Why Iran's Kharg Island is central to Strait of Hormuz security

Despite being only about five miles long, the island serves as the main hub for Iran’s crude oil exports and hosts military assets around the Strait of Hormuz.

Recent US strikes targeting military infrastructure on the island – while deliberately sparing its oil facilities – have underscored Kharg’s importance at the intersection of energy markets, maritime security and regional military strategy.

Iran’s oil lifeline

Kharg Island is the backbone of Iran’s crude oil export system. Energy analysts estimate that roughly 90% of the country’s crude exports pass through terminals on the island, making it one of the most critical pieces of economic infrastructure for the Islamic Republic.

Tanker tracking data shows that in 2025 the island handled about 96% of Iran’s crude exports, equivalent to roughly 1.54 million barrels per day out of a national total of about 1.6 million barrels per day.

The scale of Kharg’s infrastructure dwarfs other Iranian export facilities. The island’s loading terminals were originally designed to handle up to seven million barrels per day and can service eight or nine supertankers at once. More than 50 crude storage tanks on the island can hold over 34 million barrels.

Most of the crude shipped from Kharg arrives via pipelines from mainland oil fields in southern Iran rather than being produced on the island itself.

Other export facilities operate on a far smaller scale. Lavan Island can process roughly 200,000 barrels per day, with storage capacity of about 5.5 million barrels. Sirri Island provides around 4.5 million barrels of storage. The energy hub at Assaluyeh handles gas condensate rather than crude oil, meaning it does not function as a major oil export terminal.

Iran has also attempted to create alternative export routes outside the Persian Gulf. A terminal under development at Jask, on the Gulf of Oman, has a projected capacity of about one million barrels per day, but storage capacity there is only about two million barrels, far below the scale of Kharg.

For this reason, Kharg is widely considered to be the centerpiece of Iran’s crude export system. Much of the infrastructure and export data referenced here has also been highlighted in recent analysis by sanctions and financial analyst Miad Maleki on X.

A military hub in the Persian Gulf

Kharg Island is not only an economic asset but also an important military location.

Access to the island is tightly restricted and guarded by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The IRGC Navy maintains a presence there, including the 112th Zolfaghar Surface Combat Brigade, a unit operating fast-attack boats designed for asymmetric naval warfare in the Persian Gulf.

These vessels are typically equipped with anti-ship missiles, rockets and naval mines, allowing them to threaten commercial shipping or larger naval vessels operating nearby.

Military infrastructure around the island includes coastal missile launchers, radar systems, surveillance networks and drone facilities used to monitor activity across the northern Persian Gulf.

Iran’s regular navy, known as the Army Navy, also operates in the broader Bushehr–Kharg region, using helicopters and boats for maritime patrols and potential mine-laying operations.

Together, the IRGC Navy and the conventional navy maintain a presence that could pose risks to shipping lanes during periods of conflict.

The Strait of Hormuz factor

Kharg’s strategic importance is closely tied to the Strait of Hormuz, located southeast of the island.

The narrow maritime passage connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the wider Indian Ocean. About 20% of the world’s oil supply passes through this chokepoint every day.

Tankers carrying crude from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates all transit the strait before reaching global markets.

Although Iran itself contributes only 3–4% of global oil supply, its geographic position along the Strait of Hormuz gives it the ability to threaten a far larger portion of global energy flows.

Iran’s naval doctrine emphasizes the use of asymmetric tactics, including naval mines, fast-attack boats and anti-ship missiles.

Iran is believed to possess between 2,000 and 6,000 naval mines. Even a limited number could disrupt maritime traffic in the narrow waterway. Military analysts note that clearing mines is a slow and complex process requiring specialized ships, drones and helicopters.

Why the US struck Kharg

The United States early Saturday targeted military assets on Kharg Island as part of a broader campaign aimed at protecting maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz.

US President Donald Trump said American forces struck military targets on the island while deliberately avoiding its oil infrastructure.

“Moments ago, at my direction, the United States Central Command executed one of the most powerful bombing raids in the history of the Middle East and totally obliterated every military target in Iran’s crown jewel, Kharg Island,” Trump wrote in a post on Truth Social.

Trump said the operation specifically avoided damaging oil facilities.

“Our weapons are the most powerful and sophisticated that the world has ever known but, for reasons of decency, I have chosen not to wipe out the oil infrastructure on the island,” he wrote.

The strikes targeted military equipment including missile boats, speedboats, launchers, drones and coastal batteries associated with Iranian forces stationed there.

The strategy appears aimed at removing threats to minesweeping operations rather than disrupting global oil supply.

Commercial tankers cannot be safely escorted through the Strait of Hormuz while facing missile, drone and mine threats from nearby Iranian bases. Neutralizing these capabilities allows specialized naval vessels and drones to begin clearing mines from shipping lanes.

Trump warned that the decision to spare Kharg’s oil facilities could change if Iran interferes with maritime traffic.

“Should Iran, or anyone else, do anything to interfere with the free and safe passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz, I will immediately reconsider this decision,” he wrote.

Oil exports continue despite strikes

Despite the military strikes, oil operations on Kharg appear to have continued.

Shipping data indicates that tankers have continued loading crude from the island’s terminals. One very large crude carrier (VLCC) was reported to have completed a two-million-barrel loading shortly after the strikes.

Satellite imagery showing flames on the island does not necessarily indicate damage to oil facilities. Gas flaring, a routine process used in oil operations, occurs regularly on Kharg and can appear as fires in satellite images.

Kharg has also demonstrated resilience in past conflicts. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iraqi forces repeatedly bombed the island and destroyed several storage tanks. Despite the damage, Iran continued exporting more than 1.5 million barrels of oil per day.

More than six decades after exports began there in 1960, Kharg Island remains both Iran’s primary energy gateway and a key strategic point in the security architecture of the Persian Gulf.

As long as a large share of the world’s oil continues to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, the small island will remain one of the most consequential pieces of infrastructure in the region.

The statement, read aloud by a state television anchor over a still photograph of the new leader, called for continued military resistance and said the Strait of Hormuz should remain a tool of pressure.

“The demand of the masses of the people is the continuation of effective and regret-inducing defense,” the message said. Khamenei has remained largely absent from public view amid persistent questions about his health and whereabouts and unconfirmed reports he was hospitalized with injuries.

In their Wednesday, March 11 editions, newspapers and websites had already begun shifting their focus from the mechanics of succession to projecting authority during an active conflict. The pivot came despite the information blackout inside Iran and Mojtaba’s continued silence at the time.

In the first two days after Ali Khamenei’s death on February 28, coverage largely emphasized Mojtaba’s religious credentials and lineage. By midweek, however, newspapers and websites had turned toward portraying him primarily as a wartime commander.

Continuity and defiance

Kayhan, closely linked to the former leader’s office, referred to him as “the general of the revolution,” highlighting his long-standing but largely hidden ties to the IRGC.

Conservative outlets and several mainstream websites dropped the respectful title ‘Agha’ (sir/master) traditionally used for the son of an ayatollah. Some instead adopted ‘Imam’ or ‘Ayatollah’, reflecting his rapid elevation to the highest clerical and political rank.

Front pages were dominated by pledges of allegiance from military commanders, clerics, bureaucrats and cultural figures.

The Tehran Times reinforced the continuity narrative with its headline, “Trump is gone, Khamenei remains,” responding to Donald Trump’s earlier remark that the new leader “would not last long.”

Moderate and reformist outlets such as Etemad offered cautious backing, framing the hereditary succession as a stabilizing step that prevented a dangerous power vacuum during wartime.

Mentions of dissent or possible unrest were absent, with coverage unfolding inside a tightly controlled information environment.

Manufactured unity

Hardline outlets such as Kayhan and Tasnim framed the succession as a strategic defeat for the United States and Israel, arguing that Ali Khamenei’s killing was meant to trigger systemic collapse and that Mojtaba’s swift appointment demonstrated the system’s resilience.

Some columnists also sought to recast Mojtaba as a capable executive, describing him as a “silent reformer” suited to confront corruption inside the state.

Official websites and IRGC-affiliated Telegram channels amplified the message with pledges of loyalty from generals, clerics and even former political rivals such as Ali Larijani.

Wartime iconography—including posters merging the faces of Khomeini, Ali Khamenei and Mojtaba—reinforced a narrative of continuity and unity.

State media repeatedly warned that public skepticism at this stage could amount to collaboration with the “Zionist enemy,” underscoring the narrow space for dissent as the new leadership consolidates power.

UNESCO’s World Heritage Centre has confirmed damage to several sites on its global heritage list, though the full extent remains unclear, its director Lazare Eloundou Assomo said.

Several of the affected buildings carried the Blue Shield emblem, an international symbol used to identify protected cultural heritage sites under international law and often described as the “Red Cross for cultural heritage.”

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi later criticized UNESCO’s response. “It's natural that a regime that won't last a century hates nations with ancient pasts. But where's UNESCO? Its silence is unacceptable,” he wrote on X.

Among the sites affected is the historic Golestan Palace, a Qajar-era complex in central Tehran added to the UNESCO list in 2013.

According to Afarin Emami, director of the Golestan Palace World Heritage complex, blast waves from airstrikes on March 1 shattered windows and damaged delicate mirrorwork in several halls.

Images published by Iranian media show damaged crystal chandeliers and wooden doors and windows torn from their frames.

Emami said museum objects inside the palace were not harmed because they had been moved to secure storage after earlier tensions raised concerns about possible escalation.

The nearby Grand Bazaar of Tehran, a vast network of corridors forming a key part of the capital’s historic fabric, also sustained damage. Other buildings affected in Tehran include the former Senate Palace and the historic former Police Headquarters.

Several days later, further blast waves reportedly caused damage in Isfahan, one of Iran’s most important historic cities.

Images circulating online show shattered windows, cracked walls and fallen mirrorwork at multiple sites, including the Safavid-era Chehel Sotoun Palace and the Ali Qapu Palace in the Naqsh-e Jahan area.

The primary target appeared to be the provincial governor’s office building in the nearby Rashk-e Jahan complex, which was reportedly directly bombed. Ashraf Hall, a Safavid structure known for its gold-decorated ceilings, sustained significant damage, with photographs showing fallen tiles scattered among office furniture.

Elsewhere, Iranian media reported damage in Sanandaj, where several historic mansions lost sections of plaster decoration, mirrorwork and wooden doors. In northern Iran, reports suggest the Safavid-era Safi Abad Palace in Behshahr may have been affected by nearby strikes targeting a military radar facility, though no confirmed photographs have been released.

Near the historic Falak-ol-Aflak Castle in western Iran, the provincial cultural heritage office located within the castle’s protected zone was destroyed and five staff members and heritage protection personnel were reportedly injured. The fortress itself was not damaged.

The incidents have triggered heated debate among Iranian social media users, with some criticizing the government’s own handling of cultural heritage protection.

One user wrote on X: “At least write that the Islamic Republic should not build military bases next to heritage sites when you write that a historic monument was damaged by Israeli or US attacks.”

Others argued the destruction must be viewed in the broader context of the conflict. “We can rebuild buildings,” one commenter wrote. “Save your tears for the 40,000 people who were killed.”

Some groups, including the Jurists’ Council for a Democratic Iran, have called on all sides to respect international conventions protecting cultural heritage during armed conflict.

Khamenei Jr’s continued absence from public view has fueled speculation among analysts and diplomats about how power is being exercised during the transition.

The message read on his behalf on state television on Thursday was viewed by some observers as closely aligned with the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) messaging, prompting questions about the balance between formal leadership and the IRGC.

As expected, Tehran’s regional non-state allies in Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon have rallied around the new leader, calling him the “Leader of the blessed Islamic Revolution.” His ascendence to power is perceived by these armed groups as continuity in funding and weapons transfers.

Not many share this view in the region and beyond.

Arab neighbors

Across the Persian Gulf, Mojtaba’s appointment has been met with a mix of defensive military posturing, criticism, and calls for closer security coordination.

Tensions with Saudi Arabia rose sharply after his appointment when an Iranian strike hit a Saudi residential area. Prior reporting in US media, including The Washington Post, indicated Riyadh had privately urged Washington to use significant military force to prevent Iran from emerging stronger after the transition.

Elsewhere in the region, Tehran and its proxies have been blamed for strikes on civilian infrastructure—including a desalination plant in Bahrain.

Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit denounced Iran’s “reckless policy,” reflecting broader anxieties among smaller Gulf states.

Reactions from Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have reflected concern about escalation, as the leadership transition coincided with direct attacks on regional infrastructure.

Turkey

In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan struck a supportive tone, calling Iranian officials “brothers” and expressing hope they would “get through this trap-filled period.”

Ankara has also criticized US strikes and appears likely to maintain pragmatic engagement with Iran’s leadership to avoid instability along its borders.

Russia, China and the EU

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was among the first to respond, calling Ali Khamenei’s death a “cynical murder” and describing him as an “outstanding statesman.” His message to President Massoud Pezeshkian emphasized solidarity with Iran during the transition.

China adopted a more cautious tone, stressing respect for Iran’s sovereignty and opposing regime change. Chinese officials framed the succession as a constitutional matter and an internal Iranian process.

The European Union’s reaction has been more fragmented. Diplomats say some member states quietly hope the transition could open space for political change, while others fear instability could widen the conflict. Publicly, EU officials have emphasized de-escalation regardless of who leads Iran.

None of the three powers aligned with Tehran as the United Nations condemned IRGC-linked attacks on regional targets this week.

Israel

Israel was the only country in the region to explicitly question the legitimacy of Mojtaba’s appointment, describing it as a continuation of what it called the IRGC’s “terror regime.”

Even before the appointment, Defense Minister Israel Katz wrote on X that “any leader appointed to continue the plan to destroy Israel will be an unequivocal target for elimination.”

Public reactions across Iran and parts of the Arab world have been mixed. Some early expressions of relief at Ali Khamenei’s death gave way to concern about escalation as Mojtaba’s ties to the IRGC came into focus.

Across the region, officials and analysts say the leadership transition has reinforced fears that an already volatile conflict could widen further in the weeks ahead.

For days the conflict had focused largely on military bases, missile sites and command facilities, particularly in southern Iran, as part of the wider US-Israeli campaign that has struck thousands of targets across the country since the war began on February 28.

But since Wednesday evening, reported drone strikes on checkpoints in Tehran have pointed to a parallel line of pressure: the local security posts, patrol units and temporary deployments used to enforce control on the streets.

Iranian state-linked media said several checkpoints in Tehran were hit, killing members of the security forces and Basij militia. The reported locations included positions in multiple districts across the capital.

The development suggests the conflict is increasingly intersecting with the structures the state relies on to control neighborhoods rather than only its larger military infrastructure.

• 

  Tehran checkpoints hit in reported drone attacks

• 

  Desertions, shortages and army-IRGC rift strain Iran’s military

From fixed bases to moving checkpoints

Since the start of the war, residents across Iran say checkpoints and patrols have multiplied in major cities as authorities attempt to prevent unrest and maintain control.

At the same time, Iran International has received a steady stream of messages from viewers describing the locations of checkpoints, security deployments and temporary bases.

Some reports describe armed units inspecting vehicles at major highway entrances or intersections. Others mention security forces using schools, sports halls and religious institutions as temporary accommodation or staging points.

Messages received in recent days pointed to deployments in locations ranging from major Tehran highways to entrances to cities such as Karaj, Shiraz, Mashhad and Qazvin. Residents also described units stationed beneath highway bridges, near parks or inside parking areas where buses and motorcycles were parked overnight.

In several cases, viewers reported that checkpoints they had previously seen disappeared within hours or days, while others appeared to move to nearby streets or disperse into smaller patrol groups.

Some messages described security forces sleeping inside buses or personal vehicles and conducting mobile patrols rather than remaining in fixed positions.

Others said checkpoints that had been inspecting vehicles were suddenly dismantled, leaving only a few officers nearby.

Such reports cannot be independently verified in each case. But taken together they suggest that many deployments are becoming more fluid, with positions shifting frequently rather than remaining in one place.

A war over control of the neighborhood

The shift reflects a deeper pressure on the state’s local enforcement network.

For years the Islamic Republic has relied on a dense web of Basij, police and Revolutionary Guards positions to control neighborhoods and quickly suppress unrest.

During the recent nationwide protests earlier this year, these same networks formed the backbone of the crackdown that sealed off districts and quashed the demonstrations.

In wartime, those local security units appear to be playing an even more central role.

As larger bases and installations come under pressure from airstrikes, authorities appear to be relying more heavily on mobile checkpoints and temporary deployments to maintain control on the ground.

Now those fallback positions are also being drawn into the conflict.

The result is a battlefield that increasingly overlaps with everyday urban space. Instead of remaining confined to distant military facilities, the war is beginning to touch the street corners, highway entrances and neighborhood patrol routes where the state exerts day-to-day authority.