Economy Ministry has established an “Economic War Headquarters” as officials increasingly frame the economic crisis as part of the broader confrontation with Washington. But falling oil revenues leave the government with fewer resources to cushion households against rising prices and a weakening currency.
Oil-industry workers have staged weekly Monday protests over pay and taxes at offshore platforms and in Assaluyeh, while nurses demonstrated in Kermanshah on September 8 over unpaid wages.
Accounts in Iranian media offer a more immediate picture of the pressure behind such discontent: street vendors struggling with higher rents, households going months without eating meat and parents weighing school expenses against basic food costs.
The combination of high inflation, declining purchasing power and sharply reduced oil revenues leaves Tehran with increasingly limited room to ask households to absorb further economic costs from the war.
Women sit beside mock-ups of Iranian missiles during the state-organized Janfadayan-e Iran parade in Tehran on September 18, 2026.
Iran's Revolutionary Guards paraded uniformed volunteers, Basij paramilitaries and children through Tehran on Friday in a state-organized show of force, two days after the anniversary of the 2022 protests.
The event, named Janfadayan-e Iran, roughly "those ready to give their lives for Iran," began in the morning on the order of Hassan Hassanzadeh, commander of the Guards' Tehran corps, with the password "Labbaik ya Khamenei," at your service, Khamenei.
State media put the number on the streets at more than 300,000 and said 600,000 had registered for military training. None of the figures could be independently verified. State television had spent several days urging Iranians to sign up.
The organizers billed it as a 313,000-strong parade, a number with religious rather than statistical meaning. Shiite tradition holds that 313 companions will rise alongside the Hidden Imam, the twelfth imam of Shiite Islam, who is believed to have vanished in the ninth century and to be destined to return.
Women carry models of Iranian missiles during the state-organized Janfadayan-e Iran parade in Tehran on September 18, 2026.
Hassanzadeh said the purpose of the exercise was to counter "the propaganda and media operations of the enemies of the Islamic Republic."
Hossein Taeb, the former Revolutionary Guards intelligence chief who now heads the Basij, described the marchers as "resistance battalions" ready for "full-fledged defense" and called the campaign "the biggest popular movement in the history of the world's wars."
Similar parades would follow in every province, he said, and the United States would soon be defeated and leave the region.
President Masoud Pezeshkian attended and described the display as "a magnificent manifestation of solidarity, cohesion and national loyalty."
Footage from the event showed, alongside Basij units and supporters organized by the Guards, children and teenagers marshalled by the Basij, and members of Iran-backed groups from the region, including Houthis.
Children hold rifles during the state-organized Janfadayan-e Iran parade in Tehran on September 18, 2026.
Women from the Guards carried rifles beneath a banner showing Donald Trump in crosshairs above the words "We will kill." Participants trampled US and Israeli flags. Anti-aircraft batteries, truck-mounted machine guns and the drones used against shipping in the Strait of Hormuz were put on display.
The parade closed a week in which the rial fell past 2.3 million to the dollar under a US naval blockade and new sanctions, and came two days after the fourth anniversary of the death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody, which set off the 2022 protests.
Police and the Guards had increased patrols in Tehran and Isfahan ahead of the date.
A worker during maintenance operations at facilities in Iran's northeastern Khangiran gas field, September 13, 2026
Iran is racing to restore gas infrastructure before winter after attacks knocked about 230 million cubic meters a day of gas-processing capacity offline, adding to shortages in an energy system already struggling to meet demand.
Iranian officials have said attacks knocked about 230 million cubic meters a day of gas capacity offline. Executive Vice President Mohammad Jafar Ghaempanah compared that figure with roughly 650 million cubic meters of daily gas production, although industry data indicate the two figures may refer to different stages of gas production and processing.
Tehran has begun trying to claw some of that capacity back. Officials have said roughly 100 million cubic metres a day could be restored in the coming months, still less than half the capacity reported lost.
But restoring production is only part of the problem. Rystad Energy estimated in April that repairing damage to Iran’s energy infrastructure could cost as much as $19 billion, affecting gas processing, refining and export facilities.
That figure covers physical repairs rather than the wider economic consequences of lost production, disrupted exports and industrial shutdowns. Rystad has also identified shortages of critical equipment and workers as major obstacles to recovery.
Winter could provide the first major test of whether Iran can repair enough of its energy system quickly enough to prevent wartime damage from developing into a broader economic crisis.
A system already under pressure
Iran entered the war with an energy system already struggling to match supply with demand.
The US Energy Information Administration has said sanctions slowed development of the country’s natural-gas infrastructure and that limited storage capacity left Iran poorly equipped to manage seasonal swings in consumption.
In 2022, residential and commercial consumers accounted for 33% of Iran’s gas consumption, industry including petrochemicals for 27%, and electricity generation for another 28%, according to the EIA.
Household and commercial gas consumption rises during winter, while demand from the electricity sector is highest during summer.
The loss of production capacity therefore leaves Tehran having to allocate a reduced supply among households, power stations, petrochemical plants and other industrial users.
The problem is not simply how much gas Iran has underground. Gas reserves alone do not guarantee reliable supply: the country also needs functioning processing plants, pipelines and storage facilities, as well as electricity, maintenance, equipment and skilled workers to keep the system operating.
Damage beyond gas
Reduced gas supplies to power plants could constrain electricity generation, while restrictions on industrial users could hit petrochemicals and energy-intensive sectors such as steel, aluminum and cement.
That means the eventual cost of the damage cannot be measured solely by the reconstruction bill. Lower production can also translate into weaker industrial output and exports at a time when Tehran needs resources to finance repairs.
Iran's broader energy sector is already under severe financial pressure. The war and US naval blockade have sharply curtailed Iranian oil exports, leaving tens of millions of barrels stranded in storage and depriving Tehran of crude export revenue.
The combination creates the risk of a cycle in which energy shortages constrain economic activity while reduced revenues make restoring the energy system more difficult.
A longer-term problem
The war has also magnified structural weaknesses that predate the conflict.
South Pars, which Iran shares with Qatar, is the country's largest non-associated natural-gas field and the centre of its gas industry. But the EIA had already warned before the war that without additional investment Iran could struggle to satisfy domestic demand while meeting its export commitments.
Sanctions have restricted access to foreign investment, technology and specialized equipment, leaving Tehran with an existing infrastructure challenge before US and Israeli attacks added an urgent reconstruction burden.
Rystad said delays in procuring critical equipment were likely to determine how quickly damaged energy infrastructure could be restored, while shortages of workers were another major obstacle.
The winter test
For Tehran, the immediate question is how much of the reported 230 million cubic meters a day of lost gas capacity can be restored before colder weather drives household demand higher. How severe the remaining deficit becomes will depend on demand, further repairs and whether additional infrastructure is damaged.
Tehran may have to balance household heating against industrial production and electricity generation while trying to rebuild infrastructure under sanctions.
Rystad's $19 billion estimate gives a sense of the potential physical repair bill. The larger test is whether Iran can restore enough of the system to prevent damaged gas infrastructure from feeding through into electricity shortages, industrial disruption and further economic pressure.
The coming winter should provide the clearest indication yet.
Supporters of the Islamic Republic wave Iranian flags during the 200th consecutive night of pro-state rallies in Tehran, September 17, 2026.
Iran’s nightly pro-government rallies have become an increasingly visible show of political force, occupying streets and squares for 200 consecutive nights and, more recently, turning their fire on rivals within the Islamic Republic itself.
For critics of the government, the gatherings have long carried a message beyond support for Iran during the war: that the street belongs to supporters of the Islamic Republic.
Coming after the mass protests of January, critics have viewed their nightly presence as a form of intimidation and a way of denying public space to potential dissent. For many, the effect is more mundane but relentless: late-night loudspeakers, road closures and disruption to daily life.
But the rallies have increasingly taken on another function. Participants have chanted against Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, President Masoud Pezeshkian and former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Khatami.
Some gatherings have also featured demands for strict enforcement of Iran’s controversial hijab law, whose implementation has been held back following a decision by the Supreme National Security Council amid concerns over public backlash.
The shift has prompted warnings that gatherings promoted as demonstrations of national unity are becoming arenas for political score-settling.
The Supreme National Security Council-linked Nour News website described videos showing increasingly harsh slogans at recent gatherings as a “worrying shift in Iran’s political scene.”
“When street gatherings become a place for ‘death to’ and ‘down with’ slogans against domestic political figures, the first sign of a shift in the direction of popular reactions—from the foreign enemy to the domestic rival—becomes apparent,” Nour News wrote.
That shift is particularly significant because hardline media have portrayed the nightly gatherings as a measure of national opinion.
The hardline Hamshahri newspaper marked the 200th night with an article titled “200 Nights of Referendum,” presenting continued participation as an answer to politicians who have called for the public to be consulted over the country’s direction.
“Two hundred nights of participation in nighttime gatherings are a completely clear response to the doubts of some politicians who believe that the people should be consulted and a referendum held in order to continue the resistance,” it wrote.
The article was referring to Rouhani’s recent suggestion that continuing the war and confrontation with the United States and Western countries should be subject to consultation with the public.
The reformist Shargh newspaper warned that a social gathering that began in the name of “patriotism” could acquire a different meaning if it became a place for deciding “who has the right to speak about the country’s policies and who does not.”
Even the conservative daily Khorasan, considered close to Ghalibaf, called for a review of how the gatherings are organised in an article titled “200 Nights of Taking the Field.”
It questioned the use of the gatherings to promote hijab-related demands that it said exacerbate social divisions. It also highlighted complaints about the disruption the gatherings cause to residents and traffic.
“What image of these gatherings forms in citizens’ minds when the sound of loudspeakers keeps a sick person in a nearby home awake late into the night, or when hastily organized vehicle convoys create severe traffic jams and leave a driver exhausted after a day’s work stuck in traffic?” the newspaper asked.
Similar complaints have appeared on social media.
One X user urged supporters of the rallies to ask shopkeepers, residents and taxi drivers what they thought of the disruption, asking: “What has that taxi driver done to deserve sitting in traffic because of 30 government supporters?”
Another user, Morteza Rezazadeh, pointed to the changing targets of the slogans: from Israel and the United States to Iran’s president and parliament speaker. Mossad can “rest easy,” he quipped, because those chanting were doing its work for it.
After 200 consecutive nights, the dispute over the gatherings is therefore no longer simply about noise, traffic or even demonstrations of support for the state. It has become a dispute over who controls the street, who can claim to speak for the public and who inside the Islamic Republic is considered a legitimate political voice.
Iranian state authorities organized a systematic, high-level campaign of murder, torture, and sexual violence to crush the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, according to a 1,000-page investigation published by Amnesty International on Wednesday.
The report states that senior officials directed, executed, and subsequently covered up acts that constitute crimes against humanity.
The findings are based on interviews with 270 witnesses, analysis of over 2,000 videos, and leaked official Iranian government documents.
"Amnesty International unequivocally opposes violations of international law by all parties and rejects any attempt to instrumentalize the suffering of victims of human rights violations in Iran to justify unlawful attacks that inflict further civilian harm," said Secretary General Agnès Callamard at the report's press launch, addressing both state repression and broader regional conflict.
Amnesty International identified 87 Iranian officials, including top IRGC and police commanders, who it said should be investigated for crimes against humanity under superior responsibility principles. Amnesty said that it shared its findings and the list of identified officials with Iran's leadership prior to publication but received no response.
"This investigation exposes the layers of command and coordination behind the Iranian authorities' deadly protest crackdowns," Callamard said. "The agents on the streets operated within a hierarchical and coordinated chain of command linking them to officials who directed, enabled, facilitated and supported crimes committed on a massive scale. It is beyond time to establish an international criminal justice mechanism for Iran before another protest massacre."
The report warned that impunity for the 2022 crackdown directly enabled subsequent mass atrocities, warning that state suppression of demonstrations earlier this year bore the same hallmarks on an even wider and deadlier scale. Amnesty urged the UN General Assembly to establish an independent international criminal justice mechanism to prosecute responsible officials.
High-ranking officials named for criminal investigation
Among the top-tier officials listed for criminal investigation under command responsibility principles are Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed on February 28, 2026, during military strikes, and former Armed Forces Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri, who died on June 13, 2025.
Other key figures identified in the report include Ahmad Vahidi, who served as Minister of Interior during the 2022 crackdown and was subsequently appointed General Commander of the IRGC, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Majid Mir-Ahmadi, Tehran IRGC Commander Hassan Hassanzadeh, and Tehran Deputy Prosecutor Mohammad Shahriari.
Leaked documents show early surveillance directives
Minutes from confidential security meetings show that within 48 hours of Mahsa Amini’s death in custody on September 16, 2022, state officials focused on controlling the public narrative and suppressing online protests. Security chiefs discussed strategies to secure public statements from Amini's father to support the official explanation of her death.
A government resolution dated September 18, 2022, assigned the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) intelligence unit to monitor athletes and political figures. The same document tasked the Ministry of Intelligence with tracking actors, artists, and opposition movements.
Written orders drove escalation of lethal force
Written instructions issued by the General Staff of the Armed Forces on September 21, 2022, ordered security forces nationwide to deliver a "firm and severe response" to demonstrations. Of the 326 fatalities documented during protest dispersals or in militarized zones, 178 occurred within the first two weeks of the crackdown.
Amnesty documented a total of 377 protest-related deaths, including 56 children. State authorities have officially acknowledged only 202 deaths and falsely attributed most fatalities to "rioters" or "armed terrorists" despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
Security forces used assault rifles, machine guns, and shotguns loaded with metal pellets at close range, while kinetic impact munitions caused severe long-term physical injuries and loss of vision among survivors.
Disproportionate impact on ethnic minorities
Baluchi and Kurdish protesters and bystanders accounted for 62% of all recorded deaths during protest dispersals, despite representing a much smaller share of Iran's overall population.
Operational guidelines detailed the deployment of Basij militia units and motorcycle patrols of up to 40 vehicles per battalion to maintain street control and prevent anti-government slogans from being written in urban centers.
The investigation documented widespread torture, beatings, rape, and sexual assault against detained protesters, including minors. Internal judicial communications show that prosecutors classified formal rape complaints against IRGC agents as "completely secret" and instructed staff to close files over time without citing security agencies.
When lower courts delivered murder convictions against security personnel, higher authorities intervened to overturn the verdicts, reclassify the killings as unintentional, or reduce prison sentences. State courts also penalized bereaved families by withholding statutory financial compensation and attempting to coerce false television confessions attributing deaths to opposition groups.
