A UK minister said new state-threat legislation could give the Home Secretary power to act against hostile state-backed threats, as lawmakers pressed the government over the IRGC, Iran-linked proxy groups and threats to UK-based journalists and Jewish communities.
Home Office minister David Hanson, said the government wanted the bill passed so the Home Secretary could make judgments on state threats and take action that, if approved by both Houses of Parliament, could lead to sentences of up to 14 years for those convicted.
“We are trying to put in place a framework for legislation where we can act on any potential state threat,” Hanson told the House of Lords.
He added: “The Government condemns antisemitism and is very much aware of the Iranian state threat.”
Lord Henry Bellingham welcomed the legislation and said “the use of these proxies, behind which obviously countries like Iran are hiding, are doing untold harm.”
He said the issue was “not just the IRGC,” pointing also to the Iran-linked Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya, which he said had claimed responsibility for recent antisemitic attacks.
Hanson said any future designation would be for the Home Secretary to assess once the bill becomes law, adding: “We take the threats from Iran extremely seriously and we will continue to monitor that.”
Lord John Cryer said the bill was welcome but overdue, citing the case involving an attack on Iran International journalist Pouria Zeraati and saying IRGC proxies and agents had targeted British Jews and Jewish institutions.
Lord Stuart Polak urged ministers to look beyond the IRGC itself and examine “what’s going on in the charity world here,” saying money was being raised in Britain, including British taxpayers’ money, “towards helping the IRGC.”
Hanson said Britain had already sanctioned more than 550 Iranian individuals and organizations, including the IRGC in its entirety, and had placed Iran under the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme.
“What this power will do will give the Secretary of State, if passed by both Houses, an additional power to take action against any state threat the Secretary of State deems to be a threat to the United Kingdom,” he said.
The Parliamentary Research Center said in a report on summer electricity supply that the gap between supply and demand at peak consumption is projected to reach 13,640 megawatts under a realistic scenario.
The scale is large even by Iran’s recent blackout standards. The report projects maximum simultaneous supply at about 68,420 megawatts, while peak network demand is expected to exceed 81,000 megawatts. That means the shortfall would amount to nearly one-fifth of available supply at the moment of greatest pressure.
Iran’s electricity consumption has grown steadily for decades, reaching about 347 terawatt-hours in 2024. Its summer peak demand reached around 80,000 megawatts that year, according to official data presented by Iran’s grid management company, showing how close this year’s projected demand is to the country’s recent record levels.
The figures also show why headline power-plant capacity can be misleading. Iranian officials have said installed generation capacity has crossed 100,000 megawatts, but the parliamentary report’s estimate of usable simultaneous supply is far lower, reflecting fuel limits, plant outages, grid constraints and war-related damage.
War damage reshapes electricity balance
The report said the recent war changed both sides of Iran’s electricity balance. Self-supplied power plants taken offline by the conflict removed 4,800 megawatts from supply and disrupted production chains at major industries. At the same time, lower activity in petrochemical and steel sectors reduced part of industrial demand.
That temporary reduction may ease pressure during parts of the summer, but it also points to a fragile balance: if industrial activity recovers, demand for both electricity and gas could rise again.
The report warned that damage to energy infrastructure had reduced gas production capacity to around 600 million cubic meters per day, raising concerns beyond the summer and into the winter, when gas shortages often force power plants, factories and households to compete for supply.
Reduced demand from the petrochemical and steel sectors is expected to keep summer gas consumption between 590 million and 600 million cubic meters a day, easing immediate pressure on power plants.
But the report cautioned that any recovery in industrial output could again strain gas supplies available for electricity generation.
The assessment also warned of a growing evening problem. Solar generation is concentrated during daylight hours, while Iran’s demand often rises again at night as households use cooling systems.
Consumption control seen as key solution
Without stronger demand management, the report said, the country could face larger nighttime shortages than in previous years.
Iran has long faced recurring power cuts, especially in summer, when air conditioning, water demand and industrial consumption push the grid toward its limits.
Sanctions, aging infrastructure, heavy subsidies, underinvestment and management failures have left the system with little margin when temperatures rise.
The report argued that demand control may be more effective than relying only on new power plants.
It estimated that around 60% of summer hours would see electricity shortfalls below 6,000 megawatts, while about 82% of shortage hours would remain below 10,000 megawatts. That means much of the deficit could be reduced through better operation of existing facilities, higher utilization rates and targeted cuts in peak demand.
The center said eliminating most of the imbalance through new generation alone would require roughly 8,000 megawatts of additional capacity.
Instead, it recommended broader demand-side measures, including efficiency improvements, demand response programs, shifting consumption patterns and load-adjustment contracts.
Citizens who sent the videos to Iran International described the locations as the mountains near Najafabad or areas around Vilashahr, Khomeini-Shahr and Homayoun-Shahr.
The Ahmad Kazemi facility is located in that same area, five kilometers west of Khomeini-Shahr, 1.5 kilometers north of Vilashahr and seven kilometers northeast of Najafabad.
Officially named after Ahmad Kazemi, a late commander of the IRGC Air Force, the roughly two-square-kilometer complex is used for the production, assembly and storage of the IRGC’s strategic missiles.
Iranian state media usually describe such sites as “missile cities.”
A cluster of 12 tunnel entrances can be seen at the complex in aerial images.
The site’s storage capacity has reportedly been estimated at up to 2,000 missiles, though that refers to its overall capacity. After two wars, it is unclear how many missiles actually remain there.
Prepared berms for deploying launchers and missile transport frames are visible across the complex.
A comparison of images from before the 12-day war in July 2024 and after it in December 2025 shows that large parts of the base were destroyed during that conflict.
(To compare the images below, move the slider from right to left or vice versa.)
During the clashes on Sunday night and Monday morning, June 8, there were reports both of missile launches from the area and of explosions at the site following Israeli attacks.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has described the complex as Iran’s largest missile assembly and production facility.
The Ahmad Kazemi complex was built in the late 1980s with assistance from North Korea and China. Solid and liquid fuels, missile components, Shahab missiles and Chinese-made Silkworm and M-class missiles are assembled and produced there.
During both the 12-day war in 2025 and the 2026 war, known as the 40-day war, powerful explosions were repeatedly reported in the area.
Aerial imagery partly revealed the extent of the damage after the 12-day war.
(To compare the images below, move the slider from right to left or vice versa.)
During the 2026 war, multiple reports were published about attacks on the base, including on March 13, 2026, and March 27, 2026.
Officials in Khuzestan province said the facility was hit during Israeli attacks, with reports indicating damage to chlorine-related units and storage facilities. Any prolonged disruption could affect both domestic supply chains and exports from one of Iran's most important petrochemical hubs.
Karoon is located in Mahshahr, home to a concentration of petrochemical facilities that form a major pillar of Iran's non-oil economy.
Links to the IRGC
Karoon is owned by Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC), Iran's largest petrochemical holding group.
The United States sanctioned PGPIC and dozens of affiliated companies in 2019, saying the group generated billions of dollars that helped finance the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its construction arm, Khatam al-Anbiya.
According to the US Treasury, PGPIC subsidiaries worked with Khatam al-Anbiya through engineering, construction and financing contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Washington said revenue from the petrochemical sector provided an important source of funding for the IRGC's military activities.
The Guards have long maintained a significant presence in Iran's energy and industrial sectors through a network of companies, contractors and affiliated organizations that oversee major infrastructure projects and benefit from export revenues.
Role in missile-related industries
Petrochemical facilities are primarily civilian enterprises, but some of their products can have military applications.
Chemical compounds produced in Mahshahr and other petrochemical centers such as Assaluyeh can be used as precursor materials in the production of propellants and other components associated with missile programs.
During previous operations targeting industrial facilities in the Mahshahr area, Israel said sites in the region were involved in producing materials used by Iran's missile program.
Israeli military officials said on Monday that one of their objectives was to destroy infrastructure used to manufacture raw materials essential for ballistic missile production.
The dual-use nature of petrochemical production means facilities can simultaneously support civilian industries while supplying materials that may have military applications.
Critical supplier for domestic industry
Despite scrutiny over military links, Karoon remains one of the most important suppliers to Iran's civilian manufacturing sector.
The company is the region's only producer of isocyanates, advanced chemical compounds used in the production of polyurethane materials.
These products serve as the foundation for a wide range of industrial and consumer goods, including insulation, adhesives, coatings, automotive components, footwear, furniture and household appliances.
Karoon receives feedstock such as benzene and toluene from neighboring petrochemical plants and combines them with chlorine, carbon monoxide and hydrogen to produce isocyanates and related products.
The facility's strategic importance increased after the implementation of the HYCO (Hydrogen and Carbon Monoxide) project, which enabled domestic production of carbon monoxide and hydrogen and reduced dependence on imported supplies.
Impact on supply chains and exports
Industry experts say damage to chlorine production units could have consequences beyond the immediate facility.
Chlorine is essential for the production of phosgene, a key intermediate chemical used in manufacturing isocyanates. Any interruption to chlorine supplies can halt downstream production, affecting multiple industries dependent on polyurethane products.
The effects could extend throughout the Mahshahr industrial zone, disrupting manufacturers that rely on Karoon's output.
Karoon also serves export markets. The company ships products including aniline to India and sells other chemical products to customers in Turkey, Russia and neighboring countries.
Those exports have helped Iran maintain a regional presence in specialty chemical markets while generating valuable foreign currency earnings.
A strategic target
The strike illustrates how Iran's petrochemical sector occupies a position at the intersection of economic and security concerns.
For Tehran, facilities such as Karoon support industrial self-sufficiency, exports and employment. For Israel and Western governments, parts of the sector are viewed as supporting broader military and missile-related capabilities through financial links to the IRGC and the production of dual-use materials.
As a result, major petrochemical complexes have become increasingly significant targets in a confrontation that extends well beyond the battlefield and into the infrastructure underpinning Iran's economy and defense industries.
