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CENTCOM denies report its chief pushed for renewed Iran strikes - Al Jazeera

Aug 13, 2026, 23:42 GMT+1

Al Jazeera reported Thursday that US Central Command denied an Israeli media report that its commander, Adm. Brad Cooper, had urged renewed strikes on Iran, calling the report false.

Israel’s Channel 13 had reported that Cooper pushed for attacks on Iranian infrastructure, including oil, gas and electricity facilities, during a recent visit to Israel.

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Tehran’s reshuffle leaves no pragmatic opening

Aug 13, 2026, 21:58 GMT+1
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Saeed Ghasseminejad , Janatan Sayeh
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An Islamic Republic supporter holds a picture of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s latest appointments to Iran’s top security and paramilitary institutions are not routine personnel changes but a reflection of his priorities for tighter control over the institutions directing war and domestic repression.

The defining struggle in Tehran is not between moderates and hardliners. It is a contest within the hardline establishment and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) over power, patronage, and coercion.

The transition has occurred during a very turbulent time for the Islamic Republic, in the midst of a war with both the U.S. and Israel and only months after the largest anti-regime uprising. Mojtaba has also remained largely out of public view for months, fueling uncertainty over his status and capacity to lead. This vacuum gave rival security networks room to advance their own interests, but Washington should not mistake competition within the regime for a pragmatic opening.

The SNSC is the body that coordinates defense, intelligence, and foreign-policy decisions and its resolutions take effect only after approval by the supreme leader. The secretary therefore operates at the intersection of war, diplomacy, and internal security. Rezaei commanded the IRGC from 1981 to 1997, founded its intelligence unit, and served as Mojtaba’s military adviser since March. Mojtaba first named him his representative on the council and Pezeshkian then formally appointed him secretary.

The removal of Rezaei’s predecessor, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, is equally revealing. He held the secretary position for less than five months, an extraordinarily short tenure for a post usually held for years. Pezeshkian had reportedly asked him to remain and later acknowledged unspecified “differences,” exposing the friction between the presidency and Mojtaba’s emerging power center.

Zolghadr was a close ally of Ahmad Vahidi, the IRGC commander who played a central role in running the country during the war, while Rezaei has shown he is fully aligned with Mojtaba. Replacing one hardline IRGC veteran with another, therefore, reflects a shift in networks rather than ideology, placing the regime’s most important security forum under Mojtaba’s orbit.

The dispute over the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Washington and Tehran deepened that divide. Zolghadr voted in favor of it, while Rezaei had publicly questioned the agreement and later argued that Mojtaba had favored a different path. Zolghadr’s support for the memorandum made him less compatible with a leader determined to impose his own authority on the security establishment.

Taeb’s appointment is equally significant. He and Mojtaba both served in the Habib battalion during the Iran-Iraq War, beginning an alliance that later extended into years of behind-the-scenes schemes to influence Iranian politics. Taeb was sidelined late in Ali Khamenei’s rule after his removal as head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization in 2022, but Mojtaba has now restored him to lead the Basij once again.

The Basij paramilitary embeds itself across various sectors of Iranian society and mobilizes regime loyalists to surveil and repress dissidents. Taeb sharpened that coercive machinery during his tenure, a record that later drew sanctions from the United States, Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. Mojtaba now has a trusted loyalist at the center of the institution most crucial for suppressing another nationwide uprising.

Taeb’s appointment decree instructed him to strengthen the Basij’s ‘intelligence network,’ expand its use of technology and improve coordination with other regime bodies. The priority is unmistakable: consolidation at the top and more effective control of the streets.

Ali Khamenei’s death was bound to trigger a struggle for power. For decades, access to political office, economic privilege, and security authority depended on proximity to him and his office. His death disrupted that system of patronage.

Mojtaba’s task is threefold. He must strengthen his own network, balance the influence of officials tied to rival centers of power, and sideline networks that flourished under his father and were opposed to Mojtaba. Rezaei’s elevation and Taeb’s return serve that purpose.

Washington should treat this reshuffle as a warning that Mojtaba is placing loyalists at the helm of the institutions that shape external and internal national security doctrines. This should put an end to Washington’s hope that pragmatists inside the regime can lead the country toward a different path.

The United States should reject bargains that strengthen the regime without verified changes in Tehran’s conduct. It should work with Israel and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to deter Iranian aggression and constrain Tehran’s military partnership with Russia and China. It should also deny the regime’s repressive organs the finance and technology they need while expanding support for the Iranian people confronting the regime’s apparatus of oppression.

How Iran’s Supreme National Security Council works, and who gets a vote

Aug 13, 2026, 21:09 GMT+1
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Current members of Iran's Supreme National Security Council

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council brings together the country’s most powerful officials, but its workings are less straightforward than its name suggests, as even its secretary, often dubbed Iran’s security chief, does not automatically have a vote.

That distinction has come into sharper focus with Mohsen Rezaei’s appointment as secretary of the council. Rezaei was first appointed by Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei as one of his two representatives on the SNSC, giving him a constitutional seat and a vote. President Masoud Pezeshkian then appointed him secretary, putting him in charge of the council’s secretariat as well.

The order was notable, as in recent decades, the more familiar pattern had been for the president to choose a secretary first and for the Supreme Leader to subsequently appoint the same person as one of his representatives, effectively giving the secretary a vote.

With Rezaei, the process worked the other way around: Khamenei placed him on the council first, and Pezeshkian followed by making him secretary.

The move was welcomed by some hardliners as a sign that Pezeshkian was deferring to the new Supreme Leader and demonstrating his loyalty, amid lingering uncertainty over Mojtaba Khamenei’s authority after months out of public view.

The episode also highlighted something that is often lost in descriptions of the SNSC: being secretary and being a voting member are two separate things.

What is the SNSC?

The Supreme National Security Council was created in its current form when Iran’s Constitution was revised in 1989, shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of Islamic Republic founder Ruhollah Khomeini.

Article 176 of the Constitution gives it three broad responsibilities: determining defense and national security policies within the general policies set by the Supreme Leader; coordinating political, intelligence, economic, social and cultural activities related to national security; and mobilizing the country’s resources against internal and external threats.

Its remit is therefore much broader than military affairs. Questions involving war and peace, nuclear policy, negotiations with foreign governments, sanctions, domestic unrest, internet restrictions, intelligence matters and major regional security issues can all fall within its orbit.

The president chairs the council, but that does not mean the president controls it. The SNSC was designed to bring together several centers of power that do not answer to the president alone, including the judiciary, parliament, the armed forces and the Supreme Leader’s office.

And there is another important limit on its authority: its decisions do not become binding simply because the council approves them. Under the Constitution, SNSC resolutions take effect only after approval by the Supreme Leader.

Once approved by the Leader, no other state body, including parliament or the judiciary, has a formal veto over them.

Who are the permanent members?

Article 176 provides for 10 officials who hold seats on the council by virtue of their positions.

They are the president, who chairs the council; the speaker of parliament; the head of the judiciary; the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff; the official responsible for planning and budget affairs; two representatives appointed by the Supreme Leader; the foreign minister; the interior minister; and the intelligence minister.

Those 10 positions form the fixed constitutional core of the SNSC.

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The two representatives of the Supreme Leader are particularly important. They are not representatives of the government or of another state institution. They sit directly on behalf of the Leader and have the same right to vote as the other constitutional members.

At present, those two seats are held by Saeed Jalili and Mohsen Rezaei.

Who can be added when needed?

The Constitution also names three additional categories of officials who can join the council depending on the issue being discussed.

These are the highest-ranking officer of the regular Army, the highest-ranking officer of the Revolutionary Guards, and the minister responsible for the matter under consideration.

That distinction matters because the Army and IRGC commanders are often casually described as permanent members of the SNSC. In practice, they attend many important meetings and may appear to be part of the council’s standing membership. Constitutionally, however, their participation is tied to the subject before the council.

When they participate in that capacity, they are members of the council for that discussion and have the right to vote.

The same applies to an additional minister. If the council is discussing an issue that directly concerns energy, communications, health, transport or another government portfolio, the relevant minister can be brought in as a member for that issue and can vote.

This means the number of voting members is not necessarily the same at every meeting. The council has 10 fixed members, but the number can rise depending on which military commanders or ministers are required for a particular discussion.

In June, Iranian state media reported that twelve out of the thirteen voting members of the Council voted to approve the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the United States.

Who can attend without a vote?

The SNSC can also invite other officials whose expertise or institutional role is relevant to a discussion.

That could include, for example, the head of state broadcaster IRIB, the central bank governor, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization, senior police officials, economic officials or military commanders who do not hold one of the positions specifically named in Article 176.

Their presence does not make them members of the council.

They may brief the SNSC, take part in discussions or answer questions, but they do not acquire voting rights simply because they have been invited to a meeting.

This creates an important distinction between three categories of people in the room: fixed constitutional members, issue-specific constitutional members who can vote, and invited officials who can participate but cannot vote.

Why the secretary is different

The secretary is one of the most visible figures associated with the SNSC and often acts as the day-to-day face of Iran’s national security establishment.

But there is an unusual feature in the Constitution: the secretary is not listed among the council’s members.

The secretary runs the secretariat, helps prepare meetings, coordinates between institutions, follows up on decisions and can be entrusted with major diplomatic or security files. The president appoints the secretary.

But that appointment alone does not give the secretary a seat or a vote.

For most of the SNSC’s history, this apparent gap has been resolved by giving the secretary another position at the same time: one of the Supreme Leader’s two representative seats.

That second appointment, not the secretaryship itself, is what gives the secretary voting rights.

The result has been a long-running arrangement in which one person usually wears two hats. He is the president’s appointee as head of the secretariat and, separately, the Supreme Leader’s representative as a voting member of the council.

That dual role also gives the secretary political weight that goes well beyond administration. He does not merely organize the meeting; he sits inside the decision-making body and speaks and votes as one of the Leader’s representatives.

Which appointment usually comes first?

There has never been a constitutional requirement that one appointment precede the other.

In recent decades, however, the most common pattern has been for the president to appoint a secretary and for the Supreme Leader to then appoint the same person as his representative.

That happened with Ali Shamkhani in 2013. President Hassan Rouhani chose him as secretary, and Ali Khamenei appointed him as one of his representatives shortly afterward.

The same happened with Ali-Akbar Ahmadian in 2023, when President Ebrahim Raisi appointed him secretary and Khamenei named him as his representative at around the same time.

When Ali Larijani returned to the SNSC in August 2025, Pezeshkian appointed him secretary first, and Khamenei subsequently gave him one of his two representative seats.

But this order has not been universal.

When Larijani first became SNSC secretary under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, he was already one of Khamenei’s representatives on the council before the president appointed him secretary.

The same legal separation is visible in the case of Saeed Jalili. Ahmadinejad appointed him secretary in 2007, but he was not made one of Khamenei’s representatives until months later. After leaving the secretaryship in 2013, Jalili kept his seat as the Leader’s representative, showing clearly that the two offices are independent of one another.

The broader historical pattern is therefore not that the president always chooses first and the Leader follows. It is that the two positions have usually been combined, regardless of which appointment came first.

Zolghadr was the bigger institutional exception

If Rezaei’s appointment was unusual because of the order in which the two posts were assigned, Mohammad-Baqer Zolghadr’s short tenure earlier in 2026 was unusual for a more fundamental reason.

After Ali Larijani’s death in March, Pezeshkian appointed Zolghadr as secretary of the SNSC. But Zolghadr was not publicly appointed as one of the Supreme Leader’s two representatives.

That meant the two roles were separated in a way rarely seen in the council’s history. Zolghadr ran the secretariat but, on the publicly available record, did not hold a constitutional voting seat merely by virtue of being secretary.

The distinction became especially visible during deliberations over the Iran-US agreement in June, when a public account of the vote listed the participating members but did not include Zolghadr among those casting ballots.

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Who has served as secretary?

Hassan Rouhani became the SNSC’s first secretary after the council was established in its current form in 1989. He served for about 16 years, spanning the presidencies of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, and became closely associated with Iran’s national security and early nuclear diplomacy.

Ali Larijani replaced him in 2005 under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Larijani was already one of Khamenei’s representatives on the council before becoming secretary. He served until 2007 and resigned amid disagreements with Ahmadinejad over Iran’s nuclear strategy.

Saeed Jalili succeeded him and served from 2007 to 2013. He became one of Khamenei’s representatives months after taking over as secretary and remained in that representative seat even after leaving the secretariat.

Ali Shamkhani was appointed by President Hassan Rouhani in 2013 and served for nearly a decade. Khamenei also appointed him as his representative, preserving the dual-role arrangement. Shamkhani became one of the most prominent figures in Iran’s regional diplomacy and remained secretary until 2023.

Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, a senior former IRGC commander, replaced Shamkhani under President Raisi in 2023. He too served simultaneously as secretary and as one of Khamenei’s representatives.

Ali Larijani returned for a second tenure in August 2025 after Pezeshkian appointed him secretary. Khamenei then appointed him as one of his representatives. Larijani remained in the role until his death in March 2026.

Mohammad-Baqer Zolghadr succeeded him and served for several months. Unlike his immediate predecessors, he was not publicly given one of the Leader’s two seats, leaving him without a vote in his capacity as secretary.

Mohsen Rezaei replaced Zolghadr in August 2026. This time the order was reversed: Mojtaba Khamenei first appointed Rezaei as his representative, and Pezeshkian then made him secretary.

How decisions are made

The SNSC is often described as Iran’s highest national security body, but it is better understood as a place where the Islamic Republic’s major power centers are brought together to negotiate and formalize policy.

The president chairs the meetings. The heads of parliament and the judiciary participate. Key ministers are present. The Armed Forces General Staff has a permanent seat. The Army and IRGC can join as voting members when required. The Supreme Leader has two direct representatives inside the room.

The precise voting procedures are less transparent than the membership rules. Article 176 establishes who belongs to the council but does not publicly lay out a single detailed voting formula for every type of decision.

In practice, deliberations can involve bargaining before a matter ever reaches a formal vote. Sensitive decisions may already have been discussed with the Leader’s office, the armed forces or other senior bodies before they come before the SNSC.

And even after a majority or other required threshold is reached, the process is not finished.

The Constitution says SNSC resolutions become effective only after the Supreme Leader approves them.

That gives the Leader influence at several points in the process. He sets the broad national security policies within which the council operates, appoints two voting members directly and retains the final authority to approve its decisions.

The president, meanwhile, controls another important part of the institution: he chairs the council and chooses the secretary who runs its day-to-day machinery.

Iranian forces used cultural sites, medical clinics in Alborz crackdown

Aug 13, 2026, 19:50 GMT+1
•
Farzad Fattahi
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Crowds gather in front of Fardis Cinema during protests in Alborz province on Jan uary 9, 2026. A fire burns nearby as smoke rises over the area.

Security forces used cultural venues and medical clinics as firing positions, ammunition stores and sites for holding bodies during Iran's January 2026 protest crackdown in Alborz province, according to material reviewed by Iran International.

The accounts and materials focus on January 8 and 9, when anti-government protests were taking place across Iran and large crowds took to the streets in several cities in Alborz, a province bordering the capital. Security forces responded with live fire in several areas, according to witnesses.

Verified footage, eyewitness testimony and information gathered from several cities across the province describe security operations inside medical facilities, bodies left in streets and the removal of corpses in municipal garbage trucks.

Iran International could not independently corroborate every account or casualty figure because of communications restrictions and the lack of unrestricted access. The details in this report are therefore based on testimony and information from local sources.

Cultural sites turned into firing posts

In Fardis, a city west of the capital, a public library was converted into an ammunition store and staging point, while schools and mosques were used as gathering places for armed personnel, residents said.

  • Iran tightens grip on Karaj hospitals after deadly clashes, witnesses say

    Iran tightens grip on Karaj hospitals after deadly clashes, witnesses say

Security forces were deployed at a traffic police building adjacent to the city's main cinema, using tear gas, stun grenades and live ammunition against protesters, according to testimonies.

On the evening of January 9, shooters took positions on the cinema roof and surrounding buildings and opened fire on crowds below, multiple sources said.

Forces began firing in bursts around 10 p.m. without appearing to select individual targets, one resident said, describing elderly men in the streets who had been struck by live ammunition or pellets.

Bodies were kept inside the cinema for two days before being removed, several others said. Security personnel also forced residents to delete footage they had recorded.

Gunfire from government buildings

Similar patterns emerged elsewhere in Alborz, where security forces fired from or near government and police buildings.

In Hashtgerd, a city about 70 kilometers west of the capital, forces used Kalashnikov and G3 rifles as well as DShK heavy machine guns. Some of the shooting came from an area containing the local governor's office and police headquarters, local sources said.

Twelve-year-old Sana Tosangi was killed by direct gunfire on January 9 after two bullets struck her in the back and head near government buildings, people familiar with her death said. Shooters were also positioned on the governor's office and a nearby shopping center.

In Meshkin Dasht, special police units used loudspeakers to tell residents that conditions were calm before opening fire after people emerged from their homes.

In Eshtehard, gunfire was reported near a police station and governor's office. A truck carrying bodies was later taken to a largely abandoned cemetery as the number of dead increased, local sources said.

  • Over 36,500 killed in Iran's deadliest massacre, documents reveal

    Over 36,500 killed in Iran's deadliest massacre, documents reveal

In another part of Alborz, cranes were used to destroy access points to alleys, making it harder to move between the main road, residential streets and medical facilities.

Clinics raided, bodies found bound

Medical facilities in Fardis also came under security control.

The morgue at one clinic quickly reached capacity, while security forces entered another medical facility and detained staff members and wounded protesters. Witnesses said security forces shot some wounded protesters inside the clinic.

Security personnel also took jewelry and personal belongings from wounded or dead women, several people who described events at the facilities said.

“The basement of the clinic was full of bodies,” one resident told Iran International.

Another clinic refused to admit some wounded people, information gathered by Iran International showed.

Iran International's verification team used visual and audio analysis and matched architectural features across submitted footage to identify the dental section of another clinic as the location where some of the images were recorded.

The footage shows bodies inside the medical facility, including several people whose hands and feet were bound. Three people identified by sources as members of the same family were among the dead visible in the footage.

Bodies removed in garbage trucks

Bodies were also left in streets after the shooting, according to testimony from the area.

Plainclothes personnel traveling in vehicles without license plates left bodies in pairs at alley entrances and forced passing drivers at gunpoint to transport corpses, several residents said.

One said that when people contacted the municipality about bodies in the streets, an employee responded by comparing the corpses to garbage.

The testimony and verified footage reviewed by Iran International describe the use of civilian and government infrastructure across Alborz during the January crackdown, from cultural venues and administrative buildings to medical facilities, while restrictions on independent access continue to hinder a full accounting of the deaths.

Caspian Sea hits 200-year low as Iran debates the treaty meant to divide it

Aug 13, 2026, 14:34 GMT+1
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A view from the Caspian Sea coast

The Caspian Sea is falling by as much as 20 centimeters a year and stands at its lowest level in two centuries, an Iranian environment official said, a warning that lands just as Tehran reopens the argument over how to divide a sea that is shrinking on all five of its owners.

Mohammad Reza Kan’ani, head of the Environmental Protection Department in the northern province of Mazandaran, said Thursday that the Caspian’s water level was declining by around 10 to 20 centimeters annually, attributing much of the decline to rising temperatures, climate change and increased evaporation.

The Caspian’s water temperature had risen by about 1.5 degrees over the past two decades while evaporation had increased by an estimated 10% to 15%, he added.

Kan’ani warned that continued retreat of the shoreline could have serious consequences for coastal infrastructure, local economies and ecosystems dependent on the Caspian, including wetlands.

  • Iran moves to ratify Caspian Sea pact with seabed rights still unsettled

    Iran moves to ratify Caspian Sea pact with seabed rights still unsettled

About 25% of the Caspian’s water comes from precipitation and 75% from rivers, Kanani said, with the Volga – which flows through Russia into the northern Caspian – accounting for the overwhelming majority of river inflow.

Shina Ansari, head of Iran’s Department of Environment, gave an even broader measure of the retreat this week, saying the Caspian’s level had fallen by around two to 2.5 meters over the past decade.

  • Caspian seals face extinction threat as deaths continue

    Caspian seals face extinction threat as deaths continue

She described the decline as one of the region’s most serious environmental challenges and said reduced river inflows, alongside climate change, were contributing to the crisis.

Without cooperation among the five Caspian littoral states – Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – the consequences could extend to ports, coastal communities and the wider ecosystem, Ansari warned.

  • As Caspian states pursue energy growth, Iran watches

    As Caspian states pursue energy growth, Iran watches

Falling waters meet a renewed legal dispute

The environmental warnings come as the Caspian has returned to the center of political debate in Iran over the government’s effort to ratify the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea.

Hossein-Ali Haji-Deligani, deputy chairman of parliament’s Article 90 Committee, criticized what he called the government’s rush to approve the convention, saying this week that it could effectively reduce Iran’s share from 20% to between 3.5% and 5%.

That claim requires important qualification.

  • Gorgan Gulf remains at risk as Caspian levels fall

    Gorgan Gulf remains at risk as Caspian levels fall

The 2018 convention does not assign Iran – or any of the five littoral states – a fixed percentage of the Caspian or its seabed. Instead, it establishes territorial waters and fishing zones while leaving seabed boundaries to be negotiated between neighboring states.

Iran’s southern seabed boundaries with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan therefore remain unresolved.

The frequently cited figure of 20% was a post-Soviet Iranian negotiating position based on dividing the Caspian equally among its five littoral states, rather than a previously established treaty entitlement.

Nor did the earlier Iran-Soviet treaties formally grant Iran 50% of the Caspian. Agreements concluded in 1921 and 1940 established a bilateral Iran-Soviet legal regime, including equal navigation rights and exclusive arrangements between the two countries, but did not divide the sea or its seabed into equal territorial halves.

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, four former Soviet republics emerged as independent Caspian states. Russia subsequently reached agreements with several of them to divide northern seabed resources along modified median lines, while Iran resisted that approach and pushed for an equal 20% division if the seabed was to be partitioned.

  • Iran says Caspian Sea a foreign policy priority on par with Persian Gulf

    Iran says Caspian Sea a foreign policy priority on par with Persian Gulf

Iran ultimately signed the five-state legal-status convention in 2018, but the agreement deliberately left the final division of seabed sectors unresolved. Tehran also stressed at the time that the method for drawing baselines – an important issue because Iran’s concave southern coastline can disadvantage it in maritime delimitation – remained to be negotiated.

The current ratification debate therefore does not amount to a parliamentary vote assigning Iran a specific percentage of the Caspian. The more consequential question is whether Tehran should fully commit to the five-state framework before its own seabed boundaries and the baseline methodology have been settled.

Pollution adds to pressure on a shrinking sea

The falling water level is only one of several environmental threats facing the Caspian.

Iranian environmental officials have also warned of mounting pollution, shrinking fish stocks and destruction of coastal habitats.

Touraj Sadeghi, head of marine ecosystem protection at the Gilan provincial environmental department, told ISNA that untreated municipal and industrial sewage, waste dumping, petroleum leaks, excessive agricultural fertilizers and pesticides, and illegal fishing were among the main sources of environmental degradation.

Many cities along Iran’s Caspian coast still lack adequate municipal wastewater treatment systems, he said, while rivers carry thousands of tons of domestic, industrial and oil-related pollution into the sea each year.

Such pollution reduces water quality, damages natural habitats and contributes to deaths among fish and bird populations, Sadeghi said.

The Caspian supports distinctive wildlife including sturgeon, Caspian seals and migratory birds, but Iranian officials warn that the combination of pollution, habitat degradation and a rapidly retreating shoreline is increasingly threatening the resilience of the ecosystem.

Land routes cannot replace Iran’s blocked sea trade, chamber official warns

Aug 13, 2026, 12:30 GMT+1
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Replacing a single ship carrying essential goods to Iran would require about 2,500 trucks, a Chamber of Commerce official warned, saying land routes cannot offset the US maritime blockade and negotiations are the only realistic way to restore trade.

Davoud Rangi, vice chair of the chamber’s Import Management Committee, said Iran receives around 400 to 500 ships carrying essential goods each year, making any attempt to replace maritime imports with overland transport impractical.

“Mobilizing this number of trucks is far-fetched for us, and even if they were mobilized, transportation costs would rise sharply,” Rangi told Eghtesad News on Thursday.

He said Iranian authorities should not count on land corridors as a substitute for the country’s southern ports because neighboring states could restrict border traffic at short notice and the routes lack the capacity to handle the necessary volume of goods.

Neighboring governments could close a border “with a single order,” he said, adding that the justification would not necessarily have to be political or military and could instead involve quarantine or veterinary restrictions of the kind Iran has faced before.

Rangi said land routes through countries such as Turkey or Pakistan might accommodate around one million tons of cargo annually, but could not come close to replacing Iran’s maritime trade.

“At a small scale, perhaps one million tons of cargo a year could be brought in through Turkey or Pakistan, but 23 million tons, or even half of that, is simply inconceivable,” he said.

  • Iran loses ground in oil market as neighbors rebound

    Iran loses ground in oil market as neighbors rebound

The warning comes as Iran’s southern ports remain under pressure from the war. IRGC attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz have escalated regional tensions in recent weeks, while the United States intensified economic pressure on Tehran through a maritime blockade.

The outlook for negotiations between Tehran and Washington over reopening the Strait of Hormuz remains uncertain, with concerns also growing over a possible expansion of the regional conflict.

Negotiations seen as only viable way out

Rangi said negotiations and a reduction in military tensions were the only practical route to lifting the blockade and restoring the regular flow of essential goods into Iran.

Attempting to rely instead on overland corridors would impose heavy losses on importers, he said, because of both limited capacity and sharply higher transportation costs.

The blockade is also complicating Iranian exports, particularly containerized trade.

Rangi said vessels carrying bulk commodities could more easily be allowed to pass, while container ships pose a greater problem because individual containers cannot practically be separated from the rest of a ship’s cargo.

“We are extremely vulnerable on the southern route, in Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, but along the northern and western corridors the situation is much better for exports than for imports,” he said.

Iran’s economy has already come under mounting pressure in recent months from the continuing conflict, tighter sanctions and a sharp decline in the value of the rial.

Surging inflation and falling purchasing power have further strained household finances, making essential goods increasingly difficult to afford for a large part of the population.