US talks trigger unprecedented rift in Iran’s hardline camp

The divide became unusually public this week as several ultraconservative MPs refused to sign a letter backing Iran’s negotiating team. The dispute then spilled into hardline media, triggering an unprecedented public clash between Raja News and the Revolutionary Guards-linked Tasnim News Agency.

The confrontation largely pits supporters of former nuclear negotiator and National Security Council member Saeed Jalili against allies of his longtime rival, parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who recently led Iran’s delegation in talks in Islamabad.

On Monday, Iranian media reported that 27 members of parliament—including seven affiliated with Jalili’s ultraconservative camp—refused to sign a letter backing the negotiating team and Ghalibaf’s leadership in the Islamabad talks.

One of them, Mahmoud Nabavian, who had traveled to Islamabad with the delegation, later claimed that Mojtaba Khamenei’s “red lines” had been violated. He alleged that negotiators had engaged with the United States on nuclear issues against those guidelines.

In recent days, hardline lawmakers and commentators have increasingly criticized the negotiating team.

Jalili himself appeared to escalate tensions when he called on Mojtaba Khamenei to clarify publicly whether ongoing actions reflected his directives. In a now-deleted post, he wrote that if no such message was issued, “there is one hundred percent a ‘sedition of officials,’ and all these statements are written by the coup plotter himself.”

The remark was widely seen as aimed at Ghalibaf.

The feud escalated further after a Tasnim editorial said demanding the United States lift all sanctions or agree to a comprehensive ceasefire with Iran’s armed allies in the region amounted to unrealistic expectations like a “magic beanstalk.”

The article also argued that negotiations with the United States should not be seen as a final solution and that “the power of the people in the streets” could serve as Iran’s main leverage.

Raja News published a harsh response.

Tasnim later removed the article, saying it had republished it from another outlet, but responded in an unusually sharp tone, accusing Raja of inciting division and acting against national security.

It said the outlet was “seeking to complete Trump’s project in Iran” and noted that some individuals had recently been arrested over “suspicious movements to undermine sacred unity.”

A Telegram post by Saberin News, a channel linked to security institutions, went further, labeling the Paydari Party as the Kharijites—a historical term for extremist dissenters who opposed and ultimately assassinated Imam Ali, the first Shia imam.

The post accused them of “sowing division on the battlefield” and “playing in favor of Israel and the United States.”

Iran’s state broadcaster (IRIB) has also come under scrutiny for alleged bias. Its deputy for cultural affairs, Vahid Jalili, is Saeed Jalili’s brother.

Moderate outlet Khabar Online reported that by its count, 8 out of 10 of pundits appearing on IRIB during the recent conflict have been conservatives, with 15 percent linked to the ultraconservative Paydari Front.

“The problem is not just the elimination of reformists; the data shows that even moderate conservatives or critical insiders have almost no presence in these programs,” the outlet wrote.

Raja News later said it would avoid prolonging the dispute in public and would instead pursue legal action. But as the stakes rise—whether through renewed talks with Washington or a return to war—it may prove difficult to put the genie back in the bottle.

As efforts continue to revive talks with the United States, Iranian lawmakers and state-linked outlets are increasingly calling for secrecy around negotiations.

The growing calls for secrecy may reflect an effort to control the narrative as divisions emerge at home over how far Iran should go in any negotiations.

Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, told reporters on Monday that “not everything about the negotiations needs to be stated openly.”

He compared diplomacy to marriage negotiations, where each side conceals parts of its background until after an agreement is reached, insisting that secrecy does not contradict transparency with the public.

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The growing calls for secrecy may reflect an effort to control the narrative as divisions emerge at home over how far Iran should go in any negotiations.

Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, told reporters on Monday that “not everything about the negotiations needs to be stated openly.”

He compared diplomacy to marriage negotiations, where each side conceals parts of its background until after an agreement is reached, insisting that secrecy does not contradict transparency with the public.

Iran used similar tactics at least twice in recent history: during the release of American hostages in January 1981 after 444 days in captivity, and in August 1988 when it accepted the ceasefire that ended the eight-year war with Iraq.

On Tuesday, ultraconservative lawmaker Amir Hossein Sabeti, a prominent anti-US figure, called for “nuclear ambiguity,” arguing that the United States and Israel would have used nuclear weapons against Iran had they known the exact location of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles.

His remarks coincided with similar statements from other lawmakers urging officials not to speak publicly about Iran’s positions on the nuclear issue or the Strait of Hormuz—two of the central obstacles in diplomatic efforts to break the deadlock in Iran-US relations.

US President Donald Trump said on Tuesday that Tehran had told Washington it wanted the Strait of Hormuz reopened “as soon as possible,” suggesting efforts to revive talks may include discussions over shipping through the strategic waterway.

In a Truth Social post, Trump said Iran was in a “state of collapse” and was trying to resolve “their leadership situation,” though Tehran has not publicly commented on the claim.

In Tehran, conflicting public statements have underscored divisions within the political establishment over the talks.

Ultraconservative MP Ali Khezrian told state broadcaster that all doors of negotiation with the United States were shut down” adding that no messages were being exchanged through intermediaries.

Yet other lawmakers have acknowledged that talks are continuing, including Ardestani, who said, “we cannot stop negotiating … we have won the war, and we need to establish our victory in negotiations.”

Khezrian and Ardestani both said hardline cleric and lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian—who accompanied the Iranian delegation to Islamabad during the first round of talks—was there only to brief parliament afterward.

Nabavian later said it had been “a mistake” to include the nuclear issue in the discussions.

In a report published on April 27, Khabar Online cited conservative commentator Mohammad Mohajeri criticizing lawmakers and some officials for making “uncalculated” statements on foreign-policy matters, including Iran’s position on the Strait of Hormuz.

According to the report, remarks about imposing taxes on shipping, proposing a “new legal regime” for the waterway, or using the term “closure of the strait” instead of “control” have raised concerns they could harm Iran’s national interests and create legal complications.

Khabar Online also warned lawmakers not to undermine the authority of the Supreme National Security Council, which coordinates national-security and foreign-policy positions.

In Tehran, Abbas Araghchi’s whirlwind regional tour is being presented as evidence that Iran still has diplomatic options and regional leverage.

But behind the official narrative, even Iranian media and senior officials are beginning to acknowledge a harsher reality: talks with Washington are stalled, allies are limited and the country’s room to maneuver is narrowing.

The reformist daily Shargh wrote on Monday that the visits revealed “clear signs of a deadlock in negotiations with Washington.”

In an interview with ISNA, Araghchi himself acknowledged that “the first round of talks in Islamabad failed to reach its objectives,” blaming what he described as “the United States’ excessive demands.”

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But behind the official narrative, even Iranian media and senior officials are beginning to acknowledge a harsher reality: talks with Washington are stalled, allies are limited and the country’s room to maneuver is narrowing.

The reformist daily Shargh wrote on Monday that the visits revealed “clear signs of a deadlock in negotiations with Washington.”

In an interview with ISNA, Araghchi himself acknowledged that “the first round of talks in Islamabad failed to reach its objectives,” blaming what he described as “the United States’ excessive demands.”

Media in Tehran have portrayed Araghchi’s visits to Pakistan, Oman and Russia as part of an effort to break the impasse with Washington through regional diplomacy.

But leaks in US media suggest Tehran’s message remains uncompromising: end the US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz as a precondition for immediate talks on Iran’s nuclear program.

That demand underscores the gap between Tehran’s public message of diplomacy and the harder line it may still be taking behind closed doors.

The idea that Tehran can quickly repair relations with neighboring states also appears optimistic. Regional capitals still vividly remember Iran’s recent strikes on the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

While Tehran insists diplomatic channels remain open, only a handful of neighbors appear willing—or able—to engage.

Oman, traditionally a trusted mediator, may have less incentive to play that role after Tehran’s recent actions and amid Washington’s hesitation. Russia, meanwhile, is increasingly viewed with suspicion inside Iran, where critics accuse Moscow of exploiting Tehran’s isolation without offering meaningful support.

Yet despite the impasse, signs of a possible diplomatic opening remain.

Pakistan’s active mediation has positioned Islamabad as an important hub for indirect US-Iran communication, suggesting both sides still see value in keeping channels open.

In Washington, President Donald Trump’s recent references to an “agreement in principle,” including possible limits on uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief, suggest discussions may have moved from whether to talk toward what terms might be acceptable.

Economic pressure is also pushing both sides toward pragmatism.

In Iran, the economy is buckling under war, inflation and disruption to oil exports. In the United States, rising gasoline prices are creating domestic political pressure.

The so-called pragmatists in Tehran appear increasingly willing to pursue compromise to preserve stability. Hardliners, especially among a younger generation of officials, increasingly frame the conflict as existential and may see concessions as surrender.

If they conclude Washington’s ultimate goal is regime change rather than policy change, pressure could grow for nuclear escalation rather than restraint.

Washington’s insistence that Iran halt all uranium enrichment and remove previously enriched material remains a central sticking point. The Strait of Hormuz is another.

The United States has reportedly conditioned any pause in military action on the complete and safe reopening of the waterway. Any renewed Iranian interference with shipping could trigger immediate retaliation and collapse diplomacy.

Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear or leadership targets—or retaliatory actions by Hezbollah or the Houthis—could drag both Tehran and Washington into a cycle neither fully controls.

For now, the immediate question is no longer whether Washington and Tehran are talking. It is whether either side is prepared to soften their demands before events overtake diplomacy.

And in Tehran, where the costs of war are rising by the day, that question is becoming harder to ignore.