What does Trump mean by 'finish the job' in Iran?

The Treasury Department said the measures target two Iranian firms it accused of helping the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) extort commercial vessels by requiring them to purchase maritime insurance to transit the strait, alongside eight shipping companies operating tankers that transported Iranian crude oil and petroleum products.

The sanctions also block eight vessels that Washington said carried millions of barrels of Iranian oil, mostly to China, as part of what it describes as Tehran's "shadow fleet" used to circumvent international sanctions.

"With its economy in freefall and inflation in the triple digits, the regime is desperate for cash," Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said.

"The United States will not allow Iran to hold global commerce hostage or use international shipping to finance the IRGC's terrorism, aggression, and repression."

According to the Treasury, the Persian Gulf Marine Insurance Company and HormuzSafe Marine Services Authority broker IRGC-approved insurance policies for commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, including payments in digital assets such as Bitcoin designed to evade sanctions.

The department said the scheme allows Tehran to generate revenue while tightening its control over shipping through the waterway.

On Wednesday, the IRGC Navy said it had "targeted and stopped" three oil tankers after they ignored warnings and used what it described as an unsafe route through the Strait of Hormuz.

It did not identify the vessels or disclose their ownership or destination, but warned that what it called "illegal interventions and orders" by the United States would not go unanswered.

Treasury also sanctioned eight shipping companies linked to tankers transporting Iranian crude oil and petroleum products.

It said it has now sanctioned more than 100 vessels tied to Iran's shadow fleet since the beginning of the year, describing the network as a key source of revenue for Tehran despite existing sanctions.

The Strait of Hormuz has become one of the central flashpoints in the conflict in recent weeks.

Iran has sought to tighten control over commercial shipping by introducing mandatory insurance requirements, challenging alternative transit routes and stopping vessels it says violate its navigation rules, while US-led naval forces have stepped up operations to keep the waterway open.

Roughly a fifth of global oil consumption normally passes through the strait.

The latest measures were imposed under Executive Order 13902, which targets Iran's petroleum and petrochemical sectors as part of the Trump administration's renewed "maximum pressure" campaign.

Iraq's Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces said at least 20 of its members were killed and 32 wounded in the strikes, which US Central Command said targeted sites used by groups it accused of carrying out more than 30 drone attacks on US forces and Saudi oil infrastructure over the previous 72 hours.

Iran's consulate general in Karbala denied reports that four IRGC members were killed in the strikes, saying they hit an unoccupied building and caused no casualties.

The operation also marked the first time Saudi Arabia publicly acknowledged taking part in US military action against Iran-backed groups, raising the prospect of a broader regional confrontation.

Iraq's presidency condemned the strikes on the paramilitaries as "an unacceptable attack" on the country's sovereignty, while the prime minister's office urged all sides to avoid escalation and convened an emergency security meeting.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi cancelled a planned meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman following the strikes, Reuters reported, citing three people familiar with the matter.

Trump said Washington had coordinated the operation with the Iraqi government. Baghdad did not directly address that claim but reiterated that only its own government had the authority to respond to attacks on Iraqi territory.

Iran's Foreign Ministry condemned the strikes as an attempt by the United States and Israel to widen the regional conflict. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, one of the Iran-backed groups in Iraq, warned that US and Saudi forces would pay a "heavy price."

Iran resumes military action

The IRGC said it launched ballistic missiles at a US air base and Central Command facility in Jordan on Tuesday. CENTCOM said all the missiles were intercepted, while Jordan's military said it downed five missiles launched from Iran early Wednesday.

Trump vowed a forceful response.

"We'll be hitting them hard. They're going to get a beating," he told Fox News, while adding that indirect talks with Tehran were continuing.

At the same time, the IRGC Navy said it stopped three oil tankers after they ignored warnings and used what it described as an unsafe route through the Strait of Hormuz. It did not identify the vessels or report whether anyone was injured.

Oil prices rose more than 7%, pushing Brent crude above $90 a barrel as renewed fighting deepened concerns over already restricted shipping through Hormuz and the Red Sea.

The latest exchanges underscored the increasingly regional character of the war.

Even as Washington and Tehran kept indirect diplomatic channels open, fighting spread across Jordan, Iraq and the Strait of Hormuz, raising fresh doubts about whether diplomacy can keep pace with the military escalation.

Khorasan Daily, published in Tehran and Mashhad for nearly a century, asked this week whether China's sharp cut in crude purchases "ruined Iran's Strait of Hormuz strategy" or was simply a commercial response to a war zone.

The question would be unremarkable in a Western think tank. In a paper aligned with the man running Iran's negotiations, it reads as something else: the talks camp auditing, in public, the war camp's central weapon.

The shock that never came

For decades, Iranian crisis planning has rested on one assumption: disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world's oil normally flows, and crude rockets past $200 a barrel, forcing the world to restrain Washington. During the current war, the strait has indeed been closed to Iranian exports and contested for weeks. The spike never arrived.

Khorasan's explanation is the buyer, not the seller. China purchases heavily discounted Iranian crude in calm periods, then pivots to Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) drawdowns and Russian pipeline oil the moment escalation begins, draining the drama out of the market. Western and regional reporting describes the same pattern as a deliberate "shock absorber" policy designed to neutralize Persian Gulf risk.

The paper offered two readings of Beijing's behavior. In the darker one, "real market power shifted from the producer to the largest consumer, and Iran's game was effectively neutralized by its biggest customer."

In the gentler one, China simply stepped back from a market where war-risk premiums would have bankrupted its refiners, "rather than entering intense price bidding with other global buyers."

A question from the talks camp

Where the analysis comes from matters as much as what it says. Khorasan sits in the orbit of Ghalibaf, who is not only Tehran's lead negotiator with the United States but also officially holds the China portfolio in Iran's foreign relations.

A paper in his camp questioning whether the Hormuz card still works is, in effect, an argument for his own project: if the economic weapon no longer detonates, negotiation is not weakness but arithmetic.

That may also explain the analysis's careful landing. Khorasan concluded that Beijing's buffers, reserve drawdowns and reduced refinery runs, are temporary and unsustainable without causing domestic inflation and fuel shortages.

"China did not necessarily act within a framework of ruining Iran's game," the paper wrote. Beijing's retreat "changed the traditional formula from a rapid oil shock to a gradual attrition, but it did not eliminate the core impact of the conflict on the market." The conclusion spares the partner its patron cannot afford to alienate.

Reformist and centrist outlets took the argument further. Shargh noted that while China and Russia provide diplomatic protection and veto cover at the UN Security Council, neither has any intention of entering a military or financial confrontation with Washington on Iran's behalf.

Khabar Online asked whether the two powers are helping Iran withstand Western pressure or using the confrontation as leverage in their own dealings with Washington.

Etemad and Donya-ye Eqtesad went at the doctrine itself: an energy-shock strategy assumes the customer has no alternatives, a premise they argue no longer holds.

The war camp pushes back

The other side of Iran's establishment read the same data and refused the conclusion. Tasnim, Javan and Kayhan, the outlets closest to the camp that favors fighting on, rejected the notion that Beijing "ruined Iran's strategy," reframing the story around Western supply strain and the slow grind of market friction, the "gradual attrition" that Khorasan itself conceded is still working on the world economy.

The dispute is not really about China. It is about which lever Iran has left. The war camp needs the Hormuz card to be live, because it is the argument for endurance. The talks camp needs it to be spent, because that is the argument for a deal.

What Khorasan put in print is that Iran's biggest customer may have already settled the question, and that the answer favors the men at the table.

Ukraine has struck the Caspian arms corridor before. In February, Ukrainian long-range drones hit a Russian warship and two sanctioned cargo ships, the Port Olya 2 and the Begey, both used to ferry military cargo from Iran to Russia, months after an earlier strike on the Russian port of Olya damaged a vessel carrying Iranian drone parts and ammunition.

What sets Saturday's attack apart is the flag and the casualty: Kyiv says it targeted ships moving military cargo between Iran and Russia in breach of sanctions, while Tehran says the vessel was an Iranian commercial ship, and the sailor killed aboard was the first Iranian death from Ukrainian fire.

The Kremlin called the strike an attack on Iran and accused Kyiv of trying to widen the war. Iranian officials warned it would not go unanswered.

Yet within days, both governments were publicly signaling that they wanted no further escalation.

"I stressed that our goal is to avoid unnecessary escalation," Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha wrote after speaking with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi. Ukraine's actions, he said, were "aimed solely at defending our country from Russian aggression" and "never intended to target civilian vessels or people."

Araghchi later said he had been assured the strike on the Iranian vessel was unintentional and that "Ukraine seeks no escalation."

"Iran does not seek escalation either," he wrote, while adding that "any attack on our citizens or interests is unacceptable" and that restitution should be made for the losses.

Analysts interviewed by Iran International say the exchange reinforces their assessment that the strike was less the opening of a new front between Kyiv and Tehran than a calculated signal.

Where they differ is over who was sending the message, and to whom.

A signal with different audiences

Nicole Grajewski, assistant professor at Sciences Po and author of Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine, says the operation should be understood in the context of a relationship that has existed since Iran began supplying Russia with Shahed drones in 2022.

"For the Ukrainians, this has always been linked," she told Iran International. "It's always been a war that has had a thread that goes through Iran."

She said the Caspian Sea has become one of the clearest examples of how intertwined the two conflicts already are.

"The Caspian is a very clear example of it. It's probably the most blunt example about how they're connected because that's a conduit for both what Iran receives and also what it provided to Russia."

Grajewski is not convinced the strike reflected coordination with Washington. Instead, she believes it may have involved coordination between Ukraine and Israel while advancing Kyiv's own strategic objectives.

She argues the Trump administration has reasons to avoid tying the Ukraine war and the conflict involving Iran even more closely together. For Kyiv, however, demonstrating that it can reach the Caspian and disrupt an increasingly important corridor linking Russia and Iran serves its own strategic interests.

"It's messaging," Grajewski said. "But that's also showing their capabilities or their ability to disrupt things as well."

The military relationship between Tehran and Moscow helps explain Kyiv's thinking.

Iran became an active participant in Russia's war against Ukraine in the summer of 2022 when it began supplying Shahed drones that were later used extensively against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure.

The United States has also accused Tehran of supplying Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, while Ukraine alleges Iranian trainers helped Russian forces operate drone systems.

In her new book, Grajewski writes that Russian drone operators traveled to Iran in August 2022, where they participated in an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-hosted drone competition that also served as cover for training on Iranian drones later deployed in Ukraine.

"The Ukrainians have been suffering at the hands of Iranian technology for years. Now they're giving the Iranians a taste of their own medicine," said David Patrikarakos, special correspondent for the Daily Mail, who has reported extensively from the front lines in Ukraine and has personally witnessed Shahed drone attacks.

Patrikarakos said the growing overlap reflects a broader convergence of conflicts rather than the emergence of one single war.

"I think they're still separate wars," he said. "But I'd say there's a greater overlap."

Ukraine's experience defending against Iranian-designed drones has also reshaped its own military capabilities. Kyiv developed counter-drone technologies during the war and has since exported low-cost anti-drone systems to Persian Gulf countries facing attacks from Iranian drones.

Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, agrees the strike was primarily about sending a signal but believes the intended audience may have extended beyond Tehran.

"The question isn't just what Ukraine is trying to do here. Why did the United States use Ukraine to make this point?" he said.

Vatanka, in his view, said the operation may have been intended to pressure Iran to reconsider its military cooperation with Russia while also warning Tehran that northern trade routes may be no safer than its increasingly constrained southern routes.

"The two motives there: one is for Iran to weaken its association with Russia when it comes to the Ukraine war," he said.

"The other is to raise awareness in Iran that if it's looking for alternative trade routes around the blockade, its north isn't necessarily secure either."

For months, the United States and its allies have targeted Iranian military infrastructure, ports, naval assets and logistics networks along the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz to constrain Tehran's ability to move military equipment and conduct maritime trade.

As pressure has mounted on Iran's southern access to international shipping, northern routes across the Caspian Sea have taken on greater importance, particularly the International North-South Transport Corridor linking Iran with Russia. If Vatanka's assessment is correct, the strike signaled that those routes may also be vulnerable.

Neither Grajewski nor Vatanka expects the Caspian strike to trigger a direct military confrontation between Iran and Ukraine.

"They are very careful how they horizontally escalate," Vatanka said.

Whether that message came from Kyiv alone, or with the backing of others, remains open to debate. What appears far less disputed is that neither Ukraine nor Iran has much interest in allowing that signal to become a wider war.

Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi told Iranian state television Tuesday Oman had proposed a 50-50 arrangement under which the inbound route would be on one country’s side and the outbound route on the other’s.

Tehran rejected that formula, he said, because it would not adequately address Iran’s national security concerns.

Instead, Gharibabadi said Tehran proposed placing one shipping lane entirely within Iranian territorial waters and part of the other within Iranian waters, citing national security concerns.

“Our proposal is for one route to lie entirely within the territorial waters of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with part of the other route also passing through Iranian territorial waters, so that Iran can effectively exercise oversight over both inbound and outbound traffic.”

Reuters reported Tuesday that Oman had proposed a joint regional mechanism to manage shipping through the strategic waterway and collect voluntary fees.

The proposal has regional backing and would prevent Iran from exercising sole control over the strait, the report said citing a source from a Persian Gulf country.

The future of shipping through Hormuz was also part of Iran’s wider regional discussions. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Tuesday that he had held separate phone calls with his Omani and Saudi counterparts the previous evening.

He said the conversations covered regional developments, diplomatic efforts to restore stability and insecurity in the Strait of Hormuz.

Parallel US-Iran contacts

The negotiations over Hormuz were unfolding alongside contacts between Tehran and Washington over the broader conflict.

Gharibabadi said Iran had not requested negotiations with Washington over the past 15 days, adding that it was the United States that sought talks and conveyed through Oman that it would not carry out military action against Iran.

Trump, however, said Tuesday that Washington was holding “good talks” with Iran and had a chance of reaching an agreement. He added that the United States held a “very strong position” with Tehran and that he would prefer to avoid attacks on Iranian power plants and bridges.

Trump later hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, where the two leaders agreed that Iran must not obtain a nuclear weapon, an Israeli source familiar with the talks told Iran International.

The source described the meeting as a “major moment of coordination,” saying Washington and Jerusalem agreed on their objective but could differ over how to achieve it.

The diplomatic activity unfolded as more than 20 US Navy warships operated across the Middle East in support of military missions, including enforcement of what the US military called a “steel wall blockade” against Iran.

CENTCOM said Tuesday in a post on X that, as of July 28, it had redirected 18 commercial vessels, disabled two and boarded two while enforcing the blockade.