Iran International
Amid threats of war and mounting fears of economic collapse, Iran's government is seeking to reinforce its case for moderation in a fractured and deeply polarized political landscape.
On July 29, the administration's official daily, Iran, published four opinion pieces by representatives of four moderate and conservative parties, presenting the collection as evidence of a new political accord.
The paper argued that "the traditional pattern of political competition between Iran's two major blocs has fundamentally shifted," concluding that "what seems to have 'ended' is not reformism or principlism as political identities, but the confrontational style of rivalry that had turned these blocs into near-enemies."
The optimism sits uneasily with political reality.
Hardliners routinely accuse President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf of betraying the country because of their relatively pragmatic approach to negotiations and the confrontation with the United States, while state television, dominated by ultraconservatives, has repeatedly censored key remarks by both men.
Nor did the initiative reflect the country's current balance of political power. The contributors came from four parties that have largely been sidelined since at least 2020 and no longer reflect the real distribution of influence in presidential or parliamentary politics.
The ultraconservative Paydari Party, arguably the most influential ideological force in today's parliament, and the centrist Executives of Reconstruction Party were both absent, whether by exclusion or choice.
The paper nonetheless argued that "the pressures of war and national security crises pushed both sides toward cooperation, reducing polarization and enabling decisions that required broad consensus."
Yet it also acknowledged that Paydari—described as "a small but loud minority" enjoying disproportionate influence through state broadcasting—stood outside the initiative.
Rather than demonstrating broad political consensus, the exercise illustrated its limits. Three of the four essays were written not by party leaders but by deputies or senior members of organisations that have played only marginal roles in Iranian politics for nearly two decades.
The four contributors differed in emphasis but converged on a common message.
Mahmoud Vaezi argued that, amid hybrid warfare and economic pressure, Iran needed rationality, restraint and an end to factional competition. Alireza Khojastehpour called for what he described as "revolutionary rationality." Mohammad Sadegh Javadi-Hessar framed moderation as a religious imperative, while Mohammad Ali Amani argued that resilience depended less on military power than on social cohesion.
Collectively, the essays portrayed moderation as a strategic necessity rooted in political experience, revolutionary reasoning and religious ethics. Extremism was presented as corrosive, narrowing political choices, deepening polarization and eroding public trust.
Yet the initiative may reveal less about the emergence of a new political consensus than about the administration's effort to reinforce its case for a more moderate course.
Facing the prospect of war, worsening economic pressures and relentless attacks from powerful hardline factions, Pezeshkian appears to be seeking validation for a strategy that many of the country's most influential political actors remain unwilling to embrace.
The country's most influential ultraconservative factions, their media allies and an IRGC that increasingly acts as a political institution in its own right were absent from the discussion.
They are also the actors least likely to look to the government's flagship newspaper for lessons in moderation.
