Iran International
A gasoline policy survey by Iran’s energy optimization chief has reignited debate over how the Pezeshkian administration should tackle the country’s fuel deficit without triggering another politically dangerous price shock.
The poll was conducted by Esmail Saghab-Esfahani, Iran’s vice president and head of the Organization for Optimization and Strategic Management of Energy, who launched it on X on Monday and closed it two days later.
Under Iran’s current system, subsidized gasoline quotas are allocated to vehicles through fuel cards, with motorists able to buy a limited monthly amount at a lower price and additional fuel at a higher rate.
Saghab-Esfahani’s survey offered three alternatives: keeping the existing system while giving each citizen an additional tradable 30-liter quota; selling gasoline above current quotas at 870,000 rials per liter; or limiting supply to domestically produced gasoline without additional imports.
About 50% favored a model that would maintain existing quotas while allocating an additional 30 liters of gasoline per person based on national ID numbers. The additional quota could be transferred or sold to others at a mutually agreed market price.
Another 34% supported supplying gasoline beyond existing quotas at about 870,000 rials per liter, while 15% favored supplying gasoline in line with domestic production without additional imports.
Slightly more than 14,000 people took part. Critics, however, questioned whether the results could be considered representative of public opinion, citing the relatively low use of X in Iran, particularly in rural areas.
Iran’s gasoline imbalance is estimated at about 10% of consumption, according to the Khorasan newspaper, which has argued that the problem needs to be addressed but warned against using a policy that could create a much larger economic and social shock.
The economic newspaper Donya-e-Eqtesad argued that the results should not be interpreted as a definitive expression of public support for gasoline reform.
“People have shown greater preference for the option that, compared with queues at gas stations and 870,000-rial gasoline, imposes less direct harm on them,” the newspaper wrote. “This difference is important, because the policymaker should not conclude from the higher vote that society has accepted all aspects of the plan.”
The newspaper also questioned why the survey did not include a fourth option combining non-price and structural measures, such as reducing the use of fuel-intensive vehicles, expanding imports of hybrid and electric cars, improving fuel-efficiency standards, developing public transportation, combating smuggling and gradually reforming the auto industry.
It also argued that shifting gasoline quotas from vehicles to individuals would not necessarily reduce consumption if fuel remained cheap and vehicles continued to be inefficient. At best, it said, the measure could make the distribution of subsidies fairer and reduce smuggling or misuse of some fuel cards.
The methodology also drew criticism from users who participated in the discussion. Mohammad Reza Felfalani, a civil-society activist working on water, energy and environmental issues, wrote: “It is unfair to ask people to make a decision or assessment with this amount of data. If you yourselves are designing a plan with this amount of data, give us the right to worry about Iran’s future.”
Financial markets analyst Mohammad Shahrestani warned that none of the proposed options would be cost-free under current economic conditions.
“None of these ideas will be without cost under the current economic and livelihood conditions; a cost that may be irreparable,” he wrote, challenging those who oppose negotiations to offer a solution to the fuel problem that they can implement.
Another commenter warned that any gasoline reform would risk failure unless the government first explained how it intended to control the prices of goods and services that could rise as higher transportation costs feed through the economy. The user warned that such a plan could become vulnerable to unrest on the scale of the January protests.
Hardliner roots of the proposal
Saghab-Esfahani says he does not belong to any political faction, but his positions have often been close to those of conservative hardliners such as former presidential candidate Saeed Jalili. His appointment by President Masoud Pezeshkian in November 2025 drew criticism from reformists.
He has personally shown greater support for a model linking gasoline rations to individual citizens rather than vehicles. The model is among the policies previously promoted by Jalili and featured prominently in his campaign during the last presidential election.
That connection has led some critics to accuse Saghab-Esfahani of framing the survey’s choices in a way that would produce a result favorable to his preferred model and to political groups aligned with him.
One commenter accused the government of trying to impose a proposal developed by supporters of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Jalili over the past eight years.
“You ignored the criticism of every expert and now want to topple the Pezeshkian government by forcing this plan through, and then you stage a survey?” the user wrote.
Another argued that the wording of the choices was designed to steer respondents toward the government’s preferred option, warning that giving every citizen a tradable gasoline credit could become the Pezeshkian administration’s “Achilles’ heel” during wartime.
A further commenter said none of the proposed options could solve the problem and accused the government of using the poll to seek legitimacy for a predetermined policy.
Warnings over a price shock
Many Iranian experts and media outlets acknowledge the need to address the gasoline imbalance while warning against a sudden price shock. The central disagreement is whether consumption should be controlled through sharp price increases or through a combination of quotas, gradual price adjustments, demand management, public transportation and supply-side reforms.
The Khorasan newspaper, in an editorial titled “Do Not Perform Surgery for a 10% Deficit,” argued that if the core problem is an imbalance of roughly 10% between gasoline production and consumption, the government should not resort to a policy capable of creating a much larger economic and social shock.
“The dimensions of the potential consequences may be much greater than the original problem,” the paper argued.
The warning carries particular weight in Iran, where previous fuel-price increases have triggered unrest. A gasoline price increase in 2019 led to widespread protests that were violently suppressed, while an earlier increase in 2007 sparked riots in several parts of the country, including Tehran.
For the Pezeshkian administration, the challenge therefore goes beyond how gasoline quotas are allocated. It must address a persistent fuel imbalance without allowing a reform intended to ease pressure on the energy system to become a new source of economic hardship, political conflict and social unrest.
The UAE Foreign Ministry said this week that all trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran had been halted until further notice.
Afra Al Hameli, director of the Strategic Communications Department at the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said the decision came “in light of regional escalations that undermine regional and international peace and security.”
The UAE halted trade with Tehran a day after Donald Trump spoke by phone with UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, though it is unclear whether the decision was connected to Trump’s “Economic D-Day” campaign against Iran, announced later on Wednesday.
Trade between the two countries had already been severely disrupted after the war began in late February, when Iran launched attacks on the UAE and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was curtailed.
In late June, however, Mohammad-Sadegh Ghannadzadeh, a deputy at Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization, said commercial exchanges with the UAE were gradually resuming through Jebel Ali Port. He said goods and containers stranded during the war were again being cleared and moved toward Iran.
The latest UAE announcement now casts doubt on the continuation of that channel.
Al Hameli also stressed that the UAE remains committed to protecting the integrity of the international financial system, complying with international law and applying the highest global standards.
That position is significant because even if political tensions eventually ease, Iranian businesses would still face serious restrictions stemming from US sanctions and Iran’s continued status as a high-risk jurisdiction subject to a Financial Action Task Force call for countermeasures.
One of Iran’s most important trading partners
The importance of the UAE to Iran can be seen in the latest official partner-by-partner trade figures available from Iranian customs.
During the first 10 months of the Iranian fiscal year that began in March 2025, Iran exported around $6.5 billion worth of non-oil goods to the UAE, equivalent to 14.3% of its non-oil exports.
Iran imported approximately $14.8 billion worth of goods from the UAE during the same period, accounting for 30.2% of its total imports.
Before the war, the UAE was therefore Iran’s largest supplier of goods and its third-largest destination for non-oil exports, behind China and Iraq.
Its importance extended well beyond ordinary merchandise trade. The UAE was also the largest destination for Iranian fuel oil, or mazut, and a market for other petroleum products.
A blow to mazut exports and fuel supply
Data from commodity intelligence firm Kpler, reviewed by Iran International, show that Iran exported an average of around 256,000 barrels per day of fuel oil in 2025.
Nearly 70% went to the UAE, making it by far Iran’s largest market for the product.
A prolonged halt in trade therefore threatens not only Iran’s non-oil exports but one of its most important outlets for petroleum products.
The UAE had also been among the destinations for Iranian liquefied petroleum gas, or LPG, although China accounts for the large majority of Iranian LPG exports. Iran’s total LPG exports generate more than $10 billion in annual revenue.
The UAE relationship is also important from the opposite direction.
An internal Iranian Oil Ministry report previously reviewed by Iran International showed that Tehran had increasingly relied on barter arrangements to meet domestic fuel shortages, exchanging part of its mazut exports for gasoline and diesel, particularly through traders operating in the UAE.
Iran is already struggling with a gasoline supply deficit, while officials have discussed measures ranging from tighter rationing to higher fuel prices.
Restricting access to the UAE could therefore affect not only export revenue but Iran’s ability to obtain products and refined fuels needed by the domestic market.
The end of Dubai’s role as Iran’s gateway to global trade?
The UAE’s importance to Iran has never been limited to direct bilateral trade.
For decades, Dubai has served as one of the principal re-export hubs for goods entering Iran, allowing Iranian companies to obtain products manufactured in countries with which direct trade is difficult, costly or restricted.
US sanctions and Iran’s exclusion from much of the international banking system have made this intermediary role particularly important.
Goods manufactured in Europe and Asia have routinely entered Iran through UAE-based traders and logistics networks, while Iranian companies have also used Dubai as a route to reach other markets.
The financial dimension is equally important. Dubai has long been a center for Iranian exchange houses, trading companies and intermediaries that help move money across borders despite Iran’s restricted access to the global financial system.
US sanctions packages targeting Iranian oil, petrochemical and procurement networks have repeatedly designated companies and individuals based in the UAE for alleged roles in facilitating transactions on Tehran’s behalf.
A broad and sustained UAE crackdown would therefore affect more than the physical movement of goods. It could also constrain financial, logistical and commercial networks that Iran has spent years using to mitigate its international isolation.
A major new gap for Iran’s economy
The latest available Iranian customs breakdown shows that merchandise trade between Iran and the UAE totaled about $21.3 billion in just the first 10 months of the previous Iranian fiscal year.
But even that figure understates the UAE’s economic importance because it does not capture Dubai’s wider role as a re-export, logistics and financial center for Iranian businesses.
Iran is now confronting the UAE halt while already under pressure from sanctions, foreign-currency constraints, weaker foreign trade and disruptions to energy exports.
Alternative routes through Oman, Iraq, Turkey and other neighboring countries can keep some trade moving, but they lack the combination of proximity, port infrastructure, financial connectivity and established commercial networks that Dubai offered.
The UAE has given no timetable for lifting its suspension.
For Iran, the risk is therefore not simply the loss of billions of dollars in bilateral trade. A prolonged halt could close one of its most important gateways to the global economy.
Eleven of 16 properties examined in the affluent neighborhoods of Aghdasiyeh and Elahiyeh were advertised above 10 billion rials ($5,291) per square meter, the Iranian daily said on Wednesday.
It has to be noted that the Tehran figures are sellers' asking prices for a small selection of high-end properties, not completed transactions, while the international figures represent broader city-center apartment prices.
Average asking prices across Tehran were around 2.3 billion to 2.5 billion rials ($1,217-$1,323) per square meter, with completed sales likely to be lower than advertised prices, Farhikhtegan said.
Monthly salaries for many Iranian workers are commonly put at around 200 million to 250 million rials, equivalent to roughly $105 to $132.
Multimillion-dollar properties in northern Tehran
A 500-square-meter property in Aghdasiyeh was advertised at 15 billion rials ($7,937) per square meter, giving it a total asking price of around 7.5 trillion rials ($3.97 million), according to the newspaper.
Another property measuring 600 square meters was offered at 18 billion rials ($9,524) per square meter, or approximately 10.8 trillion rials ($5.71 million).
An 850-square-meter residential property marketed for redevelopment carried an asking price of 22 billion rials ($11,640) per square meter, putting the entire property at about 18.7 trillion rials ($9.89 million).
Prices in the sample climbed further in Elahiyeh. A 2,000-square-meter property marketed for redevelopment was advertised at 25 billion rials ($13,228) per square meter, equivalent to about 50 trillion rials ($26.46 million).
A 510-square-meter unit in a residential tower carried the same per-square-meter price, taking its total asking price to roughly 12.75 trillion rials ($6.75 million).
Tehran luxury prices overtake selected global cities
Farhikhtegan separately estimated luxury residential property in northern Tehran at $13,369 per square meter and compared that figure with average apartment prices across 30 cities.
Munich stood at $13,217 per square meter and Sydney at $13,067, according to the comparison. Shenzhen followed at $12,947, Taipei at $12,922 and Luxembourg at $12,793.
The Tehran estimate draws on luxury properties in some of the capital's most expensive neighborhoods, while the international figures cover broader city-center apartment markets.
International data focused specifically on luxury housing paints a different picture.
Knight Frank's Wealth Report 2026 defines prime property as the most desirable and expensive homes in a market, generally representing the top 5% by value.
Its data show that $1 million bought 42.1 square meters of prime residential property in Sydney at the end of 2025, implying a value of about $23,800 per square meter. The equivalent figures were about $30,400 in London, $29,500 in New York and $16,100 in Dubai.
Those figures put northern Tehran's listings in a different context. At an open-market exchange rate of around 1.89 million rials to the dollar, a property advertised at 25 billion rials per square meter was equivalent to about $13,228, below the prime residential values recorded by Knight Frank in Sydney, London, New York and Dubai.
The contrast highlights how Tehran can appear more expensive than Sydney when selected high-end listings in the Iranian capital are compared with average city-center apartments abroad, but cheaper when measured against Sydney's prime residential segment.
Tehran is not included in Knight Frank's international prime residential index, meaning no standardized ranking between the Iranian capital and the cities covered by its data is available.
Dollar pricing reaches high-end property market
The rial's depreciation has also led some owners of expensive properties to advertise rents or sale prices directly in dollars, Farhikhtegan said.
Previous listings cited by the newspaper included furnished apartments offered for monthly rents of roughly $1,100 to $4,200, with some landlords seeking dollar payments to limit the erosion of rental income as the rial loses value.
However, most residential sales and rental agreements remain denominated in Iran's currency.
The growing divide between incomes and housing costs has reshaped living arrangements for some Iranians, pushing tenants to cheaper cities or Tehran’s outskirts, back into their parents’ homes, or into shared apartments to split expenses.
